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Summary 
Groups of companies are part of the realities of the modern economic system.  Despite the fact 
that such groups often function as a single economic entity, the legal point of departure remains 
that each company within the group of companies is a separate juristic person. The result of this 
is that a creditor of a company within the group can, in principle, only enforce his claim against 
the company which he contracted with or which caused him harm. Should he wish to claim from 
the holding company or other solvent companies within the group, he would have to rely on an 
exception to the doctrine of separate juristic personality, viz the possibility of piercing the so-
called corporate veil.  This dissertation is a comparative study of the extent to which the law 
protects a creditor of an insolvent company within a group. The applicable laws of Australia, 
Germany, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, were 
investigated and compared to the South African position. The dissertation concludes that the 
South African legal treatment of the problem is unsatisfactory and that the law should be 
amended through appropriate legislation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
Opsomming 
Maatskappygroepe is realiteite in die moderne ekonomiese wêreld. Ten spyte van die feit dat 
maatskappygroepe dikwels een ekonomiese entiteit vorm, huldig die reg die standpunt dat elke 
maatskappy binne ‘n groep maatskappye ‘n aparte regspersoon is. Die gevolg van hierdie 
standpunt is dat ‘n skuldeiser van ‘n maatskappy binne ‘n groep in beginsel slegs ‘n eis het teen 
die maatskappy met wie hy gekontrakteer het of wat hom skade berokken het. Indien hy ‘n eis 
teen die houermaatskappy of ander solvente maatskappye binne die groep wil instel, moet hy 
steun op ‘n uitsondering op die leerstuk van aparte regspersoonlikheid, te wete die moontlikheid 
om die sogenaamde korporatiewe sluier te deurdring. Hierdie proefskrif is ‘n regsvergelykende 
ondersoek van die beskerming van ‘n skuldeiser van ‘n insolvente maatskappy binne ‘n groep. 
Die toepaslike reg van Australië, Duitsland, Nieu-Seeland, die Verenigde Koninkryk en die 
Verenigde State van Amerika word ondersoek en vergelyk met die Suid-Afrikaanse regsposisie. 
Die proefskrif kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat die Suid-Afrikaanse regsreëling onbevredigend is 
en deur geskikte wetgewing gewysig moet word. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Bonbright and Means already in 1932 recognised the special status of the holding 
company and its ability to avoid certain regulatory practices. The authors state that: 
“[T]he holding company has become the greatest of the modern devices by which business 
enterprises may escape the various forms of social control that have been developed, wisely or 
unwisely, as a means of limiting the vast power of the great captains of industry.”1 
 
The fact that multinational enterprises control the world economy to a large extent today 
serves as testimony for the prophetic words of Bonbright and Means and those words are 
equally valid for today’s globalised economy. 
 
Company groups are commercial realities in the modern globalised world. Not only do 
they play an important role on the economic stage worldwide, but they also play an 
important, if not crucial, role on the domestic stage within the borders of countries which 
embrace a capitalist economic and business system. Even at the level of small business 
enterprises, including agriculture, entrepreneurs and sophisticated farmers organise their 
businesses in the form of groups by separating the operating entities from the controlling 
entities. This is done to reduce the risk to which the entrepreneurs may be exposed should 
a business venture fail. The operating entity would lease the land, equipment or assets 
from the controlling entity. Should the business venture fail, the operating entity would 
be the entity exposed to the risk of failure. Creditors would, however, find that the 
operating entity is nothing but an empty shell with the assets belonging to the controlling 
entity. 
 
At the global level company groups are more commonly known as multinational 
enterprises. This usually means a company which has subsidiary companies all across the 
globe. There are over 60 000 multinational enterprises in the world according to the most 
recent statistical data available on the subject in respect of company groups or 
                                                           
1
 Bonbright & Means  The Holding Company, its Public Significance and its Regulation (1932) 7. 
2 
 
multinational enterprises which could be found.2 This data also shows that foreign 
multinational companies, meaning companies whose holding companies are not 
incorporated in the United States of America, employed approximately 5.2 million 
United States citizens in 2003. At the same time American multinational enterprises 
employed about 8.4 million people worldwide. The quoted Progressive Policy Institute 
(PPI) article further refers to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
which published data in 2002 indicating that 29 of the top 100 best performing economies 
at that stage were multinational enterprises and not countries. The PPI article continues 
by referring to the proliferation of the number of multinational enterprises from about 
7 300 in 1969 to the estimated 63 000 in 2000.  
 
As a further example a study in respect of company groups was conducted in Australia in 
1997.3 The study showed that 89% of the listed companies directly or indirectly 
controlled other companies. In other words they were not necessarily the holding 
companies of other companies but had the power to control the decision-making in other 
companies. Similar research could not be found for South Africa. A brief perusal of the 
top 40 listed companies on the JSE,4 however, shows that five of the top twenty listed 
companies on the basis of market capitalisation have the word “group” in their names.5 It 
is conceivable that the majority, if not all, of the top twenty companies are part of groups 
of companies. 
                                                           
2PPI online trade fact of the week 27 April 2005.  
http://www.ppionline.org/ppi_ci.cfm?knlgAreaID=108&subsecID=900003&contentID=253303 (accessed 22 
November 2009).  
3
 The Companies & Securities Advisory Committee Report on Corporate Groups (2000) 1 with reference to a study 
by Ramsay & Stapledon Corporate Groups in Australia (Research Report, Centre for Corporate Law and Securities 
Regulation University of Melbourne 1998). 
4
 Formerly known as the Johannesburg Securities Exchange. 
5
 Data as at 20 November 2009 obtained from the JSE. These companies are MTN Group Ltd, Standard Bank Group 
Ltd, ABSA Group Ltd, Vodacom Group Ltd and Nedbank Group Ltd. 
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Figure 1: MTN Group Ltd Integrated Business Report for the year ending 31 December 2008.6  
 
Company groups can be organised in various forms. A group can be organised in a 
vertical fashion as illustrated by the MTN Group Ltd example7 or in a horizontal manner. 
Within the vertical group structure there is a holding company with a number of 
subsidiary companies which in turn could have further subsidiary companies as 
illustrated by the MTN group structure.8 Within the horizontal group structure there are 
no holding and subsidiary companies. Instead companies hold shares across a horizontal 
line in other companies which in turn also hold shares in the first-mentioned companies.9 
The Japanese keiretsu is an example of a horizontal group where a complex web of 
interlocking shareholdings exists amongst numerous companies.10 
 
                                                           
6
 MTN Group Ltd Integrated Business Report 2008, for example, which is sixth on the top fourty listed companies 
list. http://www.mtn-investor.com/mtn_ar08/ (accessed 24 November 2009).  
7
 MTN Business Report 3. 
8
 MTN Business Report 3. 
9
 Eisenberg “Corporate Groups” in Gillooly (ed) The Law relating to Corporate Groups (1993) 1 13. 
10
 Dine The Governance of Corporate Groups (2000) 39. 
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Within the vertical company group the ultimate holding company is the directing force or 
the ultimate decision-maker in respect of the policies of the subsidiaries since it would 
inevitably have the power to appoint and dismiss the majority of the directors on the 
boards of the various subsidiary companies. The Companies and Securities Advisory 
Committee on Corporate Groups in Australia puts certain criteria forward in its synopsis 
of the integration of groups of companies in order to compare different company groups. 
It refers to criteria such as economic organisation, market reasons and the public image of 
the group of companies which distinguish it from other groups of companies. In respect 
of economic organisation, for example, the question is asked whether employees are 
rotated among the companies within the group. In respect of marketing the question is 
asked whether the same trademarks are used across the group and in respect of the public 
image whether the group is publicly portrayed as a single enterprise.11 
 
This chapter highlights what a group of companies is, why groups of companies are 
formed, the legal structure of a group, namely a holding company and a subsidiary 
company in a group of companies’ most basic form and the problems associated with 
groups. 
 
1.2 The reasons for company groups 
Bonbright and Means also identified some of the reasons why a group of companies 
would be formed in the 1930s. They identified four reasons, namely (i) the centralised 
control of previously independent companies; (ii) to consolidate the financial structure of 
previously independent companies by the holding company becoming in effect the 
financier of the subsidiaries under its control;12 (iii)  the recapitalisation of the financial 
structure of one or more companies by substituting the shares of the holding company for 
the shares of a subsidiary;13 and (iv) to gain voting control of the subsidiary with very 
little financial investment.14  
                                                           
11
 The Companies & Securities Advisory Committee Report on Corporate Groups (2000) 2-3. 
12
 Bonbright & Means The Holding Company 14. 
13
 See Bonbright & Means  The Holding Company 15-17 for the example of the Long Island Capital Corporation 
and Long Island Lighting company. 
14
 Bonbright & Means The Holding Company 12; 18-20. 
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The most important reason, however, is probably to reduce the risk to which the holding 
company is exposed. Risk in this context means the possible legal risk which necessitates 
the creation of a vertical structure of a holding company and a subsidiary company. The 
point of departure is that every company within a group structure is a separate juristic 
person and as such it has its own rights and liabilities. This in turn means that one 
company in a group structure is not liable for the liabilities of another company within 
the group structure. In the light of the fact that each of the various entities within a 
company group structure retains its individual juristic personality, it automatically 
reduces the commercial risk of the other companies within the group. Subsidiary 
companies can therefore be incorporated with a minimal share capital to undertake 
business ventures which could otherwise be too risky for the holding company. Should 
the venture not be successful the holding company only loses its investment.15 
 
The creation of subsidiary companies could also lead to a more efficient management 
system. The larger a single company grows, the more difficult it may become to manage 
it efficiently. It would make sense to break up the company into smaller legal units with 
their own management structures to effect a more decentralised management format.16 
 
It is also possible that a company may create a group structure by taking over another 
company which conducts business in a related field to increase its market share or to 
increase the scale of its business. Instead of buying the assets or business of that company 
it could instead buy the shares of the company. It will therefore gain control over the 
assets and business of that company including the intellectual property of the target 
company and the goodwill attached to it.17 
 
The controlling shareholders of a company may also seek outside investment without 
wanting to relinquish any shares or their control of that company. The company therefore 
incorporates a subsidiary company and grants outside investors a minority stake in that 
                                                           
15
 See chapter 2 and chapter 7 below. 
16
 See generally the Companies and Securities Advisory Committee Report on Corporate Groups 3. 
17
 The Companies and Securities Advisory Committee Report on Corporate Groups 3. 
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subsidiary company.18 Another reason is that a company may want to retain full control 
over the whole production and supply chain in respect of the products which it produces 
from the acquisition of the raw materials stage up to the final supply and retail stage to 
the general public. A company may also want to increase its profits by investing in other 
companies which are neither directly nor indirectly involved in the existing business 
sphere of the company. The purpose of this investment is purely financial in nature and 
not for any other practical or legal reason. 
 
1.3 The legal definition of a group of companies 
Prior to the passing of the Companies Act 71 of 200819 (the new Companies Act), no 
statutory definition existed in South Africa of a company group although the legislature 
attached some consequences to the relationship between holding companies and 
subsidiary companies. The new Companies Act defines a “group of companies” as “two 
or more companies that share a holding company or subsidiary relationship.”20 
 
The new Companies Act does attach some consequences to groups of companies21 and 
also defines holding companies and subsidiary companies. A holding company “in 
relation to a subsidiary, means a juristic person or undertaking that controls that 
subsidiary.”22 
 
The new Companies Act defines a subsidiary company, broadly speaking, as a company 
which is under the control of another juristic person. The control can either be exercised 
by the juristic person by means of holding the majority of voting rights in the subsidiary 
company, or the power to control the board of directors by means of the power to appoint 
                                                           
18
 The Companies & Securities Advisory Committee Report on Corporate Groups 3. 
19
 The new Companies Act was published in Government Gazette No 32121 of 9 April 2009 but has not come into 
effect yet at the time of writing this dissertation. 
20
 S 1 of the new Companies Act. 
21
 See chapter 5, para 5.3 below. An example is loans between companies within a group of companies, para 5.3.2 
below. 
22
 S 1 of the new Companies Act. 
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or elect the directors who control the majority of the voting rights in board of directors’ 
meetings of the subsidiary company.23 
 
1.4 Problems arising within company groups 
“The time is fast coming when the people of the United States will no longer submit to this 
economic dictatorship by a great privately controlled institution, originally conjured up by 
legislative act, but now becoming more powerful than the government itself. Useful as the 
institution is when properly guided and limited, it may be destroyed by an angry electorate if our 
courts and legislatures do not find a way to make it amenable to the social control to which the 
activities of individual business men and ordinary corporations are subject. The greatest enemies 
of the holding company are not the critics who point to its present abuses, but rather those 
business men who stubbornly resist all efforts to bring it under governmental control and those 
judges who invoke the notion of separate corporate entities against all attempts to make it 
responsible for the acts of its subsidiaries.24 
 
This statement dating from 1932 was made in the light of the apparent abuses by holding 
companies in the public utilities system, namely the railways, the provision of gas for 
household use and the provision of electricity. The opinion of the time was that by means 
of holding companies controlling the operating entities, services were sacrificed for profit 
which landed in the hands of a selected few; the (major) shareholders of the holding 
company. Very often the holding company was not subject to any regulatory control, 
unlike the operating company, which led to holding companies charging their subsidiaries 
management or service fees which impacted on rates which the public had to pay to the 
operating utility companies, for example for electricity.25 The question is whether the 
authors’ assessment is still correct today. 
 
The problems which are associated with groups of companies can be put into two broad 
categories. The first category deals with internal problems and the second category 
concerns the external problems. By internal problems is meant governance problems 
which may arise within a group of companies. Two such problems are important. In the 
                                                           
23
 S 3(1)(a) of the new Companies Act which will be discussed in greater detail  in chapter 5, paras 5.2 and 5.3  
below. 
24
 Bonbright & Means The Holding Company 339. 
25
 For an interesting overview see in general Bonbright & Means The Holding Company. 
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first place there is the problem of fiduciary duties of directors within a group of 
companies and secondly the position of minority shareholders of companies which form 
part of the group of companies. In respect of the internal problems, especially the position 
of minority shareholders the problems are compounded by the common-law principle of 
Foss v Harbottle26 in terms of which the minority shareholders have to submit themselves 
to the will of the majority except in exceptional cases. 
 
The external problems posed by groups of companies are, firstly, their liability vis-à-vis 
their voluntary and involuntary creditors. Voluntary creditors in this context mean those 
third parties with whom a company within a group of companies has some form of 
contractual relationship. Involuntary creditors are those creditors whose relationships 
with a company within a group of companies arise in an involuntary manner, typically 
through the delict of a company within a group of companies. The second external 
problem is the position of creditors of companies within the group when one of the 
companies, or all of the companies, in a group, is insolvent.  
 
Intra-group debts are also problematic. It is difficult to classify this problem as external 
or internal. It is external in the light of the fact that there is a contractual relationship 
between the lender and the borrower but also internal in the light of the fact that 
governance problems could arise due to the probable absence of an arm’s length 
transaction.  
 
1.4.1    The internal problems 
(i) The position of minority shareholders within a company group 
The position of minority shareholders and their protection by necessary implication is 
only relevant where the subsidiary company is not a wholly owned subsidiary company.27 
Minority shareholders are always vulnerable in a company. This is particularly the case 
where they hold less than 25% of the issued shares of a company and are therefore unable 
                                                           
26
 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461. 
27
 For a definition of a wholly owned company refer to section 3(1)(b) of the new Companies Act. 
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to veto any amendment to the constitution of a company or other particular issues for 
which legislation requires a special resolution.28   
 
Minority shareholders are also vulnerable in the context of a group of companies. 
Minority shareholders could refer here to the minority shareholders of the holding 
company or also to the minority shareholders of the subsidiary company. The holding 
company may exercise its powers to the detriment of the position of the minority 
shareholders of the subsidiary company by, for example, authorising the sale of the 
majority of assets or business or all of the assets or the whole business of the subsidiary 
company to another company within the group. The holding company may also, in its 
position as controlling shareholder of the subsidiary or in its position as the shareholder 
with the power to appoint or dismiss the directors with the majority voting rights at board 
meetings of the subsidiary company, cause the subsidiary company to declare a dividend 
at a time where the funds of the subsidiary company could be better utilised for 
investment purposes for the future growth of the subsidiary company.29 The converse is 
also possible by retaining funds for group expansion while depriving the minority 
shareholders of expected dividends. The question therefore arises whether the minority 
shareholders of companies within a group are adequately protected. 
 
(ii) The fiduciary duties of directors of companies within a group structure 
The point of departure is that a director of a company owes a fiduciary duty to the 
company of which he is a director. Within a group of companies, therefore, a director of, 
for example the holding company, does not owe a fiduciary duty to the subsidiary 
company. The question arises whether this should be the position or whether the directors 
of the holding company should in appropriate circumstances owe a fiduciary duty to the 
subsidiary company as well. An ancillary question is whether the directors of the holding 
company should not be allowed to act for the benefit of the group instead of focusing 
their attention on the benefit of the companies of which they are directors.30 
                                                           
28
 A 75% majority in general. 
29
 The Companies & Securities Advisory Committee Report on Corporate Groups 73. 
30
 The Companies & Securities Advisory Committee Report on Corporate Groups 35. 
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Another problem which needs to be highlighted within groups is the position of the 
directors of a subsidiary especially where they are appointed solely by the holding 
company, or, even worse, where the directors of the holding company are also the 
directors of the subsidiary. This problem is only relevant where there are minority 
shareholders either in the holding company or in the subsidiary company. 
 
It is trite law that a director of a company has a fiduciary duty towards the company of 
which he or she is a director. This means that he has to act in the interest of the company 
and not serve his own interests. In the case of a single company the question is posed 
more and more whether a director does not owe a fiduciary duty to other interest groups 
in a company, for example creditors, or regarding broader environmental issues as well.31  
 
According to R v Milne and Erleigh32 and Lipschitz and Another NNO v Landmark 
Consolidated (Pty) Ltd33 a director of a company within a group of companies does not 
owe a fiduciary duty to the group as a whole. The aforementioned cases, furthermore, 
held that the directors of the parent company should not allow the dominant power of the 
holding company over its subsidiaries to undermine the subsidiaries from acting in their 
own interests.34 
 
Apart from the two cases mentioned above no other South African judicial decision in 
respect of the question of fiduciary duties of directors within the context of a group of 
companies could be found. However, the new Companies Act provides that a director of 
a company “must not use the position of director […] to knowingly cause harm to the 
company or a subsidiary of the company.”35 What this duty entails is not entirely clear. It 
will be interesting to see the interpretation of this provision where a director of the 
holding company acts in the interests of the holding company but the action is to the 
                                                           
31
 Havenga “Directors’ fiduciary duties under our future company law regime” 1997 9 SA Merc LJ 310. 
32
 R v Milne and Erleigh 1951 1 SA 791 (A). 
33
 Lipschitz and Another NNO v Landmark Consolidated (Pty) Ltd 1979 2 SA 482 (W) 488. 
34
 See also Van Dorsten The Law of Company Directors 2ed  (1999) 226. 
35
 S 76(2)(a)(ii). 
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detriment of the subsidiary and how a court will reconcile the director’s conflicting duties 
towards the holding company and the subsidiary company. 
 
In Lindgren and Others v L&P Estates Ltd36 the Court of Appeal in England rejected the 
notion that the director of a holding company owes a fiduciary duty to the subsidiary 
company. The court held that: 
“A great number of cases was cited, but I get no benefit from them.  It is of course true that a 
trustee cannot in general deal with himself or get an advantage himself in a transaction in which he 
is on both sides of the table, and authority is not needed for so well-known a proposition, but Mr. 
Lindgren was a director not of the defendant company but of the City company.  He may have 
been in breach of his duty to that company but he owed no duty to the defendant company, 
although it was about to become a subsidiary of the City company.  To hold that Mr. Lindgren, a 
director of the City company, was bound to protect the interests of one of its subsidiaries which 
had an independent board is to stretch the principle altogether beyond reason.”37 
 
It would appear from the case law at hand that the courts have been consistent in holding 
that a director of the subsidiary company should act in the interest of the subsidiary 
company. Furthermore, the directors of the subsidiary company should always exercise 
their judgment in an unfettered manner. There will, however, be instances where the 
directors of the subsidiary are under the full control of the holding company, but in that 
case there is an argument to be made that the holding company, or the directors behind 
the holding company, have a duty towards the subsidiary company to observe the utmost 
good faith in dealings with that company as stated in the Robinson v Randfontein Estates 
Gold Mining Co Ltd38 case. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
36
 Lindgren and Others v L&P Estates Ltd [1968] 1 Ch 572; 1968 1 All ER 917 (CA); [1968] 2 WLR 562. 
37
 922E-F. 
38
 Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168. 
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1.4.2 The external problems 
(i) The position of creditors of an insolvent company within a company group 
The default position is that the creditors of a company have to look to the company for 
the satisfaction of their claims and not to the shareholders of the company.39 The position 
is the same where a creditor has contracted with a company which forms part of a group 
of companies. The question therefore arises whether the (solvent) companies within a 
group should stand in for the debts of the insolvent companies within a group where 
those insolvent companies are in liquidation, either by means of a contribution or by 
means of a pooling of the assets of the companies within the group.40 
 
(ii) The position of contractual and delictual creditors of companies within a group 
structure 
A company has creditors which may be contractual or delictual. The contractual creditors 
are, to a degree, better off than the delictual creditors since they could at least 
contractually arrange for security where the contracting company is unable to pay its 
debts. It could, however, happen that their claims will not be satisfied because the 
contractual debtor company is in liquidation or is unable to pay. This will be discussed 
under the liquidation of a company within a group structure.41 
 
Delictual creditors are not in a position to arrange for security for their claims due to the 
nature of their claims. Delictual creditors of a company within a group did not become 
creditors of the specific company through choice but involuntarily. It can be that the 
person is a consumer who bought a product of the subsidiary company and suffered 
harm, or an employee of a subsidiary company who has suffered harm due to the business 
activities of the subsidiary company, or a completely innocent third party who was 
injured by an employee of a subsidiary company while that employee acted in the course 
of his duties. The question arises whether the person who has suffered loss in the above 
                                                           
39
 Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22 [HL]. 
40
 Chapter 7 below. 
41
 Chapter 7 below. 
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circumstances can recover his loss from the holding company or any other subsidiary 
company within the group structure. 
 
1.5 The problem of limited liability 
The problems mentioned in 1.4 can all be traced to the doctrine of limited liability. A 
historical perspective is necessary to understand the current law relating to groups. 
Important here is the principle of separate juristic personality with the concomitant 
doctrine of limited liability. The former doctrine is used by company-law jurists to treat 
each company as a separate person.42 It is therefore important to investigate what 
considerations underlie the principle of a separate juristic personality.  
 
In the context of groups one should note that the idea of a separate juristic person 
developed due to historical reasons. The formalistic approach, also known as the entity 
theory,43 should be understood in the context in which it developed, namely the 
relationship between the shareholder and the company in which he or she held shares.  
 
The shareholders of an enterprise were initially natural persons and the distinction 
between the shareholder and the enterprise was easily visible. The company, to a large 
degree, was the enterprise since the concept of holding and subsidiary companies was a 
later development in company law. In fact, in the United States of America the New 
Jersey legislature only in the latter half of the 1880s and at the start of the 1890s enabled 
a company to hold shares in another company.44 The entity theory was therefore 
developed prior to the possibility of one company holding shares in another company.45 
 
The enterprise, in a group context, could therefore no longer simply be seen as the 
company since the “company” became fragmented into a holding company and one or 
more subsidiaries. In practice one would have the holding company with its shareholders, 
for example natural persons, and then the subsidiary of the holding company. There is 
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 See chapter 2 below. 
43
 See in general Blumberg The Multinational Challenge to Corporation Law (1993). 
44
 Blumberg Corporation Law 56. 
45
 Blumberg Corporation Law 56. 
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therefore another entity separating the natural persons as shareholders and the subsidiary 
company. The entity theory did not have to encounter such a situation when it was 
developed and therefore the question should be asked whether the entity theory is still 
entirely appropriate in the modern era where company groups are prevalent.  
 
Gower refers to two arguments that are used to advance the principle of separate juristic 
personality in English law. When the legislator introduced the concept of limited liability 
it wanted to promote investment by individual investors or natural persons. The idea was 
that these people who were not investment experts would not want to risk their personal 
assets by becoming shareholders of a company with unlimited liability. They would 
prefer being lenders to the company instead. The company, however, sought investments 
and not loans and to facilitate investment the concept of limited liability was 
introduced.46 The argument makes sense in its historical context but does not explain the 
rationale behind the doctrine where one deals with a private company which is financed 
with shareholders’ loans, and is even less apt where the investors are other companies 
with sufficient investment expertise.47 The nature of a private company is an obstacle 
from an investment point of view since such a company must restrict the transferability of 
its shares and may not offer shares to the public.48 The investment argument to justify the 
concept of limited liability then makes little sense.49  
 
Within the context of a group the second main argument has been advanced by Kraakman 
according to Gower.50  This argument is called the asset partitioning rationale. In terms of 
this argument limited liability enables the separation of groups of assets among different 
companies within a corporate group. The doctrine of limited liability is portrayed as an 
advantage to creditors of individual subsidiary companies. The reason for this statement 
is that the creditors of a shareholder of a company can only hold that shareholder liable 
and not the company itself, which operates in favour of that company’s creditors.  
                                                           
46
 Davies Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 6ed (2003) 177. Gower refers to further more 
modern reasons by Halpern, Trebilock and Turnbull which will be investigated in chapter 2 below. 
47
 Davies Gower 178. 
48
 S 8(2)(b)(ii) of the new Companies Act. 
49
 Davies Gower 178. 
50
 Davies Gower 178. 
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1.6 Research hypothesis 
The hypothesis of this dissertation is that the South African law on company groups is an 
ineffective and inaccurate reflection of the reality of a group of companies. In South 
Africa, due to the formalistic nature of the treatment of groups, the economic reality 
behind a group is, from a legal perspective, largely uncharted territory. This leads to a 
number of problems which have been highlighted above. The problems include the 
formalistic manner in which the courts treat a group of companies. The judiciary works 
with the premise that there is no such thing as a group of companies that constitutes a 
single juristic person. This is often due to an almost religious observance of the principle 
formulated in Salomon v Salomon,51  although departures from the principle are 
occasionally made in special circumstances.52 
 
The South African law in respect of groups of companies is outdated and does not 
adequately address the problems which groups of companies pose in respect of their 
external relations vis-à-vis third party creditors, whether voluntary creditors or 
involuntary creditors. The reason for this state of affairs is either the doctrine of limited 
liability or the refusal by the legislature and/or the judiciary to recognise the economic 
reality of a group of companies, namely that a group of companies frequently constitutes 
a single economic entity, although the law does not recognise this reality. 
 
1.7 Research questions 
The law of groups in South Africa is really a misnomer since there are no coherent rules 
of law in respect of groups of companies, only certain isolated provisions in various 
pieces of legislation. The South African law in respect of groups of companies is 
therefore inadequate for modern needs. This becomes more apparent when it is compared 
with that of common-law countries like the United States of America, New Zealand and 
Australia.53  
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 [1897] AC 22 [HL]. 
52
 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 4 SA 790 (A). 
53
 See chapters 6 and 7 below. 
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South Africa is an economic powerhouse on the African continent with a sophisticated 
legal system. This legal system underpins an equally developed economic and investment 
infrastructure in the form of a sophisticated securities exchange, the JSE. However, the 
law in respect of company groups is undeveloped and needs to achieve a better balance 
between the interests of shareholder investors on the one side, and the interests of third 
parties who interact with a company within a group of companies or with the group of 
companies itself on a daily basis. This possible conflict in the competing interests of 
outsiders and shareholders raises the following questions: 
 
(iii) Does a group of companies, in general, constitute a single business enterprise? 
(iv) If a group of companies does, in general, constitute a single business enterprise, why does 
the law not treat it as a single juristic entity? 
(v) Is the doctrine of limited liability an acceptable reason for the law’s refusal to treat a 
group of companies as a single juristic entity?  
(vi) If the doctrine of limited liability is analysed in its historical context and the conclusion is 
that it is not the actual rationale for the law’s refusal to treat a group of companies as a 
single juristic entity, has the doctrine become such an integral part of company law that it 
has become, through usage, the modern reason for the law’s refusal to treat a group of 
companies as a single juristic entity? 
(vii) Is the reason for the law’s refusal to treat a group of companies as a single juristic entity 
rather one of public policy? 
(viii) If a group of companies forms a single economic entity and public policy dictates that the 
law should not recognise this economic reality, is there an effective mechanism to act as a 
compromise between these two extreme poles?  
This dissertation will look at the external relations of a group of companies, in particular 
the position of the creditors of the group of companies or the creditors of a company 
within the group structure. Recommendations on how best to protect these creditors in 
17 
 
cases of insolvency of the debtor company in a group of companies will be provided. 
Moreover, recommendations will be offered on how to protect involuntary creditors 
where they have suffered loss due to the actions of a company within a group of 
companies.  
 
The question which also needs to be answered is whether mere domination triggers the 
protection for the respective affected parties from the might of the holding company or 
whether abuse of the holding company’s position vis-à-vis the subsidiary is necessary. 
This is a very important question to address in respect of the external relations of the 
holding company or group, in the light of limited liability and the few exceptions to the 
doctrine. It is submitted that if the position of external parties, namely voluntary and 
involuntary creditors, is to be regulated differently from the current position that they 
have in law, some form of abuse still has to take place before the law should protect 
them. The key concept is balance: there will have to be some balance between the 
interests of these external creditors and the interests of the entities within the group. The 
doctrine of limited liability should, however, also be reconsidered in order to protect the 
position of external parties adequately.54 The reason for the re-evaluation is to determine 
the role of the doctrine within its historical context so as to refine its role in the modern 
economic and legal order.  
 
Muscat identifies four categories of abuse or unfairness within the group context which 
could prima facie be prejudicial to the external creditors of a member of a company 
group.55 The first occurs where the subsidiary company engages in activities which are 
not necessarily in its own interests but in the interests of the other group members, 
whether the holding company or a co-subsidiary company. One issue for example is the 
use of the profits of a subsidiary as dividends within the group or to finance other 
members of the group instead of securing the long-term health and viability of the 
individual subsidiary company. Another issue which comes to the fore is the issue of 
internal “transfer pricing”.56 Transfer pricing is the movement of funds within groups. 
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 See chapters 6 and 7 for a more detailed discussion. 
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 Muscat The Liability of the Holding Company for the Debts of its Insolvent Subsidiaries  (1996) 64. 
56
 Muscat Liability of the Holding Company 68-73. 
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This movement can take various forms: the declaration and payment of dividends, soft 
loans,57 the provision of services and the use of intellectual property.58 
 
The second is where the subsidiary company has not been adequately capitalised so that 
the interests of external creditors are put in danger. The inadequate capitalisation of a 
subsidiary may, to some extent, be off-set by the requirements of solvency and liquidity 
in the new Companies Act,59 although this may only be of assistance in a limited number 
of circumstances. 
 
The third occurs where one business is sub-divided into a number of separate juristic 
entities. The single business entity situation will be investigated later where it will be 
shown that where a group is organised in a vertical chain, this is often done to integrate 
the production chain and that this chain forms one whole.60 As already mentioned the law 
does not in principle recognise this reality. 
 
The fourth is where the external creditors of a group member are under the (mistaken) 
belief that they are dealing with the group or that the holding company will stand in for 
the obligations of the relevant group member.61  The fourth category often involves the 
holding company providing letters of comfort62 to a creditor of a subsidiary company 
only for the creditor of the subsidiary company to realise later that the letter of comfort is 
meaningless.63 
 
1.8 Overview of the dissertation 
Chapter two will address the doctrine of limited liability in common-law countries by 
investigating the reasons for its existence and the exceptions to it. The chapter will also 
investigate the development of groups of companies in the United Kingdom and the 
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 Chapter 3. 
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 Muscat Liability of the Holding Company 64-65. 
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United States of America and how the judiciary and the respective legislatures dealt with 
the phenomenon of a group of companies in the light of the doctrine of limited liability. 
 
Chapter three will address the economic reality of groups and show that many groups of 
companies in practice constitute single economic entities. 
 
The development of limited liability in Germany, the historical development of enterprise 
law and the relevant provisions of the German Konzernrecht64 will be discussed in 
chapter four. This will be done to illustrate that there are sophisticated jurisdictions, both 
legally and economically, which have acknowledged the economic realities of groups of 
companies without suffering economically. This refutes the argument, which could be 
raised, that investors would be scared off should the law recognise the single economic 
juristic entity of a group in certain circumstances.  
 
Chapter five will consider the legislative and judicial attempts to address groups of 
companies in South Africa. In this respect the provisions of the new Companies Act and 
other statutes will be investigated. The reason for this investigation is to show that since 
the legislature has accepted the need to address groups of companies in some respects, 
there are no cogent policy reasons for the judiciary and the legislature not to address the 
problem areas highlighted in this dissertation. 
 
Chapters six and seven will address the external relations of a group of companies by 
looking at the possible delictual liability of a holding company for the harm caused by its 
subsidiary as well as the position of the creditors of an insolvent member of a corporate 
group. The law in this respect of, amongst others, the United States of America, Australia 
and New Zealand will be investigated since these jurisdictions have addressed the 
highlighted problems in a manner which could be beneficial to South African law, 
without opening the floodgates of unrestricted liability of holding companies for the debts 
of their insolvent subsidiaries or the delicts committed by them.  
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The reason for comparing these jurisdictions is due to the fact that South African 
company law shares many similarities with these jurisdictions. The new Companies Act 
has also been based, to a degree, on the Model Business Corporations Act of the United 
States and therefore strengthens the argument for comparison. New Zealand and 
Australia, although being classified as more developed markets and economies than 
South Africa, are relatively similar to South Africa in their respective business 
environments. Given these factors it is submitted that South African company law could 
learn much from these jurisdictions and even adopt some of the measures taken by the 
legislature and judiciary in these jurisdictions. 
 
The chapters on the law of delict and the law of insolvency will conclude with 
recommendations to change the existing law on groups by introducing certain statutory 
amendments.  
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Chapter 2 
The doctrine of limited liability in common-law jurisdictions 
 
2.1      Introduction 
“The rational study of law is still to a large extent the study of history. History must be a part of 
the study, because without it we cannot know the precise scope of rules which it is our business to 
know.”1 
 
It is trite that a company is a separate artificial juristic person.2 This means that a 
company is the bearer of its rights and obligations and enjoys perpetual succession. A 
change in membership or shareholding of the company therefore has no effect on the 
continued existence of the company. The further effect of separate juristic personality is 
that it is the company which is liable for its debts and any advantages which accrue to the 
company belong to the company and do not form part of the estates of its members or 
shareholders.  
 
Limited liability, which generally is a concession granted by the state, is often viewed as 
one of the natural consequences of separate juristic personality. This means that should 
failure of the business of the company lead to the liquidation of the company, the 
creditors of the company have no recourse against the shareholders of the company. The 
risk for the shareholders is restricted to the amount which they invested in the company. 
Limited liability and the inability of creditors to demand payment for the obligations of 
the company from its shareholders, are not restricted to cases of liquidation. Creditors are 
also in principle precluded from demanding payment from the shareholders of the 
company during the existence of the company subject to certain exceptions.3 
 
Groups of companies consist of individually incorporated companies. As such each 
company has separate juristic personality. The holding company, as controlling 
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 Holmes “The Path of the Law” 1897 Harvard Law Review (10) 457 469. 
2
 Berle “The Theory of Enterprise Entity” Columbia Law Review 1947 (47) 343. 
3
 The personal liability company in South African law, for example, which provides that the directors of the 
company are jointly and severally liable for the contractual debts of the company incurred during their terms of 
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shareholder of the subsidiary company, also therefore enjoys the shield of limited 
liability. The question is why does limited liability exist? To answer this question the 
evolution of the company has to be evaluated to determine the reasons for limited 
liability. Once this has been established the next question will be whether the reasons for 
limited liability in respect of companies where the shareholders are natural persons apply 
equally to situations where the shareholder(s) of a company is/are other juristic persons. 
To answer these questions limited liability will be investigated from a historical 
perspective, an economic perspective and a legal perspective. At the end of the section on 
limited liability it will also be viewed from a revisionist approach. 
 
2.2       The doctrine of limited liability in its historical context in common-law countries 
2.2.1 The United Kingdom 
Medieval England was acquainted with a corporate entity although this entity was mainly 
restricted to ecclesiastical and public organisations. This status of being equipped with 
corporate personality was mainly granted by the Crown.4 The bodies which were granted 
the status of corporate personality were primarily focused on obtaining monopolies in the 
various forms of trade in which they were engaged or interested. According to Gower 
these associations were guilds of trade organisations which are very dissimilar to the 
modern corporation as we know it. The reason for this is the fact that it was unnecessary 
to separate the rights and obligations of individual members of guilds from those of a 
body to which they belonged, since every member conducted trade for his own account. 
The only obligation of the member was to comply with the rules of the particular guild of 
which he was a member.5 
 
Individuals who did not wish to trade under the auspices of a guild, but who also chose 
not to trade on an individual basis, had as the only option available to them the formation 
of a partnership.6 Traders in medieval times had the choice between two forms of 
partnership. One of the options was the commenda which consisted of the entrepreneur 
trader and the financial backer, who could be compared to a silent partner and whose 
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5
 Gower Principles 20. 
6
 Cilliers Limited Liability in Company Law LLD Dissertation UNISA (1963) 24. 
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liability was restricted to the investment which he made in the enterprise.7 In continental 
Europe the commenda as known in England evolved into the société en commandite.8 
 
The other partnership available during medieval times was the societas which had a 
greater degree of permanence to it and evolved into the common form of partnership as it 
is known today. In this form of enterprise each partner could act as the agent of the other 
partners and would be liable only to the extent of his contribution to the enterprise. In 
essence this was akin to limited liability.  
 
The name “company” was ascribed initially to merchant traders who conducted trade 
abroad based upon charters which were granted by the Crown. This can be traced to as 
early as the fourteenth century although it was not generally in use. When foreign trade 
became more common, coupled with new frontiers being discovered, this type of 
company became increasingly common from about the sixteenth century.9 
 
The companies which existed due to charters granted by the Crown were largely 
extensions of the earlier guilds. According to Gower, an individual member of a company 
conducted trade with his own stock and at his own expense. The member, however, still 
had to comply with the rules imposed by the company. Incorporation was not necessary 
therefore since every member was responsible for his own liabilities. Charters were, 
however, essential to obtain a monopoly in respect of foreign trade and the power to 
govern over foreign territory.10 
 
In time the underlying principle of a partnership, namely the conduct of business between 
two or more persons by means of a joint pool of assets, became a more attractive 
proposition for companies and these companies evolved into entities that were more 
commercially orientated compared to the more protective enterprises they had been 
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before.11 The East India Company was one of the groundbreaking entities which 
introduced the concept of a joint pool of assets outside the partnership enterprise form. 
The East India Company was granted a charter in 1600 which enabled it to monopolize 
trade to the Indies. At its inception the East India Company functioned like any other 
company of that time in that individual members conducted trade for their individual 
account but always subject to the rules of the company. However, the East India 
Company also provided for a dual system which allowed members to subscribe to a joint 
stock, over and above the traditional permission to trade for one’s own account under the 
auspices of the company.12 This state of affairs initially led to a situation where the joint 
pool of assets and profits were divided among the subscribers to the joint pool after the 
completion of each foreign expedition.13 Between 1614 and 1653 the members of the 
company could subscribe to the joint pool of assets for any number of years. Between 
1653 and 1692 a permanent pool of assets was introduced. After this the members of the 
company were prohibited from trading for their individual accounts.14 Up to 1692 
therefore the company was a hybrid between the modern company as we know it, which 
conducts business for the benefit of its members, and a mere governance mechanism for a 
particular trade. The new form of company was then called a joint stock company to refer 
to the joint pool of assets.15 
 
According to Gower arguably the single biggest advantage of incorporation, namely 
limited liability, was only realised as an afterthought. By the early fifteenth century this 
advantage was already enjoyed by the members of non-trading corporations and by the 
end of the seventeenth century in the case of trading companies.16 Members of 
companies, however, apparently did not at first fully comprehend the value of limited 
liability since it was initially understood to protect the company’s assets against forfeiture 
for the private debts of members, whereas today the advantage of limited liability is seen 
more as a benefit for the member that his assets are in principle safe from attachment by 
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the creditors of the company.17 The advantage of limited liability, in any event, served 
very little practical purpose since the constitutions of most companies enabled them to 
call upon their members to make contributions, which companies would inevitably do 
when creditors had to be paid. Creditors even had the right to proceed against members 
where the company failed to pay its debts.18 
 
By the middle of the seventeenth century the companies which were in existence came 
under pressure to relinquish their monopolies especially in respect of the governance of 
the territories where their monopolies were vested. After the French revolution the right 
to grant monopolies was removed from the Crown and instead vested in the state and 
could only be conferred by means of statute.19 
 
Although there was a decline in respect of incorporation of foreign companies, 
incorporation of more domestically inclined companies was on the increase. Companies 
like the Bank of England, which was incorporated initially under charter and then later 
under statue in 1694 were, or became, powerful entities.20 These companies were akin to 
the modern day public company seeking investment from the public at large. 
 
Towards the end of the seventeenth century the symbiotic potential between an investor 
in a business and an entrepreneur became a more realistic possibility with the advent of 
joint stock companies. Stock broking became a career opportunity and the purchase and 
sale of shares were an everyday occurrence.21 Unfortunately, the dealing in shares lent 
itself to abuse which necessitated intervention by the English legislature in 1697.22 
According to Gower there still was no proper company law at the turn of the seventeenth 
century but more of an “embryonic law of partnership.”23 Company law was really still 
only partnership law at its conception stage since this law only applied to companies 
which were not incorporated. The partnership agreements, later to become deeds of 
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settlement, and the charters which were granted to certain entities were strongly 
influenced by the guilds of earlier centuries especially with regards to the management of 
the entities. Management vested in governors and assistant governors but at the end of the 
seventeenth century the term “assistant governor” was replaced by the term “director.”24  
 
The eighteenth century did not start off well for company law. Disaster struck in the form 
of the South Sea Bubble. The South Sea company aimed to acquire the whole of the 
national debt of England. In short, it proved to be a disastrous scheme and nothing more 
than a glorified gamble.25 
 
The South Sea scheme led to other highly speculative schemes, which necessitated 
intervention by the legislature although the resulting legislation probably had more 
disastrous consequences than those of the speculative schemes.26 The House of Commons 
passed a resolution in 1720 which attempted to address the wave of speculative schemes 
which occurred during that period and later that year passed the Bubble Act.27 It appears 
that the purpose of the Bubble Act was to prevent a company from acting as a corporate 
entity and from issuing shares without valid authority in the form of a charter or an Act of 
Parliament.28 Gower quotes Holdsworth who said that;  
“[W]hat was needed was an Act which made it easy for joint stock societies to adopt a corporate 
form and, at the same time, safeguarded both the shareholders in such societies and the public 
against frauds and negligence in their promotion and management. What was passed was an Act 
which deliberately made it difficult for joint stock societies to assume a corporate form and 
contained no rule at all for the conduct of such societies, if, and when, they assumed it.”29  
 
The commentators are in agreement that the Bubble Act was very vague which made 
interpretation very difficult.  
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Whether the legislature intended it or not is debatable, but the Bubble Act proved to be 
disastrous for public confidence in the companies which existed at that stage. 
Furthermore legal steps were taken against a number of corporations which conducted 
business in terms of charters which had expired.30 These factors in tandem led to massive 
panic sales by stockholders which reduced the stock value of South Sea Company within 
six months from 1000% to 125%. Public confidence was very low hereafter and a 
comeback by joint stock companies could be seen only towards the end of the eighteenth 
century.31  
 
Joint stock companies did not completely disappear after the enactment of the Bubble 
Act.32 Numerous properly run chartered companies and a number of companies which 
had not been incorporated managed to survive the negative sentiment which swept the 
investing public and were examples of the positives of such enterprises.33 The Bubble Act 
led to fewer charters being issued with more stringent conditions.34 Towards the end of 
the century, however, statutory incorporations became more common. According to 
Gower statutory incorporation reflected many of the norms which are taken for granted 
today, for example that the liability of members was restricted to the nominal value of 
their shareholding.35 
 
Although the Bubble Act sought to end the unincorporated company it allowed 
partnerships. However, the parameters within which partnerships could operate were not 
quite clear. There was no limit on the number of partners. It would appear that initially 
legality of the partnership was dependent on the presence of a restriction on the transfer 
of shares. By the middle of the eighteenth century, however, with the Bubble Act already 
reduced to an anachronism, freedom to transfer shares took hold.36  
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The companies which were not incorporated took innovative measures to have the 
advantages of an incorporated company. These measures included conducting the 
business under a “deed of settlement” in terms of which the members of the association 
would agree to come together in an enterprise with a joint stock which would be divided 
into an agreed number of shares. Furthermore any amendments to the deed had to be 
agreed upon by a specified number of members, the management would vest in a 
committee of directors and the property of the enterprise would vest in a separate body of 
trustees which would usually include some of the directors. Provision would also be 
made for litigation by and against these trustees.37   
 
In time the disadvantages of unincorporated entities became more pronounced as more 
and more of these entities began to conduct business. It was mentioned before that the 
deeds of trust allowed the trustees to sue and be sued, but whether this was legally sound 
was not clear. The unincorporated entities which existed were in law nothing more than 
partnerships and during that period the law did not allow litigation by or against the 
entity, but it had to be instituted by or against all the individual partners, which was 
problematic especially where transfer of shareholdings took place.38 Coupled with this 
disadvantage was the personal liability which partners would incur in an unincorporated 
entity.  
 
Members of unincorporated entities only realised by the late eighteenth century that the 
lack of limited liability was problematic in their unincorporated environment. From about 
1770 entities which sought incorporation were motivated by the advantage of limited 
liability. With unincorporated entities a general clause in the deed of settlement would 
not suffice to gain the advantage of limited liability and had to be specifically included 
when the entity entered into a contract with a third party.39  
 
Gower avers that unlimited liability was no impediment for a dishonest promoter of an 
unincorporated company due to the difficulties to sue a fluctuating body of members and 
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even when judgment was obtained to levy execution. Practical problems facing creditors 
therefore made unlimited liability less of a problem for the unscrupulous promoter.40  
 
There were thus numerous problems which only appropriate state intervention could 
solve to protect the investing public against unscrupulous promoters and managers, but 
which would also allow and stimulate the incorporation of entities. The legislature could 
not think of anything better than to repeal the Bubble Act on the recommendation of the 
Board of Trade in 1825.41  
 
There was no significant movement in company law between 1825 and 1844 and limited 
liability was still the single most important aspect that needed to be addressed.42 At this 
stage limited liability still met with considerable hostility.43 The groundbreaking period 
for English company law was 1843 onwards. First of all the Parliamentary Committee on 
Joint Stock Companies issued a significant report which led to the Joint Stock  
Companies Act of 1844 which introduced principles like registration as a means to obtain  
incorporation and publicity.  
 
Limited liability, however, was still not addressed. Although the 1844 Act retained the 
personal liability of members,44 the liability was restricted. Shareholders could only be 
held liable for the debts of the company for a fixed period. Liability would terminate 
three years after any transfer of the shares. Creditors who demanded payment 
furthermore first had to seek satisfaction against the assets of the company.45 Four types 
of business entities were available to entrepreneurs following the 1844 Joint Stock 
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Companies Act. There were first of all unincorporated private partnerships which were 
restricted to a maximum of 25 persons and who incurred personal liability. Secondly, 
there were chartered companies, thirdly, statutory companies whose members had limited 
liability or whose personal liability was restricted to a fixed amount. Lastly there were 
companies which were incorporated under the 1844 Act but whose members did not 
enjoy limited liability.46 
 
Mention was made earlier of a report by Bellenden Ker47 which investigated the 
continental societé en commandite partnership where partners enjoyed limited liability.  
In 1850 the Select Committee on Investments for the Savings of the Middle and Working 
Classes was formed and one of its findings was that investment by these classes would be 
stimulated by limited liability.48 In 1851 there was a report by another committee which 
investigated partnerships and again the committee failed to address the issue of limited 
liability in a constructive manner. It did, however, recommend that the issue of limited 
liability should be referred to a royal commission.49 
 
In 1854 representatives of Scotland, Ireland and England formed a royal commission to 
investigate limited liability. Limited liability was eventually provided for in the Limited 
Liability Act of 1855.50 
 
2.2.2 Limited liability and company groups in England 
Groups of companies emerged immediately with the advent of the modern company law 
in the mid-nineteenth century. The power of companies to acquire shares in other 
companies had to be provided for specifically in the memorandum of association of a 
company. The absence of such an enabling provision would make any acquisition of 
shares by a company in another company ultra vires.51 
 
                                                           
46
 Goldenberg Guide to Company Law 4ed (1997) 1. 
47
 N 35 above. 
48
 See further Gower Principles 42. 
49
 Gower Principles 43. 
50
 Farrar Farrar’s 20.  
51
 Muscat The Liability of the Holding Company for the Debts of its Insolvent Subsidiaries (1996) 1. 
31 
 
Muscat argues that limited liability was introduced due to socio-economic factors and had 
nothing to do with separate juristic personality.52 With reference to the Companies 
Clauses Consolidation Act,53 the Joint Stock Companies Act,54 the Joint Stock 
Companies Winding-up Act,55 the Chartered Companies Act,56 and the writings of 
Grant57 Muscat concludes that corporate shareholding in another company was possible. 
However, he argues that this did not necessarily imply that one company could hold the 
majority of shares in another company.58 Muscat argues that at the time when limited 
liability was debated and contemplated, it would have been highly unlikely that the 
holding company controlling a subsidiary company was contemplated in the light of the 
fact that the goal of limited liability was to provide a safe platform for a number of 
investors to pool their assets in a separate person with limited liability.59 The goal was not 
that a single corporation would control another company. 
 
Initially limited liability was proposed to be restricted to associations of 25 persons or 
more but this minimum number was reduced to seven a year later.60 The fact that at least 
seven members where required naturally excluded the possibility of a wholly owned 
subsidiary. Muscat refers to heated debates about the requirement of seven members and 
what it meant.61 He mentions that some commentators raised the possibility of people 
nominally allowing 6 others, for example “servants to hold a share and the real 
shareholder holding the remaining ninety four shares which in effect resulted in one 
person companies.”62 In practice, however, entrepreneurs started to make use of this 
mechanism of nominal shareholders which ultimately led to Salomon v A Salomon and 
Co Ltd63which for all intents and purposes dealt with a company with a single substantial 
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shareholder, the interests of the other shareholders being purely nominal. The fact that a 
single shareholder was de facto allowed implied that it would have been possible for a 
company to be the dominant shareholder in another at the time of the Salomon case.64 
Muscat concludes that in none of the parliamentary debates or discussions on limited 
liability was the issue of corporate shareholding ever raised. He states that  
“And yet, without any apparent awareness – let alone discussion – of the profoundly different 
considerations, limited liability was automatically extended from the individual investor (who was 
clearly the intended beneficiary of the principle) to the corporate member and then onto the 
holding company. The creation of two or more strata of insulation from liability appears to have 
come about fortuitously.”65 
 
2.2.3 Limited liability in the United States of America 
The most significant developments in respect of company groups can be found in the 
United States of America. It is difficult to determine precisely when limited liability 
became the norm in the United States in the light of the fact that corporate law developed 
at state level rather than at the federal level in the United States of America. The first 
companies in the United States were, as in England, also chartered companies which were 
engaged in various business sectors like construction and banking.66 By 1801 there were 
already 335 companies in the post-revolution United States which were all granted 
charters by their respective states.67 Limited liability was also to a large degree a foreign 
concept and in most states the charters provided for liability for the debts of the company 
by the shareholders.68 In certain sectors, however, limited liability was more important.69 
There are, however, few reported judgments prior to 1800 and therefore the true extent of 
limited liability in early corporate United States is unknown.70 
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Limited liability soon became more relevant with the expansion of the number of 
companies and the growth in the manufacturing sector.71 The American judiciary already 
recognised the concept of limited liability in the early nineteenth century.72 According to 
Blumberg the state legislatures in due course followed suit. Whereas early statutes 
provided for direct liability of shareholders of companies, this trend eventually changed 
due to the rapid increase in the number of companies.73 California is an example of a 
large state and economy which resisted the change for a number of years until early in the 
twentieth century.74 
 
Prior to the reform, Californian law provided for unlimited liability of the shareholders. 
Shareholders were not jointly and severally liable for the debts of the companies in which 
they held shares but rather proportionally to the size of their shareholding.75 The 
Californian legislation was far reaching since it also applied to companies which were not 
incorporated in California but which conducted business in California. Furthermore it 
also applied regardless of whether the company legislation of the state of incorporation 
provided for limited liability.76 States were therefore forced to enforce Californian 
judgments against their own residents if those residents were shareholders of companies 
which conducted business in California. This was held not to be unconstitutional.77 
 
According to Blumberg the Californian law was not de facto as draconian as it appeared 
to be. It allowed shareholders to contract out of liability and the statutory liability 
prescribed three years after the date on which the obligation had originally been incurred 
and not within three years of default.78  
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2.2.4 Limited liability and company groups in the United States of America 
2.2.4.1 Introduction 
Limited liability was initially a non-issue in the United States in respect of company 
groups as it was not allowed at all. In the nineteenth century it was initially impossible for 
one company to own shares in another subject to certain exceptions.79 A bank, for 
example, could hold shares in a construction company, if the bank had an interest in the 
building.80 Contracts to purchase shares by one company in another were seen to be ultra 
vires and therefore unenforceable.81 By 1855 some companies in some industries were 
allowed by certain states to own up to ten percent of shares in another company.82 
According to Cook the shareholder of a company, which contemplated the purchase of 
shares in another company, could not object to that purchase, despite the fact that the 
purchase would be ultra vires the company.83 
 
According to Blumberg the prohibition remained unchallenged for most of the early and 
mid-nineteenth century with a few exceptions.84 He does, however, mention that there 
were also statutory exceptions to the general prohibitions. These statutory exceptions 
were mainly in three areas: banks and insurance companies could purchase shares in 
other companies for the purposes of investment in the fields of water, gaslight and the 
railroads.85 The railroads were significant in that the expansion of the United States 
towards to the west was stimulated by a rapidly increasing rail track system. By allowing 
the holding of shares by one company in another the expansion was stimulated through 
the interconnection of different companies’ lines.86  
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According to Bonbright and Means87 the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company could be 
considered to be the first holding company in the United States since it was allowed by 
the state of Maryland to purchase the majority of shares in the Washington Branch Road 
in 1832 or 1833. Bonbright and Means, however, aver that the incorporation of a number 
of companies which obtained legislative charters to own shares in other companies was 
thought “to have been the result of legislative favouritism and corruption”.88 
 
Despite the abovementioned exceptions the holding of shares by a company in another 
was still only allowed if the former’s charter allowed this. The doctrine of ultra vires still 
acted as a general bar in the absence of authority in a charter.89 According to Blumberg 
entrepreneurs found innovative ways to consolidate control of various companies, for 
example, by using a trust.90 The shelf life of the trust device was short lived, as antitrust 
legislation in various sectors soon followed at the end of the nineteenth century.91 
 
New Jersey was the first state which earnestly sought licence fees from incorporated 
companies.92 The state drew numerous companies to register in the state due to its 
adoption of legislation authorising the holding of shares in other companies. Bonbright 
and Means state in this context: 
“When the title state of New Jersey, eager to enrich its treasury with license fees from corporate 
promoters, amended its general corporation law so as to permit corporations freely to hold the 
stocks of other corporations, it took a step the economic consequences of which have seldom been 
equalled in the entire history of business legislation. For it thereby opened the door for the entry of 
the holding company as the leading device for combining enterprises under common control and 
management.”93 
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According to Bonbright and Means the New Jersey legislature felt the need to clear up 
any ambiguities and amended the statute in 1889 and broadened its extent in 1893.94 The 
success of New Jersey led to other states following suit.95 Not everybody was happy 
though and some saw it as the start of great conglomerates. Blumberg quotes a journalist, 
Steffens, who described the action of the New Jersey legislature as “New Jersey: A 
Traitor State. How She Sold Out the United States.”96 According to Blumberg the initial 
New Jersey Act was not as radical as the quoted response would suggest. It merely 
provided for some form of “vertical integration” by allowing a company to purchase 
shares in another company which served as a supplier for the business of the company 
purchasing those shares.97 Later amendments of the initial enabling Acts went further and 
provided for the unrestricted power of companies, which were incorporated in New 
Jersey, to obtain the shares in other companies with the consent of the directors of the 
purchasing company.98  
 
In respect of the judiciary’s attitude towards the holding of shares by companies in other 
companies the position was that there was antagonism to such a situation. The rationale 
for such prohibition, namely that one company could not hold shares in another, lay in the 
courts’ refusal to extend the powers of companies beyond those which were granted by 
the respective legislative charters or the relevant company’s constitution. The power to 
hold shares in another company therefore had to be expressly granted to a company.99 A 
company only had certain powers in terms of its constitution and any act beyond these 
powers was ultra vires.100 This view was confirmed in De La Vergne Refrigerating 
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Machine Co v German Savings Institution.101 In Buckeye Marble & Firestone Co v 
Harvey102 the court not only stated that such shareholding was ultra vires, but was also 
influenced by the concern that it could lead to the establishment of monopolies, which 
also had to be avoided. 
 
According to Blumberg,103 the courts’ antagonism towards the holding of shares by a 
company in another could be seen as a way of resisting the control which could be 
gained. Courts looked at the constitutions of companies and if they did not provide for the 
control of another company it would be ultra vires to acquire or exercise control even if 
they permitted shareholding in another company.104 Courts would therefore not allow 
such shareholding in the absence of an enabling provision in the charters of the 
companies and such a power to hold shares in another company would also not be 
implied by the courts.105 Compton advances a number of reasons for this resistance 
including jealousy by the state of the power of large corporations, the risk for the 
shareholders of the holding company, public policy, unfairness towards the company in 
which shares were to be purchased and the fact that it was against the provisions of a 
company’s charter which was to be interpreted strictly.106 Compton does not, however, 
provide any details for these reasons against the holding of shares in one company by 
another. A brief history of the development of the courts’ attitude towards companies 
holding shares in other companies will now be provided to show how the initial 
antagonism which Blumberg refers to changed in time. 
 
2.2.4.2 The early attitude of the United States’ courts in respect of limited liability in company 
groups  
Probably the first reported case in respect of corporate groups was New York and 
Maryland Line Railroad Company, Plaintiff in Error v Winans.107 The plaintiff was a 
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company incorporated in Pennsylvania and was the subsidiary of a Baltimore and 
Susquehanna Railroad Company which was incorporated in Maryland. The plaintiff 
operated a railroad from York (Pennsylvania) up to the border of the state with Maryland 
where the holding company continued the railroad to Baltimore. The subsidiary allegedly 
infringed on certain patented rights in respect of its railroad carriages and legal action 
was instituted against it by the respondent.  
 
The subsidiary then argued that it could not be liable because it and its holding company 
were one company and that the holding company should therefore be held liable, i.e. a 
“reverse piercing of the corporate veil” argument where an entity attempts to deny its 
own separate existence.108 The court rejected this argument and held the subsidiary liable 
although the basis seems to have been estoppel. The subsidiary had its own president and 
directors and submitted annual statements. The Supreme Court held that the subsidiary 
thus created the impression that it was a separate entity which it could not then deny.109 
 
From the outset the attitude of the courts towards limited liability in groups was 
inconsistent. There are cases where the courts confirmed the separate personality of the 
subsidiary and refused to hold the holding company liable for the delicts committed by its 
subsidiary or vice versa.110 In Pennsylvania Company v Esther Rossett111 Rossett was 
injured on the Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago & St Louis Railway Co railway. The 
question that the court had to decide was whether the appellant holding company 
managed and controlled the railway to incur liability for its possible negligence. On the 
facts the court accepted that although the holding company held all the shares in the 
relevant railway company that this could not imply delictual liability. The court 
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nevertheless still held on the facts that the holding company and the relevant subsidiary 
were one entity and therefore held that the railway in question was under the control and 
management of the appellant. 
 
In Pennsylvania Railroad Company v Jones Same v Stewart Nos 40 and 41112 a number 
of companies were engaged in the transportation of passengers on various lines of which 
some intersected and on one of such intersecting lines an accident caused the death or 
injury of a number of persons. The injured therefore claimed damages from these 
companies as common carriers. The court held that the mere fact that the appellant held 
(the majority) shares in the other appellants did not imply that there was some partnership 
or agreement with those companies to act as a common carrier and there could therefore 
not be any liability purely on that basis. 
 
In Lehigh Valley Railroad Company v Dupont,113 Dupont was the executor of the estate 
of Jules Dupont who died in a railroad accident. Lehigh was the holding company of the 
Easton & Amboy Railroad Company on whose railroad Dupont was killed. On the facts 
there was a strong argument that the subsidiary was the agent of the holding company 
since the carrier ticket, which the deceased bought, showed at face value that the carrier 
was Lehigh. This fact was sufficient for the court to hold Lehigh liable. 
 
In Lehigh Valley Railroad Company v Delachesa114 an employee was injured on the 
railroad of the subsidiary of Lehigh. The question was whether the holding company, 
Lehigh, could be held liable for the injuries suffered. Although the court attempted to 
rationalise its judgment by referring to the facts of the case as justification it would 
appear that ultimately the mere fact that there existed a relationship of holding company 
and subsidiary between Lehigh and Easton & Amboy Railroad Company was sufficient 
to imply agency between them and therefore liability on the holding company.  
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In United States v Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co et al,115 Milwaukee was accused of 
giving and receiving unlawful rebates. In terms of the Interstate Commerce Act of 
1889116 common carriers, the officers of such common carriers, receivers and agents of 
such corporations were prohibited from giving rebates, preferences and advantages and 
making unjust discriminations and were punishable by fine and imprisonment. The 
carriers themselves were not punishable but only the agents of corporate carriers. 
 
In terms of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1889 any common carrier, and the officers 
and agents of corporate carriers who by means of “false new acting, classification, 
weighing or other device or means, shall assist, suffer, or permit any one to obtain 
transportation at less than established rates, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable 
by fine and imprisonment.” According to the court the corporate carriers themselves did 
not fall within the ambit of the penalties.117 In terms of the Elkins Act of 1903 corporate 
carriers were made liable to the same extent as were their agents under the 
abovementioned two statutes but subject to a fine only. 
 
In casu a brewer company was a large shipper of beer prior to the enactment of the Elkins 
Statute and habitually received rebates from carriers. After the enactment of the statute 
the defendant company was incorporated which contracted with the brewer company to 
make all shipments of the brewer company and the defendant contracted for shipments 
with such interstate carriers as would pay it from one tenth to one eight of the published 
rate for the transportation, ostensibly as a commission for obtaining the business (which 
was allowed), but in fact was according to the charges a rebate for the benefit of the 
brewer company. The question before the court was therefore whether any repayments 
were made to the brewing company or to a third party. On the facts the court held that the 
two companies were one and the same and were guilty of the offences as charged. To a 
present-day company lawyer the outcome of this case, like the previous ones, would be 
surprising given the fact that the law allows a person to utilise such structures to avoid 
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certain statutory rules especially in those cases where there is no fraudulent activity 
involved. 
 
In United States Ex Pel. Attorney General of the United States v Delaware & Hudson 
Company, Erie Railroad Company, Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, Delaware, 
Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company, Pennsylvania Railroad Company, Lehigh 
Valley Railroad Company118 the issue at stake was once again the alleged transgression 
of certain commercial legislation. In terms of the Hepburn Act119 it was unlawful for 
railroad companies to transport, among others, coal in interstate commerce if the coal was 
manufactured, mined, or produced by it [the railroad company] or under its authority, or 
which it may own in whole or in part, or in which it may have any interest direct or 
indirect.” The accused companies therefore incorporated subsidiary companies to conduct 
the mining operations whereafter they would transport the mined articles. The United 
States alleged that the interest which a holding company had in a subsidiary would be 
embraced by the phrase “interest direct or indirect”. The accused, however, averred that 
the phrase “interest direct or indirect” included only those commodities in which the 
railroad companies had a legal interest and excluded the situation where the railroad 
company was the holding company of the mining company and the only interest it had 
was the shares which it held in the subsidiary.  
 
The court approached the question from the point of departure that the legislature would 
have expressly provided for the holding company and subsidiary company situation had it 
been its intention to extend the prohibition to this situation. Since there was no express 
language to cover the situation at hand it must have been the intention of the legislature 
not to include the holding company–subsidiary company relationship under the 
prohibition. 
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In United States of America v Lehigh Valley Railroad Company,120 the issue at stake was 
similar and once again the case concerned an alleged transgression of the Hepburn Act. 
Lehigh and others had incorporated subsidiary companies to conduct the mining 
operations and they would then transport the mined commodities. The United States 
alleged that the coal mining company was not a bona fide operation but merely an 
instrument of Lehigh which was the legal owner of the mining company and had a 
pecuniary interest in the coal which was mined by the subsidiary. 
 
The court held that the facts showed that the railroad company had actual control over the 
property of the subsidiary and an actual interest in that property which went beyond the 
mere interest which the railroad company would have had as a shareholder. The court 
therefore held the two entities to be one. The court furthermore rejected the argument that 
the legislature had to use express language to include the holding company–subsidiary 
company situation. The court held that the wording of the statute was clear enough to 
include the situation at hand. It furthermore held that: 
“[I]n view of the express prohibitions of the commodities clause, it must be held that while the 
right of a railroad company as stockholder to use its stock ownership for the purpose of a bona 
fide separate administration of the affairs of a corporation in which it has a stock interest may not 
be denied, the use of such stock ownership in substance for the purpose of destroying the entity of 
a producing, etc, corporation, and of commingling its affairs in administration with the affairs of 
the railroad company, so as to make the two corporations virtually one, brings the railroad 
company so voluntarily acting as to such producing, etc, corporation within the prohibitions of the 
commodities clause.”121 
  
In Augusta A Peterson and Ida Peterson, a Minor v Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific 
Railroad Company,122 the defendant company had a subsidiary company in Texas, 
namely the Chicago, Rock Island & Gulf Railroad. The plaintiffs sued the defendant 
based on the alleged negligent killing of their husband/father who was employed by the 
Texan company. The plaintiffs alleged that the Texan company was the subsidiary of the 
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defendant and thus the principal was liable for damages. The court held that the mere fact 
that the defendant held the majority shareholding in the Texan company did not make it 
the principal of the Texan company and therefore the argument that the defendant 
conducted business in Texas through its subsidiary could not be sustained.123 
 
In Stone et al v Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Co et al124 the New 
York Court of Appeal gave a well reasoned judgment as to why a holding company could 
not be held liable for the damages caused by the negligence of a subsidiary merely 
because it was the major shareholder in the subsidiary.  
 
The New York Court of Appeals considered the fact that the appellant owned the 
majority of shares in the offending railroad company which enabled it to control the 
appointment or dismissal of directors. A minority of the directors of the offending 
subsidiary were also directors of the appellant. The same applied to a number of 
executive officers. The court mentioned that the question to be decided was whether the 
evidence made one railroad company responsible for the ordinary daily operations of its 
subsidiary where the corporate organisation of the subsidiary was controlled by the 
holding company although the two companies remained distinct and separate legal 
entities. The court held that where the subsidiary maintained a separate corporate identity, 
entered into its own contracts, kept its own accounts, collected its own income and paid 
its own operating expenses and the only interest which the holding company had in the 
subsidiary was the financial interest of possible dividends, the holding company could 
not be held liable for the operations of the subsidiary.125  
 
The New York Court of Appeal referred to Pennsylvania Railroad Company v Jones 
Same v Stewart Nos 40 and 41126 and Augusta A Peterson and Ida Peterson, a Minor v 
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Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Company127 but distinguished the facts of those 
two cases from the factual situation in casu. What is clear from the judgment of the New 
York Court of Appeals is the fact that it refused to hold the holding company liable for 
the delict of the subsidiary merely because the holding company exercised control over 
the subsidiary. 
 
In United States v Reading Co and others128 the United States Supreme Court had to 
decide mainly on the alleged contravention of the applicable anti-trust legislation by 
Reading Co and a number of its subsidiaries in the coal mining and transportation 
businesses. A secondary question to be decided was the alleged contravention by some of 
the subsidiaries of Reading Co of the commodities clause.129 
 
The Supreme Court investigated the history of the acquisition by the holding company of 
the various subsidiaries as well as looking at the evidence at hand. It was clear to the 
court that there was collusion between the holding company and its subsidiaries to 
prevent competition. The question was whether the mere control of a holding company 
was sufficient to hold it liable under the anti-trust legislation. The court referred to 
Northern Securities Co v United States130 and quoted the following passage from that 
case: 
“No scheme or device could certainly come within the words of the act -‘combination in the form 
of a trust or otherwise in restraint of commerce among several states or with foreign nations’- or 
could more effectively and certainly suppress free competition between the constituent companies. 
The mere existence of such a combination and the power acquired by the holding company as its 
trustee, constitute a menace to, and a restraint upon, that freedom of commerce which Congress 
intended to recognize and protect, and which the public is entitled to have protected.”131 
 
The Supreme Court also referred to another of its own previous decisions in United States 
v Union Pacific Railroad Company132 where it held that: 
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“the consolidation of two great competing systems of railroad engaged in interstate commerce by 
transfer to one of a dominating stock interest in the other creates a combination which restrains 
interstate commerce within the meaning of the statute, because, in destroying or greatly abridging 
the free operation of competition theretofore existing, it tends to higher rates. Nor does it make 
any difference that rates for the time being may not be raised and much money be spent in 
improvements after the combination is effected. It is the scope of such combinations and their 
power to suppress or stifle competition or create monopoly which determines the applicability of 
the Act.”133 
 
The court therefore held that there was a contravention of the anti-trust legislation and 
ordered the break up of the group with each company required to be independent and free 
from shareholding or other control by the other companies. 
 
In Berkey v Third Avenue Railway Company134 which was decided in 1926, the New 
York Court of Appeals had to decide on the liability of a holding company for the 
delictual damages that its subsidiary caused. The plaintiff in this case was injured through 
the negligence of the motorman of the Forty Second Street, Manhattanville & Saint 
Nicholas Avenue Railway Company which company’s shares were substantially held by 
the respondent. The basis of the action by the plaintiff was that the respondent operated 
the whole railway system of its subsidiaries, including the one in question, under the 
screen of subsidiaries and that the respondent was therefore liable for the delicts of the 
consolidated enterprise.135 After analysing the facts of the matter the Court of Appeal 
held that the corporate veil will be pierced where the subsidiary is a mere dummy of the 
holding company. The court mentions a number of factors where piercing would be 
allowed without exactly stating what the basis for the decision was in the case at hand. It 
referred to a “dummy”, public policy, “tests of honesty and justice”, the subsidiary 
having no independent existence, fraud and abuse. It would appear that any of these 
would suffice as seen from the extract below: 
“Liability of the parent has never been adjudged when the subsidiary has maintained so 
consistently and in so many ways as here the separate organization that is the mark of a separate 
existence. […]  The whole problem of the relationship between parent and subsidiary corporations 
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is one that is still enveloped in the mists of metaphor. Metaphors in law are to be narrowly 
watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it. We say at times 
that the corporate entity will be ignored when the parent corporation operates a business through a 
subsidiary which is characterised as an ‘alias’ or ‘dummy.’ All this is well enough if the 
picturesqueness of the epithets does not lead us to forget that the essential term to be defined is the 
act of operation. Dominion may be so complete, interference so obtrusive, that by the general rules 
of agency the parent will be principal and the subsidiary an agent. Where control is less than this, 
we are remitted to the tests of honesty and justice. […] The logical consistency of a juridical 
conception will indeed be sacrificed at times, when the sacrifice is essential to the end that some 
accepted public policy may be defended or upheld. This is so, for illustration, though any agency 
in any proper sense is lacking, where the attempted separation between parent and subsidiary will 
work a fraud on the law. […] At such times unity is ascribed to parts which, at least for many 
purposes, retain an independent life, for the reason that only thus can we overcome a perversion of 
a privilege to do business in a corporate form. We find in the case at hand neither agency on the 
one hand, nor, on the other, abuse to be corrected by the implication of a merger.136 
  
In Cannon Manufacturing Company v Cudahy Packing Company,137 Cannon was a 
company which was incorporated in North Carolina. Cannon instituted legal action in 
North Carolina against Cudahy, which was incorporated in Maine, for breach of contract. 
Cudahy brought a point in limine in the North Carolina court that the North Carolina 
court had no jurisdiction over it since Cudahy did not conduct business in North Carolina. 
The summons in the action was served on the subsidiary of Cudahy, Cudahy Packing 
Company of Alabama, which had an office in North Carolina. Cannon therefore had to 
show that Cudahy in fact conducted business in North Carolina. 
 
The Alabama company did not act as the agent of Cudahy. It bought products from 
Cudahy and sold them to dealers. The sold products were, however, delivered directly by 
Cudahy to the dealers and the Alabama company collected the purchase price. On the 
other hand the two companies operated as two distinct legal entities by keeping separate 
books and the transactions between the companies were also reflected like any 
transactions between two independent entities. 
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The Supreme Court considered the arguments and cases like Peterson v Chicago, Rock 
Island & Pacific Railway Company,138 discussed above, and affirmed that the mere fact 
that a holding company had a subsidiary in another state did not necessarily subject the 
holding company to the jurisdiction of that state.139 The court eventually held that the 
separation of the two Cudahy companies was real and not a fiction. There was therefore 
no basis to hold that the business of Cudahy Alabama in North Carolina became the 
business of Cudahy Packing Company. 
 
In the same year that it decided the Cudahy case, the Supreme Court had to decide the 
Davis v Alexander140 case. In this case cattle, which were being transported from New 
Mexico, through Texas, to Oklahoma on the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway 
System, were negligently injured during federal control. The action to recover damages 
was instituted in the state court of Oklahoma against Davis, in his capacity as agent 
designated by the President, pursuant to the Transportation Act of 1920.141 The injuries 
which were suffered by the cattle were suffered partly in New Mexico, partly in Texas 
and partly in Oklahoma. The main issue to be decided was whether the claim for the 
injuries in Texas should be allowed.  
 
The main issue arose because the railway lines of the Rock Island System in Texas were 
owned by a subsidiary, the Chicago, Rock Island & Gulf Railway Company which was 
incorporated in Texas. Davis was in charge of both the holding and the subsidiary 
company. The holding company argued that the companies operated the two railway 
systems as independent and distinct systems and entities. The court, apparently referring 
to the facts before it, held that “where one railroad company actually controls another and 
operates both as a single system, the dominant company will be liable for injuries due to 
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the negligence of the subsidiary company.”142 The claim for the injuries in Texas was 
therefore successful. 
 
The Interstate Commerce Act143 again came before the Supreme Court in United States v 
Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway Company.144 It would appear that by this stage the courts 
had accepted that a company may hold the majority shares in a producing company and 
then also transport the latter’s products without violating the Interstate Commerce Act.145 
In the Elgin case, however, the holding company held the majority shares in both the 
producing and the transportation company. The State argued that such transportation is 
illegal. The argument was that the subsidiaries of a holding company were no more than 
parts of the holding company. 
 
The court then stated that “it is impossible for us now to declare as matter of law that 
every company all of whose shares are owned by a holding company necessarily 
becomes an agent, instrumentality, or department of the latter. Whether such intimate 
relation exists is a question of fact to be determined upon evidence.”146 The court 
furthermore held that “[t]he mere power to control, the possibility of initiating unlawful 
conditions, is not enough. […] That a stockholder should show concern about the 
company’s affairs, ask for reports, sometimes consult with its officers, give advice, and 
even object to proposed action is but the natural outcome of a relationship not inhibited 
by the commodities clause.”147 
 
From the above it would appear that the early United States’ cases in general did not 
easily depart from the principle of limited liability. The courts were only willing to pierce 
the corporate veil in a few cases which either dealt with competition law where other 
policy considerations weigh stronger than limited liability or in cases where there were 
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cogent reasons to pierce the veil. It therefore becomes necessary to investigate the 
development of the piercing of the corporate veil doctrine in the United States in more 
detail, which will be done in a subsequent chapter.148 
 
2.3 Limited liability from an economic perspective 
The importance of limited liability from an economic perspective has been emphasised in 
the following terms 
“The economic historian of the future may assign to the nameless inventor of the principle of 
limited liability … a place of honour with Watt and Stephenson and other pioneers of the 
Industrial Revolution. The genius of these men produced the means by which man’s command of 
natural resources was multiplied many times over; the limited liability company the means by 
which huge aggregations of capital required to give effect to their discoveries were collected, 
organized and efficiently administered.”149 
 
A company has voluntary creditors in the form of trade creditors and employees. It may 
also have involuntary creditors in the form of people who have claims based in delict 
against the company. Voluntary creditors run the risk of non-payment when they extend 
credit to a company as is the case when they extend credit to a natural person. The higher 
the risk and the longer the risk will be present, the more these creditors will attempt to 
safeguard themselves, either in the form of higher interest rates or a demand for security, 
or both.  
 
Cheffins150 argues that limited liability has a positive effect on people who are “poor risk 
bearers”.151 A poor risk bearer is a person who may or may not be wealthy but whose 
assets would be exposed to attachment to satisfy the debts of a company. Such liability 
could ruin the investor financially. Limited liability shifts this risk from a poor risk bearer 
to creditors who are more than likely better equipped to deal with the insolvency of its 
debtor company.152 
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Easterbrook and Fischel153 advance a number of reasons justifying limited liability from 
an economic perspective. Firstly, limited liability reduces the costs involved for 
shareholders to monitor the people who manage the company, the board of directors.154 
The board of directors acts as representative or agent of the company. The ideal solution 
would naturally be that each shareholder would like to monitor the conduct of the 
business as closely as possible. This is however unrealistic. The profile of the individual 
shareholder in the modern world is mostly an educated person who is meaningfully 
employed and who does not have the time to monitor constantly the people who manage 
the company in which he or she holds shares. The chances are also good that the 
shareholder may hold shares in a number of companies which further reduces the chances 
of (effectively) monitoring the directors of those companies. Even if the shareholder 
appoints fund managers to invest in companies on his behalf the monitoring of company 
managements will still be difficult. Easterbrook and Fischel argue that at some point the 
costs of monitoring would be disproportionate to the investment of the shareholder. They 
argue that in the light of the possible diversified nature of the portfolio of a shareholder, 
the shareholder will neither have the incentive nor the necessary expertise to monitor the 
conduct of the directors of a company who are, in theory, experts in what they are 
doing.155 
 
The second economic advantage of limited liability is that it reduces the costs involved to 
monitor the other shareholders of the company. If limited liability did not exist, there 
would be lower risk that the estate of any one shareholder would be required to satisfy a 
corporate debt where the estates of other shareholders are larger than the estate of that 
shareholder. In such a case it would make sense for shareholders to monitor the activities 
of the other shareholders to guard against them disposing of their assets, although the 
monitoring costs would be high. Limited liability however makes this exercise 
unnecessary and the identity and relative wealth of these shareholders irrelevant.156 
 
                                                           
153
 Easterbrook & Fischel The economic structure of corporate law (1991). 
154
 Easterbrook & Fischel Economic structure 41. 
155
 Easterbrook & Fischel Economic structure 41-42. 
156
 Hansman  & Kraakman  “The Essential Role of Organizational Law” (2000) Yale Law Journal 110 387 424. 
51 
 
The third advantage of limited liability is that it promotes efficient management. Limited 
liability in practice promotes the transferability of shares. Since shareholders are 
generally free to dispose of their shareholding, this restrains the actions of the board of 
directors. The restraint is provided by the voting rights which are tied to the shareholding. 
If existing shareholders were to sell their shares, the new shareholders could form 
powerful blocks and remove inefficient directors. The directors who therefore act under 
the sword of being removed by shareholders will act efficiently to avoid the threat of 
dismissal.157 
 
The fourth benefit of limited liability is the shifting of monitoring from the shareholders 
to the creditors of the company.158 The reason for this is obvious. If creditors know that 
they will only have recourse against the assets of the company, they will monitor those 
assets and the company with more vigour than in the case where shareholders have 
unlimited liability. 
 
The fifth advantage of limited liability is that it creates a uniform share price in light of 
the fact that the value of the shares of the company reflects any further information of the 
company.159 Unlimited liability would create a situation where shares would not be 
homogenous commodities and the market price for the shares would vary from 
shareholder to shareholder due to the fact that a person who wants to invest in a company 
would have to incur greater costs to determine whether the value of the shares of the 
company is its true value. Potential shareholders would therefore incur greater costs to 
determine the true value of the shares which then reduces their appetite to invest. If 
everybody buys and sells on the same terms the market will reflect the true value of the 
shares based on the available information in respect of the company at hand. The need to 
engage in costly research for information therefore falls away.160 
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Sixthly, limited liability stimulates the diversification of the share portfolio of an 
investor.161 Since his only risk is the investment that he has made, he has the incentive to 
diversify his share portfolio by buying shares in a number of diverse companies. Were he 
exposed to unlimited liability such a diversification would become an extremely high 
risk. The reason is that he would expose his estate to claims by creditors of a number of 
companies whereas investment in one company would reduce the risk to only that one 
company. A company can therefore seek investors at a lower cost due to limited liability, 
since the investor knows that the loss of his investment is the only risk. Under unlimited 
liability an investor would not diversify and this would increase the costs to companies of 
raising funds.162 
 
The last reason for limited liability is connected to the fifth reason. Limited liability 
promotes the diversification of an investor’s share portfolio because a shareholder would 
want to invest in a company which is growing, without fear of liability should the 
company fail. If the company fails this is not fatal, since the shareholder’s risk was 
limited to his investment and he has also been able to diversify his portfolio by holding 
shares in other companies. With unlimited liability this would not be possible. If a 
business venture is risky, despite the present growth value of a company’s shares, a 
potential shareholder would not want to enter into the risk of diversification. Easterbrook 
and Fischel argue that this is a social loss because business ventures which show a 
positive net present value163 are “beneficial uses of capital”.164 
 
 
In summary therefore limited liability reduces the financing costs of business ventures by 
reducing the time and costs spent to obtain and disseminate information about a company 
and its activities, the conduct of its management as well as the monitoring of the other 
shareholders of the company. This leads to more efficient business structures as well as 
                                                           
161
 Easterbrook & Fischel Economic structure 43. 
162
 Easterbrook & Fischel Economic structure 43. See also Cheffins Company Law 499. 
163
 Although the authors do not define the term it could be described, considering the context in which it appears, as 
the probability of success or failure of a business venture in relation to financial reward or loss. In cases therefore of 
unlimited liability an investor would not invest where there is a greater chance of failure regardless of the high 
possible return on the investment. 
164
 Easterbrook & Fischel Economic structure 44. 
53 
 
the standardising of credit terms which creditors are willing to provide to corporate 
debtors.165 Anderson, however, argues that the economic efficiency arguments of 
neoclassical economists are based on the assumption that all the relevant information is 
available to the market which the market is able to digest as it becomes available.166 This 
is of course not so. Various creditors have different abilities to obtain information. The 
stronger the bargaining power of a creditor, a bank for example, the more it can protect 
itself, bearing in mind its ability to access this information. A small creditor does not 
have this power. Cheffins argues that in cases of abuse of limited liability or where 
management mismanages the company a creditor could advance credit to a company 
without being aware of such abuse and cannot contractually adjust the risk which he is 
exposed to. The losses which he suffers could impact on the funds he has available for 
other productive uses, which losses may then have a social impact.167 
 
The economic arguments justifying limited liability should, however, be viewed with 
circumspection. Limited liability may make economic sense in contract law but it does 
not necessarily make sense in the context of the law of delict, or where a group of 
companies is involved.168 Cheffins also expresses the same concerns about limited 
liability in the field of delictual law including the costs involved for an individual who 
had to institute legal action against shareholders who could be spread across the world.169   
 
2.4 Limited liability from a legal perspective 
Antunes argues that limited liability should be viewed from the point of view that there 
should be some form of power before a person can be saddled with liability; no liability 
without power.170 Since shareholders have no power because it is vested in the board of 
directors, the argument proceeds that there cannot be liability for the shareholders. 
Antunes then argues that in a corporate group the situation is different in that there is a 
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dominant shareholder who exercises all the power over the subsidiaries, hence there 
should be some form of liability.171  
 
This argument of Antunes is not without merit but it is an open question whether it can be 
supported. Shareholders are not completely without power. It may be correct that if they 
are in the minority that the only power that they may have is the ability to prevent a 
special resolution but they are certainly not without power. If the argument is that they do 
not enjoy effective power the argument could have some basis. But the counterargument 
would then be that the directors, who enjoy the power, should be saddled with liability. 
This is not reflected in the current company laws of any major jurisdiction.  
 
A legal discussion of limited liability is not possible without making reference to the 
House of Lords’ decision in Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd.172 Mr Salomon was a boot 
and shoe manufacturer who sold his business to a company which he incorporated. Seven 
shareholders were required by the Companies Act.173 The shareholders were Mr 
Salomon, who owned the majority of the shares, which he received as part payment for 
the sale of the business to the newly incorporated company, and the rest of his family, bar 
one, each holding one share in the company. The purchase price for the business of Mr 
Salomon was partially to be paid by means of debentures which the company issued to 
Mr Salomon and which provided him with security for the debt as well as preference over 
the concurrent creditors of the company.  
 
At the time of the transfer of the business to the company the business was a prosperous 
and solvent one. In less than a year the company became insolvent. Salomon borrowed 
money and provided the debentures in the company as security to the lender. Salomon 
however retained a beneficial interest in the debentures which provided him with a 
preferent claim against the company. Upon the liquidation of the company the liquidator 
attempted to have the preference of Mr Salomon set aside. The court of first instance 
refused this but instead was of the opinion that Mr Salomon should be held liable for the 
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debts of the company since the company was a mere alias for Mr Salomon. On appeal the 
Court of Appeal held that the incorporation of the company was contrary to the intention 
of the Companies Act and that the company was merely a trustee of Mr Salomon who 
acted as a cestui que trust. Furthermore the court held that the family member 
shareholders were mere dummies of Mr Salomon and that the incorporation of the 
company and the transfer of the business of Mr Salomon to the company was a scheme 
which was contrary to the intention of the legislature. 
 
The House of Lords unanimously rejected the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the 
court of first instance. Lord Macnaghten focused on the requirements of the Companies 
Act which provides for separate juristic personality upon incorporation.174 The House of 
Lords provided the reason why an investor would incorporate a company, namely to 
avoid liability which was the purpose behind the Companies Act. In casu there was no 
fraud or dishonesty on the part of Mr Salomon. The unsecured creditors, in the words of 
Lord Macnaghten “had only themselves to blame for their misfortunes. They had full 
notice that they were no longer dealing with an individual, and they must be taken to have 
been cognisant of the memorandum and of the articles of association.”175 Ultimately the 
court was swayed by the fact that Mr Salomon merely did what the law allowed him to 
do. This decision set the tone for more than a century and is still the prevalent view. 
 
2.5 An apparent alternative perspective on limited liability  
Hansmann and Kraakman176 argue that the essential role of organisational law177 is  
“to provide for the creation of a pattern of creditors - a form of ‘asset partitioning’ - that could not 
be practicably established otherwise. One aspect of this asset partitioning is the delimitation of the 
extent to which creditors of an entity can have recourse against the personal assets of the owners 
[…] of the entity. The truly essential aspect of asset partitioning is, in effect, the reverse of limited 
liability - namely, the shielding of the assets of the entity from claims of the creditors of the 
entity’s owners or managers.”178 
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Hansmann and Kraakman identify two crucial elements for a firm to serve as a nexus of 
contracts.179 Firstly it has to have agents to enter into contracts on behalf of the entity and 
secondly the firm has to have a pool of assets to satisfy claims of creditors against the 
company.180 The authors refer to this pool of assets as the firm’s “bonding assets.”181 
 
A natural person has these two attributes. Juristic persons also have these attributes but 
differ from natural persons in that their bonding assets are separate from the assets of the 
shareholders or directors of the company. Therefore the creditors of the juristic person 
can in principle only claim from the assets of the juristic person and the creditors of the 
shareholders and directors of the company can only claim from the personal assets of the 
shareholders and directors respectively. For Hansmann and Kraakman the last mentioned 
element is the defining element of a juristic person, i.e. the separation of the bonding 
assets of the entity and the personal assets of the shareholders and directors of the juristic 
person.182 Organisational law’s most important role according to the authors is then to 
establish this separation of assets.183 
 
Asset partitioning has two components. The first is to separate the assets of the juristic 
entity and the shareholders of the juristic entity. The second component is the 
“assignment to creditors of priorities in the distinct pools of assets that result from the 
formation of a legal entity.”184 This assignment of assets then takes two forms. The first 
is the claim that the creditors of the company have against the assets of the company 
which ranks higher and stronger than the claim of the creditors of the shareholders of the 
company. This the authors call “affirmative asset partitioning.”185 The other form of asset 
partitioning is called defensive asset partitioning. This term reflects the opposite notion, 
namely that the personal creditors of the shareholders have a prior claim against the 
personal assets of the shareholders of a company, which claim is stronger than the claims, 
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if any, of the voluntary creditors of the company.186 Defensive asset partitioning is 
therefore reflected by the principle of limited liability which precludes the creditors of a 
company from claiming against the assets of the shareholders of the company.187 
Affirmative asset partitioning and defensive asset partitioning form two sides of the same 
coin, the position of creditors of the company vis-à-vis the shareholders of the company 
and their personal creditors. Hansmann and Kraakman argue that affirmative asset 
partitioning reduces the costs of credit for companies since it reduces monitoring costs, it 
protects against the premature liquidation of assets and it allows for efficient risk 
allocation.188  
 
Hansmann and Kraakman argue that the costs of defensive asset partitioning are not high 
from the perspective of the shareholder. The reasons for this is that it allows the 
shareholders to act opportunistically towards the creditors of the company especially in 
cases where the asset value of the company is less than the credit which the company 
requires for its operations. This implies that the company may take excessive risks.189 
 
Hansmann and Kraakman next ask the question whether the law is required to provide for 
limited liability or whether it can be achieved by means of contract. The authors argue 
that although there could be high transaction costs involved for the shareholders, the 
latter approach would not be impossible. They argue that the transaction costs of 
establishing defensive asset partitioning would still not be as high as the transaction costs 
involved in creating affirmative asset partitioning.190 Affirmative asset partitioning would 
be impossible to provide for by means of contract in light of the transaction costs, 
monitoring costs and moral hazard involved. The reasons for the high costs would be that 
the creditors of the company would have to rely on the shareholder to enter into a 
contract with each of his creditors that they would not lay claim to the assets of the 
company. The shareholder would have to enter into such a contract with every creditor 
                                                           
186
 Hansmann & Kraakman Organizational Law 393. 
187
 Hansmann & Kraakman Organizational Law 394. 
188
 Hansmann & Kraakman Organizational Law 398–405. Compare also Easterbrook & Fischel Economic structure 
para 2.3 51. 
189
 Hansmann & Kraakman Organizational Law 423. 
190
 Hansmann & Kraakman Organizational Law 429. In respect of affirmative asset partitioning by means of 
contract and the difficulties and resulting transaction costs see 406-410. 
58 
 
which would be time consuming and expensive. The monitoring costs for the creditors of 
the company would be excessive. They would have to monitor the shareholder to ensure 
that he enters into these contracts with every personal creditor. Since this will be difficult, 
this could lead to opportunistic behaviour by the shareholder by not contracting with all 
of his personal shareholders. This leads to moral hazard.191 With defensive asset 
partitioning the company, in the absence of limited liability, would include a standard 
waiver in every contract with a creditor in terms of which the creditor waives his right to 
claim from the personal estates of the shareholders. Hansman and Kraakman argue that 
these costs would not be as expensive as with affirmative asset partitioning since there 
would be no need to amend the contract in respect of every creditor (only one standard 
form waiver is required) and the chances for moral hazard would not be present.192 
 
In respect of involuntary creditors193 the authors argue that limited liability would appear 
to be a “historical accident.”194 They base this opinion on the circumstances which 
existed during the formative years of companies in the late nineteenth century where 
delictual liability was sufficient to cause the downfall of a company. The authors further 
argue that although limited liability makes sense in respect of the law of contract, it does 
not make sense in respect of delictual liability. A victim of a delict, after all, has no 
influence over who injures him. They therefore argue that “to make the amount recovered 
by a tort victim depend upon the legal form of the organization responsible for the tort is 
to permit the externalization of accident costs, and indeed to invite the choice of legal 
entity to be governed in important part by the desire to seek such externalization.”195 
 
The problem with the abovementioned views of Hansmann and Kraakman, in respect of 
voluntary creditors, is that they do not necessarily make sense within the context of the 
reality of a group of companies. The authors argue that asset partitioning benefits the 
creditors of the owners or managers of a company because the creditors of the owner 
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enjoy protection for their claims against the owner in light of the fact that the creditors of 
the company cannot enforce claims against the owner. The problem with this argument 
where a holding company is the owner is that the owner does not have “personal 
creditors” and is even less in need of protection than the creditors of its subsidiary 
company in the light of the domination and control that the holding company enjoys. The 
holding company’s power to give directions to the subsidiary, divert corporate 
opportunities from the subsidiary to the holding company and deprive it of its funds 
ensures that the holding company runs less risk of insolvency than the subsidiary 
company. The creditors of the holding company are therefore shielded and were the 
holding company to be liquidated they have a claim against the assets of the holding 
company, which assets include its shares in the subsidiary company. The pool from 
which the creditors of the holding company can draw is in theory much bigger than the 
pool available to the creditors of the subsidiary and asset partitioning works in favour of 
the creditors of the holding company as well as the owners of the holding company. 
Should these owners be natural persons the ultimate benefits of the subsidiary company 
accrue to them and their creditors ultimately enjoy the benefits of limited liability and 
asset partitioning.  
 
In chapter six it will be shown that other writers also doubt the historical basis for limited 
liability in respect of the field of the law of delict.196 
 
2.6 Evaluation 
It is clear that limited liability was a concession by the state to enable companies to 
attract investors without the risk of these investors being liable for the company’s debts 
should the business venture fail or other liabilities arise. However, the doctrine of limited 
liability was adopted at a time when companies consisted of individual shareholders who 
were natural persons. As shown above legislators in the United States of America only 
allowed companies to hold shares in other companies in the 1880s and the judiciary also 
refused to recognise companies as shareholders unless their memoranda of association 
allowed this. Furthermore it should be borne in mind that after the Industrial Revolution 
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and the advent of companies, companies were small consisting of only a few investors. 
With the advancement in technology and growing economies it would only be natural to 
assume that companies would grow from businesses with a small number of investors to 
larger entities with more complex structures to deal with the expansion of their 
enterprises. An example is provided by the evolution of corporate structures to finance 
the building of railroads in the United States.  Companies grew from being part of 
“atomic capitalism” to a system where groups of companies became the face of the 
economy.197 When the doctrine of limited liability was adopted, the growth and 
sophistication of corporate business activities could not have been foreseen. This 
argument is strengthened by the fact that shareholding in companies was initially 
restricted in the United States to natural persons. The legislature had to intervene to 
enable shareholding by companies in other companies. Even when corporate 
shareholding was allowed the judiciary set strict requirements before a company could 
hold shares in another. Parallel to shareholding by a shareholder is the privilege of limited 
liability, namely that he will not be held liable for the debts of the company of which he 
is a shareholder. A conclusion which could reasonably be drawn from the above is that 
limited liability cannot be treated the same where a natural person is a shareholder in a 
company compared to the position of another company being a shareholder, since limited 
liability became the norm before companies could hold shares in other companies. 
Limited liability was merely an existing tool in company law which the judiciary and the 
legislature inadvertently extended to companies as shareholders without taking into 
account the context in which limited liability was adopted. 
 
Limited liability evokes much discussion, as shown above. Its origins and the reasons for 
its existence differ from scholar to scholar. It is however clear from the historical 
perspective that it came about through a concession by the legislature and not by private 
contractual means. Companies were in existence long before limited liability was 
considered to be important for incorporators. Company groups were also not possible or 
even under consideration when the legislators in the United States granted limited 
liability to companies with natural person shareholders as shareholders. It is therefore an 
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open question whether the doctrine of limited liability provides adequate justification for 
not imposing some form of liability on holding companies in the light of the historical 
fact that holding companies and subsidiaries were not in existence or possible when the 
doctrine was introduced. 
 
Interestingly, limited liability has not evoked much discussion in South African law and it 
is seemingly accepted as a logical consequence of the principle of a company being a 
separate juristic person.198 Limited liability of shareholders is, however, not necessarily a 
logical consequence of separate juristic personality. Although a partnership is not a 
separate juristic person, the partners do enjoy limited liability to an extent during its 
existence in respect of partnership debts. Any claim which a creditor has, has to be 
instituted against the partners jointly and not against an individual partner. Any claim has 
to be first satisfied from the partnership estate and only if this is insufficient can the 
balance be recovered from the estates of the individual partners.199 Only upon dissolution 
of the partnership do the partners become jointly and severally liable for the debts of the 
partnership.200 
 
Limited liability was also not specifically mentioned as an automatic consequence of 
incorporation in previous companies law legislation. The 1926 Companies Act merely 
provided that upon registration of the memorandum of association and articles the 
members of the company form a body corporate with perpetual succession, which can 
exercise all the functions of an incorporated company.201 Nathan202 writes that this meant 
that the company became an entity distinct from its members and that the members 
enjoyed limited liability by referring, among others, to the Salomon203 case. Limited 
liability, in terms of the 1926 Companies Act, however, has to be understood within the 
context of the 1926 Act. The basic form of company in the 1926 Act was the unlimited 
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company.204 Nathan’s referral to the Salomon case is therefore only in respect of a limited 
company. 
 
Although unlimited companies ceased to be the basic form,205 the 1973 Companies Act206 
(“the 1973 Act”) contains virtually similar wording to the 1926 Companies Act.207 The 
new Companies Act differs from its predecessors. It specifically provides that the 
shareholders, incorporators and directors generally are not liable for the company’s 
debts,208 as a consequence of its incorporation with a separate juristic personality.  
 
From an economic perspective it would also appear that most of the reasons which are 
advanced in respect of the benefits or justification of limited liability are in respect of the 
shareholders of the company being natural persons and not other companies. The 
monitoring costs of shareholders, who are natural persons, simply cannot be compared to 
the monitoring costs for a juristic person, especially one that controls another company. 
The juristic person furthermore can effectively appoint the managers of the subsidiary 
which further reduces any monitoring costs for the holding company. The same may be 
so in the case of an individual who dominates a company, but generally speaking 
monitoring costs do not play as an important role where groups of companies are 
involved compared to a company directly controlled by natural persons.209 
 
In conclusion it would therefore appear that historically the principle of limited liability 
was not related to the existence of company groups. The fact that companies in the 
United States and England were prohibited from holding shares in other companies until 
later in the nineteenth century precludes an interpretation that one should look at the 
principle behind limited liability, namely shareholder protection for the existence of 
limited liability where groups of companies are involved. If the purpose of the principle 
                                                           
204
 S 5 read with s 18(1). 
205
 Under the 1973 Companies Act, new unlimited companies could not be formed, and s 25 provided for the 
conversion of existing unlimited companies. 
206
 61 of 1973. 
207
 Section 65(1). 
208
 Section 19(2). 
209
 See also Blumberg “Limited liability and corporate groups” (1985-1986) Journal of Corporate Law 11 573 623-
626. 
63 
 
of limited liability was to protect a shareholder, why would there be a distinction in 
respect of the nature of the shareholder? No logical reason exists for the prohibition on 
the holding of shares by one company in another.  The principle of limited liability can 
therefore not be accepted to apply to companies holding shares in another as it does in 
respect of natural person shareholders without more. Had there been no distinction 
between the two forms of a shareholder in a company, there would not have been a 
prohibition or restriction on companies holding shares in other companies when 
companies and therefore by implication, limited liability, were introduced by the English 
and United States’ legislatures.  
 
From an economic perspective it would also appear that limited liability is efficient in the 
context of a natural person as shareholder of the company. Although the same reasons 
could be advanced in the case of companies as shareholders this construction would 
appear to be a more forced one and make less sense than limited liability where a natural 
person is the shareholder. 
 
It would appear that limited liability was a convenient, available principle with the advent 
of company groups. The law could merely take an existing principle and utilise it in a 
situation which at first blush seems much the same as the position of a natural person as 
shareholder but there are also important differences between the two situations. 
 
2.7 Exception to the principle of limited liability: The doctrine of the piercing of the 
corporate veil in the South African law in a non-group situation 
 
2.7.1 Introduction 
It is trite law that a company is a legal person distinct from the members who compose 
it.210 It is equally trite that the courts would be justified in certain circumstances to 
disregard the separate personality of the company, also known as the piercing of the 
corporate veil, to establish liability elsewhere for what are ostensibly acts of the 
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company.211 It is therefore necessary to investigate under what circumstances the courts 
have been willing to disregard the separate personality of a company and whether there is 
a difference in their approach when disregarding the separate personality was sought in 
cases where the individuals behind the companies were targeted for liability instead of in 
group situations where the possible liability of the juristic person shareholder had to be 
considered. Interestingly enough the principle of piercing of the corporate veil has not 
attracted much academic debate. Some of the academic points of view will however be 
discussed below. 
 
2.7.2 Development of the doctrine of piercing of the corporate veil 
Dadoo Ltd and Others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council212 was one of the first South 
African cases where the separate personality of a company was at stake. Although the 
case does not deal with the potential liability of the members of the company, the central 
question was whether the identity or race of the members of the company could be 
attributed to the company.  
 
In the Dadoo case Dadoo Ltd was the owner of certain property in Krugersdorp. In terms 
of legislation,213 Asians in the Transvaal were prohibited from being the owners of land. 
In terms of other legislation214 coloured persons were also prohibited from acquiring gold 
rights or stands on a proclaimed gold field. The question therefore before the court a quo 
as well as the Appellate Division was whether the formation of a company by Indians 
was in fraudem legis since they, as Indians, would defeat the intention of the legislature 
by doing something through the instrumentality of a company that they could not achieve 
as natural persons. The municipality sought an order setting aside the transfer of the 
property to the company based on the argument that the transfer of the property to the 
company was in fraudem legis and contrary to the law.  The court a quo held that the 
actions of the shareholders of Dadoo Ltd were in fraudem legis and the company then 
appealed against this decision. 
                                                           
211
 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others 1995 4 SA 790 (A). 
212
 1920 A 530. 
213
 Law 3 of 1885. 
214
 Section 130 of the Gold Law. 
65 
 
 
The point of departure for Innes CJ was the words of Lord Macnaghten in Salomon v 
Salomon & Co215 namely: 
"[T]he company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to its memorandum; 
and though it may be that, after incorporation, the business is precisely the same as it was before, 
and the same persons are managers, and the same hands receive the profits, the company is not in 
law the agent of the subscribers or a trustee for them."216 
  
Innes CJ held that the shareholders in casu did not take advantage of a technicality, 
namely the incorporation of a company, but did something different in law and in 
substance from what was prohibited by statute.217 Unlike the court a quo, which held that 
the incorporation of the company was in fraudem legis due to the fact that this would 
circumvent the express prohibition in the legislation, Innes CJ held that the relevant 
legislation did not prohibit a company, whose shareholders were of Indian origin, to 
acquire immovable property. This according to Innes CJ was not a technical argument but 
one of substance due to the fact that a company is a separate entity from its members. 
Ultimately the Appellate Division held that the transaction (the purchase of the property 
by the company from whites) was not in fraudem legis and refused to ignore the separate 
existence of the company from its members.  
 
According to Blackman the field of piercing of the corporate veil is “an area of the law 
that has resisted clarity and coherence.”218 Blackman, with reference to a number of court 
cases, argues that a court will only pierce the corporate veil if the members of a company 
in effect dominate the finances, the direction of the company and the business practices 
of the company that lead to the transaction which is attacked, because the corporate body 
at no stage over the course of the transaction had a separate mind, will or existence.219 
Dominance, by itself is, however, not conclusive for the courts to ignore the separate 
personality of the company.220 Benade221 uses the analogy of an engagement ring to 
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illustrate the circumstances when the separate juristic personality of a company will be 
ignored. The opinion or view of an engaged lady of her engagement ring differs from the 
view of the jeweller who made the ring. The latter looks at the components of the ring to 
determine its value whereas the engaged lady looks at the ring as a whole.222 When one 
therefore looks at a company it is a question of perspective. One can look at the company 
as a whole or at its various components.223 
 
There are not many reported cases in South Africa where the corporate veil has been 
successfully pierced, probably due to the strict rules which the courts have set before they 
will ignore the separate juristic personality of a company. In Lategan and Another NNO v 
Boyes and Another224 the court refers to Orkin Bros Ltd v Bell,225 where the directors of a 
company were held personally liable to a seller who sold goods to a company at the 
instance of its directors when they knew the company to be in insolvent circumstances 
and totally unable to pay for the purchase and it appeared that the sole purpose of the 
transaction was to diminish the personal liability of the directors under a contract of 
suretyship. This was held to constitute a fraud on the seller and he obtained judgment 
against the directors personally. 
 
 In the Boyes case the court then held obiter that: 
“I have no doubt that our Courts would brush aside the veil of corporate identity time and again 
where fraudulent use is made of the fiction of legal personality. In the present case, however, there 
is no evidence that the second defendant fraudulently failed to mention the position of the sureties. 
In fact, the evidence shows that all parties concerned, including the attorneys acting for the 
mortgagor and mortgagee, forgot about the contract of suretyship when the amending agreement 
was signed. It follows that no question of fraud arises in this case.”226 
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In Botha v Van Niekerk en ‘n Ander227 the court held that fraud would not be the only 
instance where the corporate veil would be pierced, but the court should also ask itself 
whether an unconscionable injustice would result should the separate personality of the 
company not be ignored.228 
 
Domanski229 argued for a more balanced approach to the question whether the separate 
juristic personality should be ignored following the Botha v Van Niekerk case. He argued 
that the law in respect of piercing of the corporate veil, as it then was, focused on 
categories when piercing would be allowed. The problem of categories was that they did 
not always cover circumstances which justified the piercing of the corporate veil on the 
basis of public policy or fairness.230 Domanski, with reference to the Louisiana Supreme 
Court decision of Glazer v Commission on Ethics for Public Employees,231 pleads for an 
approach in respect of piercing where the policy grounds justifying the separate identity 
of the company are balanced against the policy grounds which justify piercing of the 
corporate veil.232 The traditional categories justifying piercing, for example fraud, fulfil 
an evidentiary role to provide an objective balance to the more subjective flexible 
balancing approach.233 Domanski, however, also argues for caution and that the separate 
juristic personality of the company is still the “cornerstone of our company law”.234 
 
Larkin235 argued that there is no such doctrine as the piercing of the corporate veil.236 
This argument must be viewed in the context of the time when Larkin formulated his 
views, in the 1980s, when the Supreme Court of Appeal had not yet authoritatively dealt 
with the question of piercing of the corporate veil. In brief he argues that the entity of the 
company, and therefore limited liability, is the essence of the company. Any liability 
imposed on the shareholders of the company or on the creditors of the company must be 
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based on traditional legal principles. The piercing of the veil doctrine is for Larkin “an 
extremely useful name [for the basis to hold the shareholders or directors of a company 
personally liable] while we learn to understand what it is.”237 
 
The Appellate Division had the opportunity to consider the question of the piercing of the 
corporate veil in Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd.238 In this 
case the appellant purchased certain shares in a third company from the first respondent 
in 1979.  The first respondent refused to transfer the shares and the appellant obtained 
judgment against the first respondent for the transfer of the shares in 1987. The shares 
were, however, sold in the second half of 1979 to the second respondent. The second 
respondent was never joined in the original action for the transfer of the shares in 1987. 
One Lubner was in total control of the first and second respondents. According to the 
court, on the assumption that the second respondent took transfer of the shares from the 
first respondent with full knowledge of the appellant’s rights to the shares, it was open to 
the appellant, when it came to its notice that the shares had been transferred to the second 
respondent, to join the second respondent in the original action and claim transfer of the 
shares based on the doctrine of notice. The appellant did not make use of this opportunity 
and his claim against the second respondent had prescribed. 
 
The sole cause of action on which the appellant eventually relied was that Lubner, with 
the knowledge of the rights of the appellants, and in fraud of such rights, caused the 
relevant shares to be transferred from the first respondent to the second respondent. The 
court was therefore entitled, so the argument went, to disregard the separate corporate 
personalities of the first and second respondents to give effect to the judgment in the 
original action for delivery of the relevant shares to the appellant.  
 
The court a quo found that Lubner had full control over the first and second respondents 
and that the relevant shares had been transferred from the first respondent to the second 
respondent on the instructions of Lubner in an attempt to thwart the appellant’s claim to 
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the shares. Notwithstanding this factual finding the court a quo refused to disregard the 
separate corporate personalities of the first and second respondents. It held that although 
the transfer of the shares between the first and second respondent was “clearly improper”; 
that their transfer did not constitute an “unconscionable injustice;” that the appellant had 
the opportunity to recover the shares from the second respondent but did not do so 
timeously and was therefore at fault for its loss.239 
 
The Appellate Division accepted the factual findings of the court a quo. It had to decide, 
based on the proven facts, whether the separate corporate personality of the first and 
second respondents should be ignored in respect of the transfer of the relevant shares.  
 
The Appellate Division analysed the history of the principle of the separate juristic 
personality of a company and started off with the House of Lords decision of A Salomon 
v A Salomon and Co Ltd.240 It was already tentatively accepted in that case that fraud or 
dishonesty may be grounds upon which a court will ignore the principle of separate 
juristic personality. The court continued with the historic analysis and came to the 
conclusion that it had become settled law that fraud and improper conduct could provide 
grounds for disregarding the separate corporate personality of a company. The Court 
referred to The Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Evdomon Corporation241 where 
Corbett CJ said the following: 
“It seems to me that, generally, it is of cardinal importance to keep distinct the property rights of a 
company and those of its shareholders, even where the latter is a single entity, and that the only 
permissible deviation from this rule known to our law occurs in those (in practice) rare cases 
where the circumstances justify "piercing" or "lifting" the corporate veil. And in this regard it 
should not make any difference whether the shares be held by a holding company or by a 
Government. I do not find it necessary to consider, or attempt to define, the circumstances under 
which the Court will pierce the corporate veil. Suffice it to say that they would generally have to 
include an element of fraud or other improper conduct in the establishment or use of the company 
or the conduct of its affairs. In this connection the words "device", "stratagem", "cloak" and 
"sham" have been used.” 242 
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Smalberger JA raised two points in the Cape Pacific case, which according to him arose 
from the Evdomon case. First of all the importance of the separate corporate personality 
of a company should not be lightly disregarded but on the other hand where fraud, 
dishonesty or other improper conduct is present other considerations come into play.  The 
need to maintain the separate personality of a company should then be balanced against 
policy considerations which may arise in favour of disregarding the corporate veil 
although this “balancing test” approach was not part of the Evdomon case.243 
 
Secondly a company does not have to be incorporated for fraudulent purposes before a 
court may disregard its separate juristic personality. What is of importance is whether the 
separate personality of the company was abused in a specific situation to perpetrate fraud 
or for a dishonest or improper purpose.244 
 
With reference to the decision of Flemming J in the Botha v Van Niekerk245 case, where 
Flemming J held that there should be an unconscionable injustice before a court will 
pierce the corporate veil, Smalberger JA held that a court should avoid too rigid a test but 
should opt for a more flexible approach, namely a test which allows the facts of each case 
to determine whether the disregarding of the corporate veil is justified. Furthermore, there 
is no authority for the proposition that piercing of the corporate veil is a remedy of last 
resort and only available where there is no other remedy.246 
 
Smalberger JA eventually held that the corporate veil may be pierced in this instance 
without making it clear on what basis. He found that there was seriously improper 
conduct. It is not clear whether his decision was based upon the first group of fraud, 
dishonesty or improper conduct, or on the second basis which he mentions, namely 
policy considerations or thirdly a decision based on the facts of the case or on a balance 
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of the various tests. It would appear that piercing of the veil was allowed in terms of 
policy considerations, although Smalberger JA does state that the transfer of the relevant 
shares was to defraud the rights of the appellant.247 Cilliers and Luiz248 argue that the 
Cape Pacific case was decided on policy considerations.249 The authors confirm that a 
court does not have a general discretion to ignore the separate identity of the company 
when it appears just to do so. They do, however, acknowledge that a strict application of 
the law in cases, where “exceptional factual circumstances are present, could result in an 
injustice,”250 like in the Cape Pacific case. They therefore agree with the judgment of 
Smalberger JA in the Cape Pacific case that a more flexible approach should be adopted 
when a court is confronted with the question of whether to pierce the corporate veil and 
that each case should be approached from a casuistic point of view.251 
 
In the subsequent case of Hülse-Reutter and Others v Gödde252 Scott JA said the 
following: 
“The circumstances in which a court will disregard the distinction between a corporate entity and 
those who control it are far from settled. Much will depend on a close analysis of the facts of each 
case, considerations of policy and judicial judgment. Nonetheless what is, I think, clear is that as a 
matter of principle in a case such as the present there must at least be some misuse or abuse of the 
distinction between the corporate entity and those who control it which results in an unfair 
advantage being afforded to the latter.”253 
 
It is unclear from this statement of the Supreme Court of Appeal as to which test would 
apply when a court is requested to disregard the separate personality of a company. What 
is, however, clear from the decided cases is that some form of impropriety needs to be 
present before a court would disregard the separate personality of a corporate entity. 
When an attempt is made to use these rather vague tests in a group situation, it would be 
futile where the group forms a single economic unit but there is no question of fraud, 
dishonesty or improper conduct. What would be left would be the question of policy 
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considerations and judicial judgment. But as can be seen from the last sentence from the 
abovementioned extract from the Hülse-Reutter case, some form of abuse which results 
in an unfair advantage would need to be present to justify piercing of the corporate veil. 
 
The question therefore has to be raised whether the test for piercing the corporate veil as 
formulated and applied by the South African courts is sufficient to address adequately the 
problems which arise within the context of groups as mentioned above.254 This question 
will be discussed below in relation to delictual liability in the context of company 
groups.255 It is submitted that the balancing test which Domanski pleads for and which 
argument the court in Cape Pacific refers to,256 could be the test which the courts should 
adopt. The Appellate Division in Cape Pacific did not reject the argument of Domanski 
and it even appears that the balancing test could also have been the basis for the 
judgment.257 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
254
 Para 1.4 above. 
255
 Chapter 6 below. 
256
 803. 
257
 At 806 the Court of Appeal balances the conduct of Cape Pacific (not utilizing an alternative remedy which then 
prescribed) against the conduct of Lubner. In essence the court weighed up the factors justifying piercing the 
corporate veil and the factors justifying maintaining the separate identity of the companies in question. 
73 
 
Chapter 3 
A group of companies from an economic perspective 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter one gave an overview of what company groups are and, briefly, the reasons for 
their existence and the problems they pose. The second chapter provided an overview of 
the principle of limited liability and showed that the economic arguments to support 
limited liability are not necessarily applicable to company groups. Chapter two also 
showed that the historical origins of company groups do not correspond with the advent 
of limited liability and that limited liability in the context of company groups is not 
necessarily justified. The aim of this chapter is to give an economic analysis of a group of 
companies. The purpose of this analysis is to determine whether a group of companies 
can be seen as a firm / single economic entity from an economic perspective.  
 
The discussion commences by looking at the relationship between the law and the field of 
economics. Then the concept of a firm will be investigated, including how a firm can be 
organised most effectively. Thereafter the group will be looked at and how it fits in with 
the concept of a firm. The chapter concludes by showing that from an economic point of 
view a group of companies can exist as a single entity. This is an important conclusion 
for this dissertation because, if a group of companies forms an economic unit, it must 
then be asked whether the law should not give more recognition to this.  However, it has 
to be borne in mind that not all groups of companies would constitute single economic 
units or firms. A distinction will have to drawn between holding companies having 
subsidiaries as investments, for example a holding company which wants to diversify and 
invest in a number of businesses unrelated to its core business and a holding company, 
which conducts a single business using subsidiaries. For example, there are multinational 
companies, with the parent company situated in one country and having subsidiaries all 
over the world, which conduct the same business as the parent company. Only in the 
latter situation could the argument of a single economic unit or firm be properly 
entertained. Therefore, what follows below is an investigation of a group of companies in 
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the context of a group consisting of separate legal entities but which are dependent on the 
holding company with respect to management, funding and policy. 
 
The simplest example of a group of companies, a group consisting of two companies, 
comes into existence in two possible ways. In the first place it can come into existence by 
means of the creation of a new company with the sole shareholder or majority 
shareholder being the holding company and the newly created company being the 
subsidiary. In the second place a company may buy the majority shareholding, or all the 
shares, in another company and thus effect a takeover of the last-mentioned company. 
The company being taken over now becomes the subsidiary of the purchasing company. 
 
Why would one company want to effect either a takeover or create a new company? 
From an economic perspective it could be to minimise transaction costs and to achieve 
maximum profits for the group, or at least for the holding company.1 There is also the 
legal benefit attached to such a course of action by the holding company. The benefit of 
separate juristic personality ensures that the subsidiary is a distinct juristic person from 
the holding company. The holding company, in general, is not responsible for the debts 
of the subsidiary.2 This benefit allows the holding company, by means of its control of 
the subsidiary company, to engage in courses of business which are of a high risk nature. 
Should the venture fail the holding company only suffers the loss of its shareholding 
which would be negligible especially where it created the subsidiary with a token amount 
of share capital.  
 
Murphy advances several reasons or benefits from an economic or business perspective 
relating to the creation of a group of companies.3 According to Murphy these reasons or 
benefits would include the following: 
“(a) separate companies may enhance decentralization of decision-making in large corporate 
groups; 
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(b) flexibility so as to isolate to separate entities and not across the entire group regulatory 
controls and regimes that would apply if only one corporate entity was used; 
(c) particular foreign jurisdictions may insist upon a locally incorporated subsidiary; 
(d) the ability to sell the entire company or business through the sale of shares, whether for 
tax or operational reasons; 
(e) maintaining the ‘goodwill’, loyalty of employees, or ‘brand’ name after a takeover which 
would otherwise be threatened through a complete integration; 
(f) a separate company may well provide legislative force to maintain a convenient unit for 
management and accounting; and 
(g) the costs in formally and finally transferring assets, services, employees, contracts with 
third parties and liabilities may be prohibitive because of the size of administrative costs, 
financial imposts (eg stamp duties) or tax consequences.”4 
 
It would appear from the above that efficiency, effective control and costs are important 
factors for a company to create or acquire subsidiary companies. Coupled with these 
factors is the legal benefit of limited liability which would reduce the risk for the parent 
company should the subsidiary fail. If the subsidiary company fails the only loss for the 
parent company will be its investment, which in many cases, will not be substantial. 
 
3.2. Law and Economics 
The first question that needs to be asked and answered is whether there is a place for an 
economic approach to law. This is a contentious issue.5 In Bank of Tokyo Ltd v Karoon6 
Goff LJ held, in the context of a holding company and subsidiary company forming a 
single economic unit, that “we are concerned not with economics but with the law. The 
distinction between the two is, in law, fundamental and cannot here be bridged.”7 In 
Adams v Cape Industries plc8 the English Court of Appeal approvingly referred to the 
statement of Goff LJ.9 It is interesting to note that Goff LJ used the word “here.” This 
could be interpreted that it was only in the specific case that the distinction between the 
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two fields could not be bridged and that he did not mean to make a general statement that 
it would never be possible to bridge the divide.  
 
The economic approach to law was traditionally confined to subjects with an economic 
basis, for example competition law but more recently the field of economics has also 
shifted to “non-market” legal subjects like the law of marriage.10 Central to the economic 
approach is the idea that any person is confronted with a choice. The choice that is made 
is then based on a number of premises which usually should lead to a rational choice, 
although there is consensus among economists that not all persons are rational and 
therefore by implication that not all choices will be based on rationality.11 In the market 
arena, therefore, any decision should normally be rational and usually the common 
denominator in formulating a choice would be the cost factor of the choice that is 
exercised.12  It is also stated that the study of law is attractive to scholars of economics 
because law provides them with a “wealth of material for evaluating theories of rational 
behaviour.”13 
 
An economic analysis of law takes two approaches, namely a positive approach and a 
normative one. According to Miceli14 the positive approach to law tends to reflect 
economic reasoning, namely efficiency is seen as a social goal that is reflected in the law. 
The normative approach investigates how the law can be improved to become more 
efficient.15 Using the latter approach it must first be determined how to run a business 
efficiently and whether the law impedes this potential efficiency. The best way to achieve 
efficiency could be to conduct business through a firm, but this begs the question of how 
the law views a firm. It is thus necessary to investigate what a firm is. 
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3.3. The Firm 
The firm can take on various forms including a company. According to Hart16 the firm 
has traditionally been treated as a “black box”. It has just been accepted as something that 
is there and the reasons for its existence and the manner in which it was conceived was 
not thought through. Bratton refers to the firm as “bundles of unruly phenomena”.17 He 
refers to the firm in this manner in the light of the fact that firms are not only centres of 
production but also because natural persons are responsible for the production. Bratton 
also states that there is no fixed theory of what a firm is but that it is an evolving concept 
which differs from person to person.18 
 
Robertson has described firms as “islands of conscious power in an ocean of unconscious 
co-operation like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk.”19 Ricketts refers to 
the firm as “simply the fundamental microeconomic unit in the theory of supply”.20 
According to Ricketts the firm can be seen as a consequence of two continuous problems 
in economic activity. First of all the operative environment of economic activity finds 
itself in a perpetual sea of change and coupled to that problem is the concomitant need of 
flexibility to adapt to the changing environment or conditions. The firm is therefore the 
ideal vehicle to cope with change.  
 
The second problem that Ricketts identifies is that agreements that are entered into by 
contracting parties need to be enforced. This could then either lead to a longstanding 
close working relationship based on trust and the generation of goodwill or it may lead to 
a system where parties to an agreement implement monitoring systems with the back-up 
of sanctions should there be non-compliance with agreements. The firm again becomes 
the ideal tool to enforce agreements.21 He further argues that firms are established to 
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counter the threat of transaction costs. An entrepreneur will establish a firm in the belief 
that he will reduce the costs associated with “achieving coordinated effort”.22 
 
Another way of looking at the firm is to see it as a number of agreements which are 
bound together in such a manner as to provide flexibility in an unstable environment 
within which a business operates.23 The instability of the business environment leads to 
uncertainty and, according to Ricketts, the consequential difficulty of providing a clear 
picture of the provisions of a contract with a person constituted the “starting point for the 
theory of a firm”.24  
 
The first person to look at the firm and the rationale behind it was Coase who wrote his 
seminal work on the firm in 1937.25 Coase referred to Robinson26 when he set out to 
determine the nature the firm. Robinson held that two questions need to be asked when 
certain assumptions are made in economics; firstly whether these assumptions are 
“tractable” and secondly whether they fit in with reality.27 Coase therefore set out not 
only to define the firm but also to define it in a manner that is not oblivious to reality and 
that is also tractable. “Tractable” in this context is with reference to tools used in 
economic analysis, namely “the idea of margin and that of substitution”.28 
 
To understand the firm better one must first understand the economic system within 
which a firm functions. According to Coase,29 with reference to Hayek,30 an economist 
views an economic system as being coordinated by the price mechanism and that society 
is not therefore an organisation but an organism. The economic system therefore “works 
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itself”. The utilisation of resources is therefore directed by price. According to Coase31 
production will be determined by the market in the form of price movements. 
 
The market consists of a number of exchange transactions. Within a firm these 
transactions are eliminated and production is determined by an entrepreneur. Although 
production is possible outside a firm, the firm is necessary because it would greatly 
reduce transaction costs which would be incurred in the market.32 The resources of a firm 
could be better managed within a firm than outside the firm. 
 
Coase, however, also realised that not all market transactions could be done within one 
firm since at some point the internal organisation within a firm would become more 
expensive than the transaction costs on the open market.33 The size of a firm becomes 
important. Should it be too large the whole idea underlying a firm would be lost, namely 
the intention to save on transaction costs which would have been incurred in the market 
place.  Coase argues that a firm will be bigger: 
a) “the less the costs of organizing and the slower these costs rise with the an increase in the 
transactions organized; 
b) the less likely the entrepreneur is to make mistakes and the smaller the increase in 
mistakes with an increase in the transactions organized; 
c) the greater the lowering (or less the rise) in the supply price of factors of production to 
firms of a large size.”34 
 
There have been three major economic theories of what a firm is. These theories are the 
managerial theory, the neoclassical economic theory and the institutional theory.35 The 
last two mentioned theories are in essence variants of the same theory, namely the new 
economic theory of the firm.36  
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The managerial theory focuses on the governance aspect of the firm, especially the fact 
that management has hierarchical power. This power exists due to the expertise which 
managers have in co-ordinating resources for production.37 Bratton identifies three 
aspects of this hierarchical power of management. Firstly it will be management which 
decides on the produce and volumes to be produced as well as the distribution thereof. 
Secondly management exercises authority over the employees of the particular enterprise 
and thirdly management-dominated firms imposed externalities.38 This means that 
management has shifted the costs of their relationship with shareholders to outside 
parties. Criticism of this theory of the firm focused on the issue that managers did not 
wield their power legitimately. Critics identified three aspects in this respect. First of all, 
management exercised its powers in terms of a statutory vested power subject to the 
approval of the shareholders of the company. Secondly management controlled the board 
of directors, and thirdly the financial environment and community supported 
management.39 
 
The new economic theory has two variants as mentioned above. Coase was the influential 
voice in respect of the institutionalistic point of view. As shown above, Coase identified 
the market and the firm as the two ways in which contracts would be entered into and that 
the issue of transaction costs determined which one of the two would be chosen.40 The 
firm, in effect, is a nexus of contracts.41 The neoclassical theory is not fundamentally 
different to the institutionalist perspective and also focuses on the firm as a nexus of 
contracts.  
 
From the above it would appear that the firm is an entity for the organisation of 
production, or, an institution to allocate the resources for production to avoid, or at least 
decrease, the transaction costs which would have been incurred had contracts been 
entered into in the market place with outsiders like suppliers and marketers. 
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The above does not, however, bring us any closer to understanding how a group of 
companies fits into the concept of a firm. As a next step the internal organisation of a 
firm needs to be investigated. 
 
3.4 The firm, hierarchies and internal integration 
The purpose here will be to ascertain what determines the organisational structure of a 
firm. A firm can be organised in a diverse number of forms, namely by means of vertical, 
horizontal and geographical integration.42 
 
Vertical integration means that a firm which produces a certain product will integrate the 
whole production process of that product within the firm. The firm will therefore, for 
example, invest in the raw materials required for its product and not only specialise in the 
production of the product. The acquisition of the raw materials is therefore internalised 
within the firm.43 From the raw material stage all the subsequent stages of the production 
chain, ending in the product, are also internalised. The marketing of the product, 
conceivably, may also be undertaken by the same firm. The production of the end product 
is therefore not necessarily the end of the vertical integration process. 
 
As reflected by the Walkovsky v Carlton44 case, horizontal integration is also possible, 
where one person or company controls a number of companies which conduct the same 
business, for example in the hotel industry or taxi industry. Each hotel or taxi is operated 
through a separate company. According to Ricketts, firms conduct business either in a 
specialised sphere or diversify into a number of different products.45 Where a firm 
diversifies its business into a number of unrelated fields, it is known as conglomerate 
diversification.46 
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International integration, according to Ricketts, is the “combining in a single firm of 
operations in many different locations and often in different countries.”47 He states 
furthermore that the standard economic theory is not fully able to explain the reasons for 
this type of integration. One conceivable explanation could be that it is nothing but 
vertical integration transcending national borders. This cannot, however, explain the 
structure of a number of transnational businesses.48  
 
It has been shown above that a firm can be integrated in a number of ways. These ways 
all point toward the formation of some form of group structure, whether vertical, 
horizontal or international. This now begs the question whether a group of companies 
constitutes a firm and how it is managed. 
 
3.5 A group of companies as a firm 
This section will be largely based on the views of Williams.49 The question that Williams 
raises is how does the management of a company group work? Is the group managed as 
one entity or is it managed as a number of separate entities? Williams calls this the 
management dilemma.50 
 
As will be shown below,51 transaction costs influence whether an entrepreneur would 
conduct business through the conclusion of a number of contracts in the market place. 
This, however, increases transaction costs. When these transaction costs can be avoided, 
or at least minimised, the option that allows this will naturally be chosen. Thus a firm is 
established and within it hierarchies are established and an integration of processes 
follows. 
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corporation could not have reached the stage that it has without this organisational 
innovation”.56 
 
A diversified corporation often comes into being by means of a takeover. One 
independent firm will attempt to take over another firm in the hope that it will increase its 
profits. According to Williams,57 enterprises merge due to synergy. Synergy means the 
belief that profits will increase when two independent enterprises merge. Although 
Williams refers to mergers,58 the same principle would apply to a takeover.59 
 
Williams refers to enterprises which in the context of groups of companies, will move 
power away from the centre of the enterprise through decentralisation or devolution. For 
example, the enterprise may have various production centres, each a separate legal entity, 
across a country. Alternatively the enterprise could have different subsidiaries with each 
subsidiary responsible for a different product of the enterprise. Williams further suggests 
that in both these situations, the synergies stretch across the individual legal entities. 
Williams further argues that the most important synergies that need to be understood 
within the context of an enterprise, which consists of various legal entities, can be 
classified under the following headings, namely economies of scope, pricing effects and 
internal capital markets.60 
 
3.5.1 Economies of scope 
According to Williams this means the saving of costs when various entities integrate their 
business activities.61 An example would be where a car manufacturer produces more than 
one model and thus is able to use the same equipment on the various models.62 
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3.5.2 Pricing Effects 
The synergy achieved by pricing effects is usually as a result of the utilisation of an input 
within a vertical chain. This means that where a group of companies exists in the form of 
a holding company, its subsidiary and the subsidiary of the first mentioned subsidiary, the 
last mentioned subsidiary would produce an input which will then be either improved or 
used by its holding company and then eventually by the ultimate holding company.63 The 
net effect of this system is that the input and supply prices within the vertical chain will 
not adversely affect the profit within the vertical group, i.e. the profit of the group will be 
higher than it would have been had the entities in the vertical chain been totally 
independent entities.64 
 
3.5.3 Internal capital markets 
 
The capital market is in theory an effective mechanism to ensure that an enterprise is run 
effectively and efficiently.65 Williams66 mentions that internal control measures within a 
company group may have certain benefits over external capital markets in respect of the 
effective management of individual enterprises. Effective control and integration of all 
the activities of each legal entity within the group are required to maximise the efficiency 
of the group of companies as a single enterprise, compared to the situation where these 
entities are all independent and the level of central control much less.67 
 
3.6. The role of transaction costs 
 
Despite the above synopsis of synergies the reason for forming company groups has still 
not been explained. It is clear that an enterprise in the wide sense can integrate or 
coordinate its business activities in two ways. It can either do so by means of a series of 
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contracts with independent contractors in the market place68 or through a hierarchic 
organisation which de iure consists of a number of separate legal entities but which de 
facto constitutes one single economic unit. 
 
According to Williamson69 transaction costs are the “costs of running the economic 
system”.70 This is, however, not the same as the narrower concept of production costs 
which is what economic analysts have been mostly occupied with in recent times. 
Williamson further avers that transaction costs are the “economic equivalent of friction”71 
which is encountered in the field of physics. This analogy stems from the averment that 
friction is ubiquitous in the physical world in which we live and should always be taken 
into account. Similarly in the world of economics there are certain factors which are 
pervasive in running the economic system.72 One of these factors is transaction costs, a 
factor which is not often found in earlier literature on the running of the economic 
system. According to Williamson economists admitted that there was a factor like friction 
in the economy but there was no terminology to describe this friction.73 
 
Williamson asserts that the failure to take transaction costs into account has certain 
consequences: 
“The neglect of transaction costs had numerous ramifications, not the least of which was the way 
in which nonstandard modes of economic organization were interpreted. Until express provision 
for transaction costs was made, the possibility that nonstandard modes of organization – customer 
and territorial restrictions, tie-ins, block booking, franchising, vertical integration, and the like – 
operate in the service of transaction cost economizing was little appreciated. Instead, most 
economists invoked monopoly explanations - be it of the leverage, price discrimination, or entry 
barrier kinds - when confronted with nonstandard contracting practices.”74 
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The firm was only seen as a production centre before transaction costs were recognised as 
the prevalent factor in economic organisation.75 
 
Transaction costs are those costs which are incurred when the terms of contracts are 
being negotiated as well as those costs which are incurred where breach of contracts 
occur and the contracts need to be enforced.76 It would be natural that each party to the 
contract would seek to negotiate the most beneficial terms for itself in the contract.   
 
Transaction costs could be ex ante or ex post facto.77 Ex ante costs are the costs 
associated with the conclusion of a specific contract like the negotiations which need to 
take place as well as the actual drafting (often by attorneys), which could become 
complex since the parties would seek to cover all possible eventualities in a pre-emptive 
manner. Ex post facto costs are the costs associated with the enforcement of contracts 
where disputes have arisen. 78  
 
Where one party is in a stronger bargaining position than the other party, especially in an 
ongoing relationship, he can force the weaker party to continue dealing with him despite 
the disadvantageous terms for the weaker party. This is called an ex post bilateral 
monopoly.79 An example would be a car manufacturer who is dependent on a tyre 
manufacture for the tyres of its vehicles. In principle the vehicle manufacturer would be 
dependent on the tyre manufacturer to a greater extent than vice versa. This is, however, 
conditional upon other tyre brands not being available. This ex post bilateral monopoly is 
also known as hold-up. Dependency on a party within a contractual relationship may lead 
to hold-up since the stronger party may literally hold the weaker one to ransom in respect 
of fees or prices. 
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Where two parties, as in the example described above, are independent the transaction 
costs for the weaker party are much higher than they should be. Where the vehicle 
manufacturer is able to internalise the transaction costs by owning the tyre manufacturer 
it is able to manage its costs much more efficiently and in fact reduce its transaction 
costs. 
 
Transaction costs economics also investigate how people behave when they enter into 
contractual agreements. Important is this respect is how industries organise themselves. 
According to Williamson industrial organisation examines what goals the parties to a 
contract are attempting to achieve. Two important components of industrial organisation 
come to the fore here, namely monopoly and efficiency.80  
 
It was mentioned above that traditionally all contracts were entered into at the market but 
that Coase then researched the firm and the reasons for supplanting the market as the 
mode of contracting.81 The question that the monopoly and efficiency approaches seek to 
answer is why traditional market transactions are being replaced by non-market vehicles 
of economic organisation.82 The monopoly approach argues that the departure from the 
traditional market-type contract is due to monopoly purposes, whereas the efficiency 
approach argues that there is some economic rationale behind this departure from 
traditional market-type contractual arrangements.83 
 
There are a number of monopoly approaches of which the important one for the purposes 
of this research is the one regarding vertical integration within a firm. Here the approach 
looks at the expansion of a firm by integrating processes by means of mergers or the 
creation of subsidiaries and the effect on the firm’s competitors.  
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More important, however, is the efficiency approach to economic organisation. Why do 
firms exist and why are market transactions replaced with non-market transactions, for 
example, by vertically integrating production within a firm? 
 
The efficiency side of economics focuses on the ex ante side of contracting.84 This side of 
economics acknowledges that the ownership of assets is important and is therefore also 
known as property-rights economics. Ownership of an asset leads to the rights of the 
owner to use the asset, to receive any income derived from a particular asset and the right 
to deal with the asset in any particular manner.85 Implicit in this ownership idea is 
therefore the ability of the owner to exercise control over an asset, for example from a 
raw product up to the final product, including control over the alienation of the asset.  
 
It was shown above that non-market transactions are viewed as non-standard forms of 
contracting and that the transaction costs economics argue that the reason for this non-
standard contracting is to achieve efficiency.86 The transaction costs perspective can be 
divided into a governance branch and a measurement branch,87 of which the governance 
branch is more important for purposes of this dissertation. The reason why the focus is on 
governance concerns the reasons why a firm would create various subsidiaries and how 
that firm is governed. Control over these subsidiaries as assets becomes important and, 
apart from the economic reasons for creating subsidiaries, it is important to know how 
control is achieved and whether such control is efficient. 
 
Economic organisation makes two behavioural assumptions. In the first place humans are 
subject to bounded rationality.88 This implies that humans have a limited sphere of 
rational behaviour and are bound to succumb to opportunistic behaviour. The second 
assumption is asset specificity. This means that in standard contractual arrangements one 
party, for example the supplier of automobile parts to a motor vehicle manufacturer, 
invests in a plant that is asset specific to the manufacturer. This supplier is at a real risk 
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since the contract could be terminated which would lead to the supplier having an 
investment which is no good to him. From the manufacturer’s point of view it is also a 
risky situation if the supplier is his sole provider of vehicle components, since this could 
lead to opportunistic behaviour on the side of the supplier, which could lead to a situation 
where the manufacturer is coerced into unfavourable contractual terms to meet his 
production needs. 
 
One could view non-standard contracting forms, especially in the light of the monopoly 
scenario sketched above, to be contrary to competition-law principles. However, 
transaction costs economics view non-standard contracting forms as necessary to protect 
transactions.89 
 
Central to the idea of efficient contracting is that there should be efficient structures 
within which contractual relations are governed due to the risk of opportunistic behaviour 
by one of the contracting parties. This is even more important where long-term 
transactions are envisaged. Again the question arises whether it would be more prudent 
and economical to enter into these transactions by means of standard contracting in the 
market or whether to internalise these transactions within the firm. 
 
Williamson reaches the following conclusions in respect of the effect of transaction costs 
economics: 
“1. The transaction is the basic unit of analysis. 
2. Any problem that can be posed directly or indirectly as a contracting problem is usefully 
investigated in transaction cost economizing terms. 
3. Transaction cost economies are realized by assigning transactions (which differ in their 
attributes) to governance structures (which are the organizational frameworks within 
which the integrity of a contractual relation is decided) in a discriminating way.  
Accordingly: 
a. The defining attributes of transactions need to be identified. 
b. The incentive and adaptive attributes of alternative governance structures need 
to be described. 
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4. Although marginal analysis is sometimes deployed, implementing transaction cost 
economics mainly involves a comparative institutional assessment of discrete 
institutional alternatives - of which classical market contracting is located at one extreme; 
centralized, hierarchical organization is located at the other; and mixed modes of firm and 
market organization are located in between. 
5. Any attempt to deal seriously with the study of economic organization must come to 
terms with the combined ramifications of bounded rationality and opportunism in 
conjunction with a condition of asset specificity.”90 
 
What can be deduced from the above is that contracting needs to be efficient from a cost 
perspective and the question then becomes how a person or firm ensures that he or it 
contracts efficiently. Point four of Williamson’s abovementioned summary then becomes 
crucial. How does a business organise itself to operate efficiently and therefore contract 
efficiently?  
 
3.7 Vertical integration 
When transactions become long-term in nature, vertical integration becomes an attractive 
and viable option. According to Williamson vertical integration has the advantage that 
changes can be effected in a structured manner.91 Furthermore, its attraction lies in the 
fact that there is no need to consult or to renegotiate inter-firm transactions since control 
would be exercised from the top to the bottom by means of effective management 
measures to ensure compliance on a lower level within the firm. Since there is for all 
intents and purposes a single proprietor on both sides of a transaction, profit can, 
theoretically speaking, be maximised. Williamson avers that adjustments can be made as 
frequently as desired to maximise profits within a single firm. Adaptations can be readily 
made in respect of, for example, quantity and price of products without the need to 
renegotiate the transaction as would be the case in a standard market transaction where 
conditions may have forced the parties to re-evaluate the terms of their agreement in 
respect of quantity and price. 
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It was mentioned earlier that vertical integration can be viewed from two perspectives. 
On the one hand, it could be done to create a monopoly, or on the other hand it could 
constitute an attempt to contract efficiently and to limit transaction costs.92 
 
Williamson quotes the following extract from Kleindorfer and Knieps93 regarding the 
purpose of vertical integration: 
“The most popular [explanation] has been that when economies of scope between successive 
stages due to technological organizational interrelationships are strong enough, these activities 
should be provided under joint ownership. Other arguments for Vertical Integration have been the 
avoidance of factor distortions in monopolized markets; uncertainty in the supply of upstream 
goods with the consequent need for information by downstream firms; and the transfer of risks 
from one section of the economy to another. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that transaction 
costs might create important incentives for vertical integration.94 
  
There is an argument that vertical integration is based upon technological advances which 
have been made in industry. Such technological advances allowed the integration of 
processes from the raw material stage of a product up to its end stage which could even 
include the sale stage.95 Williamson is, however, of the opinion that vertical integration is 
rather the result of the need for transaction costs economics.96 Although technological 
advances have made vertical integration easier, ultimately the reason for vertical 
integration is to off-set market transactions with their inevitable variable cost 
implications by integrating those market transactions within the firm to save on the 
transaction costs involved.  
 
According to Williamson, asset specificity is also a fundamental reason for vertical 
integration. Were asset specificity not a factor, transactions could readily be entered into 
effectively in the market place. However, the more asset specificity develops the more 
the parties to a transaction, especially the procurer, realise that internal organisation may 
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be more efficient than standard market transactions. The decision to enter into 
transactions in the market or to internalise them is then determined, on the one hand, by 
the difference in governance costs associated with each of the two options. On the other 
hand, economies of scope also play a role.97 But the more important factor is the 
efficiency of the governance structures of transactions within a firm. To be efficient, 
however, the governance structures which are created to integrate the various non-
standard transactions within a firm need to be controlled by efficient and effective 
management control by the owner/parent company.98 
 
3.8 Agency costs and transaction costs 
The M-form organisation has been referred to above.99 In this format an enterprise 
organises itself based on the products which it produces or on the regions where it 
operates. According to Williams these units are called profit centres which are designed 
to overcome agency costs.100 Williams further mentions that these costs are the 
counterpart of transaction costs within an enterprise and defines these costs as “the costs 
of negotiating and enforcing agency arrangements.”101 Agency costs have been explained 
as follows: 
“In most agency relationships the principal and the agent will incur positive monitoring and 
bonding costs (non-pecuniary as well as pecuniary), and in addition there will be some divergence 
between the agent’s decisions and those decisions which would maximize the welfare of the 
principal. The dollar equivalent of the reduction in welfare experienced by the principal due to this 
divergence is also a cost of the agency relationship, and we refer to this latter cost as the ‘residual 
loss.’ We define agency costs as the sum of: 
(1) the monitoring expenditures by the principal, 
(2) the bonding expenditure by the agent, 
(3) the residual loss.”102 
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One of the most common forms of agency costs is the costs to get managers to function 
as representatives of the shareholders of a company. Within the context of the M-form 
enterprise the applicable agency costs are the costs involved to get all the managers 
within the enterprise as a whole to achieve the most beneficial economic outcome for the 
enterprise.103 The ultimate goal is therefore to achieve maximum efficiency within the 
whole enterprise, and to this end all the separate entities within the enterprise will have to 
cooperate and coordinate their activities for the greater good of the enterprise as a whole. 
 
3.9 Analysis and criticism of the transaction costs approach 
This chapter attempted to demonstrate that a group of companies is a firm and thus could 
be a single economic unit. Although it would appear that economists do not deem a study 
of what a firm is as crucial but treat it as a given, the insights of Coase are still prevalent 
today and influenced a number of economists who have done research on the internal 
organisation of a firm. It is clear that a group of companies falls within the vertical 
hierarchal structure of the firm and is mainly created to limit transaction costs which 
would otherwise have arisen and had to be paid in terms of external contracts with third 
parties, where such parties are not controlled by the grantor of such contracts. Although 
the agency costs may be problematic, ultimately the benefits of internalising the 
operations of a firm outweigh the disadvantages. 
 
The transaction costs approach has nevertheless been subjected to criticism. Anderson104 
argues that the neoclassical economic analysis of companies, as one of a nexus of 
contracts, leads to an analysis where the separate entity of the company yields to an 
analysis where the focus is on inputs and the facilitation of express and implied contracts.  
Shareholders and creditors are merely factors of production and this leads to an analysis 
that company law is only interested in economic efficiency and not reality.105 She regards 
this school of economic thought to be insufficient as a determinant of company law since 
the focus is purely on transaction costs and efficiency, and not on the equitable 
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distribution of the gains made by each party to the contract, namely creditors on the one 
side and the company on the other.106 
 
The aim of the economic analysis of the company is to determine whether efficiency 
exists as shown above.107 The Kaldor-Hicks analysis does not require the winners to 
compensate those who are worse off after the bargain, only that there has been 
efficiency.108 When the Kaldor-Hicks analysis is used to determine whether there is 
efficiency where the resources of the company are distributed or arranged in such a 
manner that the advantage to those who are better off exceeds the disadvantage for those 
people who are worse off, it appears that there is efficiency.109 Creditors of companies 
which fail may therefore be without any remedy against shareholders due to the principle 
of limited liability, although there was still efficiency in the bargaining between the 
contractual parties; the parties being the creditors, on the one side, and the company, on 
the other side. 
 
3.10 Case law recognising the economic reality of groups 
The main English case which has given some recognition to a group of companies as a 
single economic entity is DHN Food Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough 
Council, Bronze Investments Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council and D.H.N. 
Food Transport Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council.110 In that case the 
plaintiffs formed a group of companies. Bronze Investments Ltd (“Bronze”) and DHN 
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Food Transport Ltd (“Transport”) were the wholly owned subsidiaries of DHN Food 
Distributors Ltd (DHN).  
 
The business of the group was to import groceries and to distribute these groceries to 
shopkeepers. In due course private individuals could purchase these groceries at the 
warehouse of the group. Problematic in this instance was the fact that the business of the 
group was owned by DHN, the holding company, Bronze owned the land on which the 
warehouse was situated and Transport owned the vehicles which were used to distribute 
the groceries to shopkeepers from the warehouse. 
 
In 1969 Tower Hamlets London Borough Council made a compulsory acquisition order 
for the land on which the warehouse of the group was situated to build houses. It went 
through the necessary procedures and then gave the required notices to the group to 
vacate. The issue in this case was the compensation payable to the owner of the land. Had 
the land and the business had one owner, the owner would have been entitled to 
compensation based on the value of the land and, secondly, compensation based on the 
disturbance in having its business closed down. The acquiring local authority denied that 
it owed the group any compensation for the disturbance for the business closing down 
since the business of the landowner was not disturbed. The business according to the 
local authority belonged to DHN and not to the landowner, Bronze. The argument was 
that since DHN and Transport had no interest in the land, they were not disturbed.111 
 
One odd thing about the decision was the fact that the group had sufficient time from the 
moment they first became aware of the possible compulsory acquisition of the land in 
question and the eventual acquisition to transfer the property from Bronze to DHN 
without having to pay any stamp duty. The group failed to do so.112 This was, however, 
not important to the court. Lord Denning held that the fact that the three companies were 
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in fact one did not necessitate the need “to go through a conveyancing device to get [the 
compensation].”113 
 
DHN instituted legal action against the defendant and based its action on three grounds of 
which the important one was the averment that the court should pierce the corporate veil 
and treat DHN as the owners of the land despite the fact that it itself chose the form of 
three separate entities to conduct business. 
 
Lord Denning referred to Gower114 who mentioned that there were instances where the 
separate juristic personalities of companies in groups were ignored and recognition was 
given to the economic reality of that group as a single legal entity. Lord Denning 
continued by looking at wholly owned subsidiaries which were “bound hand and foot” to 
the holding company and had to act as directed by the holding company.115 He also 
referred to Harold Holdsworth & Co v (Wakefield) Ltd v Caddies116 (without providing 
any details or reasons as to the reason for the referral) as authority and held that the three 
companies before the court in casu were partners in a partnership and “should not be 
treated separately so as to be defeated on a technical point.”117 He therefore held that the 
three companies should be treated as one and that the holding company, DHN, was the 
one which was entitled to claim compensation for the disturbance.  
 
Lord Goff in a concurring judgment, however, made it clear that he agreed with the Lord 
Denning solely on the facts at hand and that piercing would not be allowed every time 
that there was a group of companies before the court.118 Goff LJ also referred in more 
detail to the Harold Holdsworth case119 where Lord Reid held that: 
“It was argued that the subsidiary companies were separate legal entities each under the control of 
its own board of directors, that in law the board of the appellant company could not assign any 
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duties to anyone in relation to the management of the subsidiary companies and that therefore the 
agreement cannot be construed as entitling them to assign any such duties to the respondent. 
“My Lords, in my judgment this is too technical an argument. This is an agreement in re 
mercatoria and it must be construed in light of the facts and realities of the situation. The 
appellant company owned the whole share capital of British Textile Manufacturing Co. Ltd. and 
under the agreement of 1947 the directors of this company were to be the nominees of the 
appellants. So, in fact, the appellants could control the internal management of their subsidiary 
companies, and, in the unlikely event of there being any difficulty, it was only necessary to go 
through formal procedure in order to make the decision of the appellants' board fully effective.”120 
 
On the facts and with further reference to other case law,121 Goff LJ also held that he had 
to look at the business realities of the situation and not at the strict narrow legal rules.122 
 
Shaw LJ wrote a concurring judgment in which he stressed the fact that the directors 
were the same people in all three companies and that all three had a significant interest in 
the property where the business was conducted. There was according to him “one 
completeness of identity” and “one community of interests” between DHN and 
Bronze.123 
 
3.11 Conclusion 
It has been shown in this chapter that a group of companies can constitute an economic 
unit and in effect be one entity due to reasons of efficiency. Efficiency implies that there 
are winners and losers and that the winners do not have to compensate the losers. A firm 
is therefore often better off to internalise its operations by means of the creation of 
vertical or horizontal independent structures than to conclude independent contracts in 
the market. This has been an important result in light of the conclusions in chapter two, 
where it has been shown that the historical justification of limited liability in respect of 
groups is suspect and could be considered to be a historical accident. This, the doubt in 
respect of the economic efficiency of limited liability in respect of delictual liability as 
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indicated in chapter two124 and later in chapter six125 and the conclusions in this chapter, 
namely that a group of companies can form one single economic entity, create sufficient 
reason for a re-evaluation of the doctrine of limited liability where company groups are 
involved. Cumulatively the abovementioned arguments present a strong argument that 
the law as it stands in respect of groups can be considered to be outdated. From a case 
law perspective the DHN case provided brief credibility to a single unit argument. 
However this case was not generally followed, its effect was short lived and it was 
ultimately rejected in Adams v Cape Industries plc.126 The question arises again whether 
the ratio decidendi should not be reconsidered given its lucidity and the fact that the court 
gave effect to a de facto situation which existed.  
 
In the light of the conclusions which have been reached above it becomes necessary to 
investigate a system which, on face value, recognises the reality of a group of companies 
in legislation. The aim of the investigation of such a system in the next chapter, namely 
the German Enterprise law, will be to determine how it gives effect to the economic 
reality of groups and whether it is an effective system to follow and implement. 
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Chapter 4 
The German approach to company groups 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters it has been shown that the principle of limited liability in respect 
of company groups is suspect from a historical and economic perspective. Despite the 
suspect nature of the limited liability principle the legislature and judiciary in South 
Africa, and other common-law jurisdictions, have been inconsistent in their attempts to 
address company groups and have usually failed to acknowledge the single unit reality 
behind groups.1 It was also shown that from an economic perspective there are plausible 
arguments justifying an inference that a group of companies could be considered to be a 
single entity in appropriate circumstances. 
 
This chapter will focus on possible statutory options which could be explored to regulate 
corporate groups better. The focus will be on German enterprise law which is the most 
advanced system in respect of permitting corporate groups to operate as single economic 
enterprises. As a quid pro quo, however, there is enhanced protection for creditors and 
any minority shareholders. 
 
4.2 The principle of limited liability in German law 
Before investigating German enterprise law on corporate groups as a single economic 
unit, the German system in respect of business enterprises needs to be briefly explained. 
For the purposes of this dissertation the more important entities with juristic personality 
are the Aktiengesellschaft,2 a company with share capital which is usually listed; the 
Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien, a public limited partnership by shares; and the 
Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH), a company which is comparable to a 
private company.  
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Modern company law as it is understood in the common-law system also only appeared 
in Germany in the nineteenth century, especially with the advent of the Industrial 
Revolution. Merchant guilds existed since the middle ages but, unlike England, there 
were not many chartered companies. The lack of chartered companies could be explained 
by the lack of access to the ocean which was an impediment to strong federal states of the 
then Germany like Bavaria and Saxony, the weakness of the central German 
“government” and the Thirty Year War.3 At the end of the Thirty Year War, Brandenburg 
became a dominant power in the north, replacing Saxony and also acquired access to the 
ocean through its acquisition of East Pomerania.4 Despite the political instability in 
Germany, Frederick William of Brandenburg, who reigned as elector over Brandenburg-
Prussia from 1640 to 1688,5 was determined to form chartered companies, not only for 
trade purposes but also to found colonies.6 Frederick William was succeeded by 
Frederick III whose status as elector changed to King in 1701. Following his coronation 
Frederick III became King Frederick I.7 Frederick I reigned over Prussia until 1713 and 
was then succeeded by King Frederick William I.8 
 
The legal basis of companies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is not entirely 
clear, since there was no enabling legislation for the creation of such companies. The 
basis was apparently the granting of charters by the monarch, like the chartered 
companies in England. Without these charters no company with a share capital was 
possible.9  
 
Internally the companies issued shares which were transferable by means of cession. The 
companies of this era were under the control of the members’ meeting. There were 
directors who managed the company but they were subject to the control of the members’ 
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meeting. The two-tier board system of modern Germany was unknown in the era under 
discussion.10  
 
Frederick II11 reigned in Prussia from 1740 to 1786. He encouraged trade and also 
embarked on a programme of colonisation.12 In the light of his programme to promote 
enterprise, Frederick the Great issued numerous charters in Prussia to companies, which 
enjoyed certain privileges like exclusive trade, in the second half of the eighteenth 
century. According to Gmuer, Frederick II was most impressed by the well known work 
by Adam Smith13 and as a consequence did not issue any more charters with exclusive 
rights to companies.14 
 
In subsequent years further charters were nevertheless issued with certain privileges, 
barring exclusivity. In 1843, however, the Prussian Aktienrecht15 was codified and this 
ended the charter system. The incorporation of a company needed state approval as was 
the case in England at around the same period.16 
 
The Prussian Act of 1843 also granted limited liability to the members of companies 
which sought incorporation.17 Initially, prior to the Prussian Aktienrecht, limited liability 
seems to have been a secondary reason for the formation of companies.18 The Prussian 
Aktienrecht was enacted a few decades after the French Code de Commerce.19 The 
French Code specifically provided for limited liability20 and was the first to provide for 
the company in the form that would be recognisable by the modern company lawyer.21 
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One should be mindful of European history however. At that stage France controlled the 
area west of the Rhine following the Basel Peace Accord in 1795.22  Parts of modern 
Germany therefore were already acquainted with company law with the concomitant 
limited liability in 1807. In Prussia concessions or charters were still the only means 
through which companies could be formed. Prussia, however, gained control of the Rhine 
area in 1815. German commercial law, however, only replaced French commercial law 
there in 1862.23  
 
It would appear from the available literature that limited liability was not treated as 
essential in the build up to the acceptance of the Code de Commerce or the Prussian 
Aktienrecht. The reasons could be twofold: either due to the fact that other advantages of 
incorporation were regarded as more important, or the fact that on continental Europe the 
societé en commandite, a partnership, was already known and since such an entity 
conferred limited liability to a degree, limited liability was not something completely 
foreign. 
 
4.3 German enterprise law prior to 1965 
According to Dettling24 four phases can be distinguished in the development of the 
German “group entity” or law relating to company groups, hereafter referred to as 
enterprise law. These phases are firstly the period commencing during the 1870s, 
secondly the Weimar Republic period, thirdly the period of national socialism and then 
lastly the period after the Second World War.25 
 
4.3.1 The initial period 
The initial period after the enactment of the Prussian Aktienrecht was known as the 
concession era when companies were subject to very strict control.26 The fear of the 
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political establishment was that the civil population would, by means of associations with 
share capital, become a secondary institution which could even compete with the state.27 
This fear was also due to the recent French revolution and the uncertainty about this new 
creature in the form of a company with a share capital.28 This fear was replaced by the 
fear of the lack of competition and that small enterprises could be usurped by this new 
way of conducting business.29 The public needed protection from abuse and since there 
was no personal liability, the State had to make sure that the company had sufficient 
funds to satisfy creditors before it allowed incorporation. The grant of incorporation was 
therefore a concession from the State. On the other hand, there was the perception that 
companies with strong financial means could become a threat to the State.30 It would 
appear that the State was of the opinion that economic growth should be under control of 
the State and that the State should be the ideal institution to protect persons who had an 
interest in a company. 
 
There was a boom in the incorporation of companies, especially with the advent of the 
Industrial Revolution, despite the best efforts of the State to make the company as 
unattractive as possible. Especially in the railway and mining industries there was a 
steady growth in the incorporation of companies.31 This coupled with the advent of 
laisezz faire as well as the recognition that creditors and shareholders were not 
necessarily protected by the sometimes draconian rules for incorporation led to the 
demise of the concession theory.32 The acceptance of the ADHGB33 in 1861 also led to 
the challenging of the concession theory. Much debate ensued amongst the different 
provinces in respect of the continued existence of the concession approach. This led to a 
compromise, namely that the provinces could decide whether they wanted to continue 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
zu machen und sie einer dauernden Regierungskontrolle zu unterwerfen sei.“ (The share company was seen as an 
institution which could be dangerous. To counter this it needed state approval to be incorporated and was subject to 
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with the concession approach or not. Civil pressure on the state also led to the demise of 
the concession approach.34 
 
The most important step to get rid of the concession approach was the adoption of free 
trade in 1869.35 The normative approach to company law was introduced in 1870 by 
means of the Kommanditgesellschaftgesetz and the Aktiengesetz.36 The state therefore left 
the internal organisation of a company to the company itself so that the company could 
determine its own sphere of existence and economic activities.37 This was also in line 
with the general liberal attitude of that time. The Industrial Revolution stimulated but also 
forced extensive capital input into firms which consequently pacified the critics of the 
company with share capital.38 Interestingly enough it was the railways, which, as in the 
United States,39 again played a dominant role as the frontrunner of companies with a very 
large share capital.  
 
However, unlike the United States, a recession struck Germany in the mid-1870s after the 
initial boom following the successful war with France.40 The recession led to warnings of 
monopolies since the primary issue at stake was survival. Competition between 
companies became secondary. This reality led to companies having to merge or be taken 
over by other bigger companies. Cartels also became a regular feature and these cartels 
were also justified before the Reichsgericht.41  A fierce critic of possible monopolies was 
Rudolf von Jhering42 but his, and other, criticism were ignored when in certain industries, 
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like the mining of potassium, cartels were granted privileges and the dangers of cartels 
were ignored.43 
 
The introduction of the freedom to incorporate a company was not only important in 
respect of the building of cartels but also important in respect of the formation of 
enterprises.44 Before the existence of enterprise law can be investigated the same question 
needs to be asked as in the case of the United States,45 namely when did it become 
possible for one company to hold shares in another in Germany? 
 
It was possible from the 1840s for companies to hold shares in other companies. Initially 
it was banks which held shares in other companies.46 Grossfeld47 refers to Renaud,48 who 
declared that by the mid-1860s it was possible for a company to be a member of another 
company. Case law from 1877 also shows that holding companies already existed at that 
stage.49  By the end of the nineteenth century the company as juristic person had in effect 
obtained all the rights that a natural person could have. Whether it was ever intended that 
companies could hold shares in other companies seems to be answered in the negative by 
the available literature.50  
 
Enterprises, or groups of companies, were unknown phenomena during the formative 
years of the German Aktiengesetz. The promotion of competition between companies was 
probably also unknown at that stage since competition would usually be stifled by big 
conglomerates which owned numerous subsidiary companies. However, with the 
introduction of the Sherman anti-trust legislation in the United States of America at the 
end of the nineteenth century,51 German legal scholars started to point out the potential 
hazards associated with company groups or where companies are allowed to hold shares 
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in other companies.52 Grossfeld refers to railway companies which cooperated, to a large 
degree, with each other without apparently creating a legal nexus. The consequence was 
that in theory companies were competing with each other but as a matter of fact, one was 
under the control of another. 
 
Legal scholars started to formulate problems which groups of companies could cause. 
Liefmann53 recognised that control over a company could be achieved while having very 
little capital. The risk of failure therefore was remote since the investment in the 
company is very small. The risk of the holding company could however be passed to this 
subsidiary and should it have been a shrewd investment, the holding company would 
benefit from it. Liefmann also recognised the political impact of the concentration of 
power in powerful groups, albeit at the political national level, whereas today the 
concentration of power transcends national borders in the era of globalisation.54 
 
Klein recognised that minority shareholders could be prejudiced by these holding 
companies since individuals would be outmuscled by organised capital whose sole 
concern was its own interests.55 Mezel argued that the legislature needed to amend the 
Aktiengesetz and regulate the concentration of power by groups to protect not only 
shareholders and creditors but also the public interest.56 On the other hand there were 
other authors like Isay who were of the view that the creation of holding companies and 
subsidiary companies was a natural progression of the economic order. He saw the 
separation of the holding company and its subsidiary as formalistic and according to him, 
it was a single enterprise and should be recognised by the law as such.57 
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Despite the reservations referred to above, groups of companies mushroomed in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century. At this time a new entity was also created by the German 
legislature, namely the GmbH.58 
 
According to Dettling the establishment of groups led to market domination through the 
elimination of competition as well as to secure the raw materials which were needed for 
production and simultaneously securing the point of delivery.59 It was mainly big family 
businesses which formed the group enterprises, whereas the larger public enterprises 
preferred the establishment of cartels.60 
 
The German legislation initially still treated the share capital company as one separate 
entity and initial amendments were in respect of the incorporation of companies as well 
as the protection of creditors of the company. Furthermore the members’ meeting was the 
more important organ of the company and not the board of directors. The majority rule 
principle also became more firmly entrenched as a principle which reduced the position 
of minority shareholders in the company.61 
 
The German courts did not have any principled opposition to companies holding shares 
in other companies. They did, however, set certain boundaries. Decisions of the company 
could for example not be abdicated to third parties; the third party being the holding 
company. The implication is, however, that should a party be within a company, 
remembering that the members’ meeting was the more important organ, the holding 
company could or would effectively decide what the subsidiary could or could not do.62 
Since the majority vote was controlled by the holding company any damages which were 
caused by the board of directors could be ratified by the members’ meeting. 
 
An examination of the early scholarly works in respect of groups shows that the biggest 
concern was the lack of competition which would ensue. Problems that are still 
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encountered today, like the position of creditors of entities within the group and the 
sometimes unenviable position which directors of the various entities in the group find 
themselves, were not on the agenda at that early stage of company law. The minority was 
subject to the will of the majority, who could ratify any act which caused harm, even 
where minority interests were at stake or prejudiced. Economic expediency was therefore 
at the forefront during the first phase of the German enterprise law.63 The dangers which 
a number of commentators alluded to or warned against were not heeded, most probably 
due to the shape of the German economy in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the 
liberal atmosphere of the early years where the freedom to associate in any legal manner 
was respected and the formalistic approach by the German courts, when confronted by 
groups of companies. 
 
4.3.2 The second phase 
The second phase of German enterprise law started at the end of the First World War, in 
1918, and ended just before the rise of National Socialism in Germany in 1933. 
According to Dettling enterprises came more and more to the fore and in a sense started 
to replace cartels as dominant forces in the German economy after the end of the First 
World War.64 By 1932 nearly 50% of companies in Germany were part of a group of 
companies in one way or another. It would appear that, like the first phase, due to the 
heavy burden of debt after the war and a recession, many companies could only survive 
as part of a group enterprise.65 Dettling further mentions that the enterprise idea promoted 
numerous debates regarding the value of a single enterprise approach. Juristic works of 
the time focused on accentuating the positives of treating a group of companies as a 
single entity, but without referring to the possible risks of a single entity. The treatment 
of groups as single entities became known as the relative theory, because there was no 
single theory in respect of an enterprise which suited all areas of the law. The area of law 
therefore determined whether the enterprise would be treated as a single entity or not. 
Treatment of groups as single entities then ultimately depended on whether this was to 
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the advantage of the group.66 Tax law was at the forefront in treating company groups as 
single entities. In this context the mere holding of the majority of shares or votes in 
another company was sufficient for them to be seen as a single entity.67 
 
In the context of company law, it would appear that the courts were also more inclined to 
treat the group as a single entity where it would be to the advantage of the group, but as 
separate entities where it was not. The holding company would only be held liable for the 
debts of the subsidiary in very restricted circumstances.68 In respect of contract law the 
position was largely the same as in company law. Where the contracts were beneficial to 
the group there was no problem in contracting on behalf of the group.69  
 
In general it could be said that the post first world war era was one of legal liberalism in 
respect of groups. The courts and the legislature seemingly went out of their way to 
recognise a group entity, if it were to the advantage of a group. However, the single entity 
approach was applied more restrictively in those cases where treating the group as one 
entity would be to the disadvantage of the group. 
 
The first phase, discussed above, was seemingly a totally liberal phase where the law 
recognised the de facto existence of the group also formally, although strictly speaking 
there was no legal basis for such treatment. The existing Aktiengesetz did not provide for 
any recognition of the enterprise as a single entity.  
 
The need for a strong economy was again at the forefront during the second phase to 
relieve the German national debt due to the economic burden which the terms of the 
Versailles peace treaty placed on Germany, coupled with the aftermath of the then recent 
worldwide recession. 
 
 
                                                           
66
 Dettling Entstehungsgeschichte 59. 
67
 Dettling Entstehungsgeschichte 61with reference to the German Reichsfinanzhof. 
68
 Dettling Entstehungsgeschichte 62 with reference RGZ 142(1934) 219 and Spindler Recht und Konzern. 
69
 Dettling Entstehungsgeschichte 63. 
111 
 
4.3.3 The third phase 
Germany passed a new Aktiengesetz in 1937 which gave greater power to the majority 
shareholders but also expected that companies had to serve the greater good of the 
population and the State.70 It made provision for enterprises as independent entities under 
certain conditions.71 It also provided for contracts which the enterprise could enter into as 
a single entity.72  
 
The 1937 Act again gave significant recognition and protection to enterprises. Dettling 
refers to an article in the Frankfurter Handelsblatt which had the heading; “Freie Bahn 
dem Konzernwohl”.73 Germany thus became the country which allowed the conduct of 
business in the form of cartels and groups since these were protected by law.74 
 
4.3.4 The fourth phase 
Post Second World War discussion in Germany in respect of enterprise law was 
characterised by five schools of thought. These were the ordoliberalen or 
ordnungsrechtliche school, the unternehmensrechtliche school, the managerial school, 
the organisationsrechtliche or conservative liberal school and the schutzrechtliche 
school.75 The three most important schools, which warrant a brief discussion, are the 
ordoliberalen school, unternehmensrechtliche school and the conservative liberal school. 
 
The ordoliberalen school was in favour of the market economy system and competition 
between businesses. Should a number of entities position themselves as a single 
enterprise it would defeat competition in the market place.76 Their purpose in respect of 
the Aktiengesetz therefore was to make the creation of enterprises as difficult as possible 
and by this means prevent the concentration of market or economic power in the hands of 
a few.77 The logic behind this argument is naturally that if the number of enterprises, 
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which consist of multiple companies, possibly with different types of businesses, are 
prevented or reduced, the more competition there will be. 
 
The unternehmensrechtliche school, also known as the neo-socialism school, was not 
much different from the ordoliberalen school and the prevention of the concentration of 
power was also important to them. Power for them, however, extended beyond economic 
power and included social and political power. Furthermore, the protection of employees 
was crucial. State intervention was the only means to achieve this. Private regulation of 
company law could not solve all the problems associated with large enterprises.78 
 
The conservative liberal school was of the view that a big enterprise was at the forefront 
of economic development which would lead to technological advances and the 
advancement of the economic position of employees.79 The school viewed an enterprise 
as a logical conclusion of the internal growth of a company and that any attempt to 
prevent this growth would be contrary to all principles.80  
 
4.4 The Aktiengesetz of 1965 
The above developments culminated in the Akiengesetz of 1965. The Aktiengesetz is 
divided into various books. The law in respect of enterprises is regulated in the third book 
of the Aktiengesetz. In the first book of the Aktiengesetz, however, there is provision for 
what a common-law lawyer would understand as the regulation of a holding company 
and a subsidiary company. Initially the discussion will focus on the content of the 
Aktiengesetz regarding the regulation of enterprises and thereafter an evaluation of the 
provisions will be provided. 
 
4.4.1 The first book of the Aktiengesetz: Definitions of relevant concepts in respect of 
enterprises 
Section 15 of the Aktiengesetz defines connected companies as judicially independent 
companies, which in relation to each other exist in majority owned enterprises and within 
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majority participating enterprises as provided for in §16 of the Aktiengesetz, independent 
and controlling enterprises,81 enterprise businesses,82 businesses which are in a reciprocal 
business relationship with each other83 or in a contractual relationship based on a 
enterprise agreement with each other.84 
 
Section 16 of the Aktiengesetz regulates what in South African company law parlance 
would be the controlling interest which one company has in another. Section 16 of the 
Aktiengesetz provides for Mehrheitsbeteiligung.85 Mehrheitsbeteiligung is present where 
either one company owns the majority  of the shares in another juristic entity or where 
one company, by means of usually controlling the majority shares in another company, 
has the majority voting rights in that company. The Aktiengesetz provides that shares 
which are held in a fiduciary capacity or by a dependent company shall be treated as 
those of the holding company.86 The voting rights would therefore follow a similar 
pattern in that the shares which belong to or controlled by the holding company will carry 
the concomitant number of votes.87 
 
Section 17 of the Aktiengesetz regulates dependent and controlling enterprises. 
Dependency and therefore indirectly section 17, stands central in enterprise law.88 The 
Aktiengesetz defines a dependent company as an independent (separate) company over 
which another company (the controlling company) can directly or indirectly exercise a 
controlling influence.89 Where one company owns the majority shares or has the majority 
voting rights in another company, within the context of section 16 of the Aktiengesetz, it 
is deemed that the latter company is dependent on the first mentioned company.90 One of 
the consequences of the dependency relationship is that should the dependent company 
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hold shares in the controlling company, those shares shall not carry any voting rights.91 
Furthermore it would appear that it is crucial that the controlling company should have 
the power or the means to subject the dependent company to its will before it will be 
considered to be a controlling company.92 
 
There are a number of ways in which one company can subject another company to its 
will and thus control that other company. The control could be legal in nature or factual. 
Legal control, due to its legal nature, guarantees a more lasting influence.93 
 
Factual control could either be economic or personal and by its nature is more likely to 
change. For example one company could be dependent on another for its raw materials or 
for the distribution of its products. Where this relationship or dependency is not 
formalised in a holding and subsidiary relationship it is entirely dependent on contractual 
relationships which could be terminated whereas a holding and subsidiary relationship 
would be a more long-term relationship especially where the holding company and 
subsidiary company stand in a vertical relationship in the production chain of a product.94  
 
There are a number of ways in which one company could control another so as to have 
factual or legal control. A majority shareholder through its capital investment would 
naturally be able to exercise control. Concomitant to this would be the fact that a majority 
shareholder would have the majority voting rights at the members’ meeting of the 
controlled company. Contracts qualifying as enterprise agreements in terms of section 
291 of the Aktiengesetz could also be entered into to establish or support a situation of 
control.95 
 
Although the first book of the Aktiengesetz defines what connected companies are, the 
substance of the relationship between connected companies is regulated in the third book 
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of the Aktiengesetz, which is divided into five sections. The first two sections of the third 
book of the Aktiengesetz are the most important since they regulate the two important 
forms of group entity which the German legislature chose to recognise, namely 
contractual and de facto groups.                
 
4.4.2 The third book of the Aktiengesetz 
4.4.2.1 Introduction 
The German enterprise law96 distinguishes two situations, namely companies which form 
de facto groups and companies which stand in a contractual relationship to each other and 
form contractual groups. The point of departure in German company law, as in South 
African law, is that each company is a separate juristic person. The management of a 
company is also conducted by its board of directors.97 The enterprise law as regulated by 
the Aktiengesetz fundamentally contradicts this underlying principle of company law 
since one company has the power to manage the subsidiary company. The power of a 
company to manage another company is provided and regulated in the Aktiengesetz.98  
 
The enterprise law as regulated by the Aktiengesetz can be divided into various sections. 
The first section comprises provisions which common-law jurists would interpret as the 
building blocks of a group,99 namely defining holding companies and subsidiary 
companies, related companies and connected parties. The second section deals with 
enterprise agreements, the third section with de facto enterprises, the fourth section deals 
with the integration of a subsidiary company into the holding company and the last 
section deals with the squeezing out of minority shareholders.100   
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4.4.2.2 Enterprise agreements in terms of the Aktiengesetz 
4.4.2.2.1 Substantive provisions 
Contractual enterprises are regulated in the third book of the Aktiengesetz.101 Section 291 
refers to domination agreements in terms of which a company with shares (a listed 
company) or a public limited partnership with shares cedes the management of that 
company (“the dependent company”) to another company, the controlling company.102 or 
where such a share company or public limited partnership by shares  undertakes to cede 
all its profits to another company.103 Also an undertaking by a company with shares or a 
limited partnership with shares to conduct business for the account of another entity 
qualifies as a cession of profits agreement.104 Should one of two companies, which are 
not dependent on each other, be managed under single management, without the one 
company becoming dependent on the other company, such an agreement will not 
constitute a domination agreement.105 The controlling enterprise could be any form of 
enterprise and does not have to be a company with shares or a limited partnership with 
shares.106 Furthermore, the controlled companies have to be German incorporated 
companies. The controlling company does not, however, have to be a German 
incorporated company and may be a foreign or external company.107  
 
The cession of profits agreement implies the cession of all profits by a company with 
shares or a limited partnership with shares. Profits in this context mean all profits of the 
specific undertaking.108 The practical importance of this type of agreement lies in its tax 
implications.109 The company which cedes its profits has to be a German incorporated 
company whereas the recipient company may be a German incorporated or external 
company.110 Unlike the domination agreement the cession of profits agreement can be 
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made operational retrospectively to include the current financial year in which the 
agreement is entered into.111 
 
The consequences of the abovementioned relationships between companies in the same 
group vary. The mere fact that two companies fall under the auspices of section 16 of the 
Aktiengesetz112 does not necessarily imply that the holding company would be liable for 
the debts of the subsidiary company.  
 
According to Emmerich and Habersack most enterprises in Germany are de facto 
enterprises and are not formed in terms of a domination agreement.113 Important further is 
the question of international agreements where one of the parties is a foreign company. 
Germany used to follow the lex situs, the place where the company had its head office, to 
determine the nationality of a company.114 Lately, however, the German courts have been 
looking at the place where the company has been incorporated.115 
 
Two situations have to be distinguished when dealing with agreements which transcend 
national borders. Firstly, cases where a German company is the controlling company of a 
foreign company and secondly where a German company is the company under control 
of a foreign company. In respect of a foreign company under the control of a German 
company the legal position of the former is subject to the law of the country where the 
company is incorporated.116 In the second scenario where the controlled company is a 
company which has been incorporated in Germany, the German company is protected 
like any other controlled German company under the Aktiengesetz.117 
 
Section 292 of the Aktiengesetz regulates the position of other enterprise agreements.118 
The section regulates the situation where a company binds itself to merge its profits or 
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the profits of its individual businesses with the profits of other enterprises or the 
businesses of other enterprises.119 Partial profit transfer agreements are also regulated in 
the Aktiengesetz.120 In terms of a partial profit transfer agreement an enterprise binds 
itself to another to transfer a portion of its profits or the profits of certain divisions to the 
other contracting enterprise. Betriebspacht121 and Betriebsüberlassungsverträge122 are 
also regulated.123 According to Emmerich and Habersack one of the purposes of this 
section is to subject enterprise agreements to sections 293 to 299 of the Aktiengesetz.124 
 
4.4.2.2.2 Procedural requirements for enterprise agreements 
Sections 293 to 299 provide for the procedural requirements which need to be complied 
with for the conclusion, amendment and termination of the enterprise agreement which 
can, amongst others, be in the form of a domination agreement as mentioned above. The 
Aktiengesetz requires a 75% majority of the dominated company’s shareholders to 
approve of the enterprise agreement in writing.125 Neither the creditors of the dominated 
company nor the creditors of the controlling company have any say in the matter. One 
would have assumed that the creditors of the holding company would have had a say in 
the matter in the light of the fact that there are now more creditors that have to be 
satisfied and who can influence the payment of their claims. Should the enterprise 
agreement take the form of a domination agreement or a transfer of profits agreement and 
the other party to the agreement is an Aktiengesellschaft or a Kommanditgesellschaft auf 
Aktien126 a 75% majority of that company’s shareholders is also required.127  
 
The boards of directors of both parties to an enterprise agreement, subject to the 
requirements of section 293 of the Aktiengesetz, have to provide a comprehensive written 
report in which they have to explain and justify the conclusion of the relevant contract. 
The conclusion of the enterprise agreement has to be justified economically as well as 
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legally. Furthermore, details have to be provided in respect of the amount of 
compensation as well as the severance payment for a dissenting or minority shareholder 
of the dependent company.128 One can assume that the purpose of this requirement is to 
enable the shareholders of the contracting parties to make an informed decision in the 
light of all the relevant information. The enterprise agreement nevertheless also has to be 
considered by a Vertragsprüfer.129 This auditor is appointed by the board of the 
dependent company or by the court on application of the dependent company to the 
enterprise agreement.130 The contract auditor is in principle a chartered accountant and 
his duties are set out in the Aktiengesetz.131  The auditor, among other duties, has to 
report, in writing, whether the compensation or severance payment is adequate.132 The 
relevant shareholders are also entitled to be furnished with copies of the enterprise 
agreement, the annual financial statements of the contracting parties for the preceding 
three years as well as the reports of the respective boards and auditors before the annual 
general meeting at which they are expected to vote on the proposed enterprise 
agreement.133 The enterprise agreement becomes binding only once it has been entered in 
the commercial register.134  
 
4.4.2.2.3 The protection of the dependent company, its creditors and minority shareholders 
The Aktiengesetz provides for the protection of the dependent company, its creditors and 
its minority shareholders.135 The provisions can be divided into three groups; firstly 
provisions to protect the company and its creditors, secondly provisions to protect 
minority shareholders and thirdly the ambit of the powers of the dominating company.136  
 
In the first group of provisions the legislature aimed to protect creditors of the dominated 
company by means of (i) a requirement that a minimum capital reserve amount has to be 
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maintained; (ii) that cover is in place for any annual losses suffered by the dominated 
company; and (iii) the maximum profit which may be transferred to a controlling 
company in terms of a transfer of profits agreement; and (iv) a provision providing that 
the controlling company provides security to the creditors of the dependent company to 
ensure that they will be paid once enterprise agreement comes to an end.137  
 
In the second group of provisions minority shareholders of the dependent company are 
able to choose between two alternatives. They may either choose to remain shareholders 
of the dominated company and demand certain capital payments in lieu of dividends they 
would have received were the company still independent;138 alternatively they have the 
right to leave the company. In the event that they leave the dependent company they can 
either demand payment of an agreed amount for their shares or demand shares in the 
holding company in exchange for their shares. Should the holding company also be a 
subsidiary company of another company the shareholders may demand shares in the 
ultimate holding company in exchange for their shares in the first-mentioned 
subsidiary.139 
 
The third group of provisions regulates the powers of the controlling company vis-à-vis 
the dependent company are regulated.140 The controlling company is entitled to give 
directions to the dependent company if a domination agreement is in place.141 These 
directions may also be prejudicial to the dependent company in the absence of a contrary 
provision in the enterprise agreement. As long as these directions are to the benefit of the 
controlling company or other companies within the group, the dependent company has to 
comply with these directions. The board of the dependent company may not refuse to 
follow the directions of the controlling company because they believe that the directions 
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are not to the benefit of the controlling company or of other companies within the group 
structure.142 
 
4.4.2.3 The regulation of factual enterprises in the Aktiengesetz 
The Aktiengesetz makes provision for situations where an enterprise agreement in its 
various options is not present but where one company does exercise control over 
another.143 This concerns the existence of de facto enterprises. If no domination or 
cession of profits agreement exists, the Aktiengesetz provides that the holding company 
may not issue directives to the dependent subsidiary to engage in activities detrimental to 
its business or to take any business decisions which would be detrimental to the 
subsidiary, unless the detriment is remedied by the holding company.144 In the light of the 
fact that the majority of shareholders will determine the policies of the GmbH,145 this 
form of company is the preferred option as subsidiary company.146 If the detriment is not 
remedied during the financial year in which it was caused it has to be made good at the 
end of that financial year. Should this not be done the subsidiary will have a claim against 
the holding company.147 
 
The board of directors of a subsidiary company has to compile a report within the first 
three months of a financial year in which the relations of the subsidiary vis-à-vis related 
companies has to be reported, if no domination agreement is in existence. This report has 
to state all the legal obligations which the subsidiary had incurred in the previous 
financial year towards the holding company or a related enterprise of the holding 
company and all the obligations undertaken upon the directive of that holding company, 
as well as any business decisions undertaken upon the directive of the holding company. 
The report has to state the performance that had to be given as well as the consideration 
received by the subsidiary company. The report also has to state which business decisions 
and measures the subsidiary company undertook upon the directive of the holding 
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company, the reasons for these decisions and the advantages and disadvantages for the 
subsidiary company. The report has to state whether the disadvantages have been made 
good by the holding company and if so, how. The report also has to state whether the 
rights which the subsidiary obtained have been guaranteed.148 This report has to be 
included in the annual report149 of the subsidiary company.  
 
If the subsidiary company is audited, the auditor has to report to the supervisory board150 
whether the report of the board of directors is correct, that the performance which the 
subsidiary had to provide was not unnecessarily high or that the detrimental transactions 
of the subsidiary were remedied by the holding company.151 The board of directors also 
has to submit the abovementioned report152 to the supervisory board which has to report 
to the shareholders meeting. If the company was audited, the supervisory board also has 
to take a stance on the report of the auditor and report this stance to the shareholders 
meeting, especially if there are objections against the conclusions which the board of 
directors reached.153 If the subsidiary company has to be audited, the auditor has to 
participate in the meeting of the supervisory board and report on the material conclusions 
of his report in respect of the relationship between the company and related companies.154 
 
A shareholder of the subsidiary company may also approach a court to appoint an auditor 
to investigate the business relations between the subsidiary and the holding company or 
other related companies of the holding company. The shareholder may do this under three 
circumstances, namely where the auditor did not sign off the report of the board of 
directors as required of him by the Aktiengesetz, secondly where the supervisory board 
has declared that objections which were raised against the report of the board of directors 
in respect of the relations between the subsidiary company and the holding company or 
related companies of the holding company be disregarded or thirdly where the board of 
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directors declared that the subsidiary company had been harmed by certain activities or 
measures and that the harm had not been remedied.155  
 
The Aktiengesetz contains additional measures intended to provide protection for 
minority shareholders. The Aktiengesetz provides that where a holding company issues 
directives to its dependent subsidiary company to engage in harmful business activities or 
to take detrimental business decisions without remedying the harm during or at the end of 
the financial year, the holding company has to pay damages to the subsidiary company. 
The holding company also has to pay damages to the minority shareholders of the 
subsidiary company if they suffered damages over and above the loss they suffered 
because of the harm caused to the subsidiary company.156 The holding company is, 
however, relieved of this duty to make good any damages to the subsidiary company if a 
reasonable and diligent157 business manager of an independent company would have 
undertaken the same business or issued the same business decisions.158  
 
The statutory agents are also jointly liable with the holding company for the envisaged 
damages.159 The board of directors can also be held liable, over and above the liability 
envisaged in section 317 of the Aktiengesetz, for the failure of the holding company to 
remedy the detrimental directives which it issued to the subsidiary company by the end of 
the financial year. Like the holding company, the board of directors has a defence in the 
form of the reasonable and diligent business manager defence.160 This means that if a 
reasonable and diligent business manager would have acted in the same way there will be 
no liability. The burden of proof is on the board of directors to show that they acted as 
reasonable and diligent business managers.161 The supervisory board of directors is also 
liable if it fails to consider the report of the auditor in respect of the detrimental business 
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relations between the holding company and the subsidiary company and fails to report the 
conclusions of the auditor’s report to the shareholders meeting.162 
 
4.4.2.4 The integration of wholly owned subsidiary companies  
The last group of provisions in the Aktiengesetz on enterprises deals with the integration 
of a wholly-owned subsidiary into the holding company and the consequences for 
shareholders and creditors of the subsidiary company.163 Naturally the holding company 
as sole shareholder will decide whether it wants to integrate the wholly owned subsidiary 
company into the holding company, which has to be a domestic German company.164 The 
shareholders of the holding company, by means of a 75% majority,165 also have to 
approve the integration of the two companies.166 Certain other formalities also have to be 
complied with to enable shareholders to make an informed decision.167  
 
The Aktiengesetz also allows a company which owns at least ninety-five percent of the 
share capital168 of another company to integrate that company into the holding 
company.169 The same requirements which are required for the integration of wholly 
owned subsidiary companies apply mutatis mutandis.170  
 
The legislature made provision for the remaining minority shareholders who hold up to 
5% of the share capital of the subsidiary company. The shares of the minority vest in the 
holding company once the integration of the subsidiary company into the holding 
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company is completed by means of registration in the commercial register.171 The 
minority shareholders are entitled to compensation for the (involuntary) loss of their 
shares. They become entitled to shares in the holding company as a quid pro quo for their 
shares.172 Should the holding company be a dependent company, i.e. a subsidiary 
company of another holding company, the minority shareholders have an election 
between receiving shares in that (subsidiary) company or to receive adequate 
compensation in cash for their shares.173 The minority shareholders are not entitled to 
have the decision to integrate the holding company and the subsidiary company rescinded 
should the compensation for the loss of their shares be inadequate. Instead they are 
entitled to approach the court to determine what adequate compensation would be for 
their shares in the integrated company.174 The holding company has to convene a 
shareholders’ meeting of the subsidiary company to decide on the integration of the 
subsidiary into the holding company. The agenda has to include a declaration (offer) by 
the holding company to the minority shareholders to provide them with shares in the 
holding company, or where the holding company is itself a subsidiary, shares in the 
company and an offer of cash as an alternative.175 The integration is also subject to 
further requirements.176 
 
Provision is also made to protect creditors of the integrated subsidiary company.177 
Security for the payment of proven claims has to be provided by the integrated (holding) 
company in so far as the claims of the creditors of the subsidiary cannot be satisfied.178 
The holding company becomes jointly liable for the obligations of the subsidiary which 
came into existence prior to the integration of the two companies, as well as for the 
obligations of the subsidiary which are proven or due after the date of the integration of 
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the two companies.179 The holding company and subsidiary cannot enter into an 
enforceable contract with a third party unless the holding company also assumes liability 
for the obligations towards the third party.180 The holding company has all the defences 
which the subsidiary would have had against the creditors of the subsidiary.181 The 
holding company can also refuse to satisfy a claim of a creditor of the subsidiary 
company for as long as the subsidiary has the right to attempt to have the underlying 
causa for the obligation rescinded.182 It can also refuse to satisfy a claim of a creditor of 
the subsidiary company should set-off between the claims of the subsidiary company and 
that creditor of the subsidiary company be possible.183  
 
The holding company becomes entitled to issue directives to the company which is 
integrated into the holding company.184 The holding company is also entitled to enter into 
a written profit transfer agreement with the subsidiary company which is to be integrated 
without the need to meet the other requirements of the Aktiengesetz in such a case.185  
 
The shareholders of the holding company are also provided for. They are entitled to the 
same information in respect of the integrated company as they are concerning the holding 
company.186 This means that the shareholders of the holding company are being treated 
as if they are shareholders of the integrated company.187 
 
The integration of the subsidiary company can also be terminated.188 The integration of 
the subsidiary company is terminated if the shareholders of the integrated company 
                                                           
179
 S 322(1). 
180
 S 322(1), third sentence. 
181
 S 322(2). 
182
 S 322(3), first sentence. 
183
 S 322(3), second sentence. 
184
 See s 323(3) which provides that s 308(2), first sentence, s 308(3), s 309 and s 310 will apply mutatis mutandis.  
S 323(3) also provides that the sections dealing with de facto groups, namely ss 311 to 318 will not apply to 
integrated companies. See para 4.4.2.3 above. 
185
 See s 324(2) which provides that ss 293-296 and 298- 303, discussed in para 4.4.2.2.3, are not applicable in the 
case of integrated companies. 
186
 S 326. 
187
 Emmerich & Habersack Konzernrecht 697. 
188
 S 327. 
127 
 
decide to terminate the integration,189 if the holding company ceases to be a stock 
company with its main office in Germany,190 if the holding company ceases to own all 
the shares in the integrated company191 or if the holding company is dissolved.192 If the 
holding company no longer owns all the shares of the integrated company, it has to 
inform the integrated company in writing.193 The board of directors of the hitherto 
integrated company has to notify the relevant authority about the termination of the 
integration of the companies, the basis for the termination as well as the time of the 
termination. The relevant authority will then register this termination in the commercial 
register.194 All claims of creditors against the hitherto main company prescribe after five 
years from the date on which the registration of the termination of the integration became 
effective unless a shorter period of prescription applies. Prescription only starts to run 
from the date on which a debt becomes due and payable, if the debt becomes due and 
payable after the date on which the registration of the termination of the integration took 
effect.195 The legislature therefore provides for the position of creditors in the case of 
termination of the integration. 
 
4.4.2.5 Squeeze out of minority shareholders 
The last relevant group of provisions is contained in only one section with various 
subsections. This section deals with the position of minority shareholders in cases where 
the integration of the subsidiary company is not contemplated.196 Emmerich and 
Habersack describe this situation as a “squeeze out”.197  Once a company owns ninety-
five percent of the issued share capital of another company, the former company may 
acquire the remaining shares for adequate cash payment.198  The rest of the applicable 
section regulates the cash payment or offer which is to be made to the minority 
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shareholders,199 the formalities for the shareholders meeting of the company in which the 
majority company owns at least ninety-five percent,200 the registration of the decision to 
expropriate the shares of the minority in the commercial register201 and the fact that the 
minority shareholders may not apply for the rescission of the expropriation if they are of 
the opinion that the compensation for their shares is not adequate. Instead they may apply 
to court to determine what the adequate cash payment should be.202 The provisions 
regarding the determination of the cash payment largely correspond to those when 
integration of the subsidiary company takes place.203 
 
4.5 Evaluation of the German Enterprise law 
4.5.1 General comments on the provisions of the Aktiengesetz 
Prima facie the German enterprise law appears to be the perfect system. The third book 
of the Aktiengesetz provides for controlling and dependent companies to enter into 
agreements in terms of which the controlling company may issue directives to the 
subordinate company and therefore manage the subordinate company, even to the 
detriment of that company. Creditors are, however, protected as are the minority 
shareholders. Provision is also made for the integration of a subsidiary into the operations 
of the holding company where the holding company has an overwhelming majority of the 
shares in the subsidiary, namely ninety-five percent. In this situation creditors and 
minority shareholders are also protected. 
 
The third book of the Aktiengesetz also provides for de facto enterprises where one 
company holds the majority shares in another company. Provision is then made for the 
manner in which the holding company could be held liable for any detrimental 
instructions which it issued to the subsidiary company. The question is whether the 
German system is a system which South Africa could adopt. Interestingly Brazil, a 
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developing nation like South Africa, adopted a system similar to that of Germany 
regarding enterprise law.204 
 
As a point of departure it appears that the contractual group option205 is not popular in 
Germany.206 The reasons for the lack of interest in the contractual group option are 
probably the lack of any incentives for the dominant company and the fact that it 
becomes liable for the debts of the subordinate company. The obvious alternative is 
therefore the de facto group option, despite the fact that the Aktiengesetz places a heavier 
burden on the holding company due to the control which it exercises over the 
subordinated company.  
 
Antunes points out a number of difficulties with the German enterprise provisions. In 
respect of contractual groups, he points out that the contract is one where one party, the 
dominant company, decides unilaterally on the question whether the domination contract 
should be concluded, the date of the contract and its terms. The dominant company can 
decide and thus manipulate the date on which to terminate the contract to benefit it and to 
the detriment of the minority shareholders of the subordinate company.207 
 
Antunes refers to the system which regulates de facto groups as a theoretical fallacy.208 
He regards it as a theoretical fallacy in the light of the fact that the German legislature 
attempted to reach a compromise between two positions, namely the fact that the holding 
company enjoys the power to dominate the subsidiary due to its shareholding and the 
principle that each juristic person is a separate entity, so that the subsidiary company is in 
theory free to determine its own future.209 Antunes finds this to be an inherent attempt to 
reconcile the irreconcilable. 
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An investigation of the provisions which regulate de facto groups reveals three statutory 
mechanisms to protect the subsidiary company and therefore indirectly its minority 
shareholders and creditors. These mechanisms are firstly, the obligation of the holding 
company to indemnify or compensate the subsidiary company for every detrimental legal 
transaction or for every detrimental measure or business decision which the holding 
company directed the subsidiary company to take. This indemnity or compensation has to 
be paid immediately or at the end of the financial year.210 The second protective 
mechanism is the requirement of the dependency report by the board of the subsidiary as 
well as its verification by an independent third party, an auditor.211 The third protective 
measure is the liability of the holding company to indemnify or compensate the 
subsidiary company under the envisaged circumstances.212 Problematic is, however, any 
direct liability vis-à-vis the creditors of the subsidiary company. The provisions of the 
Aktiengesetz only protect the subsidiary company and its minority shareholders. If the 
subsidiary company is a GmbH the creditors may attempt to pierce the corporate veil to 
hold the shareholders liable and this attempt to hold the holding company liable is 
available in the qualified factual enterprise situations.213  
 
The mechanisms to protect the subsidiary company against detrimental business 
transactions and decisions need to be briefly evaluated to determine whether they provide 
adequate protection. Kropff highlights a number of problems with the relevant 
provisions. In the first place it may be difficult to distinguish whether a specific business 
decision or transaction stemmed from a directive of the holding company or whether the 
decision was made by the board of directors of the subsidiary company.214 The nature of 
a group of companies is such that some of the directors will often serve simultaneously 
on the boards of several companies within the group. Even if there are no directors in 
common on the boards of the holding company and the subsidiary company, it could still 
be difficult to determine whether the subsidiary acted at the behest of the holding 
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company. It is easily conceivable that the subsidiary company may, on its own initiative, 
engage in activities to promote the interests of the group independently, despite the 
detriment to itself. The nature of a group of companies is furthermore such that 
cooperation between the various companies is inevitable in respect of planning, 
production, information technology and the like.215 Furthermore the information to 
determine whether a harmful business decision was due to the directives of the holding 
company falls within the knowledge of the management of the holding company and the 
subsidiary company. It may be difficult for the minority to provide the requisite proof 
that the subsidiary company acted at the behest of the holding company.216 
 
The second problem according to Kropff is the determination of what qualifies as a 
detrimental transaction or decision.217 The German legislature addresses this question by 
providing that one should ask whether a reasonable and diligent218 business manager of 
an independent company would have undertaken the same business transaction or made 
the same business decision under the circumstances.219 This provision appears to be 
similar to the business judgement rule which has been adopted in the new South African 
Companies Act. The new Companies Act provides that 
  “(3) Subject to subsections (4) and (5), a director of a company, when acting in that 
capacity, must exercise the powers and perform the functions of director— 
(a) in good faith and for a proper purpose; 
(b) in the best interests of the company; and 
(c) with the degree of care, skill and diligence that may reasonably be expected of 
a person— 
(i) carrying out the same functions in relation to the company as those 
carried out by that director; and 
(ii) having the general knowledge, skill and experience of that director. 
(4) In respect of any particular matter arising in the exercise of the powers or the 
performance of the functions of director, a particular director of a company— 
(a) will have satisfied the obligations of subsection (3)(b) and (c) if— 
(i) the director has taken reasonably diligent steps to become informed 
about the matter … .”220 
 
The point of comparison is the objective component of the business judgement test 
(reasonableness) and the requirement of skill. The tenor of this provision of the new 
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Companies Act is clear. If a director acted reasonably, namely with the necessary care 
and skill, no liability will accrue to that director for decisions which were taken and 
which were ultimately harmful to the company.  
 
The first problematic aspect of the German test for a detrimental transaction is that 
although the subsidiary company is de iure an independent entity, de facto it is under the 
control of the holding company. It is therefore difficult to compare the decisions of the 
subsidiary company with the decisions of an independent company. 
 
The second problematic aspect is that one is working here with the fictional notion of the 
management of an independent company. This means that one has to determine ex post 
facto whether the management of an independent company would have acted in the same 
way in the given circumstances. Antunes avers that, in the light of the unpredictable 
nature of the business environment and the relevant market, whether internal or external, 
and the broad discretion which management has in respect of the management of a 
company (the business judgement rule), the determination of the conduct of the 
management of a notional independent company is very difficult. He argues that the 
standard which has been set will only be of value in circumstances of “exceptional cases 
of notorious or scandalous subsidiary mismanagement”.221  
 
The question can also be asked whether there must be damages for the protective 
measures to become operative. The logical answer would probably be that the holding 
company would only have to indemnify the subsidiary company should the latter suffer 
loss due to the directives of the holding company. Kropff argues that there can be harm or 
detriment without damages being suffered. He provides the example of a subsidiary 
company which engages in a risky venture which necessitates a higher quid pro quo. 
Even if there is an eventual advantage to the subsidiary company it was a detrimental 
transaction when it was entered into. If the subsidiary company acted at the behest of the 
holding company the provisions of the Aktiengesetz would become operative.222 
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The next problem which Antunes identifies is the problem of quantifying the harm which 
the subsidiary company suffered due to the directives of the holding company. The first 
issue again concerns how the management of an independent company would have acted 
in those circumstances? Would they have entered into the transaction? If so, would it 
have been on the same terms, with the same contracting party and at the same price?223 
What if the answer to some of the questions is “yes” and “no” to others? Is there still 
liability? Can a person determine a causal link between the specific offending term which 
the management of an independent company would not have accepted and the eventual 
harm that was suffered? The quantification of damages could in some circumstances be 
easy but in other cases very difficult. In a situation like the one under discussion the 
added problem lies in determining whether the management of an independent company 
would have acted differently. Once that complex question is determined, the extent of the 
loss has to be proved which can make the whole exercise very complicated and difficult 
for minority shareholders or creditors of the subsidiary company, with the added 
complication of a lack of information.  
 
Another relevant consideration is the need to determine what the interests of the 
subsidiary company are. Does the subsidiary company exist solely for its own benefit or 
for the benefit of the group, especially in those cases where the group constitutes one 
economic unit? On the assumption that the subsidiary company is merely one part of the 
bigger picture, how does one attempt to quantify harm for the subsidiary where the group 
has benefited and that benefit has directly or indirectly benefited the subsidiary 
company?224 
 
4.5.2 The regulation of qualified factual groups225 
One of the major shortcomings which has been identified in the German enterprise law is 
the regulation of qualified factual groups. Whereas the Aktiengesetz makes provision for 
contractual enterprises and de facto enterprises, it is silent on qualified factual groups. A 
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qualified factual group is generally speaking one where the holding company226 is 
permanently responsible for the management of the subsidiary company and therefore 
exercises permanent control over the day to day management of the subsidiary 
company.227 The qualified factual group differs from both options envisaged by the 
Aktiengesetz. The difference is that there is neither a contract between the holding 
company and the subsidiary company nor is there ad hoc interference by the holding 
company as envisaged by the applicable provisions of the Aktiengesetz.228 The liability of 
the holding company as envisaged by the Aktiengesetz is therefore restricted to liability 
determined on a case by case basis for a detrimental business transaction or decision 
which is capable of being remedied by an indemnity by the holding company.229 Since 
qualified factual groups have no statutory basis it has been left to the judiciary to 
determine firstly what the definition of a qualified factual group is and secondly what, if 
any, liability ensues from its (permanent) management of the subsidiary company and 
when such liability will ensue. 
 
The first important decision in respect of qualified factual groups was the Autokran230 
decision. The court recognised that the protective mechanisms of the Aktiengesetz in 
respect of de facto groups do not apply to a qualified factual group.231 The court 
recognised the difficulty in determining when a qualified factual group can be said to 
exist. The court looked at indiciae of a qualified factual group. It firstly referred to the 
fact that the controlling party exercised control over the subsidiaries as if they were 
divisions of the business.232 It referred secondly to the fact that the controlling party in 
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casu had extensive and continuous control over the dependent companies.233 The court 
concluded that the provisions of the Aktiengesetz, which protect creditors where a 
domination agreement exists between two parties, could be applied to a case such as the 
present.234 
 
The next important decision was the Tiefbau235 decision. In this case the facts showed 
that there was neither a domination agreement nor a de facto group situation as envisaged 
by the Aktiengesetz. The claimant therefore attempted to hold the controlling shareholders 
liable on the basis of section 302 of the Aktiengesetz, namely the provision in terms of 
which the controlling entity in terms of a domination agreement incurs liability for the 
losses of the subordinate company.  The court recognised that no conclusive test has been 
established to determine when sections 302 and 303 of the Aktiengesetz will apply in 
respect of the German GmbH enterprise.236 The court held that where the controlling 
shareholders were responsible for the financial management of the dependent company 
and their management caused the losses, they will incur liability in terms of the 
Aktiengesetz.237 The controlling shareholders can escape liability by showing that they 
were not permanently in control of the dependent company and even if they were, that 
this did not cause the loss. 
 
The next case was the Video238 case. In this case the court held that the fact that a 
company only had one shareholder was sufficient to show a continuous and extensive 
management by the controlling shareholder.239 Subsequent to the Video case in the 
TBB240 case the court apparently changed direction by not focusing on the permanent and 
extensive control which the controlling shareholder exercised over the dependent 
company. Instead it held that one has to investigate whether the controlling shareholder, 
objectively speaking, abused his management power. Such abuse would be present when 
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the controlling shareholder manages the dependent company in a manner that does not 
take into consideration the separate interests of the dependent company and without 
compensating any disadvantages which may follow.241  
 
In the Bremer Vulkan242 decision the court looked at whether the controlling shareholder 
endangered the continued existence of the dependent (subsidiary) company. In this case 
the court also held that 
“liability for the sole shareholder of a dependent GmbH does not accrue in terms of the 
Aktiengesetz but in terms of the relevant provisions of the GmbH Act. The sole shareholder has to 
take the position of the company into consideration when he withdraws assets from the company. 
The sole shareholder has not taken due care if the company cannot meet its obligations due to the 
withdrawal of assets by the sole shareholder.”243 
 
Altmeppen244 was of the opinion after the Bremer Vulkan case that the doctrine of the 
qualified factual enterprise came to an end in the light of the abovementioned quotation. 
It would appear that the court held that the creditor should find his remedy in the GmbH 
statute. Schmidt, however, maintains that the doctrine still existed despite the Bremer 
Vulkan decision.245 
 
The most recent decision which could be found on this topic was the Trihotel246 decision 
of the Bundesgerichtshof. The court stated the following: 
“Instead liability accrues in terms of section 826 of the German Civil Code as one of the unique 
forms of contra bones mores acts causing damages. The claim for damages in terms of the 
German Civil Code is ancillary to the causes of action in terms of sections 30 and 31 of the GmbH 
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Act. Section 826 of the German Civil Code essentially provides that a person who causes another  
person harm due to his contra bones mores actions will be liable for the loss of that person.”247 
 
Altmeppen248 argues that the Trihotel decision is a departure from the doctrine of 
piercing the corporate veil in Kapitalgesellschaften. Instead it would appear that the 
German judiciary imposed liability on delictual grounds as provided for in the German 
Civil Code read with the GmbH Act. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
An analysis of the German enterprise law shows that the German system is not as 
effective as one may at first think. The first reason for this is the fact that the application 
of the provisions in the Aktiengesetz, which deal with enterprise law, is restricted to those 
cases where an Aktiengesellschaft or a public limited partnership by shares249 is the 
dependent company.250 It can be safely assumed that for small and medium (family) 
enterprises the preferred method for conducting business would be either by means of a 
partnership or by using the GmbH.251 This is evidenced by the development of case law 
regarding the qualified factual enterprise doctrine. The continued existence of this 
doctrine seems to be in doubt in light of the Bremer Vulkan and Trihotel decisions 
discussed above. 
 
A further problem with the German system is the inadequacy of the provisions dealing 
with remedies for ad hoc interference in the management of a dependent subsidiary by 
the holding company in the light of the fact that a creditor of the dependent company will 
first have to show that the holding company or controlling shareholder issued detrimental 
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business instructions to the dependent company or forced it to make disadvantageous 
business decisions, which caused harm to the dependent company. Once this has been 
established the holding company or controlling shareholder can still escape liability by 
means of the business judgment rule. Even if these two hurdles are overcome the 
quantification of the loss or detriment could still be difficult. 
 
The principle or rationale underlying enterprise law system in Germany is, however, 
sound as the reality of an enterprise is accepted as the point of departure. It goes wrong in 
the application of the principle, however. There is no apparent advantage of the 
domination agreement except tax benefits.252 Once there is no real advantage in a system, 
it in effect becomes obsolete through its non-use. This seems to have been the case in 
respect of domination agreement. 
 
As the domination agreement model has not been successful it has to be established 
whether the de facto enterprise system could be of any value for the development of the 
South African law. It appears, however, that South African company law already 
provides some similar, if not all, the answers as the German de facto enterprise system. 
The new Companies Act provides that the directors of a company may not act to the 
detriment of its subsidiary company.253 Furthermore in Barlows Manufacturing Co Ltd v 
RN Barrie (Pty) Ltd254 the court held that although a director may delegate his powers of 
control he may never abdicate those powers because this would breach his fiduciary duty. 
This means that the board of directors of the subsidiary company may consult their 
holding company but may never abdicate their duties to the (board of directors) of the 
holding company. This could be interpreted as being similar to the German provisions 
which determine that where the holding company issues detrimental business instructions 
to the subsidiary company, any losses which are suffered by the dependent subsidiary 
company have to be indemnified by the holding company.255  
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The new Companies Act makes provision for the business judgment rule256 which may 
provide a defence for the directors of the subsidiary company where it is alleged that they 
breached their fiduciary duties toward the subsidiary company. A creditor of the 
subsidiary, who fails with his claim against the directors of the subsidiary company, will 
then be obliged to proceed against the holding company or its directors. The creditor will 
have to prove that their actions caused harm to the subsidiary, making it very difficult for 
the creditor to discharge the burden of proof.257 
 
The German de facto enterprise system should also be understood in its historical context. 
The 1937  Aktiengesetz did not contain a similar regulatory regime like the provisions of 
the Aktiengesetz which regulates de facto enterprises.258 The initial draft of the 1965 
Stock Corporations Act clung to the independent existence of the subsidiary company 
and its autonomy. The holding company could not issue business directives to the 
subsidiary company and interfere in its management. Were it to do so it would incur 
liability, jointly with the management of the holding company, for the damages which 
resulted from those directives or decisions.259 According to Kropff this suggested system 
was fraught with difficulties, was draconian and could have unintended consequences.260  
According to Kropff there were also problems related to the enforcement of the 
provisions and the provisions were deemed to be Haifisch ohne Zähne261 by some 
commentators.262  
 
According to Antunes, Flume, a celebrated German jurist, made proposals to amend the 
initial version. Flume proposed that any harm had to be remedied with any benefit that 
flowed from a disadvantageous business directive by the holding company. An obligatory 
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report had to be submitted which provided the details of all the holding company and 
subsidiary company relations.263 This proposal was more acceptable than the initial draft 
but there was also criticism.264 The enacted version heeded the criticism and provides that 
the harm can be remedied throughout the financial year and the harm does not have to be 
remedied from any benefit which flowed from the detrimental business directive or 
decision.265 
 
The issue of qualified factual groups has apparently now been dealt with by the German 
judiciary. Even if there is still no clarity it is my submission that such an issue would not 
be as problematic in a common-law jurisdiction. By limiting the application of the 
provisions dealing with enterprise law to only some companies, the German legislature 
invited uncertainty and left it for the courts to develop rules for those circumstances 
where the Aktiengesetz was not applicable. The courts then merely adopted the same rules 
as the provisions of the Aktiengesetz to cater for the situations where companies were 
involved in an enterprise, but which were not covered by the Aktiengesetz. The 
(permanent) interference in the management of a company could however be a vital 
ground for a court to hold a holding company liable in a common-law jurisdiction.266 
Practically speaking therefore, the German statutory system has not achieved much but it 
would appear that it has been the judiciary, influenced by academic scholars, which has 
taken the initiative to develop the German enterprise law system.  
 
The most important problem, which the provisions of the Aktiengesetz regarding factual 
groups have not directly addressed, is the direct liability of the holding company towards 
the creditors of the subsidiary company. Instead the protection is afforded to the 
subsidiary company by means of the provisions to the effect that any detrimental 
measures undertaken by the subsidiary company at the behest of the holding company 
have to be made good by the holding company. A creditor will therefore be restricted to 
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the piercing of the corporate veil remedy to hold the holding company directly liable for 
the debts of the subsidiary company. This, it would appear, occurs where qualified factual 
groups are present. Alternatively, if the Trihotel decision has replaced the piercing of the 
corporate veil doctrine with a delictual remedy in terms of the German Civil Code, a 
creditor will have to base his claim on what the South African jurist would refer to as a 
delictual claim for pure economic loss.267 A claim based in delict differs from the 
traditional piercing of the corporate veil remedy which is contractual in nature. The 
arguments of the court in the Trihotel decision resemble the arguments of the Dutch 
courts in cases where the holding company had been held liable for the debts of the 
insolvent subsidiary.268 
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Chapter 5 
The South African law on company groups 
 
5.1      Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of the South African law relating to 
company groups. It also considers to what extent the South African law recognises the 
possible reality of groups as single entities, and to what extent the law still reflects the 
principle of limited liability where company groups are involved.  Reference will be 
made to statutes on company law, competition law, tax law and consumer protection. The 
chapter will also investigate the statutory developments that influenced company groups 
as well as the evolution of the concepts of “holding company” and “subsidiary company”. 
In the process, the interpretation of certain aspects of these statutory provisions by the 
courts will be discussed. At the end of the chapter the judicial approach to groups in some 
of these fields will also be investigated. A discussion regarding the judicial approach to 
company groups in the fields of the law of delict and insolvency law will be left for later 
chapters.1 
 
5.2      Statutory definitions relating to company groups 
 
The concepts of a holding company and a subsidiary were not initially part of the 
Companies Act 46 of 1926. A definition was only inserted at a later stage after the 
concept received attention by the English legislature.2 The concept first received statutory 
attention in the English Companies Amendment Act of 1928 and the amendment was 
then incorporated in the 1929 Companies Act. In terms of the 1929 English Act,3 a 
company was seen as being a subsidiary of another company if the other company was a 
shareholder and that company, firstly, either had more than 50% of the issued share 
capital or had more than 50% of the voting power, or secondly, where that company 
could appoint the majority of the directors of the subordinate company. Membership of 
the subsidiary as such was clearly not a prerequisite, since the 1929 Act only refers to 
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shareholding and not membership. Via an amendment4 the concepts of subsidiary and 
holding company were introduced into the South African Companies Act 46 of 1926 in 
1939. “Holding company” was defined as follows: 
 
“‘Holding company’ means a company whose assets consist in whole or in part of shares in 
another company, whether a company within the meaning of this Act or not, and whether such 
shares are held directly or through a nominee, and 
(1) which, at the time when its accounts are made up, so holds more than fifty per cent of the 
issued share capital of  that other company, or is entitled to more than fifty per cent of the 
voting power in that other company; or 
(2) which has power (not being power vested in it by virtue only of the provisions of a 
debenture trust deed or by virtue of shares issued to it for the purpose in pursuance of 
such provisions) directly or indirectly to appoint a majority to the directors of that other 
company; 
and 'subsidiary company' has a correlative meaning.”5 
 
The 1939 Amendment Act in essence followed the wording of its English counterpart 
although a new concept, namely that of a subsidiary of a subsidiary, was also introduced.6 
The English Companies Act was then amended in 1948 which resulted in the Companies 
Amendment Act 46 of 1952 in South Africa. The Act again followed the scheme of its 
1948 English counterpart and a new definition of holding company and subsidiary 
company was introduced that replaced the definition contained in the 1939 Companies 
Amendment Act. This definition read as follows: 
 
“(1) For the purposes of this Act, a company shall … be deemed to be a subsidiary of another 
only if - 
  (a) that other either - 
(i) is a member of it and controls the composition of its board of directors; or 
(ii) holds more than half in nominal value of its equity share capital; or 
(b) the first-mentioned company is a subsidiary of any company which is that other's 
subsidiary; provided that the first-mentioned company shall be deemed to be a subsidiary 
of that other if subsidiaries of that other between them hold more than one-half in 
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nominal value of the equity share capital of the first-mentioned company or if that other 
and one or more of its subsidiaries between them hold more than one-half of such capital. 
(2) For the purposes of ss (1), the composition of a company's board of directors shall be 
deemed to be controlled by another company only if that other company, by the exercise 
of some power exercisable by it without the consent or concurrence of any other person, 
can appoint or remove the holders of all or a majority of the directorships; but for the 
purpose of this provision that other company shall be deemed to have power to appoint to 
a directorship with respect to which any of the following conditions is satisfied, that is to 
say - 
(a) that a person cannot be appointed thereto without the exercise in his favour by that other 
company of such power as aforesaid; or 
(b) that a person's appointment thereto follows necessarily from his appointment as director 
of that company.”7 
 
Membership was again not a requirement in all cases but only where the existence of the 
relationship depended on control of the board of directors. According to Coetzee J in 
Unisec Group Ltd and Others v Sage Holdings Ltd8 the 1952 Amendment Act expanded 
and tightened the control of the holding company / subsidiary company relationship. The 
1926 Companies Act, as amended, also introduced provisions which were either aimed to 
provide sufficient disclosure of the financial position of a subsidiary in the annual 
financial statements of the holding company, or to prevent abuse.9 
 
The next development was the overhaul of the companies legislation in 1973 with the 
introduction of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (“the 1973 Act”). The 1973 Act was a 
result of the Van Wyk De Vries Commission which suggested that the various 
relationships between companies within the same group could not be accommodated 
under a single “controlling company/subsidiary company relationship”.10 The 
Commission identified certain forms of abuse that could take place in the holding 
company / subsidiary company structure and aimed to eradicate such abuse. The 
Commission recommended that the provisions which dealt with disclosure had to be 
separated from the provisions which dealt with the prevention of abuse by holding 
                                                           
7
 S 90 nov of the Companies Act 46 of 1926. 
8
 Unisec Group Ltd and Others v Sage Holdings Ltd 1986 3 SA 259 (T). 
9
 De Wet & Van Wyk De Wet en Yeats Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 4ed (1978) 690. 
10
 De Wet & Van Wyk Handelsreg 690. 
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companies and subsidiaries.  The provisions which dealt with disclosure focused on the 
relationship between the holding company and a subsidiary company, and this 
relationship was based on the shareholding which the holding company held in the 
subsidiary company. Control was therefore irrelevant.11 The provisions which focused on 
the prevention of abuse, however, were based upon control, regardless of the 
shareholding of one company in another. According to De Wet and Van Wyk the above 
distinction was not tenable and was also not consistently applied by the Commission.12 
The legislature accepted the recommendations and made further amendments which led 
to more confusion.13 The result was by no means satisfactory.14 In fact, the attempt to 
address the issue in the Act was a total failure. As a result, the former definition of 
holding company-subsidiary company, as reflected by the Companies Amendment Act 
46 of 1952, was to a large degree restored in 1974. Membership was again made a 
requirement in situations where the definitions provided for control over the board of 
directors of the subsidiary company. In both the 1973 and 1952 versions shares that were 
held in a fiduciary capacity or through a nominee were to be treated as being held by the 
beneficial owner to determine the status of a company as a holding company. The 
outcome of the 1974 amendment was also not entirely satisfactory.15  
 
The definition of the subsidiary-holding company concept again underwent surgery by 
means of the Companies Amendment Act 82 of 1992. Whereas the previous definition 
focused on control of the composition of the board coupled with membership of that 
company or alternatively, the holding of the majority of equity shares by a company 
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 De Wet & Van Wyk Handelsreg 690. 
12
 De Wet & Van Wyk Handelsreg 690. 
13
 De Wet & Van Wyk Handelsreg 691. 
14
 See Unisec above 268-269 where the court states:  “Regrettably, the Legislature, in its haste, did not heed 
criticisms of the 1952 definition which were voiced from time to time.  [W]hether a company is a subsidiary of 
another or not is a question the answer to which carries a large number of important consequences and … it seemed 
a pity that a more satisfactory definition could not be found. One glaring example … is the strange prerequisite 
(introduced by the 1952 Act) of H Co's membership of S Co when control of the composition of the board of 
directors of S Co is the test. As there is no deeming provision in respect of membership (only the "holding" of 
shares, which has nothing to do with membership, is so dealt with), H Co can conveniently avoid these important 
consequences by simply not being a member of S Co. It can "hold" its shares through a nominee who will be the 
member.” 
15
 In general see Unisec above. 
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either alone or through its subsidiaries,16 the focus of the new definition shifted slightly to 
the question of who held the majority voting rights or who could appoint/dismiss the 
directors with majority of votes at meetings of the board of directors. Despite criticism17 
the new definition18 not only still contained the requirement of membership but in fact 
opened the gate to (potentially) more abuse. Under the previous definition, a company 
                                                           
16
 Haydock “The Effect of the Amendments to the Definition of a Subsidiary in the Companies Amendment Act 82 
of 1992” (1993) SA Merc LJ 166. 
17
 Unisec above. 
18
 S 1(3) as amended in 1992 read: For the purposes of this Act, a company shall be deemed to be a subsidiary of 
another company if- 
 
  (i) that other company is a member of it and- 
 
   (aa) holds a majority of the voting rights in it; or 
 
(bb) has the right to appoint or remove directors holding a majority of the voting 
rights at meetings of the board; or 
 
(cc) has the sole control of a majority of the voting rights in it, whether pursuant to 
an agreement with other members or otherwise; or 
 
(ii) it is a subsidiary of any company which is a subsidiary of that other company; or 
 
(iii) subsidiaries of that other company or that other company and its subsidiaries together 
hold the rights referred to in subparagraph (i) (aa), (bb) or (cc). 
 
(b) In determining whether a company holds the majority of the voting rights as contemplated in 
paragraph (a) (i) (aa)- 
 
(i) voting rights which are exercisable only in certain circumstances shall be taken into 
account only- 
 
(aa) when those circumstances have arisen, and for so long as they continue; or 
 
(bb) when those circumstances are under the control of the person holding the voting 
rights; 
 
(ii) voting rights held by a person in a fiduciary capacity shall be treated as not held by him 
but by the beneficiary of such voting rights; 
 
(iii) voting rights held by a person as nominee for another person shall be treated as not held 
by him but by that other person, and voting rights shall be deemed to be held by a 
nominee for another person if they are exercisable only on the instructions or with the 
consent or concurrence of that other person. 
 
(c) A body corporate or other undertaking which would have been a subsidiary of a company had 
the body corporate or other undertaking been a company shall be deemed to be a subsidiary of that 
company. 
 
(cA) For the purposes of this subsection 'hold' or any derivative thereof refers to the registered or 
beneficial holder (direct or indirect) of shares conferring a right to vote.” 
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would only be a holding company of the subsidiary in a situation where it controlled the 
composition of the board, if the first mentioned company was a member of the last 
mentioned company. Where a company had the majority equity shares in another 
company, the first-mentioned company would be the holding company of the other 
company, regardless of the fact that it was not necessarily a member of that company. In 
terms of the 1992 amendment, the requirement of membership was included also where a 
company had the majority of voting rights. 
 
The most recent development in company law is the passing of the new Companies Act19  
in December 2008 by the South African parliament. The new Companies Act will 
commence on a date to be fixed by the president by proclamation in the Government 
Gazette, which may, however, not be earlier than one year from the date on which the 
president signed the new Companies Act, namely 8 April 2009.  
 
The new Companies Act has made changes to the current definitions of holding and 
subsidiary companies as well as to the consequences of such relationship. A holding 
company is defined in relation to a subsidiary, as meaning “a juristic person or 
undertaking that controls that subsidiary.”20  
 
The new Companies Act defines a subsidiary company as follows: 
“3. (1) A company is— 
(a) a subsidiary of another juristic person if that juristic person, one or more other 
subsidiaries of that juristic person, or one or more nominees of that juristic person or any 
of its subsidiaries, alone or in any combination— 
(i) is or are directly or indirectly able to exercise, or control the exercise of a majority of the 
general voting rights associated with issued securities of that company, whether pursuant 
to a shareholder agreement or otherwise; or 
(ii) has or have the right to appoint or elect, or control the appointment or election of, 
directors of that company who control a majority of the votes at a meeting of the board; 
or 
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 71 of 2008. 
20
 S 1 of the new Companies Act. 
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(b) a wholly-owned subsidiary of another juristic person if all of the general voting rights 
associated with issued securities of the company are held or controlled, alone or in any 
combination, by persons contemplated in paragraph (a). 
(2) For the purpose of determining whether a person controls all or a majority of the general 
voting rights associated with issued securities of a company— 
(a) voting rights that are exercisable only in certain circumstances are to be taken into 
account only— 
(i) when those circumstances have arisen, and for so long as they continue; or 
(ii) when those circumstances are under the control of the person holding the voting rights;  
(b) voting rights that are exercisable only on the instructions or with the consent or 
concurrence of another person are to be treated as being held by a nominee for that other 
person; and 
(c) voting rights held by— 
(i) a person as nominee for another person are to be treated as held by that other person; or 
(ii) a person in a fiduciary capacity are to be treated as held by the beneficiary of those voting 
rights. 
(3)  For the purposes of subsection (2), ‘hold’, or any derivative of it, refers to the 
registered or direct or indirect beneficial holder of securities conferring a right to vote.”21 
 
A group of companies is also defined in the new Companies Act, albeit not in an entirely 
elegant and logical manner. The phrase means “two or more companies that share a 
holding company or subsidiary relationship.”22  
 
A new aspect of the new Companies Act is the definition of a juristic person within the 
context of a holding company / subsidiary company relationship. According to the new 
Companies Act a juristic person includes a trust.23 In terms of the definition of a 
subsidiary company in the new Companies Act a trust can now be the holding company 
of another company which in terms of the 1973 Act is not possible.  
 
Another new aspect of the statutory provisions regarding groups of companies is the 
terms “related” and “inter-related” persons. “Related” means “when used in respect of 
                                                           
21
 Section 3.  
22
 Section 1 of the new Companies Act. 
23
 Section 1 of the new Companies Act “juristic person” includes - … “(b) a trust, irrespective of whether or not it 
was established within or outside the Republic;” 
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two persons, … persons who are connected to one another in any manner contemplated in 
section 2(1)(a) to (c).”24 The term “inter-related” is defined in the definitions section of 
the new Companies Act as follows:  
“when used in respect of three or more persons, means persons who are related to one another in a 
series of relationships, as contemplated in section 2(1)(d).”25  
 
However, apparently through an oversight, the new Companies Act, as approved by 
parliament, contains no section 2(1)(d).26  
 
Regarding the question of whether a juristic person is related to another juristic person 
the new Companies Act provides that:  
  “2. (1) For all purposes of this Act— 
(c)  a juristic person is related to another juristic person if— 
(i)  either of them directly or indirectly controls the other, or the business of the other, as 
determined in accordance with subsection (2); 
(ii)  either is a subsidiary of the other; or 
(iii)  a person directly or indirectly controls each of them, or the business of each of them, as 
determined in accordance with subsection (2). 
(2) For the purpose of subsection (1), a person controls a juristic person, or its business, if— 
(a)  in the case of a juristic person that is a company— 
(i)  that juristic person is a subsidiary of that first person, as determined in accordance with 
section 3(1)(a); or 
(ii)  that first person together with any related or inter-related person, is— 
(aa)  directly or indirectly able to exercise or control the exercise of a majority of the voting 
rights associated with securities of that company, whether pursuant to a shareholder 
agreement or otherwise; or 
(bb)  has the right to appoint or elect, or control the appointment or election of, directors of that 
company who control a majority of the votes at a meeting of the board; 
                                                           
24
 See below. 
25
 S 1 of the new Companies Act.  
26
 S 2(1)(d) of the Companies Bill B61-2008 defined “inter-related” as follows: “Three or more persons are inter-
related if the first and second such persons are related, the second and third such persons are related, and so forth in 
an unbroken series.” An attempt has been made to remedy the omission by inserting the aforementioned definition 
into the draft regulations of 26 January 2010. Regulation 3(6) deals with “interpretation” and authority for this 
power to draft this regulation, amongst others, is allegedly provided by s 223(1)(d)(ii) of the new Companies Act 
which provides that the relevant minister may make regulations in respect of  “any ancillary or incidental matter that 
is necessary for the proper implementation and administration of this Act.” Whether this attempt to insert a 
substantive matter into the new Companies Act by means of a regulation is lawful is not entirely clear. 
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(b)  in the case of a juristic person that is a close corporation, that first person owns the 
majority of the members’ interest, or controls directly, or has the right to control, the 
majority of members’ votes in the close corporation; 
(c)  in the case of a juristic person that is a trust, that first person has the ability to control the 
majority of the votes of the trustees or to appoint the majority of the trustees, or to 
appoint or change the majority of the beneficiaries of the trust; or 
(d)  that first person has the ability to materially influence the policy of the juristic person in a 
manner comparable to a person who, in ordinary commercial practice, would be able to 
exercise an element of control referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c).”27 
 
 
The new Companies Act contains a further provision of relevance in respect of related or 
inter-related parties. The new Companies Act provides that: 
“With respect to any particular matter arising in terms of this Act, a court, the Companies Tribunal 
or the Panel may exempt any person from the application of a provision of this Act that would 
apply to that person because of a relationship contemplated in subsection (1) if the person can 
show that, in respect of that particular matter, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the 
person acts independently of any related or inter-related person.”28 
 
At first blush it is not entirely clear what the purpose of the above provision is. It could 
conceivably be a reflection of the definitions of related and inter-related being phrased 
widely to prevent abuse and therefore to provide for exemptions in deserving cases. The 
new Companies Act contains a general section which, for example, allows for 
exemptions from the provisions of the Act.29 The relevant section also attempts to address 
anti-avoidance measures which may be taken, for example an attempt to avoid falling 
under the definition of a related or inter-related party, but substantively being a related or 
inter-related person.30 
 
Membership as a pre-condition for a holding company–subsidiary company relationship 
has been removed. The definitions in the new Companies Act are otherwise very similar 
                                                           
27
 S 2(1)(c)-2(2). 
28
 S 2(3). 
29
 S 6(2). This section will conceivably operate parallel to s 2(3). 
30
 S 6(1). Assume, for example, that company A can appoint the majority of directors of company B which would 
make company B a subsidiary of company A in terms of s 3(1)(a)(ii). Company A “relinquishes” that right by 
allowing its legal advisor to appoint a number of directors in company B, the effect of which is that company A does 
not appoint the majority of directors of company B anymore. Such a scheme could conceivably be deemed to be an 
anti-avoidance arrangement in terms of s 6(1).  
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in principle to the definitions of subsidiary company in the 1973 Act, apart from the 
removal of the requirement of membership of the subsidiary company.31 Regarding the 
power of a company to control the board of the subsidiary, the new Companies Act does 
not mention the power to appoint or dismiss the directors who control the majority of 
votes at a board meeting like the 1973 Act, but merely mentions the power to appoint the 
directors who control the majority of voting rights at a board meeting.32 It does not 
appear to be a fundamental change, however. 
 
The definition of a wholly-owned subsidiary company is, however, rather peculiar.33 This 
peculiarity can be illustrated by the following example. Assume that company A holds 
51% of the voting rights in company B. Company B holds 50% of the voting rights in 
company C and the remaining 50% is held by company A. Company C is now in terms of 
the definition a wholly-owned subsidiary company of company A. In terms of the 1973 
Act, company B had to be wholly-owned subsidiary company of Company A for 
company C to be a wholly-owned company of company A. It is submitted that the 
definition in the 1973 Act made more sense than the definition in the new Companies 
Act. 
 
5.3      Recognition of company groups in the 1973 Act and the new Companies Act 
The 1973 Act does not specifically recognise the concept of a group as such, but it does 
attach certain consequences to the relationship between a holding company and a 
subsidiary company. This recognition takes on a variety of forms, from provisions to 
prevent the abuse of the group relationship and then also financial disclosure measures 
within a group of companies. The new Companies Act also attaches a number of 
consequences arising from the relationship between a holding company and its subsidiary 
company. 
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 Above. 
32
 S 3(1)(a)(ii). 
33
 S 3(1)(b). 
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5.3.1 Accounting standards within company groups 
The 1973 Act requires a holding company to compile group financial statements as a 
means of disclosing the financial position of the group.34 The 1973 Act, for purposes of 
disclosure of the group financial statements, therefore treats the group as a single 
economic unit. The 1973 Act, however, does not thereby deny the separate juristic 
entities within the group. The 1973 Act specifically provides that if the directors of a 
holding company are of the opinion that the business of the company and that of a 
subsidiary are so different that they cannot reasonably be treated as a single undertaking, 
group annual financial statements need not deal with that subsidiary if the Registrar 
approves the omission.35 It is clearly implied here that the 1973 Act does recognise the 
single economic unit in respect of annual financial statements but without disregarding 
the separate juristic personality of each component within the single economic unit. 
 
The new Companies Act, however, does not make express reference to accounting 
records and the requirements for financial statements of a group of companies.36  
However, the new Companies Act provides that the relevant minister may make 
regulations prescribing financial reporting standards.37 In terms of the draft regulations 
the minister has determined that the International Financial Reporting Standards will be 
the applicable reporting standard.38 The International Financial Reporting Standards 
makes provision for consolidated group financial statements.39 
 
The new Companies Act provides in respect of the annual financial statements of groups 
that: 
  “The annual financial statements of a company must— 
(a)…; 
(b) include a report by the directors with respect to the state of affairs, the business and profit or 
loss of the company, or of the group of companies, if the company is part of a group, including— 
                                                           
34
 Ss 288-294. 
35
 S 291(2)(b). 
36
 See, however, s 115(2)(b)(ii), para 5.3.8 below, as an example of a provision which assumes such statements 
exist.  
37
 S 29(4). 
38
 Regulation 28 of the draft regulations of 26 January 2010. 
39
 S 29(4)(a). See International Accounting Standard (IAS) 27, “Consolidated and separate financial statements”, 
read with IAS 1. 
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(i) any matter material for the shareholders to appreciate the company’s state of affairs; and 
(ii) any prescribed information.”40 
 
The new Companies Act also provides for the disclosure of directors’ remuneration 
within the context of a group of companies.41  
 
5.3.2 Loans made and securities within company groups 
There are a number of sections in the 1973 Act and the new Companies Act which 
regulate the potential abuse that could take place within a group of companies.  Funds of 
the subsidiary can be misused by means of loans to directors of the holding company or 
to directors of other companies within the group,42 the funds of the subsidiary could be 
used to assist persons who wish to obtain shares43 in the holding company and the 
holding company may force its subsidiary to make loans to it or to other companies 
within the group on disadvantageous terms to the subsidiary company. These provisions 
will now be briefly discussed. 
 
Section 37 of the 1973 Act deals with loans made and security which is provided by a 
subsidiary to its holding company, or to a subsidiary of its holding company, but excludes 
loans or security to a subsidiary of itself.44 Section 37 specifically covers loans45 by a 
subsidiary to its holding company and to a subsidiary of its holding company, via 
intermediaries. 46 Loans have a broad meaning.47 Security is also defined as including a 
                                                           
40
 S 30(3)(b) 
41
 Article 30(5)(b)(ii) provides that “[t]he information to be disclosed under subsection (4) must satisfy the 
prescribed standards, and must show the amount of any remuneration or benefits paid to or receivable by persons in 
respect of— 
(a) …; or 
(b)services rendered while being directors or prescribed officers of the company— 
(i) as directors or prescribed officers of any other company within the same group of companies; or 
(ii) otherwise in connection with the carrying on of the affairs of the company or any other company within the same 
group of companies.  
42
 S 37 of the 1973 Act and s 45(2) of the new Companies Act.  
43
 S 44 of the new Companies Act applies more widely to financial assistance for the acquisition of securities as 
defined. 
44
 S 37(1)(a)(i) and (ii). 
45
 As well as the provision of security. 
46
 Compare s 226 in respect of direct and indirect loans and S v Pouroulis 1993 4 SA 575 (W). 
47
 S 37(4)(b) provides that a loan may include any credit extended by a company, if the debt concerned is not 
payable or being paid in accordance with the normal business practice of the company in respect of the payment to it 
of other debts of the same kind. 
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guarantee.48 It is clear that neither definition is intended to be exhaustive but rather to 
include forms of loan or security respectively that ordinarily may not be covered by those 
terms in the strict sense. Regarding loans, section 37 also focuses on the funds of the 
company which are used as a loan. Funds are also widely defined as including money, 
shares, debentures or any other property.49 According to Blackman50 one should not read 
section 37 in isolation but should read it in conjunction with the provisions of section 226 
of the 1973 Act regarding loans to directors,51 the common-law duties of directors, 
namely their fiduciary duties and duty of care and skill, as well as the provisions of the 
Insolvency Act52 which deal with dispositions by debtors (in this context companies) 
where such debtors received no value in return for the dispositions. 
 
Initially the 1926 Companies Act prohibited loans by a company to its holding 
company.53 The section that provided for the prohibition was then amended to allow 
loans by wholly owned subsidiaries to their holding companies if all the members of the 
company gave their consent to the loan.54 It is clear that the legislature accepted that 
sound business reasons may exist for the making of loans within a group of companies.55 
The original section 37 of the 1973 Act was, however, also drafted restrictively in respect 
of intergroup loans and in 1974 a new section 37 was introduced which in turn was 
replaced by the current section 37 in 1977.56 
 
Section 37(1) of the 1973 Act requires that details of any loan57 made by a subsidiary to 
its holding company, or to a subsidiary of its holding company, but excluding its own 
subsidiary, must be disclosed in the annual financial statements of the lending company 
for every year that the loan exists. However, the right to disclosure may be waived by the 
members of the lending company should all the members of the company agree to such 
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 S 37(4)(c). 
49
 S 37(4)(a). 
50
 Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 4-53. 
51
 See para 5.3.5 below. 
52
 Act 24 of 1936. 
53
 S 86bis(1). 
54
 S 69 Companies Amendment Act 46 of 1952. 
55
 Millin Commission of Enquiry on the Amendment of the Companies Act Report 1947-8 UG No 69-1948 46.  
56
 Blackman et al Commentary 4-53. 
57
 S 37(10) also applies to the giving of security by the subsidiary company. 
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waiver.58 This is surprising since one would assume that the disclosure provisions are not 
only there for the protection of minority shareholders of the company but also for the 
protection of creditors of that company. 
 
The disclosure requirements of the sections are also not applicable where the loan or 
security, as the case may be, was provided bona fide in the ordinary course of the 
business of a company actually and regularly carrying on a business of which a 
substantial part is the making of loans or the provision of security, as the case may be.59 
 
Besides the disclosure requirements, section 37 also imposes liability in certain 
circumstances on the directors responsible for making the loan or providing security. 
Should a subsidiary make a loan or provide security, as the case may be, to its holding 
company or to a subsidiary of its holding company on terms that were not fair to the first-
mentioned company, or failed to provide reasonable protection to its business interests at 
the time of the making of the loan or the provision of the security, the directors who 
authorised the loan could be held liable for any damages that the company may have 
suffered due to the making of the loan or the provision of the security.60 The section lists 
a number of examples of what could conceivably not provide reasonable protection to the 
business interests of the company or what could be unfair.61  
 
It is interesting to note that “directors” as mentioned in this context includes the directors 
of the holding company.62 This statutory liability is in addition to any other rule of law 
relating to the liability of a director or officer of the company.63 In terms of the common 
law, a director only has a fiduciary duty towards the company of which he is a director 
and the duty of care and skill also only applies to the company of which he is a director. 
Section 37 therefore extends the common-law liability of a director to a director of the 
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 S 37(5). 
59
 S 37(1)(b). 
60
 S 37(3)(a). 
61
 S 37(3)(c). 
62
 S 37(3)(b) read with s 37(3)(a). 
63
 S 37(3)(d). 
156 
 
holding company.64 Should all the members of the company, however, consent to the 
loan or security, as the case may be, there shall be no liability for the directors even if the 
subsidiary company is prejudiced.65 Such consent must be prior consent.66 
 
The new Companies Act also deals with loans and securities which companies within 
groups provide to other group members.67 The new Companies Act provides that a 
company may only provide financial assistance68 to a related or inter-related company,69 
under certain circumstances.70 These circumstances are firstly that the board of directors 
of the company, giving financial assistance, may only provide such assistance to the 
related or inter-related company if the shareholders of the lending company adopted a 
special resolution within the preceding two years, either authorising the specific 
transaction or generally approving a category of recipients, and the recipient falls within 
that category,71 and the board of the lending company is satisfied that the company would 
satisfy the solvency and liquidity test72 immediately after the provision of the financial 
assistance.73 Furthermore, if the memorandum of incorporation of the company sets out 
any further requirements or conditions for the granting of financial assistance, these also 
have to be satisfied.74 If the directors of the company approve of such financial 
assistance, the company has to give written notice of the assistance to all its shareholders 
and to any trade union which represents the employees of the company if the total value 
of the assistance and of all financial assistance during the course of that financial year 
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 Blackman et al Commentary 4-54. 
65
 S 37(5). 
66
 Naude “Loans or security by subsidiaries: The new section 37 and abuse of control” 1979 MBL 8 14, Blackman et 
al Commentary Revision Service 6 (2009) 4-55. See in general Naude for a detailed discussion of s 37 of the 1973 
Act.  
67
 S 45. 
68
 Financial assistance is defined in s 45(1) and includes loans, the provision of security and the guaranteeing of a 
loan. The definition is, however, not exhaustive. 
69
 See above for the definitions of related and inter-related. This definition therefore includes financial assistance by 
one group member to another group member, including financial assistance by a holding company to its subsidiary. 
If a subsidiary company finds itself in financial difficulty, the holding company or other related or inter-related 
companies may only assist it if the last-mentioned companies are solvent and liquid. This requirement can have 
severe consequences for the creditors of the subsidiary although the creditors of the holding company, for example, 
are protected. 
70
 S 45(2) read with s 45(3) and s 45(4). 
71
 S 45(3)(a)(ii). 
72
 The solvency and liquidity test is defined in s 4 of the new Companies Act. 
73
 S 45(3)(b). 
74
 S 45(4). 
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exceeds one tenth of 1% of the company’s net value at the time of the board resolution.75 
Non-compliance with these requirements could result in the resolution of the board 
authorising financial assistance being declared void by a court,76 and which could lead to 
personal liability for the directors.77 There is also a general fiduciary duty on the directors 
of a company not to use their position to cause harm to the company or to a subsidiary of 
the company of which they are directors.78 
 
The provisions in respect of inter-group financial assistance in the new Companies Act 
are stricter than those in the 1973 Act. Whereas the 1973 Act merely requires disclosure, 
the new Companies Act requires compliance with procedural requirements79 and also 
protects creditors.80 Whereas non-compliance of the provisions in respect of financial 
assistance within groups does not cause the assistance to be void in terms of the final 
version of the 1973 Act, the new Companies Act provides that non-compliance can result 
in the financial assistance being declared void by the court. 
 
It is noteworthy that should a subsidiary provide the financial assistance, the new 
Companies Act does not expressly require the subsidiary to disclose such assistance in its 
annual financial statements as is required by the 1973 Act. One may assume that the 
reason for the absence of such provision in the new Companies Act is that creditors of the 
subsidiary company are protected by the requirement of solvency and liquidity after the 
transaction takes place and the minority shareholders of the subsidiary company are 
protected by the requirement that a special resolution is required. However, an equally 
good argument could be made that disclosure by the subsidiary company of such loan or 
security would assist to encourage compliance with solvency and liquidity.81 
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 S 45(5). 
76
 S 45(6) read with s 218(1). 
77
 S 45(7). 
78
 S 76(2)(a)(ii). 
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5.3.3 Financial assistance for the acquisition of securities of the company or of a related 
company 
Section 38 of the 1973 Act prohibits a subsidiary from granting financial assistance 
directly or indirectly to a person to obtain shares in itself or in its holding company.82 The 
financial assistance may not be for the purpose of or in connection with a purchase or 
subscription made or to be made by any person of or for any shares of the relevant 
company. Financial assistance includes a loan, guarantee, the provision of security or 
otherwise.83 
 
The reason for the introduction of section 38 of the Act was to prevent persons who did 
not possess sufficient funds to gain control of a company on the basis that they would use 
the funds or creditworthiness of the company to finance the acquisition of shares in the 
company.84 The potential for abuse is obvious. The directors of the holding company 
could exercise their influence over the directors of the subsidiary to obtain funds to 
purchase shares in the holding company or the subsidiary company.85 
 
Section 38 provides for certain exceptions when a company will be allowed to give 
financial assistance for the purchase of shares in itself or its holding company.86 Should 
the subsidiary contravene the prohibition contained in section 38(1) of the 1973 Act, the 
company as well as every director or officer of the company shall be guilty of an 
offence.87 The contract that provides for the granting of financial assistance will be void 
as will be all ancillary obligations.88  
 
One of the most important reasons for the introduction of section 38 in the 1973 Act was 
to confirm one of the pillars of the common law, namely the capital maintenance rule in 
terms of which the funds of the company have to be protected for the benefit of creditors 
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and minority shareholders.89 The traditional rules in respect of capital maintenance have, 
however, in the recent past been substantially amended to allow, for example, the 
payment of dividends out of capital under certain circumstances90 as well as the 
possibility that a company may buy back its own shares under certain conditions.91 
Section 38 in a sense became one of the last outposts of the capital maintenance rule and 
its continued existence became increasingly anachronistic.92 
 
Mainly because of the increasingly anachronistic nature of section 38, coupled with the 
problems that the section creates for black economic empowerment, the 1973 Act was 
amended by creating an additional exception, which allows a company to give financial 
assistance for the purchase of or subscription for shares of that company or its holding 
company if the company’s board is satisfied that, subsequent to the transaction, the 
company will be solvent and liquid, as defined.93  
 
Section 38 of the 1973 Act will be replaced by section 44 of the new Companies Act. The 
latter section allows a company to provide financial assistance, subject to certain 
requirements, to any person for the subscription of “any option, or any securities, issued 
or to be issued by the company or a related or inter-related company, or for the purchase 
of any securities of the company or a related or inter-related company”.94 Section 38 of 
the 1973 Act, in the context of a group of companies, only applied to financial assistance 
by a subsidiary company to a person for the acquisition of shares in the holding company. 
Section 44 of the new Companies Act has a broader ambit since it applies to related and 
inter-related companies as well. Financial assistance by a company within a group to a 
person for the acquisition of securities in another company within the group will 
                                                           
89
 Peters v Schoeman 2001 1 SA 872 (SCA) 881. 
90
 S 90. 
91
 S 85. 
92
 Blackman et al Commentary 4-58. 
93
 S 9 of the Corporate Laws Amendment Act 24 of 2006 inserting s 38(2A) into the 1973 Companies Act. The Act 
was passed on 17 April 2007 and came into effect on 14 December 2007. 
94
 S 44(2). In terms of s 44(3) some of the requirements are that the board of the company has to be satisfied that the 
company would satisfy the solvency and liquidity test, the shareholders must have approved the assistance by means 
of a special resolution either generally or for a specific transaction,  the financial assistance and the terms of the 
assistance have to be fair and reasonable to the company. In terms of s 44(4) the memorandum of incorporation can 
also set out certain requirements which have to be satisfied. See also para 5.3.6 below for a brief discussion of the 
solvency and liquidity requirement. 
160 
 
therefore now be subject to the provisions of section 44 as well, for example financial 
assistance by a holding company to persons, so that they can acquire a minority 
shareholding in the subsidiary. 
 
5.3.4    Subsidiary holding shares in the holding company 
Section 39(1) of the 1973 Act was substituted by section 4(a) of Act 37 of 1999. Prior to 
1999 there was a prohibition on membership by a subsidiary of its holding company 
except in a few circumstances. This was an extension of the common-law rule that a 
company may not purchase its own shares.95 Once the legislature allowed a company to 
purchase its own shares,96 the prohibition became obsolete and had to be amended as 
well. 
 
Section 39 of the 1973 Act has to be read with section 89 of the 1973 Act. Section 89 of 
the 1973 Act provides that a subsidiary may acquire shares in its holding company up to a 
maximum of 10% in the aggregate of the number of issued shares of the holding 
company.97 Section 39, as amended, provides that the voting rights that are attached to 
the shares that a subsidiary may acquire in the holding company in that way may not be 
exercised as longs as the shares are held by the subsidiary and that the percentage of 
votes that can be cast at a meeting of shareholders shall be reduced by the number of 
shares that the subsidiary holds.98   
 
It would appear that these provisions only apply to the acquisition of shares by a 
subsidiary in its holding company after it became a subsidiary. Shares that the subsidiary 
held in its holding company prior to it becoming a subsidiary are therefore not affected 
by the restrictions and therefore still carry voting rights.99 
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The new Companies Act also regulates the acquisition by a subsidiary company of shares 
in its holding company.100 The new Companies Act provides that a subsidiary company 
may acquire shares in its holding company, but that it or it and other subsidiaries, may 
not hold more than 10% of the issued shares of the holding company.101 The shares held 
by a subsidiary will also not carry any voting rights.102 The provisions of section 48(2)(b) 
of the new Companies Act would appear to mean that a subsidiary may not hold more 
than 10% of the issued shares of the company. This is different to the 1973 Act which 
provides that a subsidiary may not acquire more than 10% of the issued shares of the 
holding company. Shares which a company held before it became a subsidiary are 
therefore not included under the 1973 Act whereas those shares would now be 
included.103 The new Companies Act however uses the term “not more than 10% […] of 
any class” of shares.104 This would imply that should a company, for example, have four 
different classes of shares, the subsidiary could hold 10% of the issued shares in each 
class since it would in the aggregate still only hold 10% of the total number of issued 
shares of the company. A director who does not vote against an acquisition by a 
subsidiary company of shares in the holding company which contravenes the new 
Companies Act could be held liable by the company for damages suffered by it as a result 
of the contravention.105 It would appear that the aims of the provisions are to prevent the 
abuse of voting rights and to restrict trafficking in the shares of the holding company. It is 
also clear that the subsidiary does not have to comply with the solvency and liquidity 
requirements.106 
 
5.3.5 Prohibition of loans to, or security in connection with transactions by, directors and 
managers 
Potentially one of the easiest forms of abuse within a group of companies is the 
utilisation of the funds of the subsidiary to provide loans to directors of the company or to 
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its holding company or to directors of fellow subsidiaries within the group. The assets of 
the subsidiary could also be at risk since these could be used as security for loans by the 
abovementioned directors. Section 226 of the 1973 Act therefore regulates certain loans 
and the provision of security to certain directors and undertakings controlled by them.107 
 
The purpose of this provision is: 
“[T]o prevent directors or managers of a company acting in their own interests and against the 
interests of shareholders by burdening the company with obligations which are not for its benefit 
but are for the benefit of another company and/or for the benefit of its directors and/or 
managers.”108 
 
To prevent the circumvention of this prohibition, the 1973 Act also prohibits the lending 
of money by a company to a company or another body corporate that is controlled by one 
or more directors or managers of the company, its holding company or a company that is 
a subsidiary of the holding company of the lending company.109 The provision does not, 
however, prevent a company from lending, for example, to its holding company or to a 
subsidiary of its holding company or to its own subsidiary regardless whether the holding 
company, for example, is controlled by a director, who would ordinarily fall under the 
prohibition.110  
 
A company may also lend money or grant security to its own director or manager or to a 
company or other body corporate that is controlled by one or more of the directors or 
managers of the company provided that the prior consent of the members of the company 
is obtained in the form of a special resolution or by means of unanimous consent.111 A 
loan to or the provision of security for a director of the holding company or to a body 
corporate controlled by that director or to a director of a fellow subsidiary or to a body 
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corporate controlled by that director is absolutely prohibited, i.e. the loan or the provision 
of security is not possible even with a special resolution or unanimous consent. A 
company may also lend money to a director or manager of its subsidiary company 
provided that that director or manager is not a director or manager of the lending 
company itself.112 
 
In Bevray Investments (Edms) Bpk v Boland Bank Bpk113 the interpretation of the phrase 
“own director” in this context114 required judicial clarification. The simplified facts were 
that a certain Voges was a director of the applicant but also of the holding company of 
the applicant. The applicant then provided security for the obligations of Voges to the 
respondent. When Voges defaulted on his obligations to the respondent it wanted to 
exercise its security that was provided by the applicant. The applicant alleged that the 
security was prohibited because Voges was a director of the holding company.115 The 
respondent alleged that an exception covered the transaction.116 The court therefore had 
to decide whether “own director” meant that the director may only be a director of the 
lending company (and not a director of a company where the prohibition would be 
applicable) for the exception to apply or whether other directorships were irrelevant as 
long as he is an “own director” of the lending company. 
 
Botha JA in a well reasoned minority decision illustrated the mischief at which the 
prohibition is aimed by means of the following example. He gave the example of a loan 
by a subsidiary to a director of the subsidiary, where this director is also a director of the 
holding company of the lending company.117 Botha JA then explained the situation as 
follows: 
  
 
“Maatskappy I 
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houermaatskappy; direkteure A en B  E 
Maatskappy II    Maatskappy III 
filiaal van I;                 filiaal van I; 
direkteure A en C     direkteure A en D 
 
Die posisie is nou dat maatskappy II steeds verbied word, volgens subart (1)(a)(ii) en (iii), om 'n 
lening te maak aan B en D, en dat die toestemming van die aandeelhouers van maatskappy II tot 
so 'n lening nie die toepaslikheid van die verbod uitskakel nie; subart (2)(a)(i) en (ii) kan steeds nie 
in werking tree nie. Wat dan van 'n lening deur maatskappy II aan A? Die argument namens die 
Bank is dat subart (2)(a)(i) en (ii) die uitwerking het dat maatskappy II wel met die toestemming 
van sy  aandeelhouers 'n lening mag maak aan A. Maar dit is klaarblyklik absurd. Geen 
bestaansrede vir so 'n resultaat is denkbaar nie. Die ratio van die verbod op 'n lening deur 
maatskappy II aan B of D, sonder uitsondering, is steeds ten volle van toepassing ook op 'n lening 
deur maatskappy II aan A. Inderdaad is die rede vir die verbod nog sterker aanwesig in A se geval, 
vanweë sy direkte magsposisie teenoor maatskappy II as direkteur van daardie maatskappy, om tot 
eie voordeel die fondse van die maatskappy te gebruik. Die Wetgewer se oogmerk om die belange 
van die aandeelhouers van maatskappy I te beskerm teen die wanaanwending van maatskappy II 
se fondse deur B of D, vereis met groter krag dat daar 'n verbod moet wees in die geval van 'n 
lening aan A. Die toestemming van die lede van maatskappy II tot 'n lening aan A kan nog minder 
die beskerming van die aandeelhouers van maatskappy I onnodig maak as in die geval van 'n 
lening deur maatskappy II aan B of D. As die argument namens die Bank oor die betekenis van 
subart (2)(a)(i) en (ii) reg is, sou dit beteken dat die Wetgewer die verbod wat hy met die een hand 
in subart (1)(a)(ii) en (iii) tot stand gebring het, eensklaps met die ander hand weer tot groot 
hoogte ongedaan gemaak het in subart (2)(a)(i) en (ii). Die euwel wat die Wetgewer in subart 
(1)(a)(ii) en (iii) bestry het met betrekking tot direkteure van houer- en filiaalmaatskappye, sou hy 
dan weer deur middel van subart (2)(a)(i) en (ii) grootliks laat herleef het. Dit sou 'n sinlose en 
onsinnige resultaat wees. Na my oordeel is dit ondenkbaar dat dit die bedoeling van die Wetgewer 
kon gewees het.”118 
 
The majority, however, held that the exception in section 226(2)(a)(ii) covered the facts 
in point regardless of the fact that Voges was also a director of the holding company 
which would ordinarily fall foul of section 226(1)(a)(ii). The majority sets out the court’s 
approach to the interpretation of section 226 in the following terms: 
”Die breë oogmerk of oogmerke van die bepaling is natuurlik duidelik. Maatskappye word bestuur 
deur direkteure en bestuurders. Hierdie direkteure en bestuurders kan hul  bevoegdhede misbruik 
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vir hul eie voordeel. Daarbenewens kan die direkteure of bestuurders van houermaatskappye 
hulself onbehoorlik bevoordeel deur hul beheer oor filiaalmaatskappye. Die Wetgewer wou die 
moontlikheid van sulke wanpraktyke beperk. Die Wetgewer het egter nie hierdie oogmerk probeer 
verwesenlik deur 'n algemene of absolute verbod te plaas op alle transaksies tussen 'n bestuurder 
of direkteur en 'n betrokke maatskappy  waardeur die bestuurder of direkteur bevoordeel kan word 
nie. Klaarblyklik sou so 'n verbod onprakties wees. Daar moet noodwendig baie omstandighede 
wees waarin dit nie onbehoorlik is vir 'n direkteur of bestuurder om geldelike voordele te ontvang 
van die maatskappy wat hy bestuur of wat deur sy maatskappy beheer word nie. Die Wetgewer het 
homself dus beperk  tot 'n verbod op sekere bepaalde transaksies wat as prima facie onaanvaarbaar 
beskou is, nl die maak van sekere lenings en die voorsiening van sekere sekuriteite. Selfs hier is 
die verbod egter nie absoluut nie - sekere transaksies wat binne die trefwydte van die verbod val, 
was nogtans vir die Wetgewer aanvaarbaar. Om vir sulke transaksies voorsiening te maak, bevat 
subart (2) 'n langerige lys uitsonderings op die verbodsbepalings in subart (1). Die Wetgewer se 
spesifieke oogmerk met art 226 was dus om sekere bepaalde vorms van geldelike bystand te 
verbied onderhewig aan bepaalde uitsonderings. Met die een hand verbied hy; met die ander hand 
veroorloof hy. Daar was dus nie 'n eenvoudige of ongekwalifiseerde oogmerk wat as toetssteen by 
die uitleg van die artikel gebruik kan word nie.”119 
 
The example and conclusion of Botha JA certainly make sense when one considers that 
the object of the legislature was to protect the funds of the company from abuse by the 
directors of the holding company. In the Bevray Investments case the lending company 
was a wholly owned subsidiary of the holding company which, to a certain extent, 
negates the argument that the minority shareholders of the lending company should be 
protected from abuse by the majority shareholders since there are no minority 
shareholders. Creditors of the subsidiary company are, however, still exposed to abuse. 
 
Should the provisions of section 226 be contravened the directors or officers of the 
company who authorised, permitted or who were party to the making of the prohibited 
loan or the provision of a prohibited security are liable to indemnify the company and any 
other person who had no actual knowledge of the contravention against any loss directly 
resulting from the invalidity of the loan or security and are also be guilty of an offence.120 
                                                           
119
 623E-J. The argument of the majority is that the prohibition is not absolute and that there are exceptions which in 
the case at hand allowed the transaction. 
120
 S 226(4)(b). 
166 
 
The section also provides that “director or officer” in the context includes any director or 
officer of the holding company, where the subsidiary is the lending company.121 
 
On the one hand the new Companies Act simplifies the provision of financial assistance 
to directors of the company or to directors within the group of companies122 but on the 
other hand also complicates the provision of financial assistance with the introduction of 
the terms “related” and “inter-related”.  Financial assistance to certain directors, who 
were prohibited under the 1973 Act from receiving such assistance, is no longer 
prohibited.123 Should the company wish to provide financial assistance to a director of the 
company, or to a director of a related or inter-related company or to a person who is 
related to such director, the company has to satisfy the same requirements that apply 
where the company provides financial assistance to a company within the group or which 
is inter-related to the lending company.124 All the requirements and consequences in 
respect of financial assistance within the group125 apply mutatis mutandis to the financial 
assistance by a company to certain designated persons.126 
 
5.3.6 The concept of solvency and liquidity 
The solvency and liquidity provisions of the new Companies Act are the first in South 
African companies legislation to deal specifically with groups of companies.127 The 
solvency and liquidity test, which is now a prerequisite for certain company transactions, 
is a major departure from the original version of the 1973 Act where the philosophy was 
the maintenance of capital for the protection of creditors. That philosophy was, however, 
gradually eradicated over the last ten years when the legislature has allowed the buyback 
of shares by a company,128 a subsidiary company being able to hold and acquire shares in 
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its holding company,129 and a company now being able to provide financial assistance for 
the acquisition of its shares subject to solvency and liquidity requirements.130 
 
The new Companies Act provides that the determination of whether a company satisfies 
the solvency and liquidity test involves the following. If the aggregate assets of the 
company, if it is a member of a group of companies, are equal to, or exceed the aggregate 
liabilities of the company, then the company is solvent.131 This provision is a radical 
departure from the provisions in the 1973 Act with respect to solvency and liquidity. The 
definition of “aggregate assets” and “aggregate liabilities” is not entirely clear but it 
could  mean that a person applying the test should take into account all the assets and 
liabilities of the companies within the group to determine whether the solvency and 
liquidity test has been satisfied. However, the draft company regulations provide that 
(a) “Whenever the “aggregate assets of a company”, and the “aggregate liabilities of a company”, 
within a group of companies are required to be evaluated in terms of section 4 (1)(a) the 
evaluation must consider whether–  
(b) the assets of the  relevant company equal or exceed its liabilities; and 
(c) the assets of each subsidiary of the relevant company equal or exceed that subsidiary’s  
liabilities.”132 
 
The wording of the regulation brings slightly more certainty. But there could still be 
uncertainty. For example, assume that a wholly-owned subsidiary holds shares in the 
holding company. Would this shareholding be taken into account to determine the value 
of the assets of the company? What if the holding company declared dividends to its 
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shareholders? Would the dividend declared to the subsidiary be an asset of the subsidiary 
which should be taken into account?133 
 
The new Companies Act further provides that to determine whether a company complies 
with the solvency and liquidity requirements, the financial information of the company 
upon which the assessment of the company’s financial position is made, should be based 
on the accounting records and financial statements which satisfy the provisions of the 
new Act.134  
  
5.3.7 Fiduciary duties within company groups 
The new Companies Act also provides for the extension of the fiduciary duties of 
directors to duties to the subsidiary company. The new Companies Act provides that a 
director of a company should not use his position or any information which he obtains 
while in his office as a director to knowingly cause harm to the subsidiary company of 
the company of which he is a director.135 The fiduciary duties of a director in respect of a 
subsidiary company are, however, not extended to all his fiduciary duties.136 The effect of 
the provisions in the new Companies Act regarding the fiduciary duties of directors in the 
context of company groups is uncertain, especially where there is a conflict between the 
interests of the holding company and those of the subsidiary company. The effect of these 
provisions on the common-law position is also uncertain.137 
 
5.3.8 Fundamental transactions 
The provisions in the new Companies Act dealing with fundamental transactions are also 
extended to apply to groups of companies.138 The chapter on fundamental transactions 
deals firstly with proposals by the board of directors to dispose of all of or the greater part 
of the company’s assets or undertaking.139 These provisions, outlined below, do not apply 
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to transactions where the disposal is between a wholly-owned subsidiary and its holding 
company140 or between or among two or more wholly-owned subsidiaries of the same 
holding company,141 or between or among a wholly-owned subsidiary on the one hand 
and its holding company and one or more wholly-owned subsidiaries of that holding 
company on the other hand.142 
 
In terms of the new Companies Act a company may only dispose of all or the greater part 
of its assets or its undertaking if it has adopted a special resolution143 and complies with 
all the other requirements of section 115. The implication is obvious within the context of 
company groups. Unless the parties fall under the exemptions referred to above, a 
disposal between a subsidiary company and its holding company, a holding company and 
its subsidiary and two co-subsidiaries will have to comply with the provisions of section 
112 of the new Companies Act read with section 115.  
 
Section 115 provides that a special resolution by the shareholders of the disposing 
company is required and, if the company is a subsidiary, the shareholders of the holding 
company must also adopt a special resolution if the holding company is a company144 or 
an external company;145  if having regard to the consolidated financial statements of the 
holding company the disposal by the subsidiary company substantially has the effect that 
the assets or the greater part of the assets or undertaking of the holding company is being 
disposed of.146 The fact that the shareholders of the holding company also have to vote is 
to be welcomed since by that means minority shareholders of the holding company may 
prevent any abuse in the vote by the shareholders of the subsidiary company147 or at the 
very least prevent the shareholders of the subsidiary alone deciding on such a crucial 
matter, since the value of the subsidiary, which is an asset of the holding company, could 
be devalued by the sale of its assets or its undertaking.  
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The next provision, which will be briefly considered, deals with amalgamations or 
mergers.148 The relevant section provides, among other possibilities, that two profit 
companies like a holding company and its subsidiary company may amalgamate or merge 
if upon such amalgamation or merger the amalgamated or merged entity satisfies the 
solvency and liquidity test.149 The companies may therefore be insolvent prior to their 
amalgamation or merger but after the implementation of the merger or amalgamation the 
merged or amalgamated entity has to comply with the solvency and liquidity test.  
 
The new Companies Act also makes provision for takeovers and regulations in respect of 
takeovers where subsidiary companies may play a role.150 The new Companies Act also 
deals with compulsory acquisitions and squeeze outs151 and comparable and partial 
offers.152 For the purposes of this dissertation, an investigation of these provisions is not, 
however, warranted. It suffices to say that the holding of shares by a subsidiary of an 
offeror company plays a role in the determination of certain thresholds.153 
 
5.3.9 Statutory piercing of the corporate veil 
The new Companies Act provides for statutory piercing of the corporate veil.154 The test 
which is set is that an “unconscionable abuse” of separate juristic personality must have 
occurred. This test seems narrower than the common-law test in the Cape Pacific case.155 
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This provision does not however repeal the common-law but provides an alternative 
remedy. In the light of the broad common-law test the narrower statutory test will fall 
within the common-law test. The statutory test would, had it not been for the common-
law test, have made it more difficult to pierce the corporate veil. For the purposes of this 
dissertation regarding the liability of the holding company for the obligations of its 
subsidiary, this statutory test would have made potential liability more difficult to 
establish instead of alleviating the evidentiary burden on an external creditor of the 
subsidiary company. 
 
5.3.10 Miscellaneous matters 
The new Companies Act also provides that a company may not pay a fine of its own 
director or that of a related company who has been convicted of an offence in terms of 
any national legislation.156 This excludes administrative fines and presumably fines for 
traffic violations.  
 
There are also other provisions in the new Companies Act which refer to subsidiary 
companies. For example, the new Companies Act provides that an offer of securities to 
certain financial services providers and financial institutions shall not be regarded as an 
offer to the public. The same applies to an offer to their wholly owned subsidiaries.157 
 
5.3.11 Summary 
In summation it can be said that the new Companies Act fundamentally changes the 
landscape in respect of groups of companies. The provisions of the 1973 Act have been 
improved in respect of loans within groups and loans to directors within groups.158 The 
abolition of the membership requirement to qualify as a holding company is also to be 
welcomed and the easy circumvention of the definition under the 1973 Act has now been 
addressed. It is however a pity that the definition of a wholly-owned subsidiary has been 
badly drafted.159 Furthermore it is not clear how a director’s duty to the company of 
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which he is a director and to its subsidiary company will work where there is conflict 
between the interests of the holding company and the subsidiary company.160 
 
The solvency and liquidity requirement can potentially bring about a big change in the 
way that the funds of subsidiary companies are utilised. Loans and other forms of 
financial assistance for other group members will be more difficult. The problems 
highlighted by Botha JA in the Bevray161 case may therefore have been partially 
addressed. However no provision is made to keep the subsidiary economically viable, 
which means that the holding company will still, subject to the solvency and liquidity 
tests, be able to withdraw funds from the subsidiary company as dividends and not allow 
it to grow independently. There is also no specific provision, despite the provision 
regarding the limited fiduciary duty of the directors of the holding company towards its 
subsidiary,162 to prevent a holding company from forcing its subsidiary not to take a 
corporate opportunity, but to divert it to another group member.  Although groups and 
possible abuse within groups are generally better regulated in the new Companies Act 
than in the 1973 Act, there is probably still room for improvement, especially in respect 
of the insolvency of a subsidiary company.163 
 
5.4 The Competition Act 
The Competition Act164 is a relatively new piece of legislation and the jurisprudence in 
this area of the law is still in its infancy. For the purposes of company groups, however, 
this Act is extremely relevant. 
 
Section 4 of the Competition Act provides that restrictive horizontal practices are 
prohibited. Section 4 provides that: 
 
“(1)  An agreement between, or concerted practice by, firms, or a decision by an association of 
firms, is prohibited if it is between parties in a horizontal relationship and if- 
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(a) it has the effect of substantially preventing, or lessening, competition in a 
market, unless a party to the agreement, concerted practice, or decision can 
prove that any technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gain resulting 
from it outweighs that effect; or 
  (b) it involves any of the following restrictive horizontal practices: 
(i) directly or indirectly fixing a purchase or selling price or any other 
trading condition; 
(ii) dividing markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories, or 
specific types of goods or services; or 
   (iii) collusive tendering. 
(2)  An agreement to engage in a restrictive horizontal practice referred to in 
subsection (1) (b) is presumed to exist between two or more firms if- 
(a) any one of those firms owns a significant interest in the other, or they have at 
least one director or substantial shareholder in common; and 
(b) any combination of those firms engages in that restrictive horizontal practice. 
(3)  A presumption contemplated in subsection (2) may be rebutted if a firm, director 
or shareholder concerned establishes that a reasonable basis exists to conclude 
that the practice referred to in subsection (1) (b) was a normal commercial 
response to conditions prevailing in that market. 
  (4)  For purposes of subsections (2) and (3), 'director' means- 
(a) a director of a company as defined in the Companies Act, 1973 (Act 61 of 
1973); 
(b) a member of a close corporation as defined in the Close Corporations Act, 1984 
(Act 69 of 1984); 
  (c) a trustee of a trust; or 
  (d) a person holding an equivalent position in a firm. 
(5)  The provisions of subsection (1) do not apply to an agreement between, or 
concerted practice engaged in by,- 
(a) a company, its wholly-owned subsidiary as contemplated in section 1 (5) of the 
Companies Act, 1973, a wholly owned subsidiary of that subsidiary or any 
combination of them; or 
(b) the constituent firms within a single economic entity similar in structure to those 
referred to in paragraph (a).” 
  
A restrictive horizontal practice is defined in section 4(1)(b). The word “firm” is not 
comprehensively defined in the Act and the definitions section of the Act merely 
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describes “firm” as including a person, a partnership or a trust.165 It is important, 
however, to note that that section 4(1) will not apply “to an agreement between, or 
concerted practice engaged in by (a) a company, its wholly-owned subsidiary, a wholly- 
owned subsidiary of that subsidiary or any combination of them; or (b) the constituent 
firms within a single economic entity similar in structure to those referred to in (a).”166 
 
Section 4 of the Competition Act is relevant in the context of agreements that are 
concluded between firms and associations of firms, and concerted practices of firms and 
associations of firms.167 This begs the question as to what constitutes a “firm” in the 
context of competition law. According to Sutherland,168 any type of entity could be a firm 
if it is a separate economic unit. Furthermore an entity should only be seen as a firm if it 
is engaged in economic activity. 
 
The principle that a group of companies can in certain circumstances be accepted as a 
single economic unit has been accepted in European competition law, and in anti-trust 
law of the United States of America in the realm of restrictive horizontal practices.169  
According to Sutherland170 the decisions of the courts in the United States, prior to 
Copperweld Corp v Independence Tube Corp,171 in general terms, were based on the 
premise that conspiracies between intra-enterprise companies were possible. The 
Supreme Court in Copperweld held that a conspiracy is not possible between a holding 
company and its wholly-owned subsidiary. The Competition Tribunal in South Africa in 
Bulmer SA (Pty) Ltd v Distillers Corporation SA Ltd172 quoted the following relevant 
passage from Copperweld: 
“A parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete unity of interest. Their objectives are 
common, not disparate; their general corporate actions are guided or determined not by two 
                                                           
165
 See s 1(2) “firm”. 
166
 S 4(5). 
167
 S 4(1). 
168
 Sutherland & Kemp Competition Law of South Africa (2005) Service Issue 6 5-20 with reference to Waelbroeck 
& Frignani European Competition Law (1999) 33. 
169
 See Viho Europe BV v Commission of the European Communities 1996 ECR 1 5457; Copperweld Corp v 
Independent Tube Corp 467 US 752 (1984) at 771; Bulmer SA (Pty) Ltd v Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd (1) [2001-
2002] CPLR 448 (CT) para 5.7.4 below. 
170
 Sutherland & Kemp Competition Law 5-22. 
171
 Copperweld Corp v Independence Tube Corp 467 US 752 (1984). 
172
 Bulmer SA (Pty) Ltd v Distillers Corporation SA Ltd [2001-2002] CPLR 448 (CT). 
175 
 
separate consciousnesses but by one. They are not unlike a multiple team of horses drawing a 
vehicle under the control of a single driver. […] If a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary do 
agree to a course of action, there is no sudden joining of economic resources that had previously 
served different interests […].”173 
 
It is interesting to note that the court holds that a company and its wholly-owned 
subsidiary have the same objectives and that the course of the two entities is guided by 
one consciousness. Should the subsidiary company fail to act in the best interests of the 
holding company the holding company will exercise the control that it has over the 
subsidiary.174  
 
According to Sutherland the first part of section 4(5)(a) of the South African Competition 
Act reflects this approach, but the approach in Copperweld also raises a few issues that 
need to be addressed.175 Sutherland asks whether the shareholding in a subsidiary should 
be decisive to determine whether section 4 of the South African Competition Act should 
apply. He argues further that the European approach is preferable. In terms of that 
approach the focus is on whether the subsidiary is autonomous to determine its own 
direction or whether it forms part of a single economic unit. The fact that the subsidiary is 
a wholly-owned subsidiary is not decisive either way. Sutherland furthermore argues that 
it would be preferable to work with a presumption that wholly-owned subsidiaries and 
their holding companies form single economic units.176 
 
According to Sutherland it is conceivable that the required collusion for purposes of 
section 4 of the Act may sometimes not be present, even in cases where the subsidiary 
company is not wholly owned. He refers to a number of cases in the United States of 
America where the Copperweld principle has been extended to situations where the 
particular companies were not wholly-owned companies. The South African Competition 
Act provides that section 4 of the Act does not apply where constituent firms are “within 
a single economic entity similar in structure” to those between a company and its wholly- 
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owned subsidiary.177 According to Sutherland the Competition Act would appear to 
require two conditions to be met. First of all there must be a single economic entity and 
secondly the entity must have a similar structure to one that exists between a holding 
company and its wholly-owned subsidiary company or between wholly-owned subsidiary 
companies.178 
 
In the arena of competition law Sutherland is of the opinion179 that there are several 
considerations to take into account when asking whether a single economic entity 
exists.180 The mere fact that a number of separate companies may have the same mutual 
interests does not necessarily imply that those companies would constitute a single 
economic entity. For example a cartel could not possibly be deemed to be a single 
economic entity although the members of the cartel have mutual interests. The question 
should rather be whether the relevant companies acted with a unified purpose in mind, as 
opposed to mutual and overlapping self interest.  
 
Before the European competition authorities accept that a holding company and its 
subsidiary form a single economic unit, they require that a subsidiary company does not 
unilaterally embark on its own direction in the market but takes note of, and carries out, 
the instructions of the holding company, or that companies must be unable to compete for 
them to form a single economic unit.181 
 
Sutherland argues that the actual integration of the business activities, management and 
the flow of funds of the relevant companies should be important factors which should be 
taken into account to decide whether a single economic entity exists or not. The 
shareholding of the holding company should, however, not be conclusive.182 
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It is submitted that Sutherland is correct in stating that section 4(5)(b) of the Competition 
Act has been badly drafted and is problematic. Only one of the two requirements in 
section 4(5)(b) is important, namely the requirement that there must be a single economic 
unit present. Where the same companies together are in control of other companies and 
the controlling companies and the controlled companies function as a single economic 
unit, the collusion required for conduct to amount to a prohibited restrictive horizontal 
practice under section 4 of the Competition Act is not possible. 
 
5.5 Company groups and tax law 
The Income Tax Act183 (the ITA) makes provision for the concept of a group of 
companies. It defines a group of companies as:  
“two or more companies in which one company (‘the controlling group company’) directly or 
indirectly holds shares in at least one other company (‘the controlled group company’), to the 
extent that at least 70% of the equity shares of each controlled group of companies are directly 
held by the controlling group company, one or more other controlled group companies or any 
combination thereof; and the controlling company directly holds at least 70% in the equity shares 
in at least one controlled group company.”184  
 
This definition sets a very high threshold before companies will be in a group relationship 
compared to the definitions of a holding and subsidiary company in the new Companies 
Act.185 Should a company therefore directly hold less than 70% of the equity shares in at 
least one other company, it would not qualify as a “controlling group company” to 
constitute a company group in terms of the ITA. 
 
Another term that appears in the definitions section of the ITA is that of a “connected 
person”. The term is defined in relation to natural persons, trusts, partnerships and 
companies. In relation to companies the term is defined to include “any other company 
that would be part of the same group of companies as that company as if the expression 
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‘at least 70 per cent’ in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition ‘group of companies’ in 
this section were replaced by the expression ‘more than 50’ per cent”.186 
 
There are a number of other references to company groups in the ITA which will be 
discussed to the extent that they are relevant to this dissertation. First of all any gain 
made by a employee from a disposal of any equity shares which he obtained in terms of a 
broad-based employee share plan has to be included in the income of that person for the 
year of assessment, if that disposal occurred within five years of the grant of the equity 
shares.187 However, this provision will not be applicable should there be a subdivision, 
consolidation, conversion or restructuring of the equity share capital of the employer or 
any employer in the same group of companies as the employer and the person disposes of 
his equity shares in exchange for equity shares in the employer or any other company in 
the group of companies of the employer.188   
 
The ITA provides that to determine the taxable income of a person, who carries on a 
trade, deductions will be allowed for “expenditure and losses actually incurred in the 
production of income, provided such expenditure and losses are not of a capital 
nature.”189 This does not, however, entitle a holding company to deduct losses made by 
its subsidiary company from its income.190 In ITC 1684191 a subsidiary produced certain 
components in the motor vehicle industry for export. Its holding company procured 
orders for these components. The subsidiary entered into a commission agreement with 
its holding company in terms of which the subsidiary would pay the holding company 
commission based on the orders which the holding company procured for the subsidiary 
company. In the relevant tax year the subsidiary deducted the commission which it paid 
to its holding company in terms of the ITA.192 The Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
argued that the commission was of a capital nature and therefore not tax deductible. The 
                                                           
186
 S 1 ITA “connected person” (d)(i). See s 1 (d)(v) and (vA) of the ITA for further definitions of what “connected 
person” means in relation to companies. 
187
 S 8B(1) ITA. 
188
 S 8B(1)(a) read with s 8B(2) ITA. 
189
 S 11(a) ITA. 
190
 ITC 278 (1933) 7 SATC 246 (U). 
191
 62 SATC 413. 
192
 S 11(a) read with s 23(g) ITA. 
179 
 
court, however, held that the commission paid was of a revenue nature and therefore 
deductible from the subsidiary’s income. 
 
The supply and acquisition of services in terms of international agreements193 are also 
relevant to connected persons. In terms of the ITA, if there is an international transaction 
for the supply or acquisition of services or goods between connected persons the 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue may adjust the value of the performance in terms of the 
transaction to reflect the arm’s length price of the goods or services if the price of the 
transaction is more or less than it would have been were the transaction concluded 
between two independent parties at arm’s length.194 The purpose of this section is clearly 
to avoid abuse between parties who are not at arm’s length. The section is therefore not 
exclusively aimed at company groups but applies to any connected parties. 
 
Part III of the ITA provides for special rules relating to company formations,195 share-for-
share transactions,196 merger transactions,197 intra-group transactions,198 unbundling 
transactions199 and liquidation transactions.200 
 
A share-for-share transaction is defined201 in the ITA. In terms of a proviso to this 
definition, the provision does not apply to a disposal by a person of target shares202 to an 
acquiring company203 where the person and the target company204 form part of the same 
group of companies immediately before and after the disposal, if the parties so choose. 
The section on merger transactions also does not apply to the disposal of assets between 
parties within the same group of companies should the parties so choose.205 
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The rules in respect of intra-group transactions are of particular relevance.206 An intra-
group transaction is defined as a transaction: 
“(a) in terms of which any asset is disposed of by one company ([…] the transferor 
company) to another company which is resident ([…] the transferee company) and 
both parties form part of the same group of companies as at the end of the day of that 
transaction; 
(b) as a result of which that transferee company acquires that asset from that transferor 
company as a capital asset, where that   transferor company holds it as a capital asset; 
or as trading stock, where that transferor company holds it as trading stock; and 
(c) in respect of which that transferor company and that transferee company have jointly 
elected that this section applies.”207 
 
If an intra-group transaction takes place, and both parties elect that section 45 of the ITA 
must apply, the parties to the transaction would qualify for rollover relief, i.e. they can 
carry over their tax liabilities from the tax year in which the transaction took place.208 If a 
holding company therefore disposes of a capital asset to its subsidiary, it is deemed that 
the disposal took place at base cost. This means that the holding company will not realise 
a capital gain or incur a capital loss in respect of the disposed asset.209 According to De 
Koker certain circumstances in section 45 would lead to the holding company and 
subsidiary company (in the above example) effectively being deemed to be one entity in 
determining any capital gain or capital loss by the holding company on the disposal of the 
asset,210 for example the date that the capital asset was acquired by the holding company 
in the above example and the amount and date that it incurred any allowable base cost 
expenditure211 in respect of the asset.212  
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The sections dealing with unbundling transactions and transactions in respect of 
liquidation and deregistration of a company also regulates those situations where a group 
of companies is present.213 
 
Other provisions in the ITA relating to groups include: a provision in respect of the 
exemption from secondary tax on companies in terms of which any dividend that is 
declared by a company to a shareholder, which is a company that forms part of the same 
group of companies as the company that declares the dividend, is exempt from secondary 
tax on companies;214 a section that allows for the deduction of the costs of providing a 
learnership to an employee by an employer or any company which forms part of the same 
group of companies as the employer who employs the learner and provides the 
learnership agreement;215 a section which exempts a company from payment of donations 
tax if the donation is from one company to another company which is resident in South 
Africa and a member of the same group of companies as the donor company,216 and 
payments between connected persons where the incurring or accrual of interest is 
relevant.217 There is also a provision that deems certain distributions to be dividends.218 
However, any amount which is distributed between companies in the same group would 
be exempt from secondary tax on companies.219 
 
The eighth schedule to the ITA regulates the determination of taxable capital gains220 and 
assessed capital losses.221 If a person disposes of shares within two years of acquiring 
them, he must ignore any capital loss due to the disposal to the extent of any 
extraordinary dividends222 which accrued to that person or which he received within that 
two-year period in respect of that share.223 This provision, however, does not apply where 
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dividends are declared by a company to a shareholder which forms part of the same 
group of companies as the company which declared the dividend and where the 
controlling company and the company declaring the dividend are both resident in South 
Africa.224 
 
The Transfer Duty Act225 also provides for situations where a number of companies find 
themselves in a group situation. It provides that no duty is payable where an 
amalgamation transaction,226 an intra-group transaction227 or a liquidation distribution228 
in respect of immovable property takes place in terms of the ITA.229 
 
It is clear that tax legislation and competition law legislation are not blind to the reality of 
the economic reality of company groups and recognise that in many instances these 
groups form one entity. This reality is reflected in legislation and case law. 
 
5.6 The Consumer Protection Act 
The Consumer Protection Act230 was assented to on 24 April 2009 and will commence on 
24 October 2010. One of the aims of this Act is to protect consumers from hazards and to 
provide them with the statutory means to claim damages for harm suffered from what 
may be broadly described as defective products.231 The Act imposes strict liability on the 
producer, importer, distributor or retailer, among others, for supplying unsafe goods, a 
product failure, defect, or a hazard in goods if a consumer suffers harm due to one or 
more of these factors.232 Companies within a vertically integrated group may therefore be 
exposed to damages claims from consumers. This could also open the door for abuse by a 
holding company. Assume that in a vertical economic chain, the group is organised as a 
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producer, distributor and retailer and the group produces, distributes and then sells a 
defective product which causes harm to a consumer. The consumer has an election and 
may choose to proceed against the producer, the distributor or the retailer. If he is not 
aware of the existence of the group structure, he will conceivably institute legal action 
against the retailer. The retailer would in principle have a claim against the distributor. If 
the distributor is, however, its holding company or a fellow group member the chances 
are remote that the retailer will be indemnified. The Act may therefore stimulate the 
creation of subsidiaries and their use as undercapitalised retailers as the public interface 
of the group. Only the consumer who is aware of the group structure will search behind 
the retailer to determine who the distributor and producer were, which could impose a 
substantial evidentiary burden.  
 
5.7 The judicial recognition of groups 
The South African courts have had the opportunity to decide a number of cases that deal 
with company groups in a number of legal fields over the years. Reference will be made 
in this chapter to cases dealing with company groups in the fields of company law, 
criminal law, labour law, competition law, contract law, the law of delict and intellectual 
property law. The aim of this investigation is to establish whether the courts have been 
consistent in how they have dealt with groups in these various fields and if so, what the 
common thread is. Where there are discrepancies the reasons for that will be investigated. 
Cases dealing with company groups in the context of the law of insolvency will, 
however, be discussed in chapter 7. 
5.7.1 Company law 
One of the first cases where the concept of a company group was raised, even if only in 
passing, was Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd.233  The case dealt with 
the breach of fiduciary duty by Robinson who exercised control over the boards of the 
respondent as well as its subsidiaries through his nominee directors. Innes CJ said the 
following: 
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“If a mandate was rightly inferred, then there is no need for further discussing the question of 
fiduciary relationship. But, even if the relationship between the defendant and the company could 
not be fitly described as one of agent and principal, I should still hold that it was fiduciary. I had 
occasion in Hull v Turf Mines, Limited (1906, T.S p. 68), to remark upon the anomalous and 
undesirable positions which arise in the working of the group system. It is a system much in vogue 
in the Transvaal, and it exists in the present instance under the new regime as it did under the old. 
It involves the management and direction of the policy and affairs of the various companies by 
some controlling authority through nominee directors. Whether the control is exercised by a man 
who is himself a director or by someone outside makes little difference in principle. In either case 
the system is peculiarly liable to abuse. Unless the board is moulded to the will of the controlling 
authority the system cannot work. An independent set of directors would be fatal.”234 
Already in 1921 in the Robinson case the courts therefore recognised the potential of 
abuse which could take place within a group of companies. 
5.7.2 Criminal law 
The next noteworthy case where mention is made of a group of companies, is the 
criminal matter of Rex v Milne and Erleigh.235 Centlivres CJ said the following: 
“In the first place the appellants relied upon the existence of a group of companies some of which 
had appointed Erleigh their managing director and all of which had allowed him wide powers in 
carrying on their affairs. It was contended that, apart from the actual existence of wide powers 
granted to Erleigh expressly or by acquiescence in their exercise, allowance must be made, in 
judging his state of mind, for the reasonable possibility that he believed he had powers more 
extensive than he actually had. The word 'group' has been used with many shades of meaning. The 
basic idea seems to be: An association of companies, created not by resolutions to associate but by 
the acts of individuals, and depending on the facts that they have a single secretary, generally itself 
a company, and are controlled as to the appointment of their directors, and therefore as to the 
administration of their affairs, by one or a few people. The persons who wield the controlling 
power are the only legal personae apart from the companies themselves. There is no persona 
which is the group, and there are no interests involved except the interests of the companies and 
the interests of the controllers. This is not mere legal technicality. No doubt it may be convenient 
to talk of the interests of the group, but no one could seriously think of the group as having 
interests distinct from those of the companies and controllers. The fact that in a group bargaining 
between companies may often be non-existent, because the controllers decide, does not support 
the idea of a single persona with single interests. No business man would be deceived into thinking 
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that in a group there is, in effect, a pooling of assets and a right in the controllers to deal with 
assets belonging to the companies without regard to their respective interests. Those interests 
must be adjusted by the controllers as honest boards would agree to do if there were no group, i.e. 
on fair and reasonable lines, having regard to the circumstances of each transaction. Erleigh owed 
duties to the companies of which he was a director and not to any concept called the group, and he 
certainly knew that.”236 
 
The Appellate Division therefore recognised the separate identities of the companies 
within the group structure, and that a director only has a fiduciary duty to the company of 
which he is a director. 
 
5.7.3 Labour law 
In the field of labour law the treatment by the courts and industrial councils, under the 
former labour law dispensation, of company groups has been interesting. In most, if not 
all of the cases that are discussed below, the question that the courts had to answer was 
who the employer of a dismissed employee was within the context of a group of 
companies. 
 
In The Media Workers Association of SA v Facts Investors Guide (Pty) Ltd237certain 
workers were dismissed due to a work stoppage which the respondents treated as a strike. 
The first respondent averred that it was not the employer but that the second respondent 
was the employer of the dismissed workers. It was common cause that the respondents 
were associated companies (without the court stating what the relationship between them 
was in a legal sense), which operated in an interrelated manner, in that both utilised the 
labour of the affected employees, conducted their business from the same premises and 
had the same managing director. The wages of the dismissed employees were also paid 
by the first respondent. 
 
The case for the dismissed employees was based on the argument that the two companies 
operated as an indivisible unit. The argument was that the managing director of the two 
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companies operated the companies as one single entity and indiscriminately made use of 
one or the other in the operation of the businesses. 
 
The court sidestepped having to deal with piercing of the corporate veil by holding that 
the first respondent was the employer of the applicants. According to the court, its 
decision did not strictly speaking amount to the piercing of the corporate veil but this is 
also qualified by the statement that it does take into account the “realities of the 
situation”238 on a prima facie basis. Interestingly enough the court felt compelled to refer 
to DHN Food Distribution Ltd v London Borough of Tower Hamlets239 without 
expanding on its relevance. 
 
In SA Allied Workers Union v Contract Installations (Pty) Ltd240 the applicants were 
retrenched by their employer and sought a reinstatement order in terms of the provisions 
of the Labour Relations Act.241 The question that the court had to decide on was whether 
the second respondent, which denied that it ever employed the applicants, could be joined 
with the first respondent in an order for reinstatement if the court held that the 
retrenchment of the applicants was unfair. 
 
The first respondent issued income tax forms to the applicants as well as other 
documentation. The applicants, however, showed that the second respondent sent 
correspondence to their trade union, the first applicant, and that as far as the trade union 
was concerned the second respondent was the employer of the applicants. Importantly, 
however, the applicants contended that they did not really rely on the argument that the 
second respondent was the employer of the applicants, but rather on the argument that the 
first and second respondents were associated in a single business enterprise and that the 
main shareholder in the first respondent also held the largest interest in the second 
respondent which was a close corporation. The argument was therefore that: 
“in mind and management the first and second respondents are one and the same.”242 
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The applicants, inter alia, argued that the position in casu was similar to that in Media 
Workers Association of SA v Facts Investors Guide (Pty) Ltd,243 in that the respondents 
were associated companies.  
 
More importantly the applicants also argued that where several companies operate as a 
group they can be regarded as a single body244 and referred to the DHN245 case. The 
industrial council considered the statements of Lord Denning MR in the DHN case and 
stated that: 
“Nor in this case should the two corporate persons concerned be treated separately so as to 
succeed on a technical point.  Although in this case there is not a parent company and a subsidiary 
company, there is clearly, on the papers before the court, a position where a private company is in 
a hand-and-glove situation with a  close corporation, the principal shareholder in the one being the 
holder of the major interest in the other.”246 
 
The industrial council then held that the phrase of “in mind and management the first and 
second respondent are one and the same” was an apt description of the factual situation 
which prima facie appeared to have existed. The industrial council acknowledged that 
although in law the first respondent was the employer of the applicants, in equity the 
second respondent, as umbrella company of the group, should be held responsible with 
the first respondent for the unfair retrenchments. The industrial council then further 
stated: 
“Equity requires, however, that in circumstances such as prevail in this case the applicants should 
not be denied a remedy because their employer has ceased business while the group continues to 
operate.”247 
  
This certainly is a most radical statement for the industrial council to make without citing 
any authority except the DHN248 case and the Media Workers249 case and completely 
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ignoring the Salomon250 case and basic company law principles of separate juristic 
personality and relying heavily on equity which, in any event, is dubious. 
 
In Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers Union v Kaycraft (Pty) Ltd251 the industrial 
council again had to deal with the retrenchment of employees within the context of a 
group. The applicants sought a reinstatement order in terms of the former Labour 
Relations Act.252 Kaycraft was the wholly-owned subsidiary of Sterns Diamond 
Organization Ltd. The applicants were employed by Kaycraft but argued in the 
alternative that they were also employees of Sterns because Kaycraft was the wholly- 
owned subsidiary of Sterns which was also the holding company of other companies in 
the group and as such the employees were employed by the group.  
 
The applicants had a recognition agreement with both Sterns and Kaycraft and a 
retrenchment procedure was also included in the agreement. Sterns decided to close 
Kaycraft and to relocate it. Sterns, not Kaycraft, informed the applicants of the relocation. 
The applicants as mentioned above sought an order against both respondents. The 
respondents argued that the industrial council could not disregard the principles of 
company law, namely the separate juristic personality of the respondents and issue an 
order against both respondents. 
 
The industrial council referred to Cilliers & Benade as to when the corporate veil can be 
lifted, as well as to the DHN253 case.  
“Cilliers & Benade at 15-16 submit that various factors should be considered by a court before 
applying the economic entity approach: 
(a) If the necessary degree of control, which will always be a question of fact, is present.  If 
for example the relationship between the companies in the group is that of a holding 
company and wholly-owned subsidiary it can be indicative of the necessary control.  
Control will in reality have to be exercised in such a manner that the subsidiary is 
completely subservient to the holding company. 
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(b) If as far as is relevant there is an 'utter identity and community of interest' between the 
holding and subsidiary company in the group. 
(c) If by the treatment of each holding company and subsidiary in isolation it would in law 
lead to an unjustifiable inequity. 
(d) If the rights of creditors and shareholders will be prejudiced by this construction, this 
construction should not be applied.”254 
 
The industrial council also referred to the LLD dissertation of Botha255 where he 
discussed the economic entity approach: 
“These constructions should be applied conservatively if at all.  Their application can only be 
supported if the strict application of the principle of the separate legal personalities of the holding 
and subsidiary company will prevent the law being applied to the ascertained facts, or will result 
in an injustice or anomaly.”256 
   
The industrial council also referred to the Media Workers257 and Contract Installations258 
cases. The council then held that various factors indicated that it would be equitable to 
regard Sterns and Kaycraft as being jointly responsible for the retrenchments. Without 
referring to any other authority the council then held that Sterns and Kaycraft should be 
held responsible as a group for the consequences of an unfair retrenchment. 
 
In Boumat v Vaughan259the Labour Appeal Court had to decide who the employer of 
Vaughan was. Vaughan was employed as the managing director of Plumbware, a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Durity, which in turn was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Boumat 
Ltd. Boumat was the holding company of a number of companies, the Boumat group of 
companies. The appointment of Vaughan was on the letterhead of Boumat Ltd.  
 
The court referred first of all to the definition of employer in the previous Labour 
Relations Act.260  “Employer” was defined as: 
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“any person whomsoever who employs or provides work for any person and remunerates or 
expressly or tacitly undertakes to remunerate him or who, subject to subsection (3), permits any 
person whomsoever in any manner to assist him in the carrying on or conducting of his business; 
and "employ" and "employment" have corresponding meanings.”261 
 
On the facts it appeared that Boumat was the employer but the court also, interestingly, 
pointed out that it was conceivable that an employee could have more than one 
employer.262 
  
In Sage v Fourwinds Transport Co Ltd263 the applicant held various positions within a 
group of companies. The question again concerned who the employer was at the time that 
the applicant was dismissed. Considering all the evidence the industrial council held the 
following: 
“However, when read together, the totality of evidence would certainly lead one to a picture of not 
such a rigid line between the respective companies within the group. It may be rigid from a pure 
legal or accounting point of view, but from the point of view of employees, and even management, 
going about their daily business, I am not so certain that the distinction is as rigid as respondent 
would have me believe.”264 
  
The decision in Board of Executors Ltd v McCafferty265 was the first decision in which 
the Labour Appeal Court thoroughly grappled with the question of the separate existence 
of the individual companies within a group of companies, although it eventually neatly 
sidestepped the question of piercing the corporate veil and the existence of a group as an 
employer. 
 
Board of Executors Ltd (BOE Ltd) was incorporated in 1987 and at the relevant time 
owned all the shares in both Board of Executors 1838 (BOE 1838) and Board of 
Executors Merchant Bank Ltd (BOE MB).  
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When it was not a party to the proceedings BOE MB admitted that it employed and 
therefore dismissed the respondent. The Industrial Court, therefore, mero motu 
substituted BOE MB for BOE Ltd as a party to the dispute. Ultimately the question 
before the Labour Appeal Court was whether BOE Ltd was the employer of the 
respondent. 
 
The court referred to the definition of employer in the Labour Relations Act266 and then 
delved into a number of cases to determine when an “employer” is in fact an employer. 
The court concluded that an employer is one who accepts the placement of the 
employee’s capacity to work at the disposal of the recipient. 
 
On the facts it was clear that there was great confusion, not only for the respondent but 
also within the group, since letterheads of different companies within the group were 
often used in correspondence with the respondent who was employed by various 
companies within the group from time to time. BOE Ltd argued that although there was 
confusion as to who the employer was, the burden of proof was on the respondent to 
prove who his employer was.  
  
The court referred in its judgment to Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments 
(Pty) Ltd,267 Adams v Cape Industries plc,268 Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd,269 and 
Botha v Van Niekerk.270 The court accepted the point of departure that it should give 
effect to the law which recognises the creation of subsidiary companies which have 
separate identities to the holding companies.271 The court found that in casu there was 
neither any “unconscionable injustice”272 nor the flexible approach which was taken 
according to the court in the Cape Pacific case. The court therefore held that there was no 
basis to go behind the separate identity of the companies within the BOE stable. 
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The respondent argued that the BOE group was his employer. BOE MB was controlled 
by BOE Ltd through an executive committee which reported to BOE Ltd and this 
executive committee controlled the operational companies down to decisions of 
restructuring, retrenchments and dismissals. 
 
According to the court this submission of the respondent came to more than mere 
piercing of the corporate veil. The court concluded as follows: 
“This submission is more than piercing the corporate veil. It does exactly that which respondent's 
counsel disputed he ever attempted to do. It introduces more than the concept of a single economic 
entity comprising BOE 1838, BOE-MB and BOE Ltd all acting in concert regardless of their 
separate corporate personalities. This submission is tantamount to introducing a new and 
independent creature quite distinct from but comprising BOE 1838, BOE Ltd and BOE-MB. Truly 
a fourth dimension. There is, in my view, merit in the argument but it was not pleaded and no 
basis has been advanced why there should be a departure from the pleadings to such a radical 
extent.”273 
 
On the facts the court eventually found that the respondent was initially employed by 
BOE 1838, then by BOE MB before his services were terminated by BOE Ltd. The court 
therefore concluded that on the facts the respondent had three employers. This could be 
seen as a very neat sidestepping of dealing with the submission that the BOE group was 
the employer of the respondent and concomitantly the question of piercing of the 
corporate veil.274 
 
In Vermeulen v Cabletec Electrical & Mechanical Supplies (Pty) Ltd275the court again 
had to deal with a retrenchment within a group. In this case the criterion for retrenchment 
was “last in first out” (LIFO). The applicant did not dispute the fairness thereof but how 
LIFO was applied. He alleged that LIFO should have been applied throughout the group 
and not in individual subsidiaries within the group. Had this been done he alleged that he 
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would not had been retrenched. Where LIFO is applied throughout a group the process is 
known as bumping. The court held that bumping is a complex issue and that regard 
should be taken of relevant factors like how the subsidiary companies are connected and 
the extent to which they are managed as a single entity. On the facts there were indicators 
that there was a very close connection between the companies within the group. 
Ultimately the court held on the facts that the application of LIFO in this instance was 
fair. 
 
In Airlink Pilots Association SA v SA Airlines (Pty) Ltd276 the labour court was prepared 
to pierce the corporate veil although it acknowledged that, in terms of the Cape Pacific 
case,277 it had no general discretion to simply disregard a company’s separate legal 
personality whenever it felt it was just to do so. It justified its decision as follows: 
“The commercial arrangements in the group are not under attack. There is no need for it. The 
abovementioned facts do however demonstrate that the first respondent controlled the second 
respondent to the extent that it was the sole decision maker, particularly with regard to the 
employment of pilots. It would appear that the re-employment requirement and the resultant 
avoidance, of amongst other terms and conditions, the pilots' seniority system, is not a decision 
which emanates from the second respondent but from the first respondent. It appears to be a 
device to change the terms and conditions of the employment relationship between the first 
respondent and the applicant.    
 The second respondent has also failed to explain how it adopted and considered the selection 
process. It did not demonstrate any factual independence of its decision, in sharp contrast with the 
decision taken by the first respondent. 
 In my view, the applicant has on a balance of probabilities shown that the decision regarding the 
new terms and conditions in relation to the Embraer Jets was that of the first respondent, and in 
that context, the commercial relationship between the first respondent and the second respondent 
should be disregarded.”278 
 
What can be gleaned from the Airlink decision is that if there had been sufficient 
evidence that the first respondent abdicated its responsibilities to the second respondent, 
the court may have decided to give effect to the commercial reality behind the structure 
and pierced the corporate veil. 
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The labour law cases dealing with company groups show that the industrial councils and 
labour courts have been more willing to disregard the separate identity of the various 
companies within groups. This willingness seemed to be based more on equity than on 
legal principles. Furthermore the councils and courts have also escaped having to deal 
with the legal principles regarding piercing of the corporate veil by simply holding that 
an employee in appropriate cases has more than one employer. Only in the BOE and the 
Airlink Pilots cases were thorough discussions of the applicable legal principles and case 
law present. The lack of thorough discussion should not, however, result in the other 
cases being summarily discarded. At least the respective bodies were willing to recognise 
the reality of the factual situations which were present.  
 
5.7.4 Competition law 
As shown above, groups of companies are also extremely relevant in the field of 
competition law.279 In Bulmer SA (Pty) Ltd v Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd (1)280 
Distillers entered into a transaction by which it would acquire the business of 
Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery Group (Pty) Ltd. The question before the Competition 
Tribunal was whether this transaction constituted a merger in terms of the Competition 
Act.281 If it was a merger in terms of the said Act the respondents were required to notify 
the Competition Commission of the transaction. 
 
Initially the Competition Commission advised the respondents that the transaction did not 
constitute a merger. The applicant then applied to the Competition Tribunal for an order 
declaring that the transaction between Distillers and Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery (Pty) 
Ltd was a merger, and that the Competition Commission should have been notified of 
this in terms of the Competition Act. 
 
The shareholding of the two respondents was crucial in this case. Important also was the 
history of the South African liquor industry. Prior to 1979, two separate companies, Oude 
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Meester Group Limited (“OMG”) and Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery (Pty) Ltd (“SFW”) 
competed. Other major players were SAB (in the beer market) and the Ko-operatiewe 
Wijnbouwers Vereniging van Zuid-Afrika Beperkt (“KWV”). 
 
In 1979 Cape Wine and Distillers Limited (“CWD”) was formed. This occurred pursuant 
to an arrangement between SAB, SFW, OMG and KWV. In terms of the agreement SAB 
bought the Rembrandt Group’s beer interest in exchange for limiting its involvement in 
wine and spirits to its 30% investment holding in CWD. SFW and OMG also became 
wholly owned subsidiaries of CWD. CWD was listed on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange with the following shareholders: the Rembrandt Group held 30%; SAB held 
30%; KWV held 30% and the public held the remaining 10%. The Rembrandt Group and 
the KWV then formed a jointly owned holding company, Rembrandt-KWV Investments 
Limited, in which their respective shareholdings in CWD were consolidated to a 60% 
shareholding. OMG’s interests were transferred to a new entity, Distillers Corporation in 
1988 and CWD retained the business of SFW. 
 
In terms of an agreement dated 20 September 2000 the respondents entered into a 
transaction in terms of which Distillers would acquire all the principal assets and 
liabilities of SFW. As mentioned above the Commission initially advised the respondents 
that the transaction was not a merger. It then changed its mind and advised that it was a 
merger, but subsequently, after consultations with the respondents, again advised that the 
transaction did not constitute a merger.282  
 
The central question before the Tribunal was therefore whether this transaction between 
Distillers and SFW constituted a merger of which the Competition Commission should 
have been notified of in terms the Competition Act.283 The crux of the case of the 
respondents was that the transaction did not bring about an “effective” change in the 
control of SFW and Distillers and therefore was not a merger in terms of section 12 of the 
Competition Act.  
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Sections 12(1) and 12(2) of the Competition Act state that: 
“(1) (a)  For purposes of this Act, a merger occurs when one or more firms directly or indirectly 
acquire or establish direct or indirect control over the whole or part of the business of 
another firm.  
(b)  A merger contemplated in paragraph (a) may be achieved in any manner, including 
through- 
(i)  purchase or lease of the shares, an interest or assets of the other firm in question; or  
  (ii) amalgamation or other combination with the other firm in question. 
 (2) A person controls a firm if that person-  
  (a) beneficially owns more than one half of the issued share capital of the firm;  
(b) is entitled to vote a majority of the votes that may be cast at a general meeting of the firm, 
or has the ability to control the voting of a majority of those votes, either directly or 
through a controlled entity of that person;  
(c) is able to appoint or to veto the appointment of a majority of the directors of the firm;  
(d) is a holding company, and the firm is a subsidiary of that company as contemplated in 
section 1 (3) (a) of the Companies Act, 1973 (Act 61 of 1973);  
(e) […];  
(f) […];  
(g) has the ability to materially influence the policy of the firm in a manner comparable to a 
person who, in ordinary commercial practice, can exercise an element of control referred 
to in paragraphs (a) to (f).” 
 
The argument of the applicants was that a person, Distillers, acquired direct control over 
the business of SFW by way of a purchase of the assets of SFW.  
 
Distillers and SFW, however, urged the Tribunal to look at the substance and not the 
form of the transaction. They argued that the intention of the legislature was that 
notification should only take place when there were changes to “ultimate” or “effective” 
control. As a matter of form Distillers had assumed control over the business of SFW but 
the reality was that both Distillers and SFW had been controlled by the same three 
shareholders prior to the transaction and Distillers, now Distell, would still be controlled 
by these three shareholders and that therefore no change in effective control had taken 
place. The crux of the argument was that these two companies were located in the same 
economic family, and where a re-arrangement between a seller and a buyer within the 
family takes place there is no change in the effective control. The transaction would 
therefore fall outside the ambit of section 12 of the Competition Act. 
 
197 
 
The Tribunal referred to section 4(5)284 of the Competition Act and comparative 
jurisprudence to analyse the arguments of Distillers. The Tribunal referred to European 
Law where the doctrine of a single economic entity has emerged in case law in the 
context of whether article 85(1) of the European Community Treaty applied. Article 
85(1) of the Treaty, now article 81(1), is the general prohibition against agreements 
constituting restrictive practices similar to sections 4 and 5 of the South African 
Competition Act. The courts in Europe had to decide whether agreements between 
undertakings that formed part of the same group could amount to restrictive practices. 
The courts held that they did not, provided that the subsidiary did not have any real 
autonomy in determining its line of conduct.285 
 
The Tribunal also referred to the United States of America and to the doctrine of the 
intra-enterprise conspiracy which had been applied to conspiracies amongst commonly 
controlled companies. In 1984 the Supreme Court held that a parent and its wholly owned 
subsidiary must be treated as a single enterprise and were thus incapable of forming a 
conspiracy for the purposes of the section 1 of the Sherman Act.286  
 
The Tribunal stated that the case law referred to and section 4(5) of the Competition Act 
suggested that at least for the purpose of restrictive practice adjudication, the concept of a 
single economic entity was well established. The arguments of the respondents therefore 
had merit. The Tribunal, however, cautioned against the use of the single enterprise 
argument, simply because it is a concept that has proven to be useful in limiting the 
boundaries of restrictive practices to intra-enterprise arrangements. This is an area of 
substantive law as opposed to merger notification which is an area of procedural law.287 
“At this early stage of our jurisprudence we can say no more than that transactions within the 
ambit of section 4(5)(b) may be recognized as a single economic unit, for the purposes of  section 
12, but the provision must be interpreted strictly. The less something looks like a wholly owned 
parent subsidiary relationship the more cautious we need to be. To put it another way, the more 
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ambiguous the case for a single economic entity the less scope there is for rebutting the inference 
that a direct acquisition has led to a change of control.”288 
 
The Tribunal then stated: 
“The scope to accept argument about a single economic entity as a jurisdictional prerequisite must 
at this stage of the enquiry be limited to the clear cut cases suggested by section 4(5) with the 
added rider that section 4(5)(b) be strictly interpreted here.”289 
 
 And further: 
  “We must now consider on the facts of this matter:  
1. whether the respondents have made out a case for being considered as a single economic 
entity as we have set out above for the purpose of section 12 adjudication; or  
2. if we have too strictly construed the notion of single economic entity whether they have 
established that the respondents were the subject of some ultimate controller prior to the 
transaction who remains in control post transaction, or  
3. if they have failed to meet either test proposed in the first two points the transaction 
meets the requirements for a merger in terms of section 12.” 290
 
The Tribunal eventually, on the facts, held that the respondents were not part of a single 
economic unit. In principle, however, the Tribunal acknowledged that the concept of a 
single economic unit, where a group of companies is involved, would be recognised 
should it be proved that the companies within the group formed a single economic unit. 
 
From the above case it is clear that the Competition Tribunal will not shy away from 
holding that a number of companies within a group may constitute a single economic 
unit. This “judgment” has set the tone for future judgments where it can be expected that 
the Bulmer judgment will be followed in the light also of the provisions of the 
Competition Act. 
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5.7.5 Contract law 
In Dithaba Platinum v Erconovaal Ltd291 the second respondent was an external company 
which wholly owned the first respondent. The second respondent granted a right of first 
refusal in respect of mineral rights to a company which in turn ceded these rights to the 
applicant. The second respondent then alienated the mineral rights to the first respondent 
as its wholly-owned local subsidiary. The applicant therefore sought an order compelling 
the respondents to cede the mineral rights to the applicant in terms of its right of first 
refusal. The applicant argued that the cession of the mineral rights from the second 
respondent to the first respondent triggered its right of first refusal. The respondents 
averred that the first respondent, as a wholly-owned subsidiary of the second respondent, 
was under the control of the second respondent and that the mineral rights were therefore 
still under the control of the second respondent and that therefore there was no disposal 
which would trigger the applicant’s right of first refusal. The respondents in effect asked 
the court to ignore the separate legal personae of the first and second respondents which 
they themselves created.  
 
The respondents in effect requested the court to pierce the veil of corporate personality 
and relied upon the remarks of Lord Denning MR in Amalgamated Investments & 
Property Co Ltd (In liquidation) v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd292  where the 
following was said: 
“Apart from this, I think that this is one of those cases where a wholly-owned subsidiary is to be 
regarded as the alter ego of the parent company. We have often lifted the corporate veil so as to 
show forth the realities of company life. This wholly-owned subsidiary was the creature of the 
parent company. It did exactly what the parent company told it to do. It was nothing more nor less 
than a conduit pipe through which payments were made and received. It received no fees. It made 
no profits. It sustained no losses. Its transactions were all paper transactions, all book entries, 
recording the sums in and out. It was a puppet which danced to the bidding of the parent company 
just as Dr Wallersteiner's companies did (see Wallersteiner v Moir [1974] 3 All ER 217 at 238, 
[1974] 1 WLR 991 at 1013), and as the 'three in one' companies did in DHN Food Distributors Ltd 
v London Borough of Tower Hamlets [1976] 3 All ER 462, [1976] 1 WLR 852.”293 
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The South African court held that a court will not readily pierce the veil of corporate 
personality and referred to Banco de Mocambique v Inter Science Research and 
Development Services (Pty) Ltd294 (“Banco”) and agreed with the conclusions of the court 
in that case, which are that the corporate veil would only be pierced if the circumstances 
justify it, namely where the subsidiary was a sham or façade or on other recognised 
grounds.295 
 
The court in Dithaba held, after looking at the Banco case, that it was not necessary for it 
to consider the very few South African cases where the courts have pierced the corporate 
veil. The court found that the cession agreement between the second respondent and the 
first respondent was a genuine contract, designed to vest the South African assets of an 
external company in its wholly-owned local subsidiary. They therefore could not be 
stigmatised as constituting a cloak, or a fiction or a sham. The framing of group accounts 
in the form chosen by the respondents did not, in the view of the court, advance their 
cause. According to the court they remained, as holding company and wholly-owned 
subsidiary respectively, separate personae with separate identities. As a result there had 
been a disposal by the first respondent which activated the applicant’s right of first 
refusal.296  
 
In Macadamia Finance BK v De Wet297 the second appellant298 was the wholly-owned 
subsidiary of the first appellant. The first appellant and second appellant had mutual 
directors. The first appellant was placed in liquidation and the respondents were the 
liquidators. The second appellant was the registered owner of a farm. The assets on the 
farm were destroyed by fire and flooding. The first appellant claimed damages from the 
respondents and based their claim on the averment that the respondents, in their 
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capacities as liquidators of the first appellant, had a legal duty to the second appellant 
(which was not then in liquidation) to insure the assets of the second appellant. The first 
appellant mistakenly did not claim damages from the respondents based on the insurable 
interest that the first appellant had in the second appellant, i.e. the second appellant was 
an asset of the first appellant and as such the respondents may have had a duty of care to 
take proper care of the assets of the first appellant. Instead the claim of the first appellant 
was based on the assumption that the respondents had a legal duty to protect the assets of 
the second appellant. 
 
One of the arguments that the appellants raised to support their claim was that the first 
appellant and its wholly owned subsidiaries (of which the second appellant was one) 
constituted a single economic unit. The appellants referred to a number of English cases 
where the concept of a single economic unit was raised and applied. The Appellate 
Division (as it then was), however, rejected the argument of the appellants based on the 
circumstances of the case and also referred to the fact299 that the cases that the appellants 
relied on had been subjected to a restrictive analysis and discussion in the decision of the 
English Court of Appeal in Adams v Cape Industries plc.300 Botha JA then held as 
follows with reference to the single economic unit argument that the appellants raised: 
“Ek stem saam met die bevinding van De Villiers R (op 280H en 281E-F) dat die appellante se 
saak nie bevorder word deur die beskouing van die twee appellante as deel van 'n ekonomiese 
eenheid nie. Hoe heg die eenheid ook al mag gewees het, en wat ook al die gevolge daarvan in 
ander omstandighede mag gewees het, kon dit nie die likwidasie van die eerste appellant oorleef 
het op 'n wyse wat dit moontlik maak om die voortbestaan van die tweede appellant en sy eie 
direksie te negeer nie. Dit kan ook nie die gedagte onderskraag dat die respondente die beheer en 
bestuur van die tweede appellant oorgeneem het nie; die onhoudbaarheid van daardie gedagte bly 
steeds, om die redes reeds genoem, 'n onoorkomelike struikelblok in die weg van die 
appellante.”301 
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Both the Dithaba and the Macadamia cases follow the traditional approach of 
recognising the separate identity of the individual companies within the group. The 
decision in the Dithaba case is also understandable in the light of the fact that the 
companies chose to operate as separate entities and effectively asked the court to ignore 
the walls between the entities which they themselves created. It is also noteworthy that 
the court in Dithaba was strongly influenced by the Adams v Cape plc case. 
  
5.7.6 The law of delict 
In Wambach v Maizecor Industries (Edms) Bpk302 the court had to decide on the question 
of ownership of a vehicle within a group of companies. A mechanical horse and trailer 
were damaged in an accident and the respondent sought damages from the appellant. The 
appellant denied that the respondent was the owner of the mechanical horse and trailer. 
From the facts it appeared that a wholly-owned subsidiary of the respondent was the 
registered owner of the mechanical horse and trailer and that for income-tax purposes the 
horse and trailer were accounted for as an asset of another wholly-owned subsidiary of 
the respondent. It also appeared to the court that the board of directors of the respondent 
acted as the de facto board of directors of all the subsidiaries, including the registered 
owner of the horse and trailer. 
 
The respondent argued that ownership vested in the respondent since the board of 
directors controlled the alienation thereof by means of its control over the subsidiary. The 
court had the following to say about this argument: 
“Die feit dat die direksie van 'n kontrolerende maatskappy effektiewelik oor die lotgevalle van 'n 
bate van 'n filiaal besluite kan neem, bring egter nie mee dat dit daarom 'n bate van die 
kontrolerende maatskappy is nie. Spesifiek wat vervreemding betref, bly die betrokke saak 'n bate 
van die filiaal totdat gevolg gegee word aan 'n vervreemdingsbesluit. Op sy beste vir die 
respondent was die posisie van sy direksie analoog tot dié van 'n agent wat deur sy prinsipaal 
gemagtig is om laasgenoemde se bate te vervreem. Totdat vervreemding geskied, bly die saak die 
eiendom van die prinsipaal.”303 
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The respondent also tried to rely on English cases where the commercial reality of a 
group was recognised. The court responded as follows: 
“Die respondent se advokaat het tereg aanvaar dat die respondent en Bemarkings afsonderlike 
entiteite is, elk met sy eie regte en verpligtinge. Hy het hom egter beroep op 'n aantal - meestal 
Engelse - gewysdes waarin, so is aangevoer, daar 'n ontsluiering van korporatiewe identiteite 
plaasgevind het ten einde gevolg te gee aan kommersiële realiteite. Nie een van dié gewysdes is in 
die onderhawige geval van nut nie. Enige poging tot onsluiering lei tot totale duisternis.”304  
 
The court further held that Adams v Cape Industries plc305 rejected these earlier decisions 
that the respondent referred to. The facts in Wambach were in a way the converse of the 
DHN306 decision in the light of the fact that the plaintiff wanted to use the economic 
entity argument against the group. 
 
The Wambach case is illustrative of the problem before the courts but also faced by 
persons who were harmed by the actions of a member of a company group. This problem 
will be investigated in depth in chapter 6 below. 
 
5.7.7 Intellectual property law 
In Adcock-Ingram Laboratories Ltd v SA Druggists Ltd; Adcock-Ingram Laboratories 
Ltd v Lennon Ltd307 the issue to be decided was whether use of a trade mark by a wholly- 
owned subsidiary of the registered owner of the trade mark constituted use by the 
registered owner for the purposes of the Trade Marks Act.308 The court held that such use 
did not constitute use by the registered owner in terms of the Act. 
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In Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd309 a similar situation arose as in the Adcock-
Ingram case. The court had to decide whether there was use by the registered owner of a 
trade mark. The respondent was the wholly-owned subsidiary of the United States 
company. The United States company provided technical support to the respondent. 
There was no relationship between the United States company and the registered user of 
the trade mark in issue, African Sales Co (Pty) Ltd. The respondent, however, could 
compel the registered user to comply with any conditions and restrictions which were 
imposed by the registration of the relevant trade mark. According to the Appellate 
Division “[a]ny services provided by the US company to African Sales, and any control 
exercised, could only be as a result of a request, either express or tacit, by the respondent 
to the US company.”310 It follows that the services and control must have been performed 
by the technical services division at the behest of the respondent and on its behalf. On the 
facts the court ultimately held that the holding company exercised control over the 
subsidiary in respect of the use of the trade mark and therefore the mark was used by the 
registered owner.  
 
The court furthermore looked at the relationship between a holding company and its 
subsidiary but stated that: 
“It is clear that the acts of a holding company are not per se the acts of its wholly-owned 
subsidiary, or vice versa, since the holding company is a separate legal entity from its subsidiary; 
but in recent years, there has become evident in the English cases a more relaxed approach to the 
application of this basic principle.”311 
 
The court referred to Gower312 who acknowledged that in certain cases the realities of a 
group as an entity should be recognised. The court also referred to DHN Food 
Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council313 where the court 
recognised the principle of a group of companies as constituting an economic entity. The 
court then stated the following: 
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“It may become necessary to reconsider Adcock-Ingram Laboratories Ltd v SA Druggists Ltd and 
Another; Adcock-Ingram Laboratories Ltd v Lennon Ltd 1983 (2) SA 350 (T) where I held that 
use of a trade mark by a wholly-owned subsidiary of the registered proprietor was not used by the 
proprietor.”314 
  
Subsequently, however, in AM Moolla Group Ltd and Others v The Gap Inc and 
Others315 the Supreme Court of Appeal recently held that use within a group of 
companies did not constitute use by the registered proprietor or use by a third party under 
license of the proprietor. This was, however, decided purely on the facts of the case. 
Interestingly enough there is no reference to the Ritz Hotel and the Adcock-Ingram cases. 
 
5.8 Evaluation of the law pertaining to company groups in South Africa 
The purpose of this section firstly will be to summarise the law of company groups in 
South Africa as reflected by legislation and the judiciary as has been set out above. The 
further purpose is to determine whether that law is adequate in the light of the fact, as has 
been shown above,316 that the principle of limited liability is suspect historically as well 
as economically in a number of situations. In this respect the purpose of company law 
regarding the question as to whose interests a company should be serving will be 
investigated. This is important for the purposes of this dissertation since it starts from the 
premise that third parties who deal with the company, either voluntarily or involuntarily, 
are not adequately protected by the law regarding company groups at present. 
 
The Dithaba317 case was decided when the doctrine of piercing of the corporate veil was 
still in its infancy and therefore very well reasoned in light of the DHN318 case which 
easily could have resulted in a different conclusion. The Wambach319 and Macadamia 
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Finance320 cases were both decided after the English decision in Adams v Cape plc321 
where the DHN decision was rejected.  
 
The Adcock-Ingram and Ritz Hotel cases were both after the DHN case but prior to the 
Adams v Cape plc case and the influence of the DHN case can be seen in especially the 
Ritz Hotel case. Strangely enough the Appellate Division in the Ritz Hotel decision failed 
to refer to the Dithaba judgment.  
 
The labour-law cases are anomalous since the courts in earlier decisions recognised that a 
group of companies could be treated as a single entity as seen in the Contract 
Installations322 and Kaycraft323 cases, which again precede the Adams v Cape plc case. 
The other labour-law cases neatly sidestepped dealing with groups as a concept by 
holding that the employees in those specific cases had multiple employers.324 
 
The one case in competition law, where the current legislation in South Africa is still 
comparatively new, recognised the concept of a single economic unit in respect of a 
group of companies.325 Given that the legislation in this area is so new, it could be viewed 
as a radical step. On the other hand, the Tribunal could not close its eyes to the provisions 
of the Competition Act as well as to foreign jurisprudence on comparable situations. One 
can therefore expect a progressive acceptance of this doctrine in future cases before the 
Tribunal where the facts support the concept of a single economic entity. What can be 
gathered from the above is that the DHN case had a strong influence on a few South 
African cases prior to the Adams v Cape plc326 decision.  
 
It does seem that South African company law has adopted a more rigid approach to 
limited liability and that exceptions will be few and far between. The new Companies Act 
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has not changed this approach and there are hardly any provisions which cut through the 
separate juristic personality, except the consolidated financial statements which are 
(probably) required in respect of groups and in the case of the personal liability company 
where the directors are liable for the contractual debts of the company.327 
 
It has been shown that the veil of limited liability will be pierced by the courts in certain 
cases. The tests as set out by the courts are however strict, especially after the Adams v 
Cape Industries plc328 decision. The Adams decision is also still good law in England, 
twenty years after being decided.329 The Adams decision has therefore brought much 
certainty in the English law regarding the piercing of the corporate veil. With certainty, 
predictability follows which makes the provision of legal advice a much simpler task. It 
is arguable from the case law that the courts in the United States of America follow a 
more flexible approach.330 The South African courts have followed the direction of the 
English judiciary in choosing the path of certainty and predictability instead of the path of 
flexibility regarding the piercing of the corporate veil. The question is whether this path 
is the correct one, not only for the judiciary but also for the legislature in the context of 
company groups. Is limited liability with the piercing of the corporate veil as the only 
exception still the path that should be followed?  
 
In general terms it is certainly not the aim of this dissertation to provide any legal 
philosophical answer to what the law on piercing of the corporate veil in the context of 
company groups should be. As mentioned above two trains of thought seemingly exist in 
respect of the piercing of the corporate veil. There is the strict English/South African 
approach compared to the position in the United States, which tends to favour flexibility 
above certainty, as will be shown in chapter 6. The approach in South Africa therefore 
appears to be a more legal positivistic approach viewing the law as it is instead of how it 
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ought to be. The aim of this approach, as it has evolved,331 is to have order and therefore 
certainty.332 There are however conflicting values which have to be borne in mind. Van 
Niekerk333 refers to conflicting maxims salus populi suprema lex esto,334iustitia 
fundamentum regnorum,335fiat iustitia, pereat mundus336and summum ius, summa 
iniuria.337 The legal environment in the United States has long been viewed, especially in 
the early and mid twentieth century, as being based on realism.338 The most radical of the 
realists was Frank for whom the law was and should be inherently uncertain. Frank was 
of the view that legal rules were not the foundation of a decision but that law making is 
influenced by “emotions, intuitive hunches, prejudices and other irrational factors”.339 
The uncertainty which followed was for Frank socially valuable.340 The prima facie view 
of the law on the piercing of the corporate veil in the United States is one of realism and 
not one of positivism, as explained in the next chapter.  
 
Over and above the value or reason for law and legal rules the next more concrete 
question concerns that of whom the company serves. Does it only have the interests of its 
shareholders at heart or does the company serve a wider range of interested parties? The 
answer to this is important. The broader view of the two possible interests is conducive to 
the imposition of more extensive liability on the management of the company and by 
extension possibly on its holding company as well. Davis et al state that the new 
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Companies Act moves away from the traditional shareholder-orientated model to the 
enlightened shareholder value approach,341 with more regard for other stakeholders.342 It 
has been pointed out above that the new Companies Act provides that the directors of a 
company should not knowingly cause harm to the company or its subsidiary.343 What is 
meant by the subsidiary company in this context? Is it its shareholders or is its ambit 
supposed to stretch wider? What if the subsidiary is a wholly-owned subsidiary? What if 
a certain action is to the benefit of the holding company but to the disadvantage of the 
subsidiary company?  
 
The point of departure is that a director only has a fiduciary duty to the company of 
which he is a director.344 Within the context of a group of companies, therefore, the point 
of departure is still that the directors of the holding company do not owe a duty to the 
subsidiary company. In Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer,345 
however, the court held that in the case where the holding company placed its nominee 
directors on the board of the subsidiary company: 
“nominees of a parent company upon the board of a subsidiary company may be placed in a 
difficult and delicate position. It is, then, the more incumbent on the parent company to behave 
with scrupulous fairness to the minority shareholders and to avoid imposing upon their nominees 
the alternative of disregarding their instructions or betraying the interests of the minority. In the 
present case the society pursued a different course. It was ruthless and unscrupulous in design and 
it was effective in operation, and, as I have said, it was promoted by the action or inaction of the 
nominee directors.”346 
 
The court therefore held, in the situation where the holding company in effect usurps the 
functioning of the subsidiary, that there is a duty on the holding company not to act to the 
detriment of the subsidiary company. In Kuwait Asia Bank v National Mutual Life 
Nominees Ltd347 the Privy Council stated that: 
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“An employer who is also a shareholder who nominates a director owes no duty to the company 
unless the employer interferes with the affairs of the company. A duty does not arise because the 
employee may be dismissed from his employment by the employer or from his directorship by the 
shareholder or because the employer does not provide sufficient time or facilities to enable the 
director to carry out his duties. It will be in the interests of the employer to see that the director 
discharges his duty to the company but this again stems from self-interest and not from duty on the 
part of the employer.”348 
  
If the holding company exploits its position, therefore, it could become liable for the acts 
of the subsidiary company. The position could therefore be that the holding company 
could have a duty to the subsidiary company in certain circumstances as pointed out by 
the Scottish Co-operative and Kuwait Asia Bank cases. Blackman argues that this is not a 
fiduciary duty which the holding company or nominee directors have but that they do 
owe the subsidiary a duty of not interfering with its independence and not to undermine 
the independence of the subsidiary.349 In Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining 
Co Ltd350 the court stated that: 
“A man, who procures the election of a board of directors under circumstances which make it 
impossible for them to exercise an independent judgment, must, in my opinion, observe the utmost 
good faith in his dealings with the company, which he has, of set purpose, deprived of independent 
advice. The duty to do so arises from the circumstances which he has chosen to bring about and it 
is wholly inconsistent with the obligations of good faith that the defendant should have made for 
himself these profits by the method which the evidence discloses.”351 
 
In Nicholas v Soundcraft Electronics Ltd352 the court with reference to the Scottish Co-
operative case stated that 
“The truth is that, whenever a subsidiary is formed as in this case with an independent minority of 
shareholders, the parent company must, if it is engaged in the same class of business, accept as a 
result of having formed such a subsidiary an obligation so to conduct what are in a sense its own 
affairs as to deal fairly with its subsidiary. That language was wholly apposite in the Scottish Co-
operative case where the two companies were engaged in the same business and the parent was 
appropriating to itself the business, or part of the business, of the subsidiary.  But I do not read the 
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Lord President's words as in any way limiting the obligation of the parent if it is actually 
conducting the affairs of the subsidiary, and whether the two companies are engaged in the same 
class of business or not, from acting fairly towards the subsidiary.”353 
 
The independence of the subsidiary is therefore important. If the holding company 
conducts the business of the subsidiary or the board of the subsidiary is not independent, 
in that it is submissive to the holding company’s board, there could be a duty on the 
holding company to take the interests of the subsidiary company into consideration. The 
question, however, remains as to whom the duty is owed. Is it to the shareholders or to a 
wider group of interested parties? 
 
Hadden354 lists a number of interested parties in a group which may be classified as 
internal and external interested parties. These interested parties are management and 
investors (the internal interested parties), and employees, creditors, government and the 
public at large (the external interested parties).355 Havenga argues for the retention of the 
fiduciary duty to the company but that the interests of other stakeholders should also be 
considered.356 She highlights the conflicts which could arise between the interests of the 
various stakeholders and how difficult it would be to reconcile these conflicting interests. 
This could lead to decisions not being taken because of the conflicting interests of 
shareholders and employees and other interested groups. The shareholders would 
necessarily want profits to be declared as dividends. Employees would want to have 
increases in their salaries. The community within which the company operates would like 
to see social upliftment taking place, the environment surrounding the company’s 
operations to be maintained and its creditors would like to be paid as soon as possible. 
Being a director under such a regime may become an exercise in impossibility if the 
director has to balance the interests of all of these stakeholders. 
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The expansion of the duty of directors to other stakeholders has been considered by a 
number of writers.357 Also the various King Codes on corporate governance have to 
varying degrees addressed the role of directors towards the various stakeholders of the 
company including creditors. The first King Code on corporate governance was released 
in 1994. The aim of the first code was, amongst others, to set out proper guidelines for 
the management of companies. The second King Code was released in March 2002 and 
was applicable until 28 February 2010 when it was replaced by the King III Report and 
Code on Corporate Governance. 
 
The second King Code was only applicable to companies which were listed on the JSE. 
Other companies were free to adopt the code. The second King Code acknowledged that 
there was a movement away from the single bottom line to a triple bottom line in respect 
of the activities of companies. This means that companies were to take the 
environmental, social and economic aspects into consideration when deciding on their 
activities. Social aspects included the “reciprocal relationships” with other interested 
parties and not only the shareholders.358 The code proceeded by mentioning that the triple 
bottom line requirement demanded that ownership assumes responsibility.359 In the light 
of the fact that King III replaced King II in March 2010 no further discussion of King II 
will be undertaken. It suffices to say that King II realised that a (board of a) company 
does not only have responsibilities to the shareholders of the company but that other 
interested parties also have an interest in the manner in which a company is operated. 
 
The King Report on Governance for South Africa and the King Code of Governance 
Principles360 were published in 2009 and came into effect on 1 March 2010.361 King III 
became necessary in the light of the introduction of the new Companies Act. The authors 
of King III envisage that King III will apply to all entities although the basis of 
application is not clear. The King Code is not legislation and the only way it can apply to 
all entities is either by voluntary adoption or through the imposition of King III by bodies 
                                                           
357
 See, for example Davis et al Companies and other Business Structures 10-11. 
358
 17.1 of King II. 
359
 17.3 of King III. 
360
 King III. 
361
 King III Report 14. 
213 
 
like the JSE. King III adopts the “apply or explain” approach like the Netherlands Code 
to leave scope for individual companies to adapt the Code for their needs and leaves it to 
them as to how to apply the principles of King III. 
 
King III mentions that one of the philosophies of the code is corporate citizenship.362 
King III continues to adopt the triple bottom line approach in terms of which the 
company does not only take into account the interests of the shareholders, but that it 
should also be a responsible citizen. King III affirms the policy in King I and King II in 
respect of the responsibility of the board of the company, namely that the board should 
consider the interests of all interested parties and not only the shareholders of the 
company. The interested parties include external stakeholders who are necessary for the 
viability of the company, which would include voluntary creditors.363  King III is of the 
opinion that an inclusive stakeholder approach can influence the long-term growth of the 
company. Over and above creditors, consumers are also seen as stakeholders by King 
III,364 a perspective which comes from the Consumer Protection Act.365 King III 
recognises the difficulty in balancing the often conflicting interests of the various 
stakeholders in a company and therefore sets out as a principle that the board should 
strive to balance these conflicting interests in the best interests of the company.366 The 
position of creditors is also of much more prominence now in the light of the fact that the 
new Companies Act provides for extensive business rescue measures.367 King III also 
provides that the board should consider these proceedings or other measures to turn the 
company around when it is in financial difficulty.368 
 
Esser argues that King III is a significant improvement on King II and that the relevant 
principles highlighted above are an acknowledgement that the board of a company has to 
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consider the interests of the various stakeholders, who have an interest in the company.369 
The new Companies Act, however, does not apparently confirm this approach. The new 
Companies Act merely states that directors must, among other considerations, act in the 
best interests of the company.370 When one considers the purposes of the new Companies 
Act, there appears to be an acknowledgement of the wider interests which are to be 
served by a company.371 In the light of the principle in the interpretation of statutes that 
the legislature is not deemed to have amended the common law unless specifically stated, 
it is to be assumed that the new Companies Act confirms the common-law principle that 
the duty of the board is towards the shareholders and not to other stakeholders as well 
unless specifically stated. It is submitted that the fact that the legislature also specifically 
mentions the duty of directors to subsidiary companies372 (contrary to the common law) 
confirms the restrictive view that the directors have a duty to the company in the narrow 
sense. The fact that the legislature thought of the position of a subsidiary implies that it 
considered the position of other stakeholders in the company since the subsidiary is also a 
stakeholder in the operations of the holding company. It therefore did not deem it 
necessary to extend the duty of directors to other stakeholders.373 
 
King III also addresses groups of companies.374 It addresses the need for holding 
companies to respect the fact that the directors of the subsidiary company have fiduciary 
duties to the subsidiary company375 and importantly that the adoption and implementation 
of the policies and procedures of the holding company should be in the discretion of the 
board of the subsidiary company, and if the board of the subsidiary considers it to be 
appropriate.376  
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The English Companies Act377 specifically provides for directors to take the interests of 
all stakeholders into consideration. The English Companies Act provides as follows 
“A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to 
promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so 
have regard (amongst other matters) to- 
 
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, 
 
(b) the interests of the company's employees, 
 
(c) the need to foster the company's business relationships with suppliers, customers and others, 
 
(d) the impact of the company's operations on the community and the environment, 
 
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business 
conduct, and 
 
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company. 
 
(2) Where or to the extent that the purposes of the company consist of or include purposes other 
than the benefit of its members, subsection (1) has effect as if the reference to promoting the 
success of the company for the benefit of its members were to achieving those purposes. 
 
(3) The duty imposed by this section has effect subject to any enactment or rule of law requiring 
directors, in certain circumstances, to consider or act in the interests of creditors of the 
company.”378 
 
The point of departure is still the interests of the shareholders of the company. Keay 
refers to the approach in the English Companies Act of 2006 as the “shareholders first” 
approach.379 He argues that the interests of the shareholders are the most important and 
that the directors of the company only have to take the interests of the other stakeholders 
into consideration if this serves the interests of the shareholders.380 
 
The question therefore is whether the South African legislature was correct to 
circumscribe the duties of directors restrictively, namely that the directors in general only 
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owe a duty to the shareholders of the company.381 By extension it could be asked in the 
light of the Scottish Co-operative382 and the Kuwait Asia Bank383 cases whether the 
holding company could have duties to other stakeholders of the subsidiary company in 
certain circumstances. Firstly, however, it should be asked why must the directors take 
the interests of other interested parties into consideration? 
 
Jensen384 argues that to extend the duty of directors to other stakeholders would often 
make it difficult for them to take effective decisions having regard to the various 
stakeholders which they have to satisfy.385 However he recognises that the stakeholder 
theory does have some corporate use. He looks, as his point of departure, at what would 
provide maximum value to an entity. Value for Jensen here means long-term value and 
such value cannot be created without having good relations with creditors, employees and 
communities, customers or government.386 This approach Jensen calls the Enlightened 
Value Maximization Approach. He also looks at an Enlightened Stakeholder Approach. 
Jensen views this approach as one which aims to maximise long-term market value of the 
firm.387 The long-term value will enhance the position of shareholders but it also allows 
management to assess the trade-offs which need to be made among competing 
stakeholders.388 In short, a company which is successful in the long term ensures the 
long-term success of the stakeholders of the company. 
 
Keay summarises the criticisms of various authors of the shareholder primacy model. The 
first point of criticism is that it fails to maximise social wealth and that the focus on 
short-term wealth prejudices some stakeholders like employees and consumers.389 There 
is also an argument that the risk which shareholders bear should not be overestimated 
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since other stakeholders also bear risk. Employees for example could receive such 
specialised training within a company that it reduces their employment mobility. The 
employees concerned therefore become prisoners of that enterprise.390 
 
Keay also points out the normative arguments which some authors have raised against 
shareholder value. Authors who hold a communitarian view of company law argue that a 
company should be managed for the benefit of all the stakeholders of the company like 
creditors, consumers and the community within which the company operates. For these 
authors, companies should have a broad social purpose instead of being solely focused on 
profit for the benefit of their shareholders. Furthermore, company law should become less 
de-personalised and those managing the company should realise that the majority of 
corporate acts actually affect human beings.391 The communitarians depart from the point 
of view that people are: 
“part of a shared community who inherit the benefits, values and goals of the community, thus the 
cultural milieu in which people find themselves cannot be ignored, and the company is regarded as 
‘a community of interdependence, mutual trust and reciprocal benefit.’ The interests of 
shareholders are [therefore] not the only interests to be considered by directors when carrying out 
their functions, for there are other important constituencies that warrant the consideration of 
directors.”392  
 
This view of the communitarians is based on the ideology that the state grants the 
company its status but also that by granting this status to the company, the company 
becomes an instrument for the state to use. The commercial goal of a company becomes 
irrelevant and it merely becomes a tool for the state to further its political goals which are 
of a social nature.393 
 
Keay also refers to other authors who do not focus on moral arguments but instead focus 
on a combination of economics and ethics. The result of this is the stakeholder theory 
which in essence implies that a company should take a long term view of its operations 
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which will ultimately lead to a win-win situation if all the role players pull in the same 
direction.394 
 
5.9 Summary 
It would appear from the evaluation above that the following position has emerged in 
South Africa as regards company groups. The new Companies Act has restricted the 
potential for abuse within groups by introducing the solvency and liquidity requirement 
for a number of intra-group transactions, including the provision of financial assistance 
for the acquisition of securities of a related or inter-related company. Provision is also 
made for business rescue measures, which could be important when read with King III 
and the Scottish Co-operative and Kuwait Asia Bank cases. Furthermore, the new 
Companies Act does recognise that there are interested parties other than shareholders in 
a company. Although it is not expressly stated that the directors of a company have 
fiduciary duties to other interested parties, it has been shown that some provisions in the 
new Companies Act require that the interests of creditors of the company should be 
recognised in some circumstances. Another interesting provision is the partial extension 
of the fiduciary duties of directors of the holding company to the subsidiary company. It 
is, however, not clear how the directors will have to balance the conflicting interests if 
the interests of the holding company differ from those of the subsidiary. 
 
 It has also been shown that new legislation like the Competition Act in appropriate 
circumstances recognises some company groups as a single economic unit. The 
Consumer Protection Act, which provides for strict liability for any entity within the 
production and retail chain, and which allows the consumer to claim from any company 
within the chain, will potentially also impact on group activities.  
 
From a legislative perspective, therefore, it has been shown that the new Companies Act 
does not fundamentally depart from the traditional approach of limited liability regarding 
company groups. There have been improvements to protect creditors and minority 
shareholders by means of the solvency and liquidity requirement but creditors, especially 
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involuntary creditors of the subsidiary, are still inadequately protected. More recent 
legislation like the Consumer Protection Act and the Competition Act, however, does 
recognise that a group of companies can be a single economic unit. 
 
The judiciary on the other hand has not moved much, if at all, from the traditional 
approach of limited liability. There also appears to be no consistency generally between 
the piercing of the corporate veil where there are individuals behind the company and 
where there are juristic persons who are the shareholders of the subsidiary. This could be 
due to the fact that in the former group of cases the issue at stake was the potential 
liability towards third parties, whereas in the latter group of cases, the issue at stake was 
more the rights of persons which may have been affected, for example whether there had 
been use of a trade mark or whether a right of first refusal had been triggered. Be that as 
it may, after the Cape Pacific case there should be more consistency and cross 
referencing of decisions regardless of whether the shareholders are individuals or juristic 
persons. Although the labour-law cases do not carry much weight because they were 
mainly equity based, they should not simply be discarded. They could be important for 
future reform because those cases have shown that greater flexibility is possible. 
 
The King Codes, foreign authors as well as some local writers, have also highlighted the 
change in the role which companies play in society. Although the prevailing norm is still 
the shareholder primacy model, this is coming under increasing pressure and this trend 
can only get stronger, which will result in more pressure on companies and lawmakers. 
This will have an impact on groups especially in situations like the Scottish Co-operative 
and Kuwait Asia Bank cases, and where the court may hold that the holding company has 
a duty to the stakeholders of the subsidiary. 
 
The aim of this chapter was to investigate to what extent the South African law regarding 
company groups reflect the conclusions which have been reached in chapters two and 
three. It was shown in chapter two that the doctrine of limited liability in respect of 
company groups is historically suspect. In chapter three it was shown that company 
groups often form single economic units and operate as one entity. It was also shown that 
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from an economic perspective limited liability cannot be justified as easily where a 
holding company is present, as where natural persons are the shareholders. This chapter 
has shown that the South African law regarding groups has generally speaking not 
heeded this reality. Instead it has in general followed the traditional approach without 
many questions. Chapter four showed that an alternative system is possible but that there 
are problems in its implementation. With these conclusions in mind it will be the aim of 
the next two chapters to investigate whether the South African law regarding groups can 
be changed to better reflect the conclusions, which were reached in especially chapters 
two and three, without necessarily abolishing the principle of limited liability.  The 
discussion will focus on the position of involuntary delictual creditors in chapter six and 
on voluntary creditors of the subsidiary in an insolvency situation in chapter seven. These 
are the two primary instances under the current South African law where the legitimate 
claims of creditors against financially weak subsidiaries may be left unsatisfied. 
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Chapter 6 
Delictual liability within company groups 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The world is a very different place than what it was in the nineteenth century when 
limited liability for shareholders was created and adopted.1 The world has become 
increasingly globalised with technological advances and increasing global traffic being 
the order of the day. Multinationals have sprung up everywhere with subsidiary 
companies scattered across the globe, especially in those places with lax labour 
legislation and less protection for workers, where poverty forces the hand of governments 
to accommodate multinationals in their countries, quite often at the expense of the health 
of the population.2  
 
Also at a domestic level companies, regardless of size, realised the benefits of creating 
subsidiary companies in the light of the advantages which the doctrine of limited liability 
affords to them. Limited liability, as mentioned before, shields the shareholders of a 
company from liability for the debts of the company,3 both contractual and delictual. 
Limited liability therefore stimulates risk taking. Risk in this context not only means 
financial risk-taking, which could prejudice (contractual) creditors but also includes the 
risks associated with the nature of the business. A company may wish to diversify its 
business and venture into a field which poses significant risks in respect of the safety of 
workers, the environment and the health of communities who live in the vicinity of the 
company’s premises. Industries in the chemical and mining spheres are especially 
vulnerable to potential leaks, thereby causing damage to a variety of stakeholders.4 
Companies therefore want to avoid, or at least restrict, any potential delictual liability 
from their activities. It therefore makes sense to create subsidiary companies to engage in 
risky business undertakings to shield the holding company from any potential delictual 
liability. In the light of the fact that no minimum capital is required to incorporate a 
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(subsidiary) company, the subsidiary can be hopelessly undercapitalised and be funded 
by means of external funding especially in those cases where the holding company is one 
with a good credit rating. As will be illustrated below, it often happens that the harm to 
delictual victims appears much later, after the subsidiary has already closed its doors, 
which leaves the victims potentially with no recourse since the wrongdoer no longer 
exists. Even if the wrongdoer is in existence it could be undercapitalised to the extent 
which makes any litigation futile. Given the nature of the business it can be assumed that 
the holding company knew or should have known about the harm which the activities of 
the subsidiary could cause and that this knowledge was an important reason for the 
creation of the subsidiary. 
 
Creditors of a subsidiary forming part of a group of companies can be involuntary, as 
opposed to voluntary creditors. These involuntary creditors would include those who 
have suffered damages due to delicts committed by the company or by one of its 
employees in circumstances resulting in vicarious liability for the employer company. 
The first question which will arise in this case is whether the law should spread the 
liability of the subsidiary company jointly and severally among the companies within the 
group. Secondly, on what would this liability be based? Should it be statutory or should it 
be developed by the courts? Thirdly, if there is liability, should the joint and several 
liability be spread amongst the companies within the group, without making a distinction 
between voluntary and involuntary creditors? 
 
On the assumption that there should be joint and several liability within the corporate 
group, it is submitted that the nature of the creditor should be taken into consideration, 
namely whether the creditor is a voluntary or an involuntary creditor. The natural 
assumption would probably be that voluntary creditors do not deserve protection since 
they should have provided for appropriate remedies or securities in their contracts. They 
could, for example, have obtained suretyships not only from the holding company but 
also from fellow subsidiaries within the group, or demanded other forms of security. This 
view, however, is firstly based on the assumption that the parties contracted from equal 
positions of strength and secondly that the creditor is aware that he is dealing with a 
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company within a group of companies. There would, under the existing law, be no reason 
compelling a company within a group to disclose to a creditor that it forms part of a 
bigger group of companies. There should equally be no reason why, and therefore, no 
obligation upon a creditor to inform himself whether the company he is dealing with 
forms part of a group.  
 
Similar arguments could be put forth in the case of involuntary creditors, including 
juristic persons, who have suffered loss due to the wrongful and culpable acts of a 
company within a corporate group which could be a delict committed by that company 
directly or delictual liability in the form of vicarious liability. The automatic response 
would probably be that these creditors are involuntary and therefore should have a choice 
as to which entity within the group they will sue, namely the entity with the deepest 
pockets. These creditors should therefore be able to claim their damages from any entity 
within the group structure since they did not have the opportunity, like the contractual 
creditors, to negotiate securities or remedies with other members of the group or 
securities like mortgages or pledges. On the other hand, should this really be a factor? 
The cause of the loss could conceivably more often than not be the result of a negligent 
act by the company instead of a wilful act. Where the act was not wilful, would it be in 
the public interest to impose joint and several liability on the companies in the group, 
especially where the harm was caused by an employee of a company within the group 
and the liability is automatic due to vicarious liability? Already an argument could be 
made that the company is being “punished” by being held liable for the actions of its 
employees. Should one then go further to hold even the other companies within the group 
liable which would be at least two degrees away from the original wrongdoer? 
 
Illustrative of the problems of delictual liability within groups is the case of Adams v 
Cape Industries plc.5 The companies involved in this case were Cape plc (Cape), the 
holding company of a number of subsidiaries, its wholly owned subsidiary, Cape 
International & Overseas Ltd (CIOL), which in turn wholly owned Cape Asbestos South 
Africa (Pty) Ltd (CASAP). CASAP wholly owned Egnep (Pty) Ltd. North American 
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Asbestos Corporation (NAAC) was initially wholly owned by Cape but later transferred 
to CIOL. Capasco, a prominent roleplayer, was apparently another wholly owned 
subsidiary of Cape.6   
 
The structure of this group was as follows. Cape was the holding company. NAAC was 
the marketing subsidiary of Cape in the United States of America. Capasco was the 
marketing subsidiary worldwide. Casap was the subsidiary which owned the mining 
companies, which initially included Egnep, which owned the asbestos mines which 
supplied some of the asbestos that was sold into the United States of America.7 The 
shares in CIOL were later sold to Transvaal Consolidated Exploration Co Ltd in 1979. 
However, it was the mining and marketing of asbestos before 1979 which gave rise to the 
litigation against Cape and its related companies.8 Pittsburg Corning Corporation (PCC) 
was one of the main customers of Egnep. It owned an asbestos factory in Owentown, 
Texas which closed in 1972.9 
 
In the 1970s a general awareness of the dangers of asbestos took hold. In the Owentown 
district numerous plaintiffs instituted personal injury claims due to the damages suffered 
because of their exposure to asbestos dust.10 Action was instituted against Cape, NAAC 
and Egnep and later Capasco. The plaintiffs based their claim on the averment that these 
entities supplied asbestos to the Owentown factory despite the knowledge that asbestos 
was dangerous and they failed to warn the plaintiffs against the dangers of asbestos.11 
Other defendants even included the federal government of the United States of America. 
 
The actions were brought in a Texas Federal Court, and not the state court, under the 
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction which played an important role in the case. The first 
action against the defendants was instituted in the Texas Federal Court in Tyler in 1974.12 
                                                           
6
 See 443 where the court a quo sets out the facts of the case. The judgment of the court a quo and the Court of 
Appeal are reported under the same citation namely [1990] Ch 433. 
7
 See 443-444. 
8
 443. 
9
 444. 
10
 444. 
11
 444. 
12
 445. 
225 
 
In due course there was a proliferation of similar actions which caused the presiding 
judge to adopt a special form of procedure in court. In the meantime Cape, Egnep and 
Capasco filed papers averring that the Texan court had no jurisdiction over them. 
 
The judge in the case dismissed the motions of the defendants who objected to the 
jurisdiction of the court although the decision could be appealed. Ultimately the parties 
were pressured into a settlement by the presiding judge. The number of plaintiffs was 462 
and the settlement figure was $20 million.13  
 
After the first “Tyler” set of actions in the Tyler court, new plaintiffs instituted actions on 
similar grounds to the first set of actions from about 1978. The number was about 206 
and the same judge who presided over the first set was assigned to the next action.14 
Cape, Capasco and Egnep refused to participate in the second set of actions against them. 
They participated in the first set of actions under fear of being exposed to a jury trial and 
due to the fact that the other defendants were willing to settle. They also expected to win 
their jurisdictional point, an expectation which did not materialise.15 
 
Cape realised that there would be more litigation against it as a group. Cape, Capasco and 
Egnep decided not to participate at all in the second set of actions before the Tyler court 
and that they would allow default judgment to be taken against them. The three 
companies had no assets in the United States of America (except shares in NAAC which 
were without any value) and they were prepared to defend actions in England should 
there be any application there to enforce the judgments of the Texan court. They reasoned 
that under English law the courts of the United States had no jurisdiction over them. 
These decisions were taken at a meeting on 1 November 1977.16  
 
At the November 1977 meeting it was further resolved that NAAC would be liquidated to 
avoid the argument that under English law Cape’s interest in NAAC’s United States 
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business sufficed to give the court in Tyler jurisdiction over Cape. The United States, 
however, would not be abandoned as a market for asbestos. A new company, AMC was 
incorporated in Liechtenstein and the shares were held by a Liechtenstein attorney as 
fiduciary for CIOL. Sales of Cape’s asbestos into the United States would be done by 
AMC. A new marketing company in the United States was needed to replace NAAC. The 
president of the liquidated NAAC, a Mr Morgan, became the president of this new 
company, Continental Productions Corporation (CPC) at its incorporation in December 
1977. Morgan was the sole shareholder. CPC became the agent of AMC for the purpose 
of selling asbestos in the United States but had no authority to contract on behalf of AMC 
or any Cape company.17  
 
Eventually in 1983 default judgment was granted in the Tyler Court against Cape, Egpen 
and Capasco. The plaintiffs attempted to have the default judgments against the Cape 
companies enforced in the United Kingdom where Cape, Egpen and Capasco were 
“resident” and where they had assets. 
 
To enforce their judgment in the United Kingdom the plaintiffs had to show that the Tyler 
court, under English law, had jurisdiction over Cape and Capasco. Numerous contentions 
were made in this regard but for the purposes of this dissertation the most important one 
was that Cape and Capasco were present in Illinois either in January 1974 when the first 
Tyler actions commenced or in April 1978 to November 1979 when the second set of 
Tyler actions commenced. The plaintiffs argued that Cape and Capasco were present 
because NAAC was present in Illinois up to its liquidation in 1978 and CPC was present 
in Illinois until June 1979. The contention was that the relationship between these 
companies and Cape and Capasco justified treating the presence of the former in Illinois, 
for jurisdictional purposes, as the presence of Cape and Capasco in Illinois.18 This 
contention was one of the issues in dispute before the English court.  
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The case was decided before Scott J who rejected the averments of the plaintiffs and 
consequently refused to enforce the Tyler default judgments in England. The plaintiffs 
took the matter to the Court of Appeal. The focus of the discussion below will be on this 
judgment. Where relevant, reference will be made to the judgment of Scott J in the court 
a quo. 
 
The Court of Appeal had to grapple with the difficult question of the residence or 
presence of a corporation in a foreign country. Would the holding of shares in a foreign 
company, or control over it, suffice to establish residency or presence? The Court of 
Appeal, with reference to Okura & Co Ltd v Forsbacka Jernverks Aktiebolag19 held that a 
variety of factors could play a role in determining whether a company had a presence in a 
foreign jurisdiction.20 

To satisfy the requirements to establish a presence in the United States the plaintiff made 
three submissions. These were firstly that Cape and Capasco were present in the United 
States because NAAC and CPC acted as their agents, secondly that Cape, Capasco and 
NAAC and Cape, Capasco and CPC, respectively formed a single economic unit and that 
the presence of NAAC and CPC respectively in Illinois established the presence of Cape / 
Capasco in the United States and thirdly that in respect of AMC (the Liechtenstein 
company) / CPC the corporate veil should be lifted so that CPC’s and AMC’s presence in 
the United States of America should be treated as the presence of Cape / Capasco.

The Court of Appeal first dealt with the single economic unit argument of the plaintiffs. It 
acknowledged the basic principle, with reference to The Albazero,21 that each company 
within a group of companies is a separate legal entity which has separate legal rights and 
liabilities. The Court of Appeal then investigated a number of cases where the single 
economic argument featured in some form. It first referred to The Roberta22 where the 
relevant court held that the parent company and the subsidiary company were only in 
name separate entities.
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
The Court of Appeal then referred to Harold Holdworth & Co (Wakefield) Ltd v 
Caddies23 where Lord Reid said the following:
“My Lords, in my judgment this [that each subsidiary within a group is a separate entity] is too 
technical an argument. This is an agreement in re mercatoria and it must be construed in light of the 
facts and realities of the situation.”24 
 
The Court of Appeal next referred to Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v 
Meyer and Another.25 In his judgment in the Scottish Co-operative case, Lord Simonds 
said the following where there was a group of companies which may have constituted a 
single economic unit: 
“My Lords, it may be that the acts of the society of which complaint is made could not be regarded 
as conduct of the affairs of the company if the society and the company were bodies wholly 
independent of each other, competitors in the rayon market, and using against each other such 
methods of trade warfare as custom permitted. But this is to pursue a false analogy. It is not 
possible to separate the transactions of the society from those of the company. Every step taken by 
the latter was determined by the policy of the former.”26 
 
Lord Simonds concluded that the circumstances warranted the court looking at the 
business realities of the situation and not being confined “to a narrow legalistic view”.27 
 
Arguably the most important case to which the Court of Appeal refers is DHN Food 
Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council,28 in which Lord Denning 
held: 
“Third, lifting the corporate veil. We all know that in many respects a group of companies are treated 
together for the purpose of general accounts, balance sheet, and profit and loss account. They are 
treated as one concern [...] This is especially the case when a parent company owns all the shares of the 
subsidiaries - so much so that it can control every movement of the subsidiaries. These subsidiaries are 
bound  hand and foot to the parent company and must do just what the parent company says [...]. This 
group is virtually the same as a partnership in which all the three companies are partners. They should 
not be treated separately so as to be defeated on a technical point. They should not be deprived of the 
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compensation which should justly be payable for disturbance. The three companies should, for present 
purposes, be treated as one, and the parent company D.H.N. should be treated as that one.”29  
 
 In his concurring judgment in the DHN case, Goff LJ held: 
“[T]his is a case in which one is entitled to look at the realities of the situation and to pierce the 
corporate veil. I wish to safeguard myself by saying that so far as this ground is concerned, I am relying 
on the facts of this particular case. I would not at this juncture accept that in every case where one has a 
group of companies one is entitled to pierce the veil, but in this case the two subsidiaries were both 
wholly owned; further, they had no separate business operations whatsoever; thirdly, in my judgment, 
the nature of the question involved is highly relevant, namely, whether the owners of this business have 
been disturbed in their possession and enjoyment of it.”30 
 
The Court of Appeal next referred to Revlon Inc v Cripps & Lee Ltd31 where the question 
to be decided was whether the goods in question were “connected in the course of trade 
with the proprietor […] of the trade mark” within the meaning of the relevant trade mark 
legislation in the United Kingdom. The owner of the trade mark was Revlon Suisse SA 
which was a subsidiary of Revlon Inc. Lord Buckley held the following: 
“Since, however, all the relevant companies are wholly-owned subsidiaries of Revlon, it is undoubted 
that the mark is, albeit remotely, an asset of Revlon and its exploitation is for the ultimate benefit of no 
one but Revlon. It therefore seems to me to be realistic and wholly justifiable to regard Suisse as 
holding the mark at the disposal of Revlon and for Revlon's benefit. The mark is an asset of the Revlon 
group of companies regarded as a whole, which all belongs to Revlon. This view does not, in my 
opinion, constitute what is sometimes called 'piercing the corporate veil'; it recognises the legal and 
factual position resulting from the mutual relationship of the various companies.”32 
 
The Court of Appeal was requested by the plaintiffs to recognise the commercial reality 
of the Cape group of companies in the light of the abovementioned judgments. 
 
To answer the question of residence in the United States, the Court of Appeal recognised 
that it was bound to investigate the relationship between the holding company and the 
subsidiary which conducted business in the country where residency of the holding 
company was being investigated. It was especially important to determine whether there 
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was some form of agency relationship between the holding company and the relevant 
subsidiary. The Court of Appeal, however, warned that there was not a presumption of 
agency and there was no presumption that the subsidiary was the alter ego of the holding 
company.33 The Court of Appeal accepted the following basic premise in cases like these: 
“If a company chooses to arrange the affairs of its group in such a way that the business carried on in a 
particular foreign country is the business of its subsidiary and not its own, it is, in our judgment, 
entitled to do so. Neither in this class of case nor in any other class of case is it open to this court to 
disregard the principle of Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1897] A.C. 22 merely because it 
considers it just so to do.”34 
 
The plaintiffs argued before the Court of Appeal that Cape conducted a single integrated 
mining division and ignored corporate law formalities which existed between members of 
a group of companies when one viewed the manner in which Cape carried on its business. 
The Court of Appeal, however, recognised that it was in the very nature of a holding 
company and its subsidiary that the holding company was in a position to exercise total 
control over the general direction of the subsidiary and that this did not imply that the 
group was one single unit.35 The plaintiffs averred that the control which was exercised 
was not general control but the actual day to day running of the relevant subsidiary, 
NAAC. 
 
The Court of Appeal understood the averment in the light of the set up of the Cape group 
of companies. It also appreciated why the DHN36 approach of a single partnership with 
various partners seemed attractive in casu. However, the Court of Appeal agreed with the 
following statement in Bank of Tokyo Ltd v Karoon:37 
"[Counsel] suggested beguilingly that it would be technical for us to distinguish between parent and 
subsidiary company in this context; economically, he said, they were one. But we are concerned not 
with economics but with law. The distinction between the two is, in law, fundamental and cannot here 
be bridged."38

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The Court of Appeal rejected the single economic entity argument in respect of NAAC 
and CPC despite the level of control which Cape exercised over the entities, without 
providing any concrete reasons,39 except relying on a broad policy reasoning which was 
not necessarily convincing in the light of the facts at hand.

The Court of Appeal had to deal next with the piercing of the corporate veil point. To 
succeed with this argument the plaintiffs had to prove that the corporate form used in the 
Cape group was merely a façade. The plaintiffs argued that the arrangements and the 
motives behind the arrangements within the Cape group showed that the whole corporate 
form was a façade. This was especially so in the light of the fact that the whole 
restructuring within the Cape group only took place after the first set of Tyler cases and 
before the institution of the second set of Tyler cases. On the facts the Court of Appeal, 
however, concluded that it was the intention of Cape to continue to sell asbestos from the 
South African subsidiaries in the United States of America but simultaneously to reduce 
the appearance of any involvement in such sales by Cape or any of its subsidiaries. Cape 
furthermore intended to reduce any risk, by lawful means, which it or any of its 
subsidiaries could face for liability in the United States of America or possible subjection 
to the jurisdiction of the United States courts and a consequential default judgment of 
such a court which could be enforced in the courts of the United Kingdom.

The question that the Court of Appeal had to answer was whether the arrangements of 
Cape, namely the liquidation of NAAC and the incorporation of AMC and CPC were 
merely a façade to justify the piercing of the corporate veil so as that CPC’s and AMC’s 
presence in the United States of America should be treated as the presence of Cape / 
Capasco.

The Court of Appeal then investigated the case law in respect of piercing. It referred to 
Merchandise Transport Ltd v British Transport Commission,40 Jones v Lipman,41 
Wallersteiner v Moir42 and Littlewoods Mail Order Stores Ltd v Inland Revenue 
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Commissioners43 but came to the conclusion that these cases provided little guidance as 
to the principles which should guide a court in determining whether or not the 
arrangements within a group of companies constituted a sham.44

The Court of Appeal looked at the position of AMC45 and concluded that it was a façade 
and merely Cape in disguise. However, since AMC was not conducting business in the 
United States of America, it could not assist the plaintiffs to establish that Cape / Capasco 
had a presence in the United States of America.

It was important for the plaintiffs to establish that CPC was also a sham to establish a 
presence of Cape / Capasco in the United States since CPC was clearly conducting 
business in the United States. The shares of CPC it will be recalled were held by Morgan, 
who had been the president of the liquidated NAAC. The plaintiffs argued that a court 
will pierce the corporate veil where a defendant, by making use of a corporate structure, 
attempts to evade, firstly limitations placed on his conduct by law, secondly to evade 
such rights of relief against him as third parties already possess and thirdly to evade such 
rights of relief which third parties may obtain in future.46 In casu the issue was whether 
the court could pierce the veil on the third of these grounds since there were no vested 
rights when Cape Industries re-organised its operations in the United States. The court 
held that the law allows a person to arrange his/its affairs in such manner to avoid the risk 
which was foreseen in this case.47 
 
The Court of Appeal concluded on this point that Cape entered into the restructuring of 
its business in the United States due to an apprehension that they could be held to be 
present in the United States (arising after the first set of Tyler actions which were settled) 
and therefore that they should restructure their operations so as not to be present in the 
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United States. The Court of Appeal therefore also rejected the piercing of the veil 
argument.48 
 
The third ground upon which the plaintiffs relied to show that Cape and Capasco had a 
presence in the United States of America was that since NAAC and CPC acted as agents 
for Cape and Capasco, as such they conducted the business of Cape in the United 
States.49 In the court a quo Scott J rejected this submission and held that the business 
which NAAC conducted was its own business and not that of Cape. 
 
The Court of Appeal agreed with Scott J and held that the business that NAAC conducted 
was its own. It based its opinion on certain factual circumstances.50 In the first place 
NAAC was the lessee of its business premises and paid its own rent. It also owned office 
furniture and employed its own employees for whom it also had a pension scheme. 
 
It secondly also often acted independently of Cape in the sense that it did not buy all its 
asbestos from Cape. It also made purchases from the government of the United States or 
from Egnep and Casap and sold this asbestos to customers in the United States. Such 
purchases represented about 25% of the business of NAAC. It also bought asbestos from 
Japan and sold this to its customers in the United States. Although the majority of the 
business of NAAC was derived from Cape, the Court of Appeal still held that the other 
non-Cape business of NAAC was not trivial. 
 
Thirdly NAAC rented warehouses and paid for this out of its own pocket to store the 
asbestos which it had bought from the United States government or from Egnep or Casap. 
 
NAAC fourthly earned profits and paid tax in the United States on these profits. It also 
had its own creditors and debtors. Dividends were paid to its shareholder, Cape, after 
resolutions were duly passed by the board of directors of NAAC. 
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The Court of Appeal therefore held on the above facts that NAAC conducted its own 
business in the United States. The question was, however, also whether the functions 
which it performed on behalf of Cape / Capasco could be construed as conducting the 
business of those two entities. These functions were generally marketing and after sales 
follow ups with customers of Cape / Capasco. It was paid commission for these services. 
According to the Court of Appeal there was no evidence that NAAC reserved any part of 
its offices or staff exclusively for its agency functions on behalf of Cape / Capasco.51  
 
The Court of Appeal did not deny that the services which NAAC rendered for Cape / 
Capasco were very important for the business of the Cape group in the United States. 
However, NAAC did not have a carte blanche authority in respect of its agency and 
operated under strict limitations. NAAC never effected any contract which would bind 
Cape / Capasco to a purchaser of asbestos. The contractual parties in any sale that NAAC 
concluded were NAAC and the relevant third party purchaser or seller. The Court of 
Appeal therefore held that the business which NAAC conducted was its own and not that 
of Cape or Capasco. Cape / Capasco were therefore never present in the United States 
through NAAC.52 
 
The last question which needed to be answered was whether Cape / Capasco were present 
through the presence of CPC. The Court of Appeal held that, like with NAAC, the 
business was its, CPC’s, own.53 The functions which it performed for Cape / Capasco 
were similar to the functions which NAAC performed for those two entities. CPC had no 
authority to bind Cape / Capasco to any contractual obligation and the contracts it entered 
into were its own. Cape / Capasco were therefore according to the Court of Appeal not 
present in the United States through CPC at any stage. 
 
6.2 The judicial approach to company group liability  
In the light of the Adams v Cape Industries plc case the next question to investigate 
concerns the attitude of the judiciary to liability within company groups. On the 
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assumption that the law needs to address the problem of delictual liability within groups, 
two options are available. The first option is to consider the doctrine of the piercing of the 
corporate veil and to determine whether this could be an effective solution. The law of 
the United States of America, and in less detail, that of Australia will be investigated in 
order to determine whether the South African law can learn anything from these 
jurisdictions. The second option is to investigate the possibility of abolishing the 
principle of limited liability in respect of delicts committed by members of a company 
group and to determine whether this would be a sound approach from a policy 
perspective. 
 
6.2.1 The piercing of the corporate veil doctrine in the United States of America 
Initially the American courts provided little guidance as to the circumstances where the 
corporate veil within company groups would be pierced. This is illustrated by United 
States v Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co54 where the court held that the separate 
juristic personality would be ignored where the “entity is used to defeat public 
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime.”55 According to Blumberg the 
doctrine of piercing the veil within the context of company groups evolved in time as a 
“three factor ‘instrumentality’ and ‘alter ego’ doctrines for piercing the veil.”56 The 
piercing of the corporate veil or alter ego case law is based, therefore, upon three factors. 
The instrumentality mechanism is used interchangeably with the alter ego mechanism 
and both consist of three essential features or factors; firstly the lack of an independent 
existence of the subsidiary, secondly the abuse of the corporate form to accomplish a 
fraudulent, inequitable, or wrongful purpose and, thirdly the causal relationship to the 
plaintiff’s loss.57 
 
In contrast to the three-factor case law on the piercing of the corporate veil, jurisprudence 
developed which only focused on a single factor to determine whether the separate 
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corporate personality should be disregarded or not.58 This jurisprudence can be divided 
into the doctrines of “lack of separate existence of the subsidiary” and “use of the 
subsidiary for fraudulent, inequitable or wrongful purposes.”59 
 
With that brief overview of the piercing of the veil theories in the United States of 
America it is necessary to delve deeper below the surface and investigate whether the 
United States law on piercing the corporate veil in the context of corporate group offers 
any assistance and guidance to the South African courts. 
 
According to Blumberg the American judiciary either uses the instrumentality test or the 
alter ego test, or alternatively a single-factor test to determine whether the corporate veil 
should be pierced.60 As mentioned above, three factors need to be proved before an 
American court will pierce the veil between the holding company and subsidiary 
company in terms of the instrumentality test and alter ego test.  
  
6.2.1.1 The instrumentality test 
Powell was responsible for formulating the instrumentality doctrine.61 Powell lists three 
elements for the application of the instrumentality doctrine. The first element is control. 
The mere existence of control is not sufficient. The holding company should exercise de 
facto control over the subsidiary.62 Control according to Powell involves two aspects, 
namely the subsidiary has first of all become “a mere instrumentality or puppet”63 of the 
holding company. Nevertheless the assets and business of the subsidiary have prima facie 
remained distinct from those of the holding company.64 The second aspect involves that 
the affairs of the holding company and the subsidiary company have become so 
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intertwined and confused that it is not practically possible to separate them in a particular 
transaction.65 
 
The court in United States v Reading Co66 formulated the first element in the following 
terms where a holding company holds the majority shares in the subsidiary: 
“where such ownership of stock is resorted to, not for the purpose of participating in the affairs of 
the [subsidiary] corporation, […] but for the purpose of making it a mere agent, or instrumentality 
[…], the courts will look through the forms to the realities of the relation between the 
companies.”67 
 
The second element of the control test was formulated in United States v Lehigh.68 The 
court held that: 
“[T]he use of such stock ownership (by the holding company) in substance for the purpose of 
destroying the entity of a producing, etc, corporation, and of commingling its affairs in 
administration with the affairs of the railroad company, so as to make the two corporations 
virtually one.”69 
 
From both cases it is apparent that there was abusive control although it differed in 
degree. In the Reading case the businesses of the holding company and subsidiary still 
had a semblance of independence but in the Lehigh case the two businesses were 
completely intertwined and formed one entity for all practical purposes.70 
 
According to Powell it is a question of fact and degree whether the holding company 
exercises so much influence over the subsidiary company that the subsidiary company 
becomes a mere instrument of the holding company. He recognises that it would be 
impossible to set a numerus clausus of instances where the control element of the 
instrumentality test will be satisfied, but states that there are certain common 
denominators which could indicate the control required to satisfy the first requirement of 
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the instrumentality test. These common denominators or indiciae, bearing in mind that 
they have to be present in combination with one another and not in isolation, are: 
“(a) The parent company owns all the or most of the capital stock of the subsidiary. 
  (b) The parent and subsidiary corporations have common directors or officers. 
  (c) The parent corporation finances the subsidiary. 
  (d) The parent corporation subscribes to all the capital stock of the subsidiary or otherwise 
causes its incorporation. 
  (e) The subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital. 
 (f) The parent corporation pays the salaries and other expenses or losses of the subsidiary. 
 (g) The subsidiary has substantially no business except with the parent corporation or no 
assets except those conveyed to it by the parent corporation. 
 (h) In the papers of the parent corporation or in the statements of its officers, the subsidiary is 
described as a department or division of the parent corporation, or its business or 
financial responsibility is referred to as the parent corporation’s own. 
 (i) The parent corporation uses the property of the subsidiary as its own. 
 (j) The directors or executives of the subsidiary do not act independently in the interest of 
the subsidiary but take their orders from the parent corporation in the latter’s interest. 
 (k) The formal legal requirements of the subsidiary are not observed.”71 
  
The second element of the instrumentality doctrine is the holding company’s fraud or 
wrongful behaviour vis-à-vis the injured party.72 Powell refers to United States v 
Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co73 where the court held that separate juristic 
personalities of a holding company and its subsidiary will be ignored where they are used 
to defraud a person.74 
 
Powell lists a number of grounds which the courts have held to constitute fraud. Fraud 
should also be understood in broad terms. The grounds are; fraud, the violation of 
legislation, stripping the assets of the subsidiary company, misrepresentation, estoppel,75 
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torts and other cases of wrong or injustice.76 The third element of the instrumentality 
doctrine is the requirement that the plaintiff must have suffered damages or injury in a 
way which was unjust.77 
 
A case in point to illustrate the application of the instrumentality test by a number of the 
United States courts is Lowendahl v Baltimore & Ohio Railroad.78 The court restated 
Powell’s formulation of the instrumentality doctrine in slightly different terms, namely 
“Restating the instrumentality rule, we may say that in any case, except express agency, estoppel, 
or direct tort, three elements must be proved: 
‘(1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not only of 
finances, but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the 
corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its 
own; and 
(2) Such control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the 
violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or a dishonest and unjust act in contravention 
of plaintiff's legal rights; and 
(3) The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss 
complained of.’”79 
 
6.2.1.2 The alter ego doctrine 
The alter ego doctrine developed adjacent to the instrumentality doctrine in a number of 
states in the United States including California, Delaware and New Hampshire.80 
According to Blumberg the doctrine differs only in form from the instrumentality 
doctrine and is substantively the same as the instrumentality doctrine.81 
 
In Webber v Inland Empire Investment Inc82 Hyatt Land Development Corporation sold 
four pieces of land to Forecast Mortgage Corporation. Forecast Mortgage Corporation 
paid by means of a note which it had executed in the amount of $754 000,00 in favour of 
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Hyatt Land Development Corporation. Security for the amount was provided by means of 
a deed of trust over one of the pieces of land. Webber took cession of the note and the 
deed of trust. 
 
The balance of the purchase price for the four pieces of land was provided by means of a 
loan by Sanwa Bank which received security in the form of a deed of trust over all four 
pieces of land. The deed of trust of Sanwa Bank was executed before the Hyatt deed of 
trust and the prior in tempore potior in iure principle was applied. 
 
In due course the properties were transferred from Forecast Mortgage Corporation to 
Forecast Corporation which in turn transferred the properties to All Cities Mini-Storage. 
Forecast Mortgage subsequently failed to make any payments on the note which had been 
issued to Hyatt, who in turn had ceded it to Webber, who then commenced with 
foreclosure proceedings. 
 
Although the parties agreed that Forecast Mortgage Corporation had the financial ability 
to pay off the Hyatt note in August 1992, it decided not to do so. Instead, Forecast's 
owner, Mr. Previti, decided to (i) transfer title to the property from Forecast Corporation 
to another corporation he controlled, All Cities Mini-Storage; (ii) use another corporation 
he controlled, Inland Empire Investments, to purchase the note, a note which the court 
does not define, from Sanwa Bank; (iii) have Forecast Mortgage default on the note, and 
(iv) then have Inland Empire foreclose on the property, thus eliminating Mr. Webber's 
junior security on the fourth piece of property. The trial court subsequently characterised 
these transactions as a “sham foreclosure”. 
 
Following this course of action, Inland bought the note from Sanwa, and the note and 
deed of trust were assigned to Inland. Mr. Webber decided not to pursue his foreclosure 
action, and Inland then proceeded with its own foreclosure action against All Cities, 
purchasing the property at a foreclosure sale in January 1993. Due to the foreclosure of 
the senior lien, Mr. Webber's junior lien was extinguished. The end result was that Mr. 
Webber lost his junior lien in the amount of $754 000,00 plus interest.  
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The trial court found that Mr. Previti was the owner of all or at least half of the shares of 
Forecast Mortgage, Forecast Corporation, Inland Empire Investments, All Cities Mini-
Storage, Forecast Development, and Forecast Homes of Northern California. It therefore 
found that Inland, as dominated and controlled by Mr. Previti, was acting as the alter ego 
of Forecast Mortgage in the transactions under discussion. 
 
The court referred to Communist Party v 522 Valencia Inc83 where the court stated that 
ordinarily a corporation is regarded as a legal entity separate and distinct from its 
shareholders and directors. Under the alter ego doctrine, however, where a corporation is 
used by an individual or by another corporation, to perpetrate fraud, circumvent a statute, 
or accomplish some other wrongful or inequitable purpose, a court may disregard the 
corporate entity and treat the corporation's acts as if they were done by the persons 
actually controlling the corporation. 
 
The alter ego doctrine requires two elements to be satisfied. The court in Inland Empire 
couches the doctrine and its requirements in the following terms: 
“[That firstly] there is such a unity of interest and ownership between the corporation and the 
individual or organization controlling it that their separate personalities no longer exist, and 
[secondly] failure to disregard the corporate entity would sanction a fraud or promote injustice. 
The doctrine is applicable where some innocent party attacks the corporate form as an injury to 
that party's interests. The issue is not so much whether the corporate entity should be disregarded 
for all purposes or whether its very purpose was to defraud the innocent party, as it is whether in 
the particular case presented, justice and equity can best be accomplished and fraud and unfairness 
defeated by disregarding the distinct entity of the corporate form. Nevertheless, persons who 
themselves control a corporation, who have used the corporate form of doing business for their 
benefit, who have dealt with and treated the corporation as a separate entity, or who have 
otherwise by their actions expressly or impliedly recognized its corporate existence, may be 
estopped to deny the corporation's separate legal existence. Parties who determine to avail 
themselves of the right to do business by means of the establishment of a corporate entity must 
assume the burdens thereof as well as the privileges. The alter ego doctrine is applied to avoid 
inequitable results, not to eliminate the consequences of corporate operations. Thus, alter ego is 
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used to prevent a corporation from using its statutory separate corporate form as a shield from 
liability only where to recognize its corporate status would defeat the rights and equities of third 
parties; it is not a doctrine that allows the persons who actually control the corporation to 
disregard the corporate form. In other words, alter ego is a limited doctrine, invoked only where 
recognition of the corporate form would work an injustice to a third person.” 84 
 
From the above it is clear that the court looks at abuse of the corporate form in specific 
cases and not generally.85 It is not required that the corporate form has been permanently 
abused before a court will pierce the corporate veil. According to Blumberg the (Federal) 
California Courts of Appeals for the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits formulate the doctrine 
in different terms without the introduction of any new elements.86 
 
In National Labor Relations Board v Greater Kansas City Roofing87 the Court of Appeals 
formulated the requirements for the alter ego doctrine as follows: 
“In accordance with prior Tenth Circuit precedent and after careful consideration of the analysis of 
this issue offered by our sister courts, we conclude that the federal common law doctrine of 
piercing the corporate veil under an alter ego theory can best be described by the following two-
part test: (i) was there such unity of interest and lack of respect given to the separate identity of the 
corporation by its shareholders that the personalities and assets of the corporation and the 
individual are indistinct, and (ii) would adherence to the corporate fiction sanction a fraud, 
promote injustice, or lead to an evasion of legal obligations.”88 
 
In National Labor Relations Board v West Dixie Enterprises Inc89 the Court of Appeals 
confirmed the decision in the Greater Kansas case and held that: 
“the corporate veil may be pierced when: (1) there is such unity of interest, and lack of respect 
given to the separate identity of the corporation by its shareholders, that the personalities and 
assets of the corporation and the individuals are indistinct, and (2) adherence to the corporate form 
would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or lead to an evasion of legal obligations.”90 
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From the quoted cases it would appear that the second requirement is a very broad one 
since it ranges from fraud to the promotion of injustice. It would, however, appear that 
“fraud” does not mean fraud at the incorporation of the subsidiary company but fraud in 
respect of a particular action committed by the holding company.91 
 
6.2.1.3 Evaluation of the alter ego and instrumentality doctrines 
When one compares the instrumentality doctrine to the alter ego doctrine the two 
doctrines do not seem to differ fundamentally. The control element of the instrumentality 
doctrine in essence is reflected by the unity of interests element of the alter ego doctrine 
and the second element of both doctrines contains fraud, inequity or unjust behaviour. 
The third element of the instrumentality doctrine could in essence be ignored since any 
claim for damages requires a causal link between an action and the damages or loss 
suffered by a plaintiff. It is therefore not a unique requirement. 
  
The first element of both doctrines could be summarised as the subsidiary company not 
enjoying a separate existence, either due to the complete or excessive control by the 
holding company or due to the ignorance or disregard of “corporate formalities and 
absence of indiciae of separate existence.”92  
 
The first requirement of both doctrines is not particularly specific since it is not quite 
clear what “excessive” control or “lack of separate existence” means. This requirement 
therefore becomes one that can only be ascertained on the facts at hand and not one that 
could be ascertained a priori. The nature of the relationship between a holding company 
and a subsidiary company pre-supposes control. The holding company will either have all 
or the majority of the shares in the subsidiary company or be able to appoint and dismiss 
the directors who have the majority vote at board meetings of the subsidiary companies. 
It is after all the whole purpose of being a majority shareholder to control the company 
and determine its direction and policies. 
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Blumberg divides the various states of control into four classes of relationship.93 The first 
and second forms of control are not contentious. The first form is the ordinary control 
which would enable a holding company to appoint or dismiss the majority of directors of 
the subsidiary company or to be able to exercise control over the direction and policies of 
the subsidiary company. 
 
The second form of control according to Blumberg is one that is consistent and in line 
with, or generally viewed as appropriate, in the United States corporate environment. 
This would include having most or even all of the directors of the holding company 
serving on the board of directors of the subsidiary company. This would also include the 
power of the holding company to set general policies for the subsidiary company, the 
power of the holding company to veto the undertaking of large capital projects by the 
subsidiary company and to provide blanket cover in respect of pension and other benefits 
across the board for companies within a group. Blumberg states that most courts require 
more than the aforementioned elements before control could be viewed as excessive and 
resulting in a subsidiary company not enjoying a separate existence.94 
 
The most contentious class of relationship, according to Blumberg, is the third class 
where there is “[i]ntrusion into the decision making of the subsidiary going beyond 
customary and appropriate levels, but not extending as far as control over day-to-day 
decisions.”95 It is obvious that this class of relationships would imply a grey area where 
the particular facts of each case would determine the outcome of each matter and that 
there can be no hard and fast rule to act as a reliable guide through the uncertainty. 
 
In the fourth class of controlling relationships the holding company exercises daily 
control over the management of the subsidiary company which according to Blumberg is 
almost universally accepted by the United States courts as being sufficient to justify the 
piercing of the corporate veil.96 
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Apart from control, the other issue at hand with the first element is the one of the separate 
existence of the subsidiary company. The United States courts will ask whether the 
subsidiary company has its own business premises, its own business infrastructure, its 
own employees and bank accounts, for example.97 Blumberg further states that proof of 
excessive control would suffice to satisfy the first requirement and that proof that there is 
no separate existence is not required.98 Ultimately proof of either one will result in 
showing that there is not an independent subsidiary company. 
 
The second requirement of both the instrumentality and alter ego doctrines is the 
“existence of morally culpable conduct” by an alleged wrongdoer.99 Actual fraud is not 
required. In National Labor Relations Board v West Dixie Enterprises Inc100 the Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that where a shareholder appropriates the funds of a 
company for personal use, such conduct would satisfy the second requirement of the two 
piercing doctrines. In Oddenino & Gaule v United Financial Group of Illinois101 the 
Federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that: 
“The appellants fail, however, to satisfy the second prerequisite of alter ego liability, that an 
inequitable result will follow ‘if the acts are treated as those of the corporation alone.’ The 
existence of an unsatisfied creditor does not, by itself, create an inequitable result. Rather, the 
purpose of the alter ego doctrine is to afford such creditors protection where some conduct 
amounting to bad faith makes it inequitable ... for the equitable owner of a corporation to hide 
behind its corporate veil. An inequitable result arises when the existence of an unsatisfied creditor 
is coupled with an abuse of the corporate form, such as a misrepresentation of the corporate 
structure to creditors or undercapitalization so severe that the capital input is insufficient to meet 
obligations that could reasonably be expected to arise in the normal course of business.”102 
 
In RRX Industries Inc v Lab-Con Inc103 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held 
that: 
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“Appellants argue that the district court erroneously imposed liability because it did not find that 
Kelly acted in bad faith. A finding of bad faith, however, is not a prerequisite to the application of 
the alter ego doctrine under California law.”104  
 
Although the RRX Industries case precedes the Oddenino decision the latter decision does 
not explicitly reject the RRX decision in respect of the question of bad faith. It can 
therefore be accepted that bad faith is not a requirement that has to be met to satisfy the 
second element of the respective piercing doctrines.105 
 
Blumberg states that the conduct which has been required by the courts to satisfy the 
second element of the respective doctrines is “conduct beyond the pale of acceptable 
business practices that has a detrimental impact on creditors for which the latter cannot 
reasonably be expected to have bargained.”106 Blumberg refers to cases which constituted 
such conduct, namely instances where the assets of the holding company and subsidiary 
company were intermingled, instances where the holding company stripped the 
subsidiary company of its assets and instances where the holding company conducted the 
business of the subsidiary without the subsidiary having any assets or was 
undercapitalised by the holding company.107 
 
The third element of the respective doctrines does not need to be discussed since it is self 
evident that a person who feels wronged should be able to show that the conduct of the 
holding company caused him loss and that there is a causal link between the wrongful 
conduct and his loss. 
 
As mentioned before the two doctrines for the piercing of the corporate veil in the United 
States law do not appear to differ significantly from one another. In William Passalacqua 
Builders Inc v Resnick Developers South Inc108 the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit had to decide on an appeal where the plaintiff brought his action based upon both 
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doctrines under separate counts. The court as background set out the history of the 
piercing of the corporate veil and stated that the doctrine is based in law and equity.109 
The court then held that: 
“[T]he three-factor rule in New York and the alter ego theory sued on in this case are 
indistinguishable, do not lead to different results, and should be treated as interchangeable.”110 
 
Certain courts have also looked at a checklist of factors to guide them through the 
evidentiary confusion to determine whether the corporate veil should be pierced or not. In 
Associated Vendors Inc v Oakland Meat Company111 the court said the following: 
“A review of the cases which have discussed the problem discloses the consideration of a variety 
of factors which were pertinent to the trial court's determination under the particular circumstances 
of each case. Among these are the following: Commingling of funds and other assets, failure to 
segregate funds of the separate entities, and the unauthorized diversion of corporate funds or assets 
to other than corporate uses; treatment by an individual of the assets of the corporation as his 
own;112 the failure to obtain authority to issue stock or to subscribe to or issue the same;113 the 
holding out by an individual that he is personally liable for the debts of the corporation;114 the 
failure to maintain minutes or adequate corporate records, and the confusion of the records of the 
separate entities;115 the identical equitable ownership in the two entities; the identification of the 
equitable owners thereof with the domination and control of the two entities; identification of the 
directors and officers of the two entities in the responsible supervision and management; sole 
ownership of all of the stock in a corporation by one individual or the members of a family;116 the 
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use of the same office or business location; the employment of the same employees and/or 
attorney;117 the failure to adequately capitalize a corporation; the total absence of corporate assets, 
and undercapitalization;118 the use of a corporation as a mere shell, instrumentality or conduit for a 
single venture or the business of an individual or another corporation;119 the concealment and  
misrepresentation of the identity of the responsible ownership, management and financial interest, 
or concealment of personal business activities;120 the disregard of legal formalities and the failure 
to maintain arm's length relationships among related entities;121 the use of the corporate entity to 
procure labour, services or merchandise for another person or entity;122 the diversion by a 
stockholder or other person or entity, to the detriment of creditors, or the manipulation of assets 
and liabilities between entities so as to concentrate the assets in one and the liabilities in 
another;123 the contracting with another with intent to avoid performance by use of a corporate 
entity as a shield against personal liability, or the use of a corporation as a subterfuge of illegal 
transactions;124 and the formation and use of a corporation to transfer to it the existing liability of 
another person or entity.125 A perusal of these cases reveals that in all instances several of the 
factors mentioned were present. It is particularly significant that while it was held, in each 
instance, that the trial court was warranted in disregarding the corporate entity, the factors 
considered by it were not deemed to be conclusive upon the trier of fact but were found to be 
supported by substantial evidence.”126 
 
The obvious problem of working with a checklist is that a court may shift its focus from 
the substance of the dispute at hand to a formal checklist, ticking off factors to resolve a 
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dispute instead of focusing on the nature of the dispute. A checklist like the one at hand 
does not offer a weighing of factors: it is not clear which factor would weigh more or be 
regarded as being the most important. Furthermore the checklist is very diverse which 
makes reconciliation between the factors as well as weighing the relevance and 
importance of each factor extremely difficult.127  
 
Blumberg also refers to the checklist of Douglas and Shanks.128 Douglas and Shanks 
listed a number of factors which according to them could determine whether a subsidiary 
company enjoyed a separate existence or not. These factors appear very close or similar 
to the ones which Muscat argues should provide for liability on a holding company for 
the debts of an insolvent subsidiary as well as liability to involuntary creditors.129 These 
factors which Douglas and Shanks list are: 
  “1. Separate financing and adequacy of capitalisation; 
      2. Separate day-to-day business operations; 
      3. Observance of corporate and business formalities; 
      4. Separate representation of parent and subsidiary to the public.”130 
 
6.2.1.4 Single-factor piercing in the United States of America 
The classic American piercing of the veil tests employed a three-pronged test,131 but there 
has also been a movement towards a single factor test. The single factor test focuses, as 
the name suggests, on one aspect only to determine whether the holding company should 
be liable for a debt incurred by a subsidiary. The debt could be of a contractual or a 
delictual nature. Blumberg lists three overarching single grounds upon which the United 
States’ courts have been willing to pierce the corporate veil.132 Each ground is then also 
further divided into further sub-categories. The main single factor grounds are, firstly 
where the subsidiary company patently has no independent existence, secondly where the 
holding company uses the subsidiary company for fraudulent, inequitable and wrongful 
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purposes and thirdly where the holding company and its subsidiaries or related companies 
are operated as a single business enterprise.133 
 
6.2.1.4.1 Lack of independent existence 
The first ground is the complete lack of any indication that the subsidiary company 
enjoys any independent existence. Although there appear to be no recent cases after 2000, 
Blumberg mentions that where the subsidiary company is merely an entity without any 
substance, lacks assets, staff and a business, the courts have brought such a state of affairs 
under the single factor piercing doctrine.134 This basis for a single-factor test will now be 
illustrated with reference to a few of the decided cases. 
 
In Wegerer v First Commodity Corporation of Boston135 First Commodity was a 
commodity option brokerage firm with its main office in Boston and other offices in 
Newport Beach, Chicago, Miami, San Francisco and New York. The Wegerers were 
induced into an agreement to purchase commodity options by an accountant, Jones, of 
First Commodity in New York and were told to ignore the information booklet which 
was sent by mail. Soon afterwards they were alerted to the fact that the United States 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission had banned commodity options. They suffered 
loss and instituted legal action against First Commodity and its controlling shareholders 
and directors, the Schleicher brothers. The case against the Schleichers rested on the 
allegation that they acted outside their official capacities as directors and for their own 
personal gain. The court held that the Schleichers used First Commodity merely as an 
instrument for their own personal business affairs and that the corporate veil should be 
pierced based under the alter ego doctrine. 
 
In Middendorf v Fuqua Industries Inc136 the plaintiff bought property in 1967 subject to a 
lease agreement with Ward Manufacturing Inc, a company incorporated in Ohio. The 
lessor / seller of the property was Ward. Interstate Motor Freight System Inc was a 
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subsidiary of Fuqua and merged with Ward Ohio. Interstate Motor Freight System then 
changed its name to Ward Manufacturing Inc, a company of Delaware. Ward of 
Delaware thus became a subsidiary of Fuqua. Ward of Delaware was eventually 
dissolved in 1970 and all its assets and liabilities passed to Fuqua, the sole shareholder. 
All of the assets of Ward of Delaware were then sold to Ward Interfinancial Corporation, 
a company incorporated in Delaware and whose name in due course was changed to 
Eldorado Industries Inc. Ward Delaware and Fuqua assigned all of their interests in terms 
of the lease agreement to Eldorado. Rental was outstanding and the plaintiff instituted 
action against Fuqua, the holding company of Ward Delaware.  
 
The court stressed that Fuqua controlled every company which was involved with the 
leased premises after the merger of Ward Ohio into Ward Delaware and before the 
assignment to Eldorado. Fuqua attempted to escape liability on the basis that it was a 
mere assignee and not a lessee of the premises in question. Without any evidence of fraud 
or improper behaviour the court accepted the dictum in Pepper v Dixie Splint Coal Co137 
where the Virginian court stated that: 
“The actual and ultimate control and ownership of the property and business of the three 
companies was lodged in Litton and Long. Such complete dominance and control by them made 
the two corporations and the copartnership, quoad the appellant, merely a veil or shadow through 
which the court will look to the substance of things whenever it would be unconscionable, through 
corporate fiction or otherwise, to permit the responsible parties to escape liability by turning over 
their property from one entity to another. The form changed, but the real parties in interest always 
remained the same.”138 
 
In West Building Materials Inc v Daley139 the court adopted a stricter approach to veil 
piercing using the single-factor doctrine. West Building Materials was a creditor of All 
South Builders Inc, a company in which Daley and his family owned all the shares. West 
Building Materials supplied All South Builders Inc with materials and was not paid. The 
plaintiff alleged that Daley was personally liable since he acted fraudulently by using the 
building materials for his own benefit and, in the absence of fraud, the assets of Daley 
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and those of All South were so interwoven that a person could not distinguish between 
them. Furthermore there was an allegation that some corporate formalities were not 
followed. The court found that there was no fraud. Furthermore, regarding piercing of the 
veil in the absence of any fraud it concluded as follows: 
“As previously stated, in the absence of fraud or deceit, the totality of circumstances must clearly 
indicate that the shareholder and the corporation were acting as one. The use of some of the 
building materials for Daley’s personal benefit was properly considered by the trial court as only 
one of the factors to be weighed. 

The trial court applied the proper test for consideration of the totality of the circumstances. The 
court said that the proper factors to consider are, ‘co-mingling[sic] of corporate and shareholder 
funds; failure to follow statutory formality for incorporation and the transaction of corporate 
affairs; failure to provide separate bank accounts and records; and failure to hold regular 
shareholders or directors meetings.’ Applying the evidence to these considerations the court held 
‘it is evident that there was neither co-mingling [sic] of corporate funds with those of any 
shareholders, nor was there a failure to provide separate accounts and records for the corporation. 
It appears that All South Builders, Inc. was properly incorporated, and although there were no 
regular shareholders' meetings, this is not enough to allow piercing of the corporate veil.’ We 
agree.”140 
 
In Edwards Company Inc v Monogram Industries Inc141 Edwards Inc wanted to hold 
Monogram Inc, the holding company of Monotronics Inc, liable for a contractual debt. 
The court affirmed that to pierce the veil, fraud or an injustice must be shown and that it 
was not sufficient merely to show that the subsidiary acted as the representative of the 
holding company.142 The plaintiffs also alleged that the subsidiary was merely a piece of 
paper. The court held that the mere fact that (excessive) control exists is insufficient to 
pierce the corporate veil.143 
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Blumberg also states that the courts may pierce the corporate veil under the first ground 
for single-factor piercing where certain corporate formalities are not respected, namely 
the holding of separate board and shareholder meetings, the keeping of proper minutes of 
the subsidiary and maintaining a generally separate existence of the subsidiary.144 In 
Browning-Ferris Industries of Illinois Inc v Ter Maat145 the defendant was the major 
shareholder of MIG Investments Inc and AAA Disposal Systems Inc. Browning-Ferris 
and its predecessor operated a landfill site and subsequently AAA and MIG operated it as 
well. The site was toxic due to the pollution by Browning-Ferris and others who then 
agreed to clean it up in terms of the Comprehensive Environmental Response 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). In terms of CERCLA it was possible for a 
person who cleaned up a toxic waste site to seek a contribution from another person who 
was also responsible for the pollution.146 The plaintiffs alleged that Ter Maat was liable 
for the actions of AAA and MIG, which had no assets, and alternatively that AAA was 
liable for the actions of MIG since they were related parties. The court especially 
distinguished voluntary creditors and involuntary creditors. The position of voluntary 
creditors was easier to deal with for the court especially where the holding company 
allowed the subsidiary to appear more solvent than it in fact was. The position of 
involuntary creditors was however more difficult. 
“Analysis is more difficult in the case of an involuntary creditor, such as the plaintiffs here, who 
wish to be compensated for having in effect ‘lent’ the money to clean up the site of the former 
landfill but lent under compulsion, having been forced to clean it up by the Superfund law rather 
than pursuant to a contract with the ‘debtors,’ such as M.I.G. In such a case there is no issue of 
protecting reliance induced by misrepresentations by the debtor. The plaintiffs in dumping toxic 
wastes to the landfill obviously were not relying on M.I.G.'s appearing to have greater assets than 
it actually had. In these circumstances we can think of only two arguments for piercing the 
corporate veil. The first is that the owners may have so far neglected the legal requirements 
(requirements not intended solely for the protection of creditors) for operating in the corporate 
form that they should be taken to have forfeited its protections, forfeiture thus operating to enforce 
the legal requirements that the state has seen fit to impose on investors who want the benefits of 
limited liability. Moreover, if the formalities have been flouted, it becomes hard to see how the 
investors could reasonably have relied on the protections of limited liability; they would have 
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known they were skating on thin ice. In such a case the investment-encouraging function of 
limited liability is attenuated. 

Second, it could be argued that enterprises engaged in potentially hazardous activities should be 
prevented from externalizing the costs of those activities, by being required to maintain or at least 
endeavor to maintain a sufficient capital cushion to be answerable in a tort suit should its activities 
cause harm and give rise to liability, on pain of its shareholders' and affiliates' losing their limited 
liability should the corporation fail to do this. This argument has not carried the day in any 
jurisdiction that we are aware of, presumably because of the risks that it would impose on 
shareholders and because the potential victims of the corporation's hazardous activities can be 
protected without making inroads into limited liability by requiring enterprises engaged in such 
activities to post a bond large enough to assure that any judgment against the corporation will be 
collectible. Courts do, it is true, frequently mention ‘undercapitalization’ as a separate ground 
from neglect of corporate formalities for piercing the corporate veil. They do not do so on the 
basis of unusual risks to potential tort victims or other involuntary creditors, however, though 
conceivably such concerns are in the background of their thinking.”147  
 
From the above it would appear that in respect of the first ground the court adopts the 
same language as the Court of Appeal in the Adams v Cape Industries Plc case, namely 
that limitations in law should be adhered to.  The second ground appears to be a mixture 
of the arguments of Hansmann and Kraakman,148 Fischel and Easterbrook149 and the 
undercapitalisation of a company.  
 
The third manner under the first single-factor piercing doctrine is where the subsidiary 
does not independently make decisions or where the holding company exercises 
excessive control over the affairs of the subsidiary company.150 
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6.2.1.4.2 Piercing of the corporate the veil in cases of fraud, inequitable conduct or wrongful     
purpose 
The second ground under which the United States’ courts have applied a single-factor 
piercing test is where the holding company uses the subsidiary as an instrument to 
perpetrate a fraud or for inequitable or wrongful purposes.151 
 
In Farr v Sun World Savings Association152 the Texas Court of Appeals held that the 
mere fact that a shareholder kept the businesses and affairs of the controlled company 
separate from the business and affairs of the shareholders would not be sufficient to 
escape liability under veil piercing where fraud has been perpetrated. The Texas Court of 
Appeals held in the context of the Texas Business Corporations Act,153  the aim of which 
was to restrict the court’s power to pierce the corporate veil, that: 
“Carefully preserved, however, is the right of a person to go behind the corporate entity in order to 
establish individual shareholder liability by a showing of actual or common law fraud. Where 
actual fraud primarily for the benefit of the perpetrating shareholder or shareholders can be shown, 
the various doctrines for disregarding the corporate entity, including alter ego and a sham to 
perpetrate a fraud, are still very much alive.”154 
 
The Texas Business Corporations Act has been drafted broadly to limit the powers of a 
court to pierce the corporate veil. The Act essentially provided that the corporate veil 
may only be pierced in cases of actual fraud where the perpetrator of the fraud aimed to 
receive a direct personal benefit. 
 
The ratio behind the Texas Business Corporations Act was the decision of Castleberry v 
Branscum155 where the Supreme Court of Texas held that: 
“Neither fraud nor an intent to defraud need be shown as a prerequisite to disregarding the 
corporate entity; it is sufficient if recognizing the separate corporate existence would bring about 
an inequitable result. Thus, we held that note holders could disregard the corporate fiction without 
showing common-law fraud or deceit when the circumstances amounted to constructive fraud. 
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Whether [the individual] misled them or subjectively intended to defraud them is immaterial [...] 
[f]or the action was so grossly unfair as to amount to constructive fraud. To prove there has been a 
sham to perpetrate a fraud, tort claimants and contract creditors must show only constructive 
fraud. Actual fraud usually involves dishonesty of purpose or intent to deceive, whereas 
constructive fraud is the breach of some legal or equitable duty which, irrespective of moral guilt, 
the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive others, to violate confidence, or to 
injure public interests.”156 
 
Since constructive fraud was sufficient for the piercing of the corporate veil, the Texas 
legislature introduced the Texas Business Corporation Act to limit the piercing 
circumstances and as a consequence the Texas court, in its dictum in Farr v Sun World 
Savings Association157 restricted itself to actual fraud that had to be proved if a plaintiff 
wanted to rely on fraud as a basis for piercing the corporate veil. It would appear that the 
alter ego doctrine requires a more continuous or ongoing eradication of the separate 
entity principle, namely that the shareholders and the company are continuously 
interchanged so that there is no real separation between the two bodies. Fraud on the 
other hand may relate to a single act, which has to be shown to have brought about an 
inequitable result. An inequitable result should however be viewed restrictively and be 
seen in the context of what is called “constructive fraud,” namely where an act has been 
deceiving, violated confidence or injured public interests as enunciated in the Castleberry 
case. 
 
In My Bread Baking Company v Cumberland Farms Inc158 the court stated that in 
Massachusetts the corporate veil will be pierced where: 
“Although common ownership of the stock of two or more corporations together with common 
management, standing alone, will not give rise to liability on the part of one corporation for the 
acts of another corporation or its employees, additional facts may be such as to permit the 
conclusion that an agency or similar relationship exists between the entities. Particularly is this 
true (a) where there is active and direct participation by the representatives of the one corporation, 
apparently exercising some form of pervasive control, in the activities of another and there is some 
fraudulent or injurious consequence of the intercorporate relationship, or (b) when there is a 
confused intermingling of activity of two or more corporations engaged in a common enterprise 
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with substantial disregard of the separate nature of the corporate entities, or serious ambiguity 
about the manner and capacity in which the various corporations and their respective 
representatives are acting. In such circumstances, in imposing liability on one or more of a group 
of ‘closely identified’ corporations, a court ‘need not consider with nicety which of them’ ought to 
be held liable for the act of one corporation.”159 
 
In Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Company Inc v Checkers Inc160 the court confirmed 
the ratio in My Bread Baking but further held that: 
“While we have been directed to no Massachusetts case treating the question of disregard of the 
separate existence of a close corporation in greater depth, courts in other jurisdictions usually 
weigh a list of factors, including insufficient capitalization for purposes of the corporate 
undertaking, nonobservance of corporate formalities, nonpayment of dividends, insolvency of the 
corporation at the time of the litigated transaction, siphoning of corporate funds by the dominant 
shareholders, nonfunctioning of officers and directors other than the shareholders, absence of 
corporate records, use of the corporation for transactions of the dominant shareholders, and use of 
the corporation in promoting fraud. […] Where the principal shareholders of a close corporation 
fail to observe with care the corporation’s existence, a court will not later heed their request to do 
so.”161 
 
In Evans v Multicon Construction Corporation162 the Court of Appeals considered the My 
Bread and Pepsi cases and held that: 
“Four indicators point in favor of piercing the corporate veil, eight are against, but the exercise is, 
of course, not one in counting. One examines the twelve factors [as listed in the Pepsi case] to 
form an opinion whether the over-all structure and operation misleads. There is present in the 
cases which have looked through the corporate form an element of dubious manipulation and 
contrivance, finagling, such that corporate identities are confused and third parties cannot be quite 
certain with what they are dealing.”163 
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The most recent case which could be found in Massachusetts was George Hyman 
Construction Company v Gateman.164 The court held, with reference to the My Bread, 
Pepsi and Evans decisions, especially in respect of the weighing of the factors to 
determine whether piercing should be allowed or not, that: 
“The factors are weighed, not counted. Counting alone is insufficient to pierce because instead 
“[o]ne examines the twelve factors to form an opinion whether the over-all structure and operation 
misleads. There is present in the cases which have looked through the corporate form an element 
of dubious manipulation and contrivance, finagling, such that corporate identities are confused and 
third parties cannot be quite certain with what they are dealing.”165 
 
In Massachusetts therefore the courts use a balancing test by looking at various factors 
rather than a single-factor piercing test. This balancing test could be compared to the 
Cape Pacific v Lubner Controlling Investments166 case where the court looked at the 
policy of separate juristic personality which had to be weighed up against the factors 
justifying piercing the corporate veil after some form of fraud, improper conduct or 
dishonesty has been established. 
 
Another ground which the courts have considered under the second single-factor piercing 
doctrine is the excessive fragmentation of an enterprise. In Papa v Katy Industries Inc167 
the court had to consider a matter dealing with the anti-discriminatory laws of the United 
States which among other grounds prevents discrimination based on age or disability in 
the workplace, i.e. excessive fragmentation within the context of the possible evasion of 
legislation. Papa was employed by Walsh Press Company, the wholly-owned subsidiary 
of Katy Industries Inc. The relevant statute only applied to employers which employed 
more than a certain minimum number of employees. Walsh Press employed less than the 
statutory minimum number of employees and was therefore not covered by the anti-
discrimination statutes. Katy, however, had a number of subsidiary companies which in 
combination employed more than one thousand employees. Walsh received a directive 
from Katy that some of its employees had to be retrenched and Papa was one of those 
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retrenched. Furthermore, to illustrate the extent of the integration between Katy and 
Walsh, Katy fixed the salaries of the employees of Walsh, the computer systems were 
integrated and cheques above a certain limit needed approval by Katy.  
 
The Illinois Court of Appeals first considered the rationale behind the exclusion of 
smaller employers from the anti-discrimination statutes. The court then looked at the 
circumstances when it would pierce the corporate veil. It listed three grounds upon which 
it would pierce the corporate veil. In respect of the situation where there is clearly one 
enterprise which has divided itself up into numerous parts the court stated that: 
“Second, an enterprise might split itself up into a number of corporations, each with fewer than the 
statutory minimum number of employees, for the express purpose of avoiding liability under the 
discrimination laws. The division might be accomplished in such a way as to avoid creating the 
conditions in which the corporate veil is normally pierced. Each subsidiary might be adequately 
funded and comply with all requisite formalities for separate corporate status, and the group might 
make clear to all employees and all creditors that they could look only to the particular corporation 
with which they had dealt for the enforcement of their contractual entitlements. But if the purpose 
of this splintered incorporation were to elude liability under the antidiscrimination laws, the 
corporations should be aggregated to determine how many employees each corporation had. The 
privilege of separate incorporation is not intended to allow enterprises to duck their statutory 
duties.”168 
 
On the facts the court then held that: 
“There is no suggestion in either one that the business enterprise was splintered into separate 
corporations in order to defeat the antidiscrimination laws; Walsh, for example, was acquired, not 
created, by Katy. There is no showing that an ordinary creditor of one of the subsidiaries could 
pierce the corporate veil and sue the parent corporation or any of the other subsidiaries. There is 
no suggestion that the parent, or any other affiliate of Walsh's, or the enterprise as a whole 
formulated or administered the specific personnel policies, or directed, commanded, or undertook 
the specific personnel actions, of which the plaintiffs are complaining. It is true that Katy in a 
sense ‘caused’ the firing of Papa by ordering Walsh to curtail its operations; for, had Walsh not 
curtailed them, Papa would probably not have been laid off, or not so soon. But Papa cannot 
complain of being laid off as such; the antidiscrimination laws do not forbid layoffs. He can 
complain only if he was selected for layoff on some forbidden ground. Maybe he was, but there is 
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no suggestion that Katy (or any of Katy’s other subsidiaries) was responsible for his being selected 
for layoff, let alone for Walsh's having picked on him for a forbidden reason.”169  
 
Blumberg states that a number of cases have applied the excessive fragmentation 
principle as one of the factors which needs to be taken into account when the court is 
approached to pierce the corporate veil. Other factors which some courts would consider 
next to excessive fragmentation would invariably be the non-compliance with corporate 
formalities, total domination and undercapitalisation.170 Blumberg states that there would 
not appear to be any case law in respect of piercing the corporate veil where a court has 
held that excessive fragmentation was the sole reason for piercing the veil. The excessive 
fragmentation principle was always a (important) factor that was taken into account. This 
would especially be the case where an enterprise fragments itself for the sole purpose to 
escape (pre)existing liabilities or future liability claims.171 
 
Naturally it is extremely difficult to determine when a company has fragmented itself 
excessively. One only needs to look at multinational companies and the number of 
subsidiaries which exist all over the world. Often the operations of all the subsidiaries 
would be the same as the holding company and each other and with similar logistical and 
operational structures. In cases where the (sole) purpose of the fragmentation is to escape 
liability under statute or otherwise, it is easy to pierce the veil and one wonders whether 
the court needs to discuss excessive fragmentation where it could have used fraud or the 
inequitable result which flowed from the fragmentation. The question therefore remains 
whether the veil should be pierced where there is clearly a single economic or business 
enterprise in the absence of any bad faith. It would further be interesting within the 
current South African milieu as to what a court would find where an employer fragments 
its operations to avoid the affirmative-action provisions of the Employment Equity 
Act,172 in terms of which employers with less than fifty employees or less than a specified 
income do not have to comply with the affirmative-action provisions. It is also interesting 
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to compare such a decision with the Dadoo173 case. One could argue that Dadoo was 
decided soon after Salomon and that it provided justification not to pierce the veil 
although a more political interpretation would be that the court was not willing to give 
credence to unjust legislation. The case was however in contrast to the Daimler Co Ltd v 
Continental Tyre and Rubber Co (Great Britain) Ltd174 where the court held that a 
company was an enemy company because it had German shareholders, bar one, despite it 
being incorporated in England. This decision was however during the First World War 
where Germany was the enemy and the more cynical interpretation would be that this 
played a role. By analogy the Employment Equity Act is there to promote equality and a 
device to avoid the provisions of the Act would probably be interpreted like the 
Continental Tyre case and not like the Dadoo case.175 
 
6.2.1.4.3 Single economic unit 
The third ground for veil piercing falling outside the traditional grounds was developed in 
Texan and Louisianan law. The leading case in Texas used to be the case of Paramount 
Petroleum Corporation v Taylor Rental Center.176 The facts in this case, as in most (if 
not all) veil piercing cases are crucial to understand why the court decided to pierce the 
veil. Taylor rented out certain equipment, which was used on ships, to a Captain Jackson 
and a Captain Weld respectively. Jackson gave a telephone number where credit 
information could be obtained. The number was that of Paramount Petroleum. Taylor was 
told to send invoices to the Houston post office box of Paramount. Captain Weld, when 
he leased the equipment presented a business card bearing the name Paramount 
Steamship Company Ltd. The invoices in respect of the rentals were never paid. The 
court held as follows: 
“The first theory justifying the trial court's judgment is the ‘single business enterprise’ theory. 
When corporations are not operated as separate entities but rather integrate their resources to 
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achieve a common business purpose, each constituent corporation may be held liable for debts 
incurred in pursuit of that business purpose. Factors to be considered in determining whether the 
constituent corporations have not been maintained as separate entities include but are not limited 
to the following: common employees; common offices; centralized accounting; payment of wages 
by one corporation to another corporation's employees; common business name; services rendered 
by the employees of one corporation on behalf of another corporation; undocumented transfers of 
funds between corporations; and unclear allocation of profits and losses between corporations. 

We find the present record contains evidence sufficient to justify an implied finding that 
Petroleum and Steamship operated as a single business enterprise. The same shareholder owned all 
of the stock in both companies. The two companies operated from the same Houston office. They 
used the same telephone number and the same post office box. Both companies paid funds to 
Captain Jackson for repair work on the Courtney D. The employees of both companies referred to 
both companies as ‘Petroleum’. Petroleum transferred funds, with no ledger entries, to a checking 
account over which an employee of Steamship was signatory. The president of Steamship testified 
that assets of Petroleum were seized when the Courtney D was seized. All accounting for the two 
companies was performed at the Houston office by an employee paid by Petroleum. Finally, 
Petroleum failed to produce, in response to discovery requests, any corporate records of either 
corporation. This evidence demonstrates that the corporations were not operated as separate 
entities. Therefore, we find the single business enterprise theory supported by the evidence.”177 
 
The most recent Texan case in which the Texas Supreme Court had an opportunity to 
(re)consider the Paramount Petroleum case was SSP Partners and Metro Novelties Inc v 
Gladstrong Investments (USA) Corporation.178 A boy was killed in a fire at home which 
was caused by a WAX-brand disposable lighter, which had a defective child-resistant 
mechanism. The lighters were manufactured in China by Tianjin Sico Lighters Company 
Limited and exported by Gladstrong Hong Kong, both Chinese companies. Gladstrong 
Hong Kong designed and patented the safety wheel of the lighters in question and gave 
instructions to Tianjin Sico regarding how to manufacture the lighters.  
 
Gladstrong Hong Kong was the holding company of Gladstrong USA, which imported, 
marketed and distributed the lighters in the United States of America. Gladstrong Hong 
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Kong perceived and advertised Gladstrong USA as its branch office. All the employees, 
bar one, were of the same family. 
 
Metro Novelties was incorporated in Texas and sold the WAX lighters to SSP which in 
turn sold them through retailers. The aunt of the deceased boy bought two of the lighters 
and one of them caused the house fire. The parents instituted legal action against SSP and 
Gladstrong USA. SSP sought indemnity from Metro and both of them sought indemnity 
from Gladstrong USA. The parents settled their claim against Gladstrong USA and SSP 
and SSP settled its indemnity claim against Metro. SSP and Metro then sought their 
indemnity from Gladstrong USA in terms of the Federal Consumer Product Safety Act 
read with the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.  The Texas Code179 provided that 
a statutory indemnity is owed by a manufacturer.  SSP and Metro alleged that Gladstrong 
USA was the manufacturer of the WAX lighters, alternatively that Gladstrong USA was 
part of a single business enterprise, namely Gladstrong Hong Kong, which was the 
manufacturer of the WAX lighters. 
 
SSP and Metro Novelties relied on the dictum in the Paramount Petroleum Corporation 
v Taylor Rental Center180 case. SSP and Metro alleged that the evidence showed that all 
the factors as listed in the Paramount Petroleum case were satisfied.  The court then 
concluded as follows: 
“Creation of affiliated corporations to limit liability while pursuing common goals lies firmly 
within the law and is commonplace. We have never held corporations liable for each other's 
obligations merely because of centralized control, mutual purposes, and shared finances. There 
must also be evidence of abuse, or as we said in Castleberry, injustice and inequity. By ‘injustice’ 
and ‘inequity’ we do not mean a subjective perception of unfairness by an individual judge or 
juror; rather, these words are used in Castleberry as shorthand references for the kinds of abuse, 
specifically identified, that the corporate structure should not shield - fraud, evasion of existing 
obligations, circumvention of statutes, monopolization, criminal conduct, and the like. Such abuse 
is necessary before disregarding the existence of a corporation as a separate entity. Any other rule 
would seriously compromise what we have called a ‘bedrock principle of corporate law’ - that a 
legitimate purpose for forming a corporation is to limit individual liability for the corporation's 
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obligations. In Castleberry, we held that the corporate structure could be disregarded on a showing 
of constructive fraud, even without actual fraud. The Legislature has since rejected that view in 
certain cases. The single business enterprise liability theory is fundamentally inconsistent with the 
approach taken by the Legislature. Accordingly, we hold that the single business enterprise 
liability theory set out in Paramount Petroleum will not support the imposition of one 
corporation's obligations on another. Although Gladstrong USA was entitled to summary 
judgment on this issue, for reasons explained below, we conclude that the case must be remanded 
to the trial court for further proceedings. SSP will be free to assert a valid theory for requiring 
Gladstrong USA to meet any indemnity obligation Gladstrong Hong Kong may have.”181  
 
It would therefore appear that the Texas Supreme Court has rejected the single enterprise 
liability theory and that the only basis upon which it would pierce the corporate veil 
would be under the grounds listed in the Castleberry case, read with the Texas Business 
Corporations Act. It appears however that the single business enterprise argument was 
rejected due to the provisions of the Texas Business Corporations Act and not as a matter 
of principle. 
 
Louisiana applies the single business enterprise theory and only the leading case will be 
referred to, namely Green v Champion Insurance Company,182 which is still valid law. 
The case arose in the context of insurance law. Boardwalk was the holding company of 
UFS,183 as well as the holding company of CCC, an insurance holding company. 
Champion was the wholly-owned subsidiary of CCC as were USU, SEUS and UST. The 
Eicher family basically controlled all the companies in the group. USU, SEUS and UST 
were the general agents of Champion and carried on its business. Champion had no 
employees of its own and employees were used interchangeably by Champion and its 
fellow subsidiaries. 
 
Champion became insolvent and its liquidator applied, inter alia, for a declaratory order 
that Champion and the companies within the Boardwalk group formed a single business 
enterprise. 
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The court held that: 
“The legal fiction of a distinct corporate entity may be disregarded when a corporation is so 
organized and controlled as to make it merely an instrumentality or adjunct of another corporation. 
If one corporation is wholly under the control of another, the fact that it is a separate entity does 
not relieve the latter from liability. In such instance, the former corporation is merely an alter ego 
or a business conduit of the latter. When corporations represent precisely the same single interest, 
the court is free to disregard their separate corporate identity. It is clear that courts can pierce the 
veil of a corporation in order to reach the “alter egos” of the corporate defendant. This is 
especially true where the corporations constitute a single business. Courts have been unwilling to 
allow affiliated corporations that are not directly involved to escape liability simply because of the 
business fragmentation. Where a single corporation has been fragmented into branches that are 
separately incorporated and are managed by a dominant or parent entity, or have interlocking 
directorates, the courts have held the dominant or parent corporation liable for the obligations of 
its branches whenever justice requires protection of the rights of third persons. 

In addition to using a ‘piercing the veil’ theory to disregard a corporate identity, some courts have 
utilized the ‘single business enterprise’ or ‘instrumentality’ theory to extend liability beyond a 
separate entity. Prior Louisiana jurisprudence deals primarily with piercing of the corporate veil to 
hold a parent corporation solidary liable for the debts of its subsidiary. The trial court in this case 
utilized the ‘single business enterprise’ theory to disregard the identities of a group of separate 
corporations. Such a situation has not been specifically addressed by our courts. When 
determining whether a corporation is an alter ego, agent, tool or instrumentality of another 
corporation, the court is required to look to the substance of the corporate structure rather than its 
form.”184  
 
The court then listed a number of factors which had been used in previous cases to 
successfully argue that a group of companies was a single economic unit.185 The court, 
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however, stressed that these factors did not form an exhaustive list but was merely 
illustrative of the circumstances under which the court may be willing to treat a group of 
companies as single economic unit.186 
 
On the facts the court found that the Boardwalk group of companies constituted a single 
business enterprise.187 The effect of such a finding was that a court could impose liability 
on each of the group members to “prevent fraud or achieve equity.”188 
 
According to Blumberg it is not clear how this decision relates to the classic piercing of 
the corporate veil doctrine. The reasoning of the court is also not clear at times. It would 
appear that the single business enterprise could be seen as a broad interpretation of the 
alter ego doctrine from the reasoning in the judgment.189 If the business is indeed a single 
entity then certainly an argument can be made that the different components are merely 
alter egos of each other and especially of the dominant holding company. 
 
A further issue which has not been directly addressed by the Louisiana courts is whether 
some form of fault or wrongful conduct is needed before the single business enterprise 
doctrine will be applied.190 The context of the Green v Champion case could also be 
relevant since it concerned insurance law: if the various companies within the Boardwalk 
stable were not one single enterprise, a large segment of the public could have been 
prejudiced. The question is whether the same would apply in the private sphere, namely 
where there were only a few people harmed. According to Blumberg there have been 
cases in Louisiana where the single business enterprise doctrine has been accepted by the 
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courts in more private legal disputes, i.e. where there were only a restricted number of 
people harmed.191  
 
In Pine Tree Associates v Doctors’ Associates a lease agreement was entered into by Pine 
Tree (the lessors) and Subway Restaurants Inc (the lessees). The Louisiana Court of 
Appeals confirmed the Green v Champion Insurance test and the single business 
enterprise doctrine. In casu Pine Tree alleged that Subway and a number of other entities 
were the alter egos of Doctors’ Associates and that Doctors’ Associates were liable for 
the outstanding rent. Doctors’ Associates alleged that there was no fraud present and that 
in the absence of fraudulent activity, the corporate veil could not be pierced in a 
contractual dispute. The Court of Appeal held, with reference to the Green case and 
Riggins v Dixie Shoring Co Inc,192 that fraud was not a prerequisite for a court to apply 
the “totality of the circumstances” test to determine whether the circumstances justified 
the piercing of the corporate veil.193 The court further stated that the alter ego doctrine is 
applied “pursuant to either the single enterprise theory or the piercing [of] the veil 
theory.” This would indicate that the single business enterprise doctrine is not the same as 
the piercing of the corporate veil theory and that the two are alternatives.  
 
In In Re New Orleans Train Car Leakage Fire Litigation194 there was a class action based 
on a railway tank car which caught fire and which caused damage to a number of 
persons. Alabama Great Southern Railroad Company and New Orleans Terminal 
Company were subsidiary companies of Norfolk Southern Corporation and Norfolk 
Southern Railway Company.  The plaintiffs alleged that the two subsidiary companies 
were negligent and that this negligence resulted in the tank car fire and the consequent 
damage. The plaintiffs, after instituting the legal action against the two subsidiary 
companies, added the two holding companies to the legal action on the basis that the four 
companies constituted one business enterprise. The holding companies excepted against 
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being joined as defendants, arguing that they were not involved with the alleged negligent 
acts of their subsidiary companies. The court a quo rejected their exception and they 
appealed the decision. 
 
The Louisiana Court of Appeals in its judgment recognised the single business enterprise 
theory and referred approvingly to the dicta in the Green v Champion Insurance195 and 
Riggins v Dixie Shoring Co Inc.196 The court, however, did not delve into the merits of 
the case before it. Instead it focused on a procedural aspect, namely that once the 
defendants showed in the court a quo in their motion for exception that they were 
separate legal entities from their subsidiaries, the onus shifted to the plaintiffs to show 
that the various entities constituted a single business enterprise. There was no allegation 
by the plaintiffs that the holding companies were negligent, but their cause of action was 
based on the sole ground that the four entities constituted a single business enterprise. 
The Court of Appeal does not address this issue which would suggest, considering that 
the Riggins, Green and Pine Tree cases all rejected fraud as a requirement for the single 
business enterprise theory, that negligence was also not a requirement in a delictual claim 
based on the single business enterprise theory. The assumption would therefore be that 
where “one leg” of the single enterprise acted negligently, the whole business enterprise 
acted negligently. This could either imply some form of agency or vicarious liability or 
simply that any “entity” within the single business enterprise could at any stage act as 
principal in a contract or as wrongdoer in a delictual claim, thereby imposing liability on 
the other components of the enterprise. 
 
6.3 Evaluation of the piercing of the corporate veil as remedy 
It has been shown above that there is no substantive distinction between the 
instrumentality test and the alter ego test.197 Both have virtually the same elements and 
their application seems very similar. The so-called single-factor piercing jurisprudence 
also does not seem to be specifically based only on one single factor. A number of factors 
are seemingly taken into account to arrive at an answer which is then put under one 
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banner. It would rather appear to be a test which involves a balancing of a number of 
factors which ultimately leads to a result. Of these factors, some may weigh more than 
others, namely the failure to observe corporate formalities, the undercapitalisation of a 
company, the operation of a single business entity and inequity or fraudulent conduct. 
What seems to be apparent from the American case law in respect of the piercing of the 
corporate veil is that the courts in the United States appear to be more inclined to pierce 
the veil than their counterparts in the United Kingdom and South Africa. The United 
States, however, shares the same uncertainty about the labels or tests which should be 
applied to the piercing the corporate veil. It would appear that in the end it comes down 
to the facts at hand and the tests which are used are put there ex post facto to justify a 
decision. There seems to be no coherence in the different judgments, especially where 
different labels are attached to facts which at face value seem similar. 
 
In the light of the uncertainty and lack of clarity regarding the piercing of the corporate 
veil, the other option would be to abolish limited liability in respect of delicts committed 
by the subsidiary should piercing not be the answer, even in a modified form.  
 
6.4 The abolition of limited liability: The economic argument 
If there is no benefit for a company to engage in risky business activity due to the high 
costs involved, the company will not engage in that risky activity whether limited liability 
exists or not.198 A sensible voluntary creditor will also only engage in (risky) activities 
with a borrower if he has (sufficient) information about the borrower, and in the case of a 
monetary relationship, about the purpose of the loan to the debtor. The information of the 
creditor, however, does not have to be perfect. Should the creditor have sufficient 
information to have a good understanding of the nature of the company and the field of its 
activities, the creditor is able to charge a premium for the risk. If the premium is 
determined correctly it becomes immaterial whether the creditor has perfect information. 
The market price should protect both the creditor and the debtor company in a case where 
a risky engagement is foreseen. If the debtor company pays the appropriate premium for 
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the risk it will not engage in conduct which could be excessively risky.199 Limited 
liability is therefore acceptable to a voluntary creditor because he can factor his 
assessment of the risk into his transaction with the company and in general is better 
protected than the involuntary creditor. 
 
It was shown above that economics works with the question of efficiency.200 The 
question which will be briefly addressed here is whether the principle of limited liability 
ensures efficiency in respect of the damages or loss suffered by a victim of a delict 
caused by a company. Illustrative of the arguments advanced by certain authors, which 
will be discussed below, is the case of Walkovsky v Carlton.201 
 
In the Walkovsky case Carlton was the majority shareholder in ten companies which were 
horizontally integrated, i.e. all ten companies conducted exactly the same business. The 
business of all ten companies was that of the operation of a taxi business. Each company 
owned two taxis and only the minimum statutory indemnity insurance was taken out for 
each taxi by each company. From the facts it appeared that each company was 
intentionally undercapitalised for the purpose of avoiding liability for potential accidents 
which was a foreseeable risk for a taxi operator. All available income was also “milked” 
from each company to leave it with little funding. 
 
Walkovsky was injured by a driver of the Seon Cab Company, one of the ten companies 
horizontally integrated. Due to the undercapitalised nature of the company and its lack of 
assets, Walkovsky wanted to institute legal action against the majority shareholder, 
Carlton, because the “multiple corporate structure constitutes an unlawful attempt to 
‘defraud members of the general public’ who might be injured by the cabs.”202 Carlton 
excepted on the basis that the averments did not constitute a cause of action. The 
exception failed and he appealed.  
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The Court of Appeals sets out with the premise of separate juristic personality and limited 
liability and that these will only be disregarded in order to avoid fraud or to avoid 
inequitable results. The plaintiff in essence alleged that the companies were actually all 
components of one entity and in effect a dummy of the shareholders. The court stated that 
“[t]he corporate form may not be disregarded merely because the assets of the 
corporation, together with the mandatory insurance coverage of the vehicle which struck 
the plaintiff, are insufficient to assure him the recovery sought. If Carlton were to be held 
individually liable on those facts alone, the decision could apply equally to the thousands 
of cabs which are owned by their individual drivers who conduct their businesses through 
corporations”.203  
 
Undercapitalisation, the milking of assets and commingling of assets were not sufficient 
to pierce the corporate veil. There was nothing fraudulent about taking out the minimum 
insurance or organising the enterprise horizontally and therefore the veil could not be 
pierced. The question is therefore whether it is efficient from an economic perspective to 
externalise the costs of a delict from the shareholder to the victim and, in essence, to 
society. 
 
Halpern et al204 use the Walkovsky case to illustrate why limited liability is inappropriate 
in respect of delitual victims. On the assumption that the law of delict is there to 
compensate the victim for his loss and to deter the wrongdoer from inflicting the harm 
which attracts liability, the authors argue that limited liability then encourages the owner 
not to take out insurance, since he will not be personally liable in the situation where his 
company caused harm.205 This brings about a moral hazard, namely the owner will take 
higher risks since he knows that he will not be held liable and this in effect promotes 
more irrational behaviour with possible prejudice for society. 
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The authors then state that under a system of unlimited liability, the owner of several taxi 
companies would have three choices. He could firstly maintain sufficient personal funds 
to satisfy delictual claims; he could secondly take out insurance cover in his personal 
capacity to satisfy all delictual claims; or he could thirdly let the company take out 
insurance cover to guard against delictual claims. The first option is highly unlikely in 
light of the potentially prohibitive costs involved. The authors argue that the second and 
third options would in effect mean that unlimited liability and insurance cover would 
result in a de facto limited liability regime where the owner is not personally liable for the 
delicts of his company. This then again leads to a moral hazard.206  
 
The authors nevertheless argue that there is an important difference between unlimited 
liability combined with insurance and limited liability. With limited liability, the 
shareholders take out insurance at no cost, it is the company which incurs the cost. With 
unlimited liability with insurance, the premiums payable have a market price which is 
further dependent on the behaviour of the taxi owners and drivers. The shareholders will 
become more careful by causing the company to employ safe drivers and to invest in 
training for its taxi drivers to decrease the risk and to lower the premiums. There is 
therefore an incentive for efficient behaviour. The authors further argue that the company 
is the most cost effective insurer since it has better information about taxi accidents 
causing harm to pedestrians than pedestrians would have. Insurance will therefore be 
more effectively priced by the market for a taxi company than for a pedestrian. 
Furthermore transaction costs will be reduced because there are incentives for the 
company to insure, rather than pedestrians, because fewer transactions would be 
involved.207   
 
Hansmann and Kraakman208 also deal with the issue of limited liability in the field of the 
law of delict. The authors look at the corporate landscape and mention that the 
technological and industrial advances and changing norms should lead to a change in the 
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treatment of delictual liability in the context of companies.209 The authors first argue that 
a single shareholder company, especially where that shareholder is a holding company, 
which is risk neutral,210 creates incentives for inefficient behaviour.211 The inefficiency, 
also as identified by Halpern et al212 is that excess risk could be undertaken without 
taking sufficient care to avoid harm. Unlimited liability, on the other hand, would lead to 
efficient social costs being incurred by means of pre-emptive measures which would 
enable a shareholder to escape liability.213 Secondly, limited liability stimulates an 
overexposure in harmful industries due to the externalisation of costs. This could be 
positive for the shareholder but its net value for society is negative.214 Thirdly, limited 
liability may lead to an undercapitalisation of a company to reduce the exposure of the 
owner of the firm for any delictual liability.215 
 
Hansmann and Kraakman argue that a factor which could worsen inefficiency under a 
limited liability regime is the fact that the harm from hazardous activities may only 
appear much later and the company by then could have already been liquidated.216 To 
avoid liability nobody may be interested to purchase the offending company (since the 
entity would remain liable despite a change in ownership) which could lead to asset 
stripping.  
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Theoretically, where the shareholder is risk averse and he does not have liability 
insurance the inefficiency due to limited liability is possibly less severe than where the 
shareholder is risk neutral.217 The authors argue as follows: 
“With risk neutrality, damages function only to deter harm, and for this purpose efficiency 
requires that the risk neutral shareholder bears the full cost of any tort damages. With risk 
aversion, however, tort damages can serve two different efficiency functions: they can create 
incentives for avoiding harm, and they can distribute risk between injurer and victim so that the 
less risk-averse party bears most of the risk. Choosing an efficient measure of damages commonly 
requires a trade-off between these two functions.”218 
 
Unlimited liability is an even more attractive option where liability insurance is 
available.219 The shareholder, because costs are internalised, i.e. the company bears the 
costs, will take greater care to prevent the company from causing harm.220 Hansmann and 
Kraakman come to the conclusion, like Halpern et al, that unlimited liability would be 
more efficient in respect of delictual liability than limited liability, due to the 
internalisation of costs, which would be socially more efficient.221 
  
6.5 Alternative basis for delictual liability 
Muscat is of the opinion that tort liability was not under consideration when the principle 
of limited liability was introduced in the United Kingdom.222 He refers to the lack of any 
mention of tort creditors in the parliamentary debates on limited liability. He mentions 
that when limited liability was under debate, the corporations of that time could be held 
liable in tort and yet all debate on limited liability was restricted to the field of contract 
law.223 Muscat accepts however that one possible explanation for the lack of discussion 
could have been the fact that liability in tort for negligence only commenced as a separate 
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ground for liability in the 1820s and it was not a well-developed area of the law when 
limited liability for shareholders of corporations was introduced in the United States and 
the United Kingdom.224 Muscat therefore concludes that the undeveloped nature of 
liability in tort for negligence at the time and the possibility that tort liability could cause 
the demise of a company was then unheard of, may have contributed to limited liability 
only being considered in respect of contractual liability.225  
 
It appears that limited liability for delictual liability came about by accident instead of 
being based on policy considerations. The principle of limited liability was a tool which 
was conveniently there for the judiciary to use to determine delictual liability where 
companies were involved. Muscat distinguishes four situations where liability should 
arise for holding companies in respect of torts or delicts committed by a subsidiary.  
These four situations are: firstly where the subsidiary company is subservient to the 
holding company; or secondly where the subsidiary is undercapitalised by its holding 
company; thirdly where there is an economic integration of the companies within a group 
which is abusive; and fourthly where the group in certain circumstances holds itself out 
as a single person. These four situations will be discussed in chapter seven in the light of 
the fact that the arguments of Muscat are essentially concerned with the holding company 
being liable for the debts of the insolvent subsidiary in the abovementioned four 
situations.226  
 
A further view in respect of limited liability in the context of delictual liability is that of 
Kahan,227 who refers to criticism that the doctrine of limited liability leads to negative 
externalisation228 and therefore stimulates harmful and sometimes delictual corporate 
behaviour.229 Many critics of limited liability according to Kahan argue that the doctrine 
has no historical foundation in the field of the law of delict in common-law systems. 
Kahan investigates the correctness of this assumption. He argues that limited liability in 
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the field of the law of delict in the United States started out as a restraint on unlimited 
liability. The basis for this argument is that some legislatures imposed certain conditions 
on companies by inserting provisions in their articles that the shareholders would be 
liable for the debts of the company according to their shareholding. A proliferation of 
claims based on all sorts of causes of actions were instituted against companies, which 
caused the courts to interpret the word “debts” in the constitutions of companies narrowly 
and to apply only to contractual debts. Other courts in others states followed suit and it 
became the general rule.230 Limited liability eventually fortuitously became the reason for 
the fact that the holding company would not be liable for the delicts of the subsidiary. 
 
It therefore appears that a number of authors argue that limited liability should not apply 
in the field of delictual liability but that they differ in respect of the reasons for the non-
applicability of the doctrine. 
 
6.7 Australian piercing of the corporate veil 
Australian company law, like its South African counterpart, is English based. As such the 
shadow of Salomon v Salomon231 looms large over these two systems. The basic premise 
in Australia is therefore the sanctity of the separate juristic personality which will only be 
pierced in exceptional cases. 
 Each company within the group structure is liable for its own debts232 except where the 
Australian Corporations Act233 (“the ACC”) provides otherwise.234 In Walker v 
Wimborne235 and in Wimborne v Brien236 Brien was the liquidator of Langrenus Pty Ltd, 
the second appellant which was one of a number of companies in which Wimborne had 
an interest. Wimborne was married but separated from Mrs Wimborne, who sought a 
property settlement consequent to their separation. The shares in Langrenus were initially 
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held by Mrs Wimborne and a family trust. The trust was subsequently terminated by Mr 
Wimborne who then transferred the shares to himself. This led to a deadlock in the 
administration of Langrenus and an order for winding-up was granted on the basis that it 
would be just and equitable to do so despite the fact that Langrenus was solvent. 
Extensive litigation followed the separation between the Wimbornes including litigation 
involving most of the companies in the Wimborne stable. The case at hand arose out of a 
cross-claim filed in proceedings by Mr Wimborne, Langrenus and Estoril Investments Pty 
Ltd. 
All the members of the Wimborne family held shares in Estoril Investments Pty Ltd. The 
company had incurred losses but was owed money by other companies in the group 
including Langrenus and Topmast Pty Ltd. The Wimborne family trust held 50% of the 
shares in Topmast and the balance was held by Langrenus. The debtor companies of 
Estoril had to pay interest on the money owed at rates which were generally below 
market rates. On the advice of accountants the interest rates were increased to market 
rates and were also backdated. Estoril could therefore absorb some of the profits of the 
other companies and they in turn could reduce their tax liability because of their reduced 
net incomes. Estoril was also indebted to Mr Wimborne who had a charge over Estoril’s 
assets. The New South Wales Court of Appeal found that this circumstance benefited 
only Mr Wimborne and was to the detriment of Mrs Wimborne as a shareholder of 
Langrenus and of the family trust. The liquidator refused to admit the claim by Estoril in 
respect of the increased interest rates. 
In essence a number of companies in the group owed money to other companies in the 
group and there was cross-shareholding in a number of cases as well. The dispute 
between all the parties revolved around the distribution of assets between Mr and Mrs 
Wimborne. The argument of Mr Wimborne was that all the companies within the group 
would be transferred to him in return for a cash settlement which still had to be 
determined. The argument was further that it did not matter which assets were in which 
companies provided that all the assets were preserved and that the liquidator should only 
have regard to the joint interests of Mr and Mrs Wimborne and the group, and do nothing 
apart from paying outside creditors and preserving the assets. 
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The basis of the appellants’claim that the respondent should only have paid the outside 
creditors and maintain Langrenus’ assets pending the finalisation of the divorce 
proceedings, depended on the proposition that because of the interlocking and related 
shareholding of the various companies they should have been treated as a single entity 
and since all of them would be transferred to Mr Wimborne it did not matter which assets 
or liabilities were in which company. 
The Court of Appeal of New South Wales, however, held that to treat the group as a 
single entity would have breached a fundamental concept of company law, i.e. the 
separate personality of each company and that there was no legal entity of a group. It was 
therefore the duty of Brien as liquidator of Langrenus to have regard only to its interests. 
The principle in Salomon237 was therefore applied. It has to be borne in mind that it was 
Mr Wimborne who created the structure of the group and then tried to ignore the structure 
he created when that structure was to his detriment. Here was also no fraud or dishonest 
conduct at hand, the single economic unit argument was the only one advanced to pierce 
the corporate veil. 
When a company within the group structure considers the payment of a dividend to its 
members it may not take into the account the profits of the other companies in the group 
structure.238 In the Industrial Equity Ltd239 the court considered possible ways to pierce 
the corporate veil. The court first looked at the options available to pierce the corporate 
veil, which have been judicially recognised. These are, for example, where there was an 
agency relationship between the holding company and the subsidiary, in cases of fraud, 
and where there are group enterprises at hand. In casu the only possibilities available to 
the plaintiff were to show some agency agreement between the two relevant companies, 
or fraud or that the group enterprise was a single entity. On the facts, however, there 
could be no agency since the holding company was party to the agreement but not a party 
to the clause in issue.  
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The plaintiff also relied on DHN Food Distributors & Ors v London Borough of Tower 
Hamlets240 where the economic reality of a group was recognised.241 The court in 
Industrial Equity, however, distinguished the DHN case by holding that it was decided on 
policy reasons based on the specific facts and did not lay down any new legal principle. 
The court looked at the impact of the DHN case in the United Kingdom and New Zealand 
and whether it could be reconciled with Australian law.242 The court rejected the 
plaintiff’s reliance on the DHN case. It held that the court would lift the corporate veil 
only in cases where it is clear that there was de facto or in law a partnership between the 
holding company and its subsidiary, or where there was a sham or façade. In casu there 
were sound commercial reasons for having separate companies in the group performing 
separate functions. 
In the alternative the plaintiff contended that the court should pierce the corporate veil on 
the basis of equity. The court referred to Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne243 and 
Pennington244 to answer this contention. It was mentioned that fraud would be one of the 
grounds to pierce the veil. In Australian corporate parlance “fraud” however seemingly 
has a fairly broad meaning. Fraud means that a court would in equity not allow a party to 
escape from his obligations by means of drawing a corporate veil if in the eyes of equity 
it would constitute a cloak or façade. In the Industrial Equity case the court found that the 
subsidiary company was not incorporated for the sole or dominant purpose of evading 
contractual duties by the holding company. The court therefore refused to treat the group 
of companies in casu as a single juristic entity. 
In Qintex Australia Finance Ltd v Schroders Australia Ltd245 there was confusion as to 
the identity of the exact contracting party in a company group. This confusion led to 
damages for the defendant. On the facts it was clear to the court that any confusion as to 
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who the contracting parties were was entirely due to the lax internal controls of the 
defendant.  
The court, however, still mentioned obiter that commercial realities in cases like these 
made the application of the law increasingly difficult. According to the court disputes 
during the liquidation of conglomerates often result in costly litigation in respect of the 
identity of the parties to contracts entered into by members of the conglomerate. This led 
to increased expenditure on legal costs and the resulting reduction in the dividend of 
creditors. 
In Briggs v James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd246 an employee attempted to bring legal action 
not only against the company of which he was an employee but also against the holding 
company of his employer. The employee was out of time with his claim unless he could 
show that there was a cause of action available. The Court of Appeal of New South 
Wales therefore had to establish whether a cause of action existed against the holding 
company after the trial court dismissed the action on the basis that the holding company 
could neither be held liable on the basis of agency nor on the basis of the piercing of the 
corporate veil.  
Two judges of the Court of Appeal referred the matter back to the court of first instance 
since they were of the view that there was insufficient evidence to reach a decision. The 
dissenting judge however held that mere control over a subsidiary would not be 
sufficient. He referred to cases in the United States of America which held that where the 
holding company dominates the subsidiary to such a point that there was no separate 
existence or the subsidiary was formed to circumvent the law, the corporate veil would be 
lifted.247  
In Al-Shennag v Statewide Roads Ltd248 the Court of Appeal of New South Wales refers 
to Ford's Principles of Corporation Law249 where the authors confirm that there is no 
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general test for piercing the corporate veil in Australia but that three principles have been 
developed, namely, firstly fraud, secondly where the corporate entity is used to evade 
existing legal obligations and thirdly, especially in cases where a holding company and 
subsidiary company are involved, where the (subsidiary) company is under capitalised 
and generally reliant on resources of the controlling holding company or as a result of 
such under capitalisation is merely a sham or device.250 The Court of Appeal held that the 
holding company must first deny the subsidiary the resources to function independently. 
Where the subsidiary has in fact an independent existence the veil will not be pierced.251 
Mere control by the holding company is therefore not sufficient to pierce the veil.252 
6.8 Conclusion 
The principle of res perit domino provides that a person who suffers harm through his 
own misfortune is responsible for that harm. The law of delict however provides that a 
person who harms another could under certain circumstances incur liability for the loss of 
the person whom he harmed. It would appear that the law of delict is primarily focused 
on compensation for delictual victims and not as a deterrent to the delictual wrongdoer.253 
This is important in the context of this dissertation since if the focus is on the victim and 
providing him with compensation the question of limited liability should not necessarily 
be a sacred doctrine. It would appear that a balance of competing interests would arise 
within the context of groups. On the one side one has limited liability which shields the 
holding company from the debts of the subsidiary company and on the other side there is 
the victim of the delict who should be compensated. Compensation however should only 
be paid by the wrongdoer. The identity of the wrongdoer is therefore of crucial 
importance since the law would not serve its purpose if it imposed liability on the 
incorrect party. 
 
The question now is what considerations should play a role in determining whether a 
holding company should be held liable for the delicts of its subsidiary. Here it is 
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necessary to mention that with “delict of its subsidiary” is meant delict in the strict sense, 
namely where all the elements for delictual liability have to be proved. Possible vicarious 
liability, for example, for the delicts committed by an employee during the course of his 
employment by the subsidiary company should, it is submitted, be distinguished from 
other delicts given the strict liability which the employer company incurs. 
 
Limited liability is supported by policy considerations, namely it is a doctrine which 
stimulates investment and a measure of risk taking which is by and large to the benefit of 
society both from an economic and even a social perspective. Any liability imposed on a 
holding company for a delict by its subsidiary could therefore stifle investment and risk 
taking. Abolishing limited liability for delicts by the subsidiary company could therefore 
be harmful to society as a whole and lead to inefficiency in the market place. Limited 
liability also provides certainty. Certainty in turn stimulates investment and risk taking. 
Where companies have certainty as provided by limited liability they are able to plan 
according to a certain and fixed principle without fear of incurring liability.  
 
On the other hand it has been shown that doubt has been cast on the legitimacy of limited 
liability in the context of company groups, not only from a historical perspective but also 
from an economic perspective.254 From an economic perspective the doctrine does not 
have the same economic advantages for a holding company as it has for a shareholder 
who is a natural person. Even modern authors like Hansmann and Kraakman and Halpern 
et al have doubted the efficiency of limited liability in respect of delictual liability.255  
 
It is submitted that the existence of the doctrine of limited liability for a holding company 
has been put into serious doubt not only generally but also in respect of the law of delict. 
Some would argue that there is enough evidence to abolish the doctrine altogether where 
a group of companies is involved. However, it must be accepted that the doctrine has 
existed for over one hundred and fifty years and that it does play an important economic 
and social role. Its importance should not, however, be overestimated. In smaller 
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companies and even bigger ones it has become the norm to contract out of limited 
liability. Except for smaller trade creditors, larger creditors like banks and project 
creditors will usually insist on security over the assets of a company and its holding 
company and also security by the management and possibly shareholders of a company 
before entering into business relationships with that company.256 Inter-company securities 
and cash management agreements, where the various companies within a group, bank 
with the same bank and contract with the bank that should there be any credit balance to 
the account of a company within the group it will be set off against the debit accounts of 
other group members, are normal.257 Therefore the practical relevance of limited liability, 
particularly from the perspective of secured creditors and directors who provide security 
for company debts in their personal capacities, should not be overstated. 
 
It is submitted that the law, regarding limited liability in the context of delictual 
obligations, in respect of company groups should be different to the law regarding 
shareholders, who are natural persons, for the reasons set out above. The judiciary in 
South Africa, with the exception of certain decisions on labour matters, has shown itself 
to be very conservative towards granting a litigant the remedy of the piercing of the 
corporate veil. Given the reluctance of the judiciary to pierce the veil, it may be necessary 
for the legislature to provide the framework for a more effective piercing of the corporate 
veil doctrine in respect of company groups. This legislative framework should set a 
different standard for the piercing of the corporate veil in the company group context than 
that which applies where natural persons control a company. 
 
It has been shown above that the policy reasons for limited liability in respect of 
shareholders who are natural persons do not necessarily apply to corporate 
shareholders.258 It is therefore submitted that holding companies should be treated 
differently while still accommodating the doctrine of limited liability. The doctrine still 
plays an important role in the economy, even if based on sentiment and not practice, and 
foreign investment in the country could be compromised if limited liability were to be 
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abolished. The abolition of limited liability should therefore not be considered but some 
compromise between the doctrine and the need to prevent abuse of the holding company-
subsidiary company relationship is required, particularly in the context of delictual 
obligations. Abuse should be understood more broadly and not in the narrow sense as is 
currently the case with the piercing of the corporate veil in English and South African 
law. 
 
The next question to be addressed is what principles should such legislation contain? 
When one considers the different approaches in respect of the piercing of the corporate 
veil in the United States of America they do not seem to differ fundamentally from each 
other. The instrumentality and alter ego tests have been shown to be broadly similar.259 
The single-piercing tests also do not appear to bring radically different insights. 
Excessive control and lack of independence also appear as important considerations 
under the single-factor piercing tests, as do the grounds of inequity, fraud and wrongful 
conduct. The single economic unit test of Louisiana also does not appear to differ 
fundamentally from the instrumentality and alter ego tests, despite the Pine Tree 
Associates v Doctors Associates’ case.260 This conclusion is supported by the following 
quotation from the Green v Champion Insurance Company261 decision where the court 
seemingly uses the terms interchangeably and as synonyms and not as different tests: 
“When determining whether a corporation is an alter ego, agent, tool or instrumentality of another 
corporation, the court is required to look to the substance of the corporate structure rather than its 
form.”262 
 
The Australian law regarding the piercing of the corporate veil263 appears to be as 
conservative as the English and South African law, although the undercapitalisation of a 
subsidiary could be an important factor to justify piercing of the corporate veil. It is 
further submitted that the four categories of abuse which Muscat proposes should lead to 
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liability for the holding company264 can also be accommodated under the alter ego and 
instrumentality tests. The subservient company is essentially a company where the 
holding company exerts excessive control. The undercapitalised company is also a 
company which does not enjoy adequate independence and excessive control is exercised 
by the holding company. The group persona and single economic entity categories are 
also in effect the holding company in disguise and therefore can be accommodated by the 
alter ego concept. The alter ego concept is not entirely new to the piercing the veil 
parlance in South Africa and has been referred to in the Cape Pacific case,265 in Die Dros 
(Pty) Ltd and Another v Telefon Beverages CC266 as well as by Blackman who states that: 
“A company is said to have been the ‘agent’, or, perhaps more accurately, the ‘alter ego’ or 
‘instrumentality’ of its controlling shareholders where it does not, in truth, carry on its own 
business or affairs, but acts merely in the furtherance of the business or affairs of its shareholders, 
in other words, its controllers do not treat it as a separate entity, at least not in the full sense. 
Although the form is that of a separate entity carrying on business to promote its stated objects, in 
truth the company is a mere instrumentality or business conduit for promoting, not its own 
business or affairs, but those of its controlling shareholders. For all practical purposes the two 
concerns are in truth one. In these cases there is usually no intention to defraud although there is 
always abuse of the company's separate existence (an attempt to obtain the advantages of the 
separate personality of the company without in fact treating it as a separate entity).”267  
  
Blackman appears to treat the alter ego and instrumentality concepts as synonyms. He 
also subsequently refers to the possibility that different considerations could apply for the 
piercing of the corporate veil in certain situations, for example when the nature of the 
claim is delictual.268 It is therefore submitted that the instrumentality and alter ego 
concepts should be the guiding principles in any proposal for legislative reform since 
they could encompass all the ingredients which would justify the piercing of the 
corporate veil. The precise content of the two principles will however be more difficult to 
formulate in legislation and should probably be left to the courts to develop, based on the 
meanings which these concepts have acquired especially in American cases dealing with 
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the piercing of the corporate veil. Our courts are entitled to consider foreign law.269 It is 
submitted that the German law is not an appropriate model for the reform of South 
African law on liability in group situations. The voluntary contract arrangement is not 
popular in Germany despite its existence in the Aktiengesetz for nearly fifty years. 
Furthermore the regulation of de facto groups is also not without problems. The German 
law only caters for harm to the subsidiary and it has to be shown that the detrimental 
instructions were issued by the holding company. The holding company then has a 
defence in the form of the business judgment rule.270 It does not appear to provide the 
best solution to the problem of delictual liability in the context of company groups.  
 
It is therefore proposed that the following provision should be inserted in the new 
Companies Act.271 The proposed provisions include factors based on the list of Powell.272 
It is tentatively suggested that the provision could be worded along the following lines: 
  Liability of the holding company for the delicts of its subsidiary 
163(A)(1)  “Controlling company” means a juristic person who together with a related or inter-
related juristic person controls another company (the “controlled company”). 
(2)   A court may hold  
(a)   a holding company and its subsidiary company, or 
(a) a controlling company and the controlled company, 
jointly and severally liable, in accordance with the principles of the common law relating to 
delict, subject to subsections 163(A)(3) and 163(A)(4), for any loss or damage suffered by 
any person due to any act or omission by the subsidiary company or the controlled company 
at a time when the subsidiary company was a subsidiary company of that holding company or 
the controlled company was  controlled by a controlling company, for which that subsidiary 
company or the controlled company is liable in delict. 
 
(3)  For the purposes of subsection 163(A)(2) a court shall take into consideration the following 
factors; provided that if a person proves that more than one of those factors are present there 
shall be a rebuttable presumption that the holding company or controlling company are jointly 
and severally liable with the subsidiary company or the controlled company for any loss or 
damage suffered by that person:  
                                                           
269
 See s 5(2) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
270
 See para 4.5 above. 
271
 See para 5.3.9 above regarding the statutory piercing of the corporate veil remedy. The proposed provisions 
include factors based above. 
272
 See para 6.2.1.1 above. 
287 
 
(i) that the subsidiary company or controlled company did not have an independent 
existence; 
(ii) that the holding company or controlling company exercised excessive control over the 
subsidiary company or company; 
(iii) that the holding company and the subsidiary company or the controlling company and 
controlled company formed a single economic enterprise; 
(iv) that any wrongful, fraudulent or reckless conduct in respect of the conduct of the 
business of the subsidiary company or controlled company took place due to the acts of 
the holding company or the controlling company; 
(v) that the subsidiary company or the controlled company was grossly under-capitalised at 
the time it became a subsidiary or a controlled company; 
(vi) that the holding company or  controlling company and subsidiary companies or 
controlled company have directors or officers in common; 
(vii) that the holding company or controlling company pays the salaries and other expenses 
or losses of the subsidiary or the controlled company; 
(viii) that the subsidiary or controlled company substantially has no business except with the 
holding company or the controlling company or no assets except those conveyed to it by 
the holding company or the controlling company; 
(ix) that the holding company or the controlling company uses the property of the subsidiary 
or the controlled company as its own; 
(x) that the directors or officers of the subsidiary or the controlled company do not act 
independently in the interest of the subsidiary or the controlled company but take their 
orders from the holding company in the latter’s interest or from the controlling company 
in the latter’s interest; 
(xi) that the formal legal requirements regarding the subsidiary or controlled company are 
not observed; 
(xii) any other factor which the court deems relevant. 
  
(4)  For the purposes of subsection 163(A)(2) a holding company or controlling company shall 
not be held liable for any loss or damage suffered by a person due to an act or omission of 
an employee of the subsidiary company or the controlled company which results in 
vicarious liability for the subsidiary company or the controlled company under the common 
law. 
  
The main points of the proposal are the following: The principle of limited liability is 
maintained despite the doubts from a historical and theoretical perspective as to its 
applicability in respect of groups of companies and delictual liability. This will promote 
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certainty and investor confidence. On the other hand a holding company will also be 
aware that it could incur delictual liability for any acts of its subsidiary company which 
cause loss or damage under the stated circumstances. Furthermore a person will not 
frivolously bring any action because he has to prove at least one of the grounds.  If he 
only proves a single ground, he still bears the onus of showing why the holding company 
should be held liable. If he succeeds in proving more than one ground, the onus shifts to 
the holding company which will have to show that liability should not be imposed despite 
the existence of the proven grounds. Sufficient examples appear in our law in respect of 
rebuttable presumptions and this aspect will significantly alleviate the evidentiary burden 
which confronts a person when he wants the court to pierce the corporate veil.273 
 
It is important that a court should still have discretion on whether or not to impose 
liability. It is therefore still difficult for a person to hold a holding company liable but it 
will be substantially easier to succeed than it is in terms of the current law. The holding 
company is sufficiently protected by the fact that the plaintiff still has to prove more than 
one of the abovementioned grounds to shift the evidentiary burden and the court still has 
a discretion. 
 
In the light of the fact that the principle of limited liability is still the point of departure, a 
court will probably not impose liability easily. This should reassure investors and the 
provisions give them ample information to enable them to structure their operations 
accordingly. It is submitted that this proposal constitutes a sensible compromise between 
the abolition of limited liability and the courts’ conservatism in respect of the piercing of 
the corporate veil in respect of company groups. The compromise is still loaded in favour 
of the principle of limited liability and therefore cannot reasonably be regarded as radical.  
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Chapter 7 
Liability in the case of an insolvent subsidiary 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The Cork Committee on Insolvency, which was tasked to investigate possible reforms in 
the field of insolvency law in the United Kingdom, uses the following example to 
illustrate the difficulties for a creditor of an insolvent group member.1 A holding 
company incorporates a wholly-owned subsidiary company which it undercapitalises. 
The holding company naturally is responsible for the management of the business and 
affairs of the subsidiary company to the advantage of the holding company and 
cumulatively to the prejudice of the subsidiary company. The profits of the subsidiary 
company are distributed to the holding company as dividends. If the subsidiary company 
is in need of funding the holding company provides the funding by means of loans. The 
subsidiary obtains further credit, under pressure of the holding company, and it obtains a 
good credit rating due to its membership of the group. The subsidiary then falls on hard 
times, becomes insolvent and goes into winding-up procedures. The holding company, as 
a concurrent creditor, at the very least, competes with the other creditors and a substantial 
proportion of the subsidiary’s assets goes to the holding company which naturally refused 
to accept any liability for the subsidiary company’s debts. The Cork Committee accepted 
that “a law which permits such an outcome is undoubtedly a defective law.”2 
The problem that appears within groups is therefore that of the insolvency of one member 
in the group and the resulting difficulties for that member’s creditors. Under the ordinary 
principles of company law a creditor may only turn to his contractual debtor for the 
enforcement of a debt. The only circumstances where he normally could turn to its 
holding company, or to that debtor’s fellow subsidiary, is where the holding company or 
fellow subsidiary, as the case may be, provided security for the debt of the debtor or 
bound itself as co-principal debtor to the creditor.  
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290 
 
The Cork Committee considered a number of “principal ideas”3 to reform the law where 
insolvency within company groups occurs, especially in situations as illustrated above. 
The Cork Committee departed from the premise that company groups are realities of the 
commercial world and insolvency within groups needed to be addressed.4 These 
proposals were, firstly the joint and several liability of the companies within the group for 
the external debts of the other companies in the group,5 secondly an opt-in regime,6 
thirdly that there could be a contracting-out possibility in respect of the first proposal,7 
fourthly liability for a company where there has been a departure from a “predetermined 
code of conduct”,8 and lastly possible liability for a group member in case of the 
insolvency of another group member, which liability will be determined by a court, 
which should have a wide discretion but still within certain parameters.9 The Cork 
Committee ultimately made no recommendations for reform since its terms of reference 
were restricted to insolvency law and that any proposals regarding groups would have 
had an effect on other areas of the law which did not fall within its terms of reference.10 
 
Another problem which the Cork Committee identified was the possible blanket liability 
on holding companies for the debts of their insolvent subsidiary companies and what 
effect this would have on the creditors of the solvent holding company.11 Not only the 
creditors of the holding company could be prejudiced but also the shareholders of the 
holding company. The creditors could at least still be protected with effective legislation 
which could provide for the subordination of the claims of the creditors of the insolvent 
company but how could the law protect the rights or positions of the shareholders of the 
holding company? They, after all, bought their shares in the holding company and not in 
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the group. Here, however, different considerations apply. The shareholders of the holding 
company could have, or should have, been aware of the way in which the holding 
company exercises its power over the subsidiary company. It is submitted that blanket 
liability is not a suitable option but that there should only be liability in a restricted 
number of cases, as will be discussed later in the proposal for reform.12 
 
The movement of assets within groups could also pose problems to creditors, especially 
in those situations where subsidiaries in a group are wholly owned by the holding 
company. Where a subsidiary falls upon hard times and is unable to pay its debts it would 
be relatively easy to move assets to a fellow subsidiary or to the holding company. The 
onus would then be on the creditor to prove that the relevant asset is the property of his 
debtor subsidiary, which may be difficult to prove given the lack of information which he 
will be facing as well as the fact that the relationship between the subsidiary and its 
holding company would not exactly be an arm’s length one. 
It is clear from the law as it currently stands that the creditors of a company, which forms 
part of a group of companies, have in principle only a claim against the company 
indebted to them and not against the other members of the group. In the absence of any 
security by the holding company for the debts of the subsidiary, the creditors of the 
subsidiary are therefore exposed to only having a claim against the subsidiary company. 
Those creditors who have the negotiating power to force a holding company, or any other 
company which forms part of a group of companies, to provide security by means of, for 
example, cross-guarantees, will naturally do so. The majority of ordinary creditors will, 
however, not have this bargaining tool when they enter into contracts with a company 
within a group of companies.  
 
The question is therefore what could be done to regulate or change the law relating to the 
insolvency of a company within a group structure on the premise that something should 
be done to change the current position. The insolvency of a company within a group 
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affects two types of creditors. Firstly there are external creditors and secondly there are 
other companies within the group structure which may have extended loans or entered 
into transactions with a company and need to be repaid. In respect of the first question the 
issue is whether the solvent and liquid companies in the group should be liable to the 
external creditors of the insolvent member of the group. The second question is whether 
other members of the group structure should retain their claims against the insolvent 
member, whether those claims should be subordinated to the claims of all the other 
creditors or, lastly, whether the members of a group with claims against the insolvent 
member should forfeit their claims.  
The problem with insolvency within a group of companies is often compounded where 
the creditor is not entirely sure as to which member of the group it actually contracted 
with and then attempts to hold the holding company liable for the debts of the 
subsidiaries. In Qintex Australia Finance Ltd v Schroders Australia Ltd13 Schroders acted 
on behalf of Qintex Television Ltd (QLT) in foreign exchange transactions. It sold ¥1,2 
billion which realised AUS$11 560 693.64 on 1 August 1989. Instead of paying the 
proceeds into the account of QLT, it paid it into the account of the plaintiff, another 
member of the Qintex group of companies. Simultaneously to the instruction to sell the 
yen, the defendant also received an instruction to purchase ¥1,2 billion for delivery on 4 
December 1989. The purchase price amounted to $12 054 244.12 which resulted in a nett 
loss of $1 377 137.60 (including the August transaction). In terms of the arrangement 
between the member of the Qintex group of companies, on whose behalf the forward 
exchange contact had been obtained, and the defendant the amount of $1 377 137.60 
became payable to the defendant.  
On 4 December 1989 the defendant appropriated an amount of $916 206.81 from a 
domestic account of the plaintiff and $46 243.41 from a foreign account of the plaintiff. 
On 7 December 1989 the defendant appropriated AUS$153 761.40 from another of the 
plaintiff’s domestic accounts. The question which the court had to decide was on behalf 
of which group member did the defendant enter into the foreign exchange forward 
contracts.  
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From the evidence before the court it would appear that there were very lax control 
measures in respect of the entities on whose behalf the defendant contracted. From a 
commercial perspective the instructions were always from the treasurers in the Qintex 
group who always only referred to Qintex and not the specific Qintex entity and a single 
client code existed for Qintex and not individual codes for each entity. 
On the facts it was clear to the court that any confusion as to who the contracting parties 
were, was entirely due to the lax internal controls of the defendant. There was no 
evidence that the plaintiff, as holding company, was the contracting party nor was there 
any evidence that QLT acted as agent on behalf of the plaintiff. 
The court, however still mentioned obiter that commercial realities in cases like these 
make the application of the law increasingly difficult. According to the court, disputes 
during the liquidation of conglomerates often result in costly litigation in respect of the 
identity of the parties to contracts entered into by members of the conglomerate. This 
leads to increased expenditure on legal costs and the resulting reduction in the dividend of 
creditors. 
In respect of outsiders to the subsidiary, or the group for that matter, there are a number 
of possibilities which could be considered. On the assumption that creditors should be 
protected against abuse within groups, especially where a subsidiary company becomes 
insolvent, this chapter will investigate whether the South African law provides a remedy 
under these circumstances and, if not, whether the law in various jurisdictions addresses 
this potential abuse and whether any of those remedies could be applied in South Africa. 
    
7.2 South African law  
The law in South Africa will be briefly analysed to determine what remedies are available 
and how effective they are. 
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7.2.1 Remedies under insolvency law 
Businesses fail for a variety of reasons. It could be due to bad management, excessive 
risk taking, labour problems, legislation which increases the costs of the business and 
which cannot be absorbed by a company or other external factors which a company’s 
management has no control over. Where external factors cause the demise of a company 
the law certainly should not impose liability on the management of a company or on 
others who control it, like its holding company. Where a company, however, fails due to 
internal factors the question arises whether liability should be imposed on the previously 
mentioned persons. One option which could be available to a creditor of an insolvent 
subsidiary is to avail himself of the provisions of the Insolvency Act14 in respect of 
dispositions which were made prior to the liquidation of the company and which may be 
set aside by a court.  
 
The purpose of insolvency law is to bring about an equitable distribution of the assets of 
the debtor and to achieve a concursus creditorum.15 This means that upon liquidation all 
(concurrent) creditors are treated equally and the law protects them as far as possible. 
Company law starts from the premise of separate juristic personality with limited liability 
as one of its most discernable consequences.16 The position of shareholders is therefore 
paramount. Upon liquidation of a company this changes and shareholders are at the back 
of the queue and their claims are only satisfied if there are any assets left and they are 
paid after the concurrent creditors. In liquidation therefore creditors rank before 
shareholders. The 1973 Act furthermore specifically provides that the provisions of the 
Insolvency Act will apply in certain cases to the liquidation of a company which is not 
able to pay its debts.17 
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295 
 
The Insolvency Act regulates four types of dispositions which could be set aside, namely 
dispositions without value,18 voidable preferences,19 undue preferences,20 and collusive 
dispositions.21 Although these provisions of the Insolvency Act provide some form of 
relief to the creditors of the liquidated subsidiary, the protection is scant. First of all there 
would have had to be a disposition to the holding company, or any other company within 
the group. If the disposition was in the ordinary course of business and with no intention 
to prefer the holding company or co-subsidiary company, as the case may be,22 or the 
disposition was one for value23 or did not cause the insolvency of the subsidiary24 the 
recipient of the disposition may retain it. Even if the disposition is set aside, the creditors 
of the subsidiary company will most probably only have the status of concurrent creditors 
and will most likely receive a minimal dividend from the realisation of the assets of the 
subsidiary, if they receive anything at all. The ultimate aim of a creditor of a company, 
which forms part of a group of companies, is to have his claim paid in full by one of the 
solvent members of the group, if there are any and not having to be satisfied with a 
dividend of most probably less than 20% of his total claim. 
 
In Goode Durrante & Murray v Hewitt & Cornell NNO25 Fannin J said the following 
about an inter-group cession agreement, which was attacked as a disposition without 
value under the Insolvency Act:26 
“In this case, as I have said, the Company is one of a group of companies, and it guaranteed the 
obligation of another member of the same group as a result of financial pressure upon that fellow 
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member, and on the parent company. On those facts, it seems to me impossible at this stage to say 
that no 'value' was given for there are many important benefits which such a transaction might 
bring to the Company, such as, for example, the continued financial stability of the whole group of 
companies.”27 
 
This is a highly significant statement since it implies that the court viewed the group as 
an economic unit. By stating that the value of the transaction was situated in the financial 
stability of the group, the court in effect held that a debtor could show that value in terms 
of the Insolvency Act need not be received by it as the direct beneficiary, but that value 
could be received indirectly through the benefit to the rest of the group.  
 
This statement of the court is not tenable in the context of company law given the 
applicable legal principles both then and now, unless the court had been willing to hold 
that the group of companies was a sham and that the corporate veil should be pierced to 
ascertain the true character of the “group” of companies. 
 
Langeberg Koöperasie Bpk v Inverdoorn Farming & Trading Co Ltd,28 like the Goode 
Durrante case, dealt with dispositions in terms of the Insolvency Act29 within the context 
of a group of companies. In this case the respondent stood surety for the obligations of its 
holding company, Standard Finance Corporation of South Africa Ltd. Upon the 
liquidation of the respondent the appellant attempted to prove a claim against the 
respondent. The liquidator averred, inter alia, that the grant of the suretyship constituted 
a disposition without value under the Insolvency Act30 that should be set aside. The 
appellant relied on the judgment in Goode Durrante,31 namely that the suretyship gave 
value to the group of companies of which the respondent was part. 
 
Beyers JA, in delivering the majority judgment, mentioned that the respondent was a 
member of a group of companies but that it nevertheless had a personality of its own. He 
further held that when a court has to consider whether a particular transaction is or is not 
                                                           
27
 291. 
28
 Langeberg Koöperasie Bpk v Inverdoorn Farming & Trading Co Ltd 1965 2 SA 597 (A). 
29
 Above. 
30
 Above. 
31
 Above. 
297 
 
in the interests of such a company it would be prudent to bear in mind the remarks of 
Centlivres CJ in R v Milne and Erleigh,32 namely that: 
“The word 'group' has been used with many shades of meaning. The basic idea seems to be: An 
association of companies, created not by resolutions to associate but by the acts of individuals, and 
depending on the facts that they have a single secretary, generally itself a company, and are 
controlled as to the appointment of their directors, and therefore as to the administration of their 
affairs, by one or a few people. The persons who wield the controlling power are the only legal 
personae apart from the companies themselves. There is no persona which is the group, and there 
are no interests involved except the interests of the companies and the interests of the controllers. 
This is not mere legal technicality. No doubt it may be convenient to talk of the interests of the 
group, but no one could seriously think of the group as having interests distinct from those of the 
companies and controllers. The fact that in a group bargaining between companies may often be 
non-existent, because the controllers decide, does not support the idea of a single persona with 
single interests. No business man would be deceived into thinking that in a group there is, in 
effect, a pooling of assets and a right in the controllers to deal with assets belonging to the 
companies without regard to their respective interests. Those interests must be adjusted by the 
controllers as honest boards would agree to do if there were no group, i.e. on fair and reasonable 
lines, having regard to the circumstances of each transaction.”33 
 
The court a quo in the Langeberg case had held, after observing that the Goode Durrante 
case was decided on exception, that: 
“In the case now under consideration evidence has been heard and this evidence, Mr. Schock 
claimed, established beyond all doubt that the disposition did not and could not have given 
'continued financial stability' to the group or the Company. In my view there is force in this 
argument.  
After considering the evidence and the arguments adduced thereon I can come to only one 
conclusion, and that is that this was an extraordinary transaction by which a farming company 
mortgaged the whole of its assets to assist another company to meet its debts. By undertaking this 
liability the Board achieved nothing beneficial to the Company, the advantage sought was remote 
and illusory, and in the result the Company was impoverished and forced into liquidation. To 
describe the disposition as one for value is to ignore the facts.”34 
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The Appellate Division was not persuaded that the findings of the court a quo were 
incorrect. It is important to note, however, that the court held that it was not unmindful of 
the possible implications of its conclusion upon the general acceptability to creditors of 
bonds over the assets of subsidiary companies, when tendered by parent companies as 
security for the latter's obligations. The court held that if any such bond is attacked as a 
disposition without value under the Insolvency Act, the enquiry must, in its view, always 
be whether, on the facts of the particular case, the mortgaging subsidiary company can 
fairly be said to have received value for the challenged disposition. 
 
Although the Appellate Division dismissed the appeal, it would appear that it was more 
due to the facts at hand than the principle. It would appear that Beyers JA and 
Williamson JA, who wrote the dissenting judgment, tacitly acknowledged that the 
financial stability of a group of companies may constitute value in terms of the 
Insolvency Act in appropriate circumstances. This seems to imply that the court could 
view a group of companies as an economic unit in appropriate circumstances. 
 
The question of value in the context of voidable dispositions under the Insolvency Act35 
was again considered in Swanee’s Boerdery (Edms) Bpk (In Liquidation) v Trust Bank.36 
In this decision the court seemingly attempts to qualify the judgments in the Goode, 
Durrante and Langeberg cases but simultaneously does not reject the notion that the 
insolvent may receive value for its disposition within the context of a group.37 Value in 
this context refers to the financial stability of the group. This case, however, did not 
involve a group of companies. The only common feature of the companies in this case 
was that they had the same shareholders, Mr and Mrs Swanepoel. Be that as it may, the 
court still accepted implicitly that it is conceivable that the financial stability of a group 
would constitute value within the context of voidable dispositions under the Insolvency 
Act.  The court infers that it would be a question of fact by looking at all the surrounding 
circumstances.38 
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The Insolvency Act does therefore provide some relief for creditors, even if the 
protection is patently inadequate. The most which a creditor of an insolvent company 
within a group can expect is that a disposition which was made by an insolvent subsidiary 
to another group member may be set aside under any of the provisions regarding voidable 
preferences. However, there is neither a provision which would enable a creditor to seek 
a contribution from the holding company or another group member, nor a pooling of 
assets provision where the assets of the insolvent subsidiary could be pooled together 
with the assets of the holding company should the holding company also be insolvent. 
The tacit acknowledgment by the judiciary of the group principle, in recognising that the 
group financial stability could possibly constitute value should there be an application 
that the subsidiary made a disposition without value to another group member, is 
nevertheless significant. 
 
7.2.2 Reckless and fraudulent trading in terms of company law 
One of the options which The Cork Committee in the United Kingdom investigated, 
under the insolvency law reform proposals, was the wrongful trading provisions, namely 
that the holding company could in certain circumstances be seen as being party to the 
wrongful trading of its subsidiary.39 This would especially be the case where the holding 
company issued instructions to the subsidiary company and which resulted in the 
subsidiary conducting its business wrongfully.40 
 
Although different to the wrongful trading provisions41 referred to by the Cork 
Committee, the 1973 Companies Act in South Africa provides something broadly similar 
in that: 
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“When it appears, whether it be in a winding-up, judicial management or otherwise, that any 
business of the company was or is being carried on recklessly or with intent to defraud creditors of 
the company or creditors of any other person or for any fraudulent purpose, the Court may, on the 
application of […] any creditor […] of the company, declare that any person who was knowingly 
a party to the carrying on of the business in the manner aforesaid, shall be personally responsible, 
without any limitation of liability, for all or any of the debts or other liabilities of the company as 
the Court may direct.”42 
 
For the holding company to be held liable for the debts of its subsidiary under this 
provision of the 1973 Act, a creditor of the subsidiary company would have to show that 
the holding company was (i) knowingly (ii) a party to the (iii) reckless carrying on of the 
business of the subsidiary company, or (iv) with the intention to defraud creditors of the 
subsidiary company, or (v) with any other fraudulent purpose. The first two hurdles to 
overcome are therefore to prove that the person was (i) knowingly and (ii) a party to the 
anticipated mischief provided for in the section.  
 
 In Howard v Herrigel and Another NNO43 the Appellate Division held that “knowingly” 
means having knowledge of the facts from which the conclusion is to be drawn that the 
business of the company is being conducted in a reckless manner. One does not, 
however, have to be aware of the legal consequences of those facts to be held liable.44 
 
 In Philotex (Pty) Ltd v Snyman; Braitex (Pty) Ltd v Snyman45 the Supreme Court of 
Appeal held that “knowingly” does not necessarily imply “consciousness of 
recklessness”.46 This means that a person does not have to be aware of the fact that his 
conduct could incur liability in terms of section 424 of the 1973 Act. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
knew or ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that the company 
would avoid going into insolvent liquidation, and 
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According to the Howard v Herrigel case and the Philotex case “party to” does not 
necessarily imply being actively involved in the reckless or fraudulent conduct of the 
business of the company. Should a person therefore be aware of the reckless or fraudulent 
conduct of the business and does nothing to prevent it he is in effect consenting to such 
conduct and would therefore fall under the term “party to”.47 
 
The question therefore arises whether a holding company can be party to the reckless 
conduct of the business of its subsidiary. One possibility that could be helpful is the 
concept of a de facto director.48 Both the 1973 Act49 and the new Companies Act50 
contain absolute prohibitions on juristic persons from being directors of a company. 
Presumably this means that a juristic person may also not be a de facto director of a 
company. As soon as a person, including a company, involves itself in the policy and 
direction of its subsidiary it should be recognised that the entity acts as a director. 
Although it would inevitably be the board of directors of the holding company which 
issues directives to the directors of the subsidiary company, it would be cumbersome for 
a creditor of an insolvent subsidiary to try first of all to recover from the subsidiary, 
thereafter from the directors of the holding company, on the basis possibly that they 
recklessly conducted the business of the subsidiary51 and only thereafter to attempt to 
hold the holding company liable on the basis of  section 424 of the 1973 Act should he 
not be able to claim successfully from the previous two defendants. However, in the light 
of the prohibition on a juristic person from acting as a director this will not be further 
investigated.  
 
Section 424 of the Companies Act of 1973 has only been used thus far to hold directors 
liable for the debts of the companies, although an attempt has been made to hold the 
auditor of a company liable as well.52 The leading authority is Philotex (Pty) Ltd v 
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Snyman; Braitex (Pty) Ltd v Snyman,53 where a holding company was involved but no 
attempt was made to hold the holding company liable. Instead the action was only 
instituted against the delinquent directors of the subsidiary company. Section 424 
constitutes a statutory mechanism for the piercing of the corporate veil by holding the 
directors of the company liable for its debts.  
 
“Recklessness” has two components namely an objective and a subjective element.54 This 
point is especially important when a company incurs further debts at a stage when it is 
factually insolvent. The objective element requires that the conduct of the person whom 
the creditor seeks to hold liable must be compared to the reasonable person. If the 
reasonable person would not incur the debt since he knows that the debt would not be 
repaid, then recklessness is present.55 The Supreme Court of Appeal in the Philtotex case 
held that recklessness would also be present where objectively the reasonable person 
would have known that there is a strong chance of non-payment of a debt.56 The 
subjective element involves the court looking at the characteristics of the person who is 
sought to be held liable.57  
 
The question therefore arises whether a holding company could knowingly be a party to 
the reckless conduct of business by its subsidiary, especially in a case where the latter 
company incurs debt at a stage when it is technically insolvent. The requirement of 
“knowingly” should be easily ascertainable in those cases where the same directors of the 
holding company sit on the board of the subsidiary. In the light of the fact that the 
holding company is the sole or majority shareholder it would be extremely rare for these 
directors not to be aware of the financial situation of the subsidiary or the manner in 
which the business of the subsidiary is being conducted. The greater its shareholding in 
the subsidiary and the smaller the group, the more easily the holding company will satisfy 
the “knowingly” test.  
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The more problematic aspect may be the “party to the reckless conduct of the business” 
test. Mere awareness of the reckless conduct of the business will probably not suffice but 
it would have to be shown that the holding company was party to the reckless conduct of 
the business. It is submitted that some form of participation in the conduct of the business 
of the subsidiary may be required. In Powertech Industries Ltd v Mayberry58 the court 
held that in order to hold the auditor of the relevant company liable it had to be shown 
that: 
“To be a 'party' to the conduct of a company's business requires an association with it in a common 
pursuit. That is the ordinary meaning of the word as it is used in the statute. A 'party' to the 
carrying on of a company's business is one who has joined with the company in a common pursuit. 
Generally this would include its directors and managers, all of whom are acting in common 
pursuit of the company's business. If the business is conducted recklessly they are liable therefor, 
and for good reason, as they ought not to be permitted to shield behind the limited liability 
accorded to the company in these circumstances. Clearly the section is aimed only at conduct 
which attracts liability to the company, as it is only that conduct which constitutes the mischief 
against which the section is aimed. The section does not extend to those who, while carrying on 
their own business, incidentally enable the company to carry on its business.”59 
 
On the basis of this statement of the court in the Powertech case, a plausible case may be 
instituted against the holding company since inevitably there would be a common pursuit. 
The concept of directing minds may be important here since the holding company will 
inevitably appoint the majority, if not all, of the directors of the subsidiary company. Can 
the actions of the directors, appointed by the holding company, be the actions of the 
holding company? Are the directors who serve on the board of the subsidiary the 
directing minds of the holding company? 
 
In Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd60 the House of Lords held that: 
“[A] corporation is an abstraction. It has no mind of its own any more than it has a body of its 
own; its active and directing will must consequently be sought in the person or somebody who for 
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some purposes may be called an agent, but who is really the directing mind and will of the 
corporation, the very ego and centre of the personality of the corporation.”61 
 
The “directing mind” doctrine is therefore in essence there to attribute the acts and the 
mental state of the persons who control a company to that company.62 This doctrine of 
the directing mind is not limited to criminal liability but also applies to delictual 
liability.63 The question therefore is whether the holding company is the directing mind of 
the subsidiary. An argument could certainly be made out that the holding company 
directs the operations of the subsidiary. It is submitted, however, that a blanket statement 
to this effect cannot be made. The mere fact that the holding company may appoint all or 
the majority of the directors of its subsidiary could imply that the directors who are 
appointed are the directing minds of the holding company itself, at least in those cases 
where the directors are the sole shareholders of the holding company. In cases where they 
are not in control of the holding company and they are appointed by the holding company 
the argument may still be made that the holding company is the directing mind of the 
subsidiary.64  
 
It would appear that within the context of section 424 of the 1973 Act it would be 
difficult to impose liability on the holding company for the reckless trading of the 
subsidiary. One would have to argue that the conduct of business of the subsidiary had 
been usurped by the holding company.65 Prima facie it would appear to be an easy 
argument to make since the directors of the subsidiary would, as a rule, be under the 
control of the holding company. However, for a creditor to prove reckless trading is 
already a difficult task. Once he has shown that there was reckless or fraudulent trading, 
he has to show that a person was knowingly a party to such reckless trading. In a holding 
company/subsidiary company relationship, a creditor will therefore have to trace back the 
reckless or fraudulent trading to the holding company. If one had to trace back liability 
one would assume that the first line of attack would be against the directors of the 
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subsidiary, then the directors of the holding company and then the holding company 
itself, unless one argues that the actions of the holding company and its directors are not 
separable but in fact one and the same action.  
 
The above arguments may not necessarily have become a moot point, however, in the 
light of the provisions of the new Companies Act.66 The new Companies Act does not 
contain an equivalent provision to section 424 of the 1973 Act. The new Companies Act 
does provide that a company may not carry on business recklessly, with gross negligence, 
with the intent to defraud any person or for any other fraudulent purpose67 or under 
insolvent circumstances.68 Insolvent circumstances are not defined in the new Companies 
Act but from the draft regulations, the term appears to mean technical insolvency.69 The 
new Companies Act also provides that a person who contravenes the provisions of the 
new Companies Act, in this case the company itself is liable for any loss of a person due 
to that contravention.70 In the context of reckless or insolvent trading by a subsidiary this 
could possibly imply that if the subsidiary conducts its business recklessly or trades under 
insolvent circumstances, the persons who allow this could be held liable. Furthermore the 
provision imposing liability on a person who contravenes the new Act, in the context of 
trading under insolvent circumstances or recklessly, should be read with other provisions 
in the new Companies Act, which provide that a person is guilty of an offence if he was 
“knowingly a party to” the insolvent trading or reckless trading.71 
 
A problem, within the context of possible liability based upon reckless and fraudulent 
trading, which was identified by the Cork Committee is that of changes to the companies 
forming part of the group structure.72 Some companies may not have been part of the 
group structure from the start or others may have been sold off by the holding company. 
The answer again may be simple. In terms of the 1973 Companies Act a court has a 
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discretion in respect of which debts would fall within the liability of the relevant persons 
responsible for the reckless or fraudulent trading. If the business of a company was 
therefore conducted in a reckless manner prior to it becoming a subsidiary of another 
company, and that reckless conduct ceased due to the take over and resulting change in 
management, there can hardly be an argument that the holding company conducted the 
business of the subsidiary recklessly.  
 
Similar arguments apply where a company leaves the group. If the holding company 
conducted the business of the subsidiary recklessly prior to it departing the group, there 
could be liability imposed by the courts in respect of those debts incurred during that 
time. In a certain way the position is akin to a marriage in community of property. The 
parties bring their individual debts into the marriage and upon its dissolution the debts 
incurred during the marriage are for the account of both spouses jointly and severally. In 
the context of the holding company and a subsidiary the courts should only hold the 
holding company liable for those debts which were incurred during the period that the 
holding company conducted the business of the subsidiary in a reckless or fraudulent 
manner. 
 
7.2.3 Possible delictual liability 
Another option which could possibly be of assistance to a creditor of the subsidiary 
company is to hold the holding company delictually liable for the losses the creditor has 
suffered due to the holding company’s association with the subsidiary company. The 
creditor of the subsidiary would have to prove that the wrongful and negligent actions or 
omissions of the holding company caused loss to him. He would have to prove the 
requirements of delictual liability to succeed.73 The advantage of this option is that it does 
not require the piercing of the corporate veil, since the purpose is not to make the holding 
company liable for the debts of the subsidiary company. Olaerts, with reference to 
Bartman and Dorresteijn,74 states in this regard that a delict by the holding company is 
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required for indirect piercing [of the corporate veil] and therefore this does not violate the 
principle of limited liability. The shareholder is not held liable for the debts of the 
[subsidiary] company but for its own debts which are the result of its delict committed 
against the creditors of the subsidiary company.75 
 
This action of a creditor would therefore be based on the pure economic loss which he 
suffered due to the actions of the holding company. It is submitted that it would be 
difficult to hold the holding company liable on this basis, due to the difficulties of 
establishing the wrongfulness element which the creditor of the subsidiary will have to 
prove. He will also have to prove that the holding company wrongfully and negligently 
caused him loss.  
 
Wrongfulness in the context of an action for pure economic loss requires either proof that 
a subjective right has been infringed or that a duty of care has been breached.76 It would 
appear that the problem with proving wrongfulness in the context of pure economic loss 
is the question whether there was a duty of care on the wrongdoer vis-à-vis the wronged. 
In Arthur E Abrahams and Gross v Cohen77 the court held that: 
“Setting the boundaries of liability ex delicto for causing what has come to be styled as pure 
economic loss not flowing from physical damage has been a major concern of Western Courts in 
recent times. Fear of introducing what Cardozo J in Ultramares Corporation v Touche78  called 
'liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class' has 
deterred Courts from upholding too readily claims for damages for pure economic loss 
unassociated with physical damage. Thus, the mere fact that the loss which has occurred was 
reasonably foreseeable by the defendant is not necessarily per se sufficient to have given rise to a 
legal duty to act or to abstain from acting in order to avoid the loss.  
 
As I see the position it comes to this. A defendant may be held liable ex delicto for causing pure 
economic loss. [I]t will have to be established that the possibility of loss of that kind was 
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reasonably foreseeable by him and that in all the circumstances of the case he was under a legal 
duty to prevent such loss occurring. It is not possible or desirable to attempt to define exhaustively 
the factors which would give rise to such a duty because new situations not previously 
encountered are bound to arise and societal attitudes are not immutable.”79

The most difficult point therefore that a plaintiff in a group context has to prove is that 
the holding company had a legal duty not to cause him loss. The other aspects of delictual 
liability may not necessarily be much easier though. Of the most recent South African 
cases in respect of pure economic loss the most relevant, for purposes of this dissertation, 
is Holtzhausen v ABSA Bank Ltd.80  
 
In the Holtzhausen case H entered into an agreement to sell diamonds to a buyer through 
an agent of the buyer. He undertook to pay commission to the agent should the 
transaction be concluded.  The agent informed H that the purchase price for the diamonds 
was paid into his bank account with ABSA and provided H with three telephone numbers 
to verify the deposit of the purchase price into his bank account. The bank account of H 
reflected the deposit of the purchase price. H contacted the bank manager of the branch 
where he held his account to ascertain whether he could proceed with the transaction, 
namely to deliver the diamonds and pay the commission to the agent. He told the bank 
manager why he needed the verification. H gave the three telephone numbers, which the 
agent gave to him, to the bank manager. The bank manager assured him that he could 
proceed with the transaction and also personally authorised the withdrawal of the 
commission payable by H to the agent. Fraud was subsequently discovered on the side of 
the agent and buyer and the bank account of H was debited with the amount paid to the 
agent. H now sought to recover his losses from ABSA based on the negligent 
misstatement of the bank manager. The court of first instance gave absolution of the 
instance. H appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal. His action was based on a delictual 
claim for the pure economic loss which he had suffered due to the alleged negligent 
misstatement by the defendant bank. 
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The Supreme Court of Appeal referred to Bayer South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Frost81 where 
the Appellate Division, as it then was, held that it would in principle be possible that a 
negligent misstatement which induced a person to enter into a contract may give rise to a 
delictual claim for damages by that person.82 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal also needed to clear up any confusion created by the 
decision in Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd83 
which has been misinterpreted in a number of decisions. According to the Supreme Court 
of Appeal it was decided in the Lillicrap case that no delictual claim would be possible 
where the negligence which was relied upon consisted of a breach of a contractual term.84 
This did not mean, however, that a person did not have the possibility to choose between 
two actions, one based on delict and one based on contract, should the facts allow either 
one of the two.85  Since the plaintiff in the Holtzhausen case was not relying on a breach 
of a contractual obligation by the defendant bank but on a claim which he had 
independently of any contract with the bank, the Lillicrap decision was not applicable.86 
 
On the question of wrongfulness the Supreme Court of Appeal held the following: 
“So far as unlawfulness is concerned, the following findings might be made on the evidence led 
thus far: That the statement by the bank manager was made in response to a serious request; that 
the plaintiff approached the bank manager because of his expertise and knowledge of banking 
matters; and that the plaintiff's purpose in making the enquiry was, to the knowledge of the bank 
manager, to ascertain whether he could safely proceed with the transaction. It could be inferred 
that the bank manager realised that the plaintiff would rely on his answer. On the evidence led thus 
far, it might further be found that there are no considerations of public policy, fairness or equity to 
deny the plaintiff a claim; that no question of limitless liability could arise; and that an unfair 
burden would not be placed on the manager or the bank if liability were to be imposed - inasmuch 
as the manager could have refused to act on the plaintiff's request and could have protected 
himself and the bank against the consequences of any negligence on his part by a disclaimer. […] 
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Of course it goes without saying that at the end of the case, the trial court might come to the 
conclusion that no legal duty rested upon the bank manager to take reasonable steps to ensure that 
any representation which he may have made, was correct.”87 
 
The issue highlighted by the abovementioned quotation from the Holtzhausen case 
concerns the legal duty which rests on the alleged wrongdoer vis-à-vis the person who 
has suffered pure economic loss. It would appear that South African courts are still very 
wary of imposing a legal duty on a person to prevent economic loss to another unless it is 
very clear that such a duty existed and it is submitted that this requirement may be the 
most difficult requirement for a plaintiff to prove.88 Even if there is a legal duty on a 
holding company, a creditor of an insolvent subsidiary company will have to show that a 
negligent act or omission of the holding company caused him loss. It is assumed that the 
act would consist of an omission by the holding company to inform a creditor of the 
precarious financial position of the subsidiary or the failure to capitalise the subsidiary 
adequately. The negligence would lie in the fact that the holding company should 
reasonably have foreseen that the failure to inform the creditor of the subsidiary of the 
precarious financial position of the subsidiary or the failure to capitalise the subsidiary 
adequately would lead to loss for the creditor. The creditor will then also have to prove 
that this failure by the holding company was causally linked to the loss. 
 
The position in South Africa is therefore that few possibilities exist for a creditor to hold 
the holding company liable for the debts of the subsidiary. These possibilities would 
seem to be mainly theoretical and the burden of proof on the creditor would be heavy to 
discharge. The position in other jurisdictions regarding relief for creditors of an insolvent 
subsidiary will be investigated with a view to establishing whether any of these could be 
adopted for use in South Africa. 
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7.3 The position in New Zealand 
The New Zealand Companies Act89  makes provision for (i) a contribution order and (ii) 
a pooling order by the court, in the context of a company within a group structure when it 
appears to the court that it will be just and equitable to do so. The court may make a 
contribution or pooling order on the application of the liquidator, creditor or shareholder 
of the company.90 In deciding whether it is just and equitable to make such a contribution 
order the court must take into account a number of factors. These factors are, firstly, the 
extent to which a related company91 participated in the management of the company in 
liquidation. Secondly the court must consider the conduct of the related company towards 
the creditors of the company in liquidation. Thirdly, the court has to consider the degree 
to which the circumstances that gave rise to the liquidation of the company are due to the 
actions of the related company, and lastly the court has a discretion to consider any other 
matter it deems fit.92 
 
The requirements which need to be satisfied before a court may order a pooling of the 
assets of two or more related companies which are in liquidation,93 are broadly speaking 
the same as the requirements in respect of contribution orders. The New Zealand 
Companies Act provides that a court must take certain factors into consideration to 
determine whether it is just and equitable to grant a pooling order. Firstly, the extent to 
which any of the related companies took part in the management of any of the other 
companies; secondly, the conduct of any of the related companies towards the creditors 
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of any of the other companies; thirdly, the extent to which the circumstances that gave 
rise to the liquidation of any of the related companies are due to the actions of any of the 
other companies; fourthly, the extent to which the businesses of the related companies 
have been combined and finally the court is also granted a discretion to consider any 
other matter as it deems fit.94 
 
In the light of the fact that the New Zealand Companies Act,95 which preceded the current 
Act, also provided for the pooling of assets and contribution orders, it could be deduced 
that the New Zealand legislature was satisfied with the manner in which the courts 
applied the provisions of the 1955 Companies Act. The Cork Committee expressed some 
reservations regarding the position of the creditors of the holding company, for example 
that they could stand at a disadvantage should the holding company be ordered to make a 
contribution in respect of the debts of the subsidiary company.96  The creditors of the 
holding company naturally contracted on the basis that the assets of the company will be 
used only in respect of the claims of that company.97 The financial position of a company 
could drastically deteriorate within a short period of time due to unforeseen external 
factors like natural disasters or even man-made disasters, as illustrated by the global 
credit crunch towards the end of 2008.  
 
To illustrate the point in the previous paragraph, assume that holding company X is in a 
sound financial position but is ordered to make a contribution of R50 million in respect of 
the debts of its insolvent subsidiary Y. The net asset value of company X is reduced by 
R50 million but it is still solvent. That position can quickly change due to unforeseen 
circumstances which will not only prejudice the creditors of company X, but also 
                                                           
94
 S 272(2). There is, however also a qualification in the New Zealand Companies Act. S 272(3) provides that the 
mere fact that the creditors of a company in liquidation relied on the fact that another company is or was related to 
the company in liquidation is not sufficient to grant a contribution or pooling order. 
95
 The Companies Act of 1955. 
96
 438 para 1946. 
97
 The Australian Companies and Securities Advisory Committee in respect of Corporate Groups, above, refers at 
121 to Farrar “Legal Issues Involving Corporate Groups” (1998) 16 Companies and Securities Law Journal 184 
who at 197 states “If the contribution sought from a related company threatens that company’s solvency, then the 
court must consider the equities involved affecting the creditors of that company. These creditors will rely on 
arguments that they have relied on the separate assets of the company when trading with it and should not be denied 
a full payout because of that company’s relationship with another company.” Equity to the creditors of the holding 
company is, however, not the only factor which a court must take into account. In this respect see the position 
adopted by the courts in the United States, para 7.4 below. 
313 
 
company X itself, as well as its shareholders. The company’s funds have been reduced by 
the contribution order, which means that there are less funds available for new 
developments and projects. This could lead to potential job losses and smaller or no 
dividends for the shareholders of the company. The short-term benefit of assisting the 
creditors of the subsidiary could have a longer term negative impact, not only on 
company X but also on its creditors and other stakeholders like employees and the 
broader community which depend on it. The ultimate irony would be if the holding 
company itself is eventually liquidated due to a chain of events which started with a 
contribution order, even if such order was granted in circumstances which did not cause 
the immediate parlous financial state of the holding company but was the first little 
snowball which ultimately became an avalanche resulting in liquidation.98  
 
There have not been many cases in New Zealand where pooling orders have been granted 
by the courts. In Re Dalhoff and King Holdings Ltd,99 Dalhoff and King Holdings 
Limited was a listed company on the New Zealand Stock Exchange. Among its 
subsidiaries were Dalhoff and King Ltd and D and K Truck Distributors Ltd. All three 
companies were placed in liquidation. The liquidators of respective companies applied 
for a pooling order in terms of the previous New Zealand Companies Act which had a 
similar wording to the current Act.100 
 
If the pooling orders were granted the result would be that the unsecured creditors of the 
holding company would receive a dividend of 90.88 cents/$ whereas a refusal to grant a 
pooling order would mean that the unsecured creditors would receive 1$. The 
shareholders would receive 28 cents per share in the absence of a pooling order whereas a 
pooling order would result in them receiving no dividend. The unsecured creditors of 
Dalhoff and King Ltd would receive 49.22 cents/$ in the absence of a pooling order 
whereas they would receive 90.88 cents/$ were the pooling order to be granted. The 
shareholders in both cases would receive no dividend. In respect of D and K Truck 
                                                           
98
 The counter argument is that the holding company’s improper interference in the management of the subsidiary 
company and insufficient regard for the interests of the subsidiary’s creditors led to the insolvency of the subsidiary 
and ultimately to that of the holding company itself. 
99
 Re Dalhoff and King Holdings Ltd [1991] 2 NZLR 296. 
100
 Ss 315B and 315C of the Companies Act 1955. 
314 
 
Distributors Ltd the unsecured creditors, like those of the holding company, would be 
slightly worse off101 if the pooling order was granted but in both cases the shareholders 
would receive no dividend. 
 
At the time of the case there was little authority on pooling orders in New Zealand. The 
court referred to the Re Pacific Syndicates (NZ) Ltd102 case where all the parties to the 
case consented to the order and the court did not have any need to delve into the potential 
complexities which may have arisen, although the court did allude to them.103 
 
The court in the Dalhoff and King case held that it had the power to look at the conduct 
of the parties after the liquidation over and above the statutory requirements which the 
court needed to take into account.104 The first requirement that the court needed to look at 
was the question of the extent to which any of the involved companies participated in the 
management of any of the other companies.105 From the evidence it was clear that the 
three companies were de facto operated as a single entity and after the liquidation of the 
companies the bank account of the holding company was used for all the companies. 
 
The second factor which the court needed to consider in terms of the previous New 
Zealand Companies Act was the conduct of the companies towards the creditors of any of 
the companies within the group structure.106 Although the number of cases where 
accounts were not paid by the actual debtor company but by another company was not 
substantial, the court held that the debts were paid by the entity for whom it was 
convenient at any particular time. The court therefore held that if the management of the 
companies treated the companies as one single entity then so much more would the 
creditors.107 The court held in this regard that: 
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“In summary as to this aspect of the matter, it seems to me that the particular instances clearly 
establish that the conduct of the companies towards creditors was such as to lead to a degree of 
confusion on the part of creditors as to which companies were involved with what or whom. While 
the particular instances illustrating the various aspects in this matter upon which the applicants 
rely may not be of themselves of great significance or enough to justify the intervention of the 
Courts in terms of the section, taken together they tend to indicate a greater degree of 
responsibility for confusing conduct on the part of the various companies than appears from any 
one illustration. They lead at least towards an overall situation where the conduct of the companies 
may be said to have given rise to the concerns with which the section is dealing. It should not be 
forgotten that they are illustrations and examples [...] that a considerable degree of confusion had 
existed and continued to exist and arises from the continued merged operation of these 
companies.”108 
 
The next consideration was to what extent the conduct of one of the companies led to the 
liquidation of the other companies.109 It was clear to the court that the companies “stood 
and fell” together and that the demise of one would automatically lead to the demise of 
the others.110 It was however not clear to the court that the conduct of one of the 
companies necessarily led to the financial difficulties of the other companies but it 
accepted that it was “a matter of common sense” that the actions of one of the companies 
must have led to the financial difficulties of the other companies.111 
 
The next factor which the court had to take into account was the extent to which the 
businesses of the various companies were combined.112 Again the court focused not on 
individual cases of how the businesses of the various companies were commingled but 
rather on the combined effect which the individual cases had. 
“The points raised relating to a confusion of ownership in respect of particular assets is a further 
illustration that the persons responsible for managing the companies did not differentiate carefully 
between them or their activities, nor does it appear to persons dealing with the companies. […] 
There is no difficulty in ascertaining which company was intended but it illustrates the point that 
the separate identity and activities of the companies were not obvious to persons outside the 
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structure in dealing with entities within it. It does not seem to have been important which company 
owned what. A degree of flexibility has been preserved which may have been convenient for those 
operating the companies in good times but which is now extremely inconvenient for those whose 
duty it is to disentangle what has occurred. That difficulty supports the applicants’ contentions 
[that there was an intermingling of the businesses of the various companies].”113 
 
The previous New Zealand Companies Act, like the current Act, also enabled a court to 
take into account other factors which it deemed appropriate or relevant to determine 
whether or not to grant a pooling order.114 The first additional factor which the court 
considered was the issue relating to the debts within the group of companies and their 
validity. Were the court to refuse the pooling order the various debts would have had to 
be individually scrutinised and allocated to the correct entity. This would be time 
consuming and lead to uncertainty for the liquidators and the creditors.115 
 
The position of the shareholders was also a factor which the court considered. As pointed 
out above the pooling of assets would have a significant impact on the shareholders of the 
holding company since such an order would result in them not receiving any dividends. 
The previous Companies Act of New Zealand also placed an express duty on a court to 
take cognisance of the interests of shareholders who are shareholders of only some of the 
companies in the group and not of all of the companies within the group.116 The court 
held that the purpose of the section was to prevent fraudulent conduct vis-à-vis the 
shareholders of one company through the conduct of another company within the group 
structure.117 Upon the facts in casu there was no intention to defraud or to prefer the 
shareholders of one company above the shareholders of others. The sole intention of 
conducting the businesses as a single entity was one of convenience.118 Despite this 
assessment the court still held that the shareholders of the holding company should not 
receive preference over the other shareholders within the group. This is strange since 
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there was never any intention by the management of the holding company to conduct the 
businesses of the three entities as a single enterprise so as to prefer the shareholders of the 
holding company. The court reasons as follows: 
“It is true that DK Holdings is a public company but people who purchase shares on the stock 
market must make their own assessment of the ability and style of management in the companies 
in which they invest, and I do not think that the fact that the shares are publicly traded is a factor 
which should give a preference to those particular shareholders as distinct from others.”119 
 
A further relevant factor for the court in respect of the position of shareholders is the 
balancing of interests of shareholders and creditors of a company in cases of insolvency. 
With reference to Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd120 the court121 held that the interests 
of creditors are more important than those of the shareholders in cases of insolvency. 
According to the court section 315B(2) of the former Act was there to regulate the 
relationship between the shareholders inter se and not to find a balance for the competing 
interests of the shareholders and the creditors of a company.122 
 
The relevant section123 in the former New Zealand Act, like the current Act,124 required 
the court to be satisfied that it would be just and equitable to grant a pooling order having 
regard to the relevant factors. The court, having considered the factors discussed above 
concluded that a pooling order would be apposite in the circumstances: 
“Taken cumulatively the various matters add up to a formidable case as far as the applicants are 
concerned. Looked at overall, I think it is apparent that the persons responsible for managing these 
companies saw them as being separate facets of one enterprise and managed them accordingly 
dealing with particular situations as was most convenient at the time without reference to strict 
legal differentiation. [I]t is hardly surprising that members of the public saw the activities of the 
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group of companies in the same way. The occasions where confusion undoubtedly occurred are, 
taken together, such as to negative any suggestion that there was mere public mistake arising out 
of the similarity of names. Like the persons managing the companies the public generally saw the 
companies as a group being run as one entity. Subsequently both receivers and liquidators have 
faced the same difficulty arising in part out of the history of the operations of the company and 
also because of the recognition that they did run as one enterprise. To separate them now would be 
to belatedly recognise a legal separation which has never in fact operated. It would be to prefer 
some creditors over others and to do so fortuitously since there does not seem to have been any 
principle on which the activities of the company were divided and also to fortuitously prefer 
certain shareholders over others. Much more significantly, it would allow shareholders who were 
no doubt participating in the enterprise as a whole in the case of one of the companies, to recover 
at the expense of the creditors. Justice and equity are terms which would normally involve equality 
of treatment taking into account all the surrounding circumstances. Against the background of the 
operations of this group of companies, I think it would be unjust and inequitable both to 
shareholders and creditors to allow their liquidation separately, thus preferring some fortuitously 
as against others and, further, separating out activities which have always in the past operated 
together.”125 
 
An interesting point which the court also had to consider was the position of one of the 
creditors who had a claim against one of the subsidiaries. In addition, that creditor 
obtained security from the holding company of that subsidiary in the form of guarantee. 
The creditor under normal circumstances, i.e. in the absence of a pooling order, would 
have had a claim against both the companies as long as it did not receive a total dividend 
of above 100 cents/$. The creditor therefore requested the court to impose a condition to 
the pooling order in terms of which both claims would be preserved. The court looked at 
the intention behind the relevant section in the Companies Act and held that the intention 
behind pooling orders was to confirm the practice whereby various companies were 
managed as if they were one entity. The court further held that it would not be 
appropriate to preserve the separate identity of two of the companies in the group so that 
the creditor still had two claims. This would, according to the court, not be consistent 
with the order which the court granted.126 The court does, however, accept that there 
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could be appropriate circumstances which could justify the right to preserve different 
grounds to claim against members of the group.127 
 
7.4 The United States of America 
The insolvency law of the United States of America also provides for pooling orders 
albeit under a different name, that is substantive consolidation orders under the United 
States Bankruptcy Code.128 There is, however, no specific provision as in the New 
Zealand Companies Act but the remedy has been developed by the judiciary. The first 
case which allowed a consolidation of assets order was the United States Supreme Court 
decision of Sampsell v Imperial Paper & Color Corporation.129 Although the case dealt 
with the consolidation of the assets of the (natural person) shareholder and a company he 
controlled the same principle would apply to a holding company controlling a subsidiary 
company. In the Sampsell case a creditor of the Downey Wallpaper & Paint Co sought an 
order which would prioritise his claim against the company after a previous court order 
directed the consolidation of the assets of the Downey company and the assets of 
Downey, who together with his wife and son were the only shareholders of the company. 
The United States Supreme Court held as follows: 
“That conclusion, of course, does not mean that the order consolidating the estates did, or in the 
absence of the respondent as a party, could determine what priority, if any, it had to the corporate 
assets […]. [C]reditors of the corporation normally would be entitled to satisfy their claims out of 
corporate assets prior to any participation by the creditors of the stockholder. […] Such priority, 
however, would be denied if the corporation’s creditors were parties to a fraudulent transfer of the 
stockholder’s assets to the corporation […] where the transfer was fraudulent or where the 
relationship between the stockholder and the corporation was such as to justify the use of the 
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summary proceedings to absorb the corporate assets into the bankruptcy estate of the stockholder. 
[T]he corporation’s unsecured creditors would have the burden of showing that their equity was 
paramount in order to obtain priority as respects the corporate assets. [T]he power of the 
bankruptcy court to subordinate claims or to adjudicate equities arising out of the relationship 
between the several creditors is complete.”130 
 
In Gulfco Investment Corporation and Others v Hogan131 Gulfco had a number of 
subsidiaries of which two were relevant in the case. A court order was previously granted 
in terms of which the assets of Gulfco and its subsidiaries were consolidated and 
attached. The main issues on appeal were the fact that the substantive consolidation 
order, which the court a quo granted, would have resulted firstly in the secured creditors 
losing their secured rights, secondly the loss of guarantees which were given within the 
group structure and thirdly the fact that the assets and liabilities of the various companies 
were consolidated for reorganisation purposes. The main reasoning behind the decision of 
the court a quo to ignore the secured creditors’ rights was that of accounting difficulties 
which arose and would arise if the rights were maintained. The accounts of the various 
companies within the group were so intertwined and difficult to distinguish that this fact 
outweighed the equitable problems which could arise for individual creditors. The trial 
court further held that transactions within the group were not at arm’s length and were 
not recorded and as such it was very difficult to evaluate the financial position of each 
company. The court a quo further held that the two most important subsidiaries, Delta 
Mortgage Corporation and Horseshoe Development Corporation, had creditors who 
believed that these two companies were in fact solvent due to the accounting chaos that 
existed in the group.  
Regarding the rights of the secured creditors the Court of Appeals, Second Circuit held: 
“The earlier decision by this court in this identical case ought to have settled the proposition that 
secured creditors cannot be reduced to the status of unsecured creditors absent some compelling 
reason, like fraud, for such a drastic change. The district court has said that the security, shares in 
Horseshoe, will be difficult to appraise and evaluate. This, however, does not furnish a reason to 
classify the claim as an unsecured one. Criteria such as administrative convenience, expediency 
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and accounting difficulties are not adequate to warrant treatment of a secured creditor as an 
unsecured creditor. Nor is the awareness by the creditor of the existence of related corporations 
sufficient to destroy the creditor's security absent circumstances like fraud.The Pratts are not 
entitled to have their security, that is, the shares of Horseshoe, destroyed because such action 
happens to be convenient or because such action avoids accounting or valuation difficulties. Thus 
the consolidation order is not to be used in order to destroy otherwise valid security in Horseshoe 
stock. The general rule is that when a person sells his shares in the corporation he is entitled to 
payment and he is entitled to pursue whatever security may have been taken.”132 
 
In respect of the question of intra-group guarantees the court held that the creditor would 
only have one claim.133 
 
In Soviero v Franklin National Bank of Long Island134 the holding company was Raphan 
Carpet Corporation and it had a number of subsidiary companies. The holding company 
went into bankruptcy and a consolidation order was sought in respect of the assets of the 
subsidiary companies. The holding company took responsibility for the expenses and 
organisation of its subsidiaries. The holding company furthermore informed creditors that 
the holding company and the subsidiaries were a single enterprise and issued a 
consolidated financial statement which listed the assets and liabilities of the whole group 
as that of the holding company. If one of the subsidiary companies incurred losses the 
holding company would stand in for the losses and in the majority of cases the holding 
company accepted liability for the rental agreements of the subsidiaries and in some cases 
also paid the rental of the subsidiaries. It was clear from the facts that the subsidiaries and 
the holding company were in effect one company and thus the liquidator wanted to 
consolidate the assets of all the companies within the group structure. 
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The court in the Soviero case therefore held as follows in respect of whether a 
consolidation of assets should be granted: 
“It is difficult to imagine a better example of commingling of assets and functions and of the 
flagrant disregard of corporate forms than as here demonstrated by the bankrupt. One gains the 
distinct impression that the bankrupt held up the veils of the fourteen collateral corporations 
primarily, if not solely, for the benefit of the tax gatherer, but otherwise completely disregarded 
them. Even Salome's could not have been more diaphanous. On these facts, we are convinced that 
the claims of individual corporate entities advanced for the Affiliates and Realty are ‘without color 
of merit, and a mere pretense’.”135 
 
In Chemical Bank New York Trust Company v Kheel136 the facts showed that a certain 
Kulukundis controlled all the companies which found themselves in bankruptcy, that the 
companies were operated as a single economic enterprise, that funds were moved to and 
fro among the several companies under the control of Kulukundis and various facts 
indicated scant regard for the separate corporate existence of the companies. The 
liquidators of the various companies sought a consolidation order in respect of all the 
assets and liabilities of the various companies under the control of Kulukundis. The bank 
in this case was, however, apprehensive about its secured claim, a mortgage, which it had 
against one of the companies in question. The court held that: 
“The power to consolidate should be used sparingly because of the possibility of unfair treatment 
of creditors of a corporate debtor who have dealt solely with that debtor without knowledge of its 
interrelationship with others. Yet in the rare case such as this, where the interrelationships of the 
group are hopelessly obscured and the time and expense necessary even to attempt to unscramble 
them so substantial as to threaten the realization of any net assets for all the creditors, equity is not 
helpless to reach a rough approximation of justice to some rather than deny any to all. 
 
By the order of consolidation, in effect the intercompany claims of the debtor companies are 
eliminated, the assets of all debtors are treated as common assets and claims of outside creditors 
against any of the debtors are treated as against the common fund, eliminating a large number of 
duplicative claims filed against several debtors by creditors uncertain as to which debtor was 
eventually liable.”137 
                                                           
135
 448. 
136
 Chemical Bank New York Trust Company v Kheel 369 F.2d 845 (1966). 
137
 847, my italics. 
323 
 
 
The court therefore held that the consolidation order was an appropriate one, apparently 
on the basis that the appellant, and in fact other creditors, viewed the companies in the 
Kulukundis stable as a single company. 
 
The Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, again had to decide on the issue of the 
consolidation of assets in In Re Augie/Restivo Baking Company Ltd v Augie/Restivo 
Baking Company Ltd.138 Augie and Restivo were initially two unrelated entities. Union 
Savings Bank was the principal lender to Augie and Manufacturers Hanover Trust 
Company (MHTC) was the principal lender of Restivo. Restivo and Augie entered into 
an agreement on 27 November 1984 in terms whereof Restivo would purchase all the 
shares in Augie and Augie would receive fifty percent of the shares in Restivo. Augie 
retained ownership over all its assets. Union Bank was not aware of the negotiations and 
a few weeks prior to the agreement lent an amount of money to Augie and the inventory, 
equipment and accounts receivable of Augie served as security for the loan. In due course 
Augie was wound up and Restivo became the sole operating company with a single set of 
books and issuing financial statements under the name of Augie/Restivo. Augie was, 
however, not dissolved. MHTC extended further credit to the new entity and received a 
guarantee from Augie in respect of certain property of Augie. Bankruptcy of 
Augie/Restivo followed in April 1986. The consolidation of assets was ordered by the 
trial court which was to the detriment of Union Bank since it effectively subordinated the 
claim of the bank that arose a few weeks prior to the November 1984 agreement to the 
claim of MHTC. Union Bank therefore appealed the decision of the court a quo. 
 
The Appellate Court’s point of departure was to look at the purpose of the consolidation 
of assets, namely the equitable treatment of all the creditors of the different entities 
whose assets and liabilities had been consolidated. The Court of Appeals referred to a 
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number of cases139 where the consolidation of assets was considered by the courts. From 
these cases the Court of Appeal concluded that a consolidation of assets would be granted 
where “creditors dealt with the entities as a single economic unit” and where “the affairs 
of the debtors are so entangled that consolidation will benefit all creditors.”140 
 
The court in casu first looked at the single economic unit argument. It held that: 
“With regard to the first factor, creditors who make loans on the basis of the financial status of a 
separate entity expect to be able to look to the assets of their particular borrower for satisfaction of 
that loan. Such lenders structure their loans according to their expectations regarding that borrower 
and do not anticipate either having the assets of a more sound company available in the case of 
insolvency or having the creditors of a less sound debtor  compete for the borrower's assets. Such 
expectations create significant equities. Moreover, lenders' expectations are central to the 
calculation of interest rates and other terms of loans, and fulfilling those expectations is therefore 
important to the efficiency of credit markets. Such efficiency will be undermined by imposing 
substantive consolidation in circumstances in which creditors believed they were dealing with 
separate entities”.141 
Based on the above statement the Court of Appeals held that the consolidation of assets 
was not justified in casu because Union provided loans to Augie solely on the financial 
position of Augie and at the time that the specific loan in question was made, Union was 
unaware of the negotiations between Augie and Restivo. MHTC also was under the 
impression that it dealt with two separate entities. The court then held that “[g]iven these 
circumstances, the fact that the trade creditors may have believed that they were dealing 
with a single entity does not justify consolidation.”142 
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The court then looked at the second basis for consolidation, namely where there was a 
commingling of the businesses of the different companies as well as their assets. In this 
respect the court cautioned against reflex reactions holding: 
“Resort to consolidation in such circumstances, however, should not be Pavlovian. Rather, 
substantive consolidation should be used only after it has been determined that all creditors will 
benefit because untangling is either impossible or so costly as to consume the assets. Otherwise, 
for example, a series of fraudulent conveyances might be viewed as resulting in a ‘commingling’ 
that justified substantive consolidation. That consolidation, because it would eliminate all inter-
company claims, would prevent creditors of the transferor from recovering assets from the 
transferee. Commingling, therefore, can justify substantive consolidation only where ‘the time and 
expense necessary even to attempt to unscramble them [are] so substantial as to threaten the 
realization of any net assets for all the creditors,’ Kheel, 369 F.2d at 847; Commercial Envelope, 3 
B.C.D. at 648, or where no accurate identification and allocation of assets is possible. In such 
circumstances, all creditors are better off with substantive consolidation.”143 
 
The court a quo ordered a consolidation of assets of Augie and Restivo on the basis that a 
merger between the two companies had taken place. The Court of Appeals rejected this 
since there was no legal merger due to the fact that the relevant merger laws of New York 
were not complied with, both companies continued to exist, i.e. neither was dissolved and 
lastly the assets of Augie were never transferred.144 There was also not a de facto merger 
according to the Court of Appeals. 
 
The court a quo held further that the consolidation would be to the benefit of the creditors 
of the two companies. The Court of Appeals rejected this view. It held that in the absence 
of the commingling of assets and the businesses of the two companies and where the 
creditors provided loans to the entities with the knowledge that they were two separate 
entities, the court cannot grant a consolidation order.145 It is clear the court here looked at 
the consolidation of assets as an exception and that there should be facts to support a 
consolidation order. In the absence of indiciae pointing to consolidation it would not be 
equitable to order a consolidation of assets. 
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Equity or fairness to (all) creditors would appear to be the ultimate goal of a 
consolidation order but the order must also be based on certain criteria. Equity itself 
would not be sufficient as illustrated by the Augie/Restivo case. The Augie/Restivo 
decision confirmed the approach of the court in In re Commercial Envelope 
Manufacturing Co Inc, Business Envelope Manufacturers Inc, Business Envelope 
Manufacturers of Tennessee Inc, Business Envelope Manufacturers of California Inc146 
where the consolidation of the assets of related entities was also sought. On the facts 
before the court there was a clear commingling of the assets and businesses of the various 
related entities which made it (virtually) impossible to distinguish between the assets and 
businesses of the respective entities. The court held that there should be a balancing of 
interests between some creditors who would be prejudiced by a consolidation order and 
the interests of those creditors who would be favoured by a consolidation. It referred to 
the Chemical Bank New York Trust Company v Kheel147 case and specifically the passage 
which held that it would be better to “reach a rough approximation of justice to some 
rather than deny any to all.”148 
 
In In re Lewellyn149 an application was brought before the Bankruptcy Court for the 
substantive consolidation of the estates of Lewellyn and GV Lewellyn & Company Inc. 
From the facts it appeared that there was no distinction made by Lewellyn between his 
personal business and assets and those of the company he controlled. There was a 
commingling of funds and a virtual impossibility to decipher the accounts of both the 
shareholder and the company. With reference to a number of cases150 the court held that 
there should firstly be a need to consolidate and secondly it must be shown that 
substantive consolidation would be fair to creditors. With reference to the Chemical Bank 
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v Kheel151 case where there was one creditor who objected to the consolidation of assets 
based on the fact that he relied solely on the credit of one entity and not on that of the 
group, the court in Llewellyn referred to an opinion of one of the judges in the Chemical 
Bank case who stated that “equality among creditors who have lawfully bargained for 
different treatment is not equity but its opposite.”152 Based on all the available facts it was 
clear to the court that the consolidation of assets outweighed any prejudice there may 
have been to individual creditors of any of the parties in the bankruptcy proceedings.153  
 
The Federal Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in In Re Owens Corning,154  had the 
opportunity to settle the apparent mess in which the bankruptcy courts had found 
themselves in respect of consolidation orders. In this case the holding company was 
Owens Corning of Delaware (OCD), which was in the asbestos business and had a 
number of subsidiary companies, each incorporated for a specific reason. Each subsidiary 
observed the required governance requirements and the financial statements and business 
records of intercompany transactions were all, by and large, properly kept and maintained 
There was no state of confusion between the different sets of accounting records as in 
other cases where consolidation was ordered. In 1997 the holding company sought a $2 
billion loan which was granted by a consortium of banks, amongst others Credit Suisse 
First Boston. The subsidiary companies of OCD had to provide guarantees for this loan to 
serve as security. The banks took special care to protect their securities by the 
subsidiaries by limiting the manner in which the holding company could deal with its 
subsidiaries. The holding company could, for example, not enter into transactions with its 
subsidiaries which would cause losses for the respective subsidiary companies. The 
subsidiary companies also gave undertakings to operate as separate legal entities and to 
comply with all the governance requirements, including financial requirements. 
Subsidiaries could also not merge with other subsidiaries nor could they be merged into 
the holding company. 
 
                                                           
151
 Above. 
152
 251. 
153
 253. 
154
 In Re Owens Corning 419 F. 3d 195 (3rd Circuit Delaware 2005). 
328 
 
In 2000 there was increased litigation against OCD based on asbestos related injuries. 
The holding company and a number of subsidiaries applied to reorganise their businesses 
in terms of the bankruptcy code. Nearly two and a half years later the relevant companies 
and some of the unsecured creditors came up with a reorganisation plan in terms of which 
substantive consolidation of the assets and liabilities of the holding company and the 
subsidiaries would take place. The effect of such a plan would be that all the separate 
guarantees of the subsidiaries would be consolidated into one obligation of the debtors as 
a whole. Naturally the consortium of banks opposed the proposed reorganisation plan 
since all their guarantees against the respective companies in the group would disappear 
and instead they would only have one consolidated claim against the group as a whole. 
 
The trial court granted a consolidation order based on its conclusion that the holding 
company and the wholly owned subsidiaries were one company and that there was no 
evidence to show that the banks relied on the separate creditworthiness of each individual 
company when they sought their security for the $2 billion loan. Consolidation would 
also, according to the court a quo, simplify and accelerate the whole bankruptcy process 
to ensure its smooth completion. The consolidation of assets and liabilities would 
furthermore also not render it necessary to untangle the financial affairs of all the 
involved companies. The consortium of banks appealed this decision. 
 
The point of departure of the Court of Appeals was to look at the reasons for substantive 
consolidation. The court concluded that the power emanates from the common law and 
was based on equity.155 It looked at the existence of the doctrine next to the piercing of 
the corporate veil doctrine and the remedy of setting aside dispositions which preferred 
certain creditors above others. It started off with the Sampsell case156 and then also 
referred to the differences between the substantive consolidation order and the piercing of 
the corporate veil doctrine. 
“‘Piercing the corporate veil’ makes shareholders liable for corporate wrongs. Equitable 
subordination places bad-acting creditors behind other creditors when distributions are made. 
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Turnover and fraudulent transfer bring back to the transferor debtor assets improperly transferred 
to another (often an affiliate). Substantive consolidation goes in a direction different (and in most 
cases further) than any of these remedies; it is not limited to shareholders, it affects distribution to 
innocent creditors, and it mandates more than the return of specific assets to the predecessor 
owner. It brings all the assets of a group of entities into a single survivor. Indeed, it merges 
liabilities as well. ‘The result,’ to repeat, ‘is that claims of creditors against separate debtors morph 
to claims against the consolidated survivor.’ The bad news for certain creditors is that, instead of 
looking to assets of the subsidiary with whom they dealt, they now must share those assets with all 
creditors of all consolidated entities, raising the specter for some of a significant distribution 
diminution.”157 
 
The court looked at the Augie/Restivo case158 and In re Auto-Train159 to determine the 
bases of the decisions which ultimately led to other courts following these two decisions. 
The basis of the Augie/Restivo decision was that substantive consolidation would be 
granted by the court in those cases where creditors contracted with the group on the basis 
that it was a single entity or where the business affairs of the respective companies were 
so intertwined and entangled that a substantive consolidation order would be to the 
benefit of all the creditors.160 The court in the Auto-Train case held that substantive 
consolidation would be granted where use was made of the “substantial identity” of the 
companies in the group test, regardless of the fact that the creditors did not rely or view 
the entities as a single one but that the advantages of consolidating the assets and 
liabilities outweighed the possible disadvantages.161 
 
The court in casu rejected the Auto-Train decision since this would not be equitable. If a 
creditor relied on the separate juristic personality of an entity “consolidation cannot be 
justified vis-à-vis the claims of that creditor.”162 The court also rejected the checklist 
approach which a number of courts have adopted when confronted with an application 
for substantive consolidation. 
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“Too often the factors in a checklist fail to separate the unimportant from the important, or even to 
set out a standard to make the attempt. This often results in rote following of a form containing 
factors where courts tally up and spit out a score without an eye on the principles that give the 
rationale for substantive consolidation (and why, as a result, it should so seldom be in play). 
(‘Differing tests with a myriad of factors run the risk that courts will miss the forest for the trees. 
Running down factors as a check list can lead a court to lose sight of why we have substantive 
consolidation in the first instance [...] and often [to] fail [to] identify a metric by which [it] can [...] 
[assess] the relative importance among the factors. The [...] [result is] resort to ad hoc balancing 
without a steady eye on the [...] [principles] to be advanced’).”163  
 
The court instead held that there are certain overarching principles which should be taken 
into account when a court is requested to order a substantive consolidation of the assets 
and liabilities of (related) entities. These principles include: the limitation of liability by 
respecting entity separateness as the point of departure and that courts should respect 
entity separateness unless there were compelling circumstances to ignore the separate 
identity of each company; the mere fact that consolidation would be beneficial to the 
administration of the case could not be seen as a harm where a court needed to interfere; 
substantive consolidation is an extreme remedy and one of last resort after considering 
and rejecting other remedies. The last principle is that substantive consolidation may only 
be used defensively to remedy the identifiable harms caused by entangled affairs. It may 
not be used as a sword, for example, to have as a primary purpose to disadvantage a 
group of creditors or to alter creditor rights.164 
 
The court then proposed that the test for substantive consolidation should be: 
“The upshot is this. In our Court what must be proven (absent consent) concerning the entities for 
whom substantive consolidation is sought is that (i) prepetition they disregarded separateness so 
significantly their creditors relied on the breakdown of entity borders and treated them as one legal 
entity, or (ii) postpetition their assets and liabilities are so scrambled that separating them is 
prohibitive and hurts all creditors.”165 
It stated further that: 
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“Proponents of substantive consolidation have the burden of showing one or the other rationale for 
consolidation. The second rationale needs no explanation. The first, however, is more nuanced. A 
prima facie case for it typically exists when, based on the parties' prepetition dealings, a proponent 
proves corporate disregard creating contractual expectations of creditors that they were dealing 
with debtors as one indistinguishable entity. Proponents who are creditors must also show that, in 
their prepetition course of dealing, they actually and reasonably relied on debtors' supposed unity. 
Creditor opponents of consolidation can nonetheless defeat a prima facie showing under the first 
rationale if they can prove they are adversely affected and actually relied on debtors' separate 
existence.”166 
 
The court then applied its own test to the facts at hand. In respect of the first basis the 
court held that it was clear that, when one looked at what occurred prior to the initial 
application for consolidation, the consortium of banks and the holding company as well 
always treated and viewed all the companies within the group as distinct separate juristic 
persons. In respect of the second basis of a commingling of assets the court also held that 
there was no evidence to support such an allegation.167 
 
The court then concluded with a statement as to what equity in the context of substantive 
consolidation means. 
“Substantive consolidation at its core is equity. Its exercise must lead to an equitable result. 
“Communizing” assets of affiliated companies to one survivor to feed all creditors of all 
companies may to some be equal (and hence equitable). But it is hardly so for those creditors who 
have lawfully bargained prepetition for unequal treatment by obtaining guarantees of separate 
entities. No principled, or even plausible, reason exists to undo OCD's and the Banks' arms-length 
negotiation and lending arrangement, especially when to do so punishes the very parties that 
conferred the prepetition benefit - a $2 billion loan unsecured by OCD and guaranteed by others 
only in part. To overturn this bargain, set in place by OCD's own pre-loan choices of 
organizational form, would cause chaos in the marketplace, as it would make this case the 
Banquo's ghost of bankruptcy.”168 
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The court also held that the purpose behind an order ordering substantive consolidation is 
meant to be defensive to provide a shield. In casu the creditors who applied for the order 
were attempting to use it as a weapon to gain an advantage over other secured creditors 
and this was not justified.169 
 
Prior to the Owens Corning judgment in 2005 the position in the United States in respect 
of the substantive consolidation of assets was very uncertain. It would appear that courts 
used a number of ad hoc tests to reach an equitable result which led to uncertainty.170 The 
Owens Corning decision has apparently brought much needed clarity and principle to the 
powers of the court to grant substantive consolidation orders, although it would appear 
that the courts will now be more circumspect before they will grant such orders.171 In the 
South African context the effect of the Owens Corning case could be that a consolidation 
order may be used in a single economic entity situation to protect the interests of 
concurrent creditors, but not to defeat the interests of secured creditors who had based 
their security on the existence of the holding company and subsidiaries as separate 
entities. 
 
7.5 Australian law 
7.5.1 Introduction 
The law of insolvency in Australia, prior to the introduction of the Corporations Act of 
2001, neither provided the statutory power to order the pooling of assets like its New 
Zealand counterpart 172 nor the common-law power which the United States courts have 
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developed.173 It was, however, possible that a voluntary pooling of assets may take place 
under certain circumstances.174 
 
In Dean-Wilcocks v Soluble Solution Hydroponics (Pty) Ltd175 the sole director, secretary 
and controller of both companies died and the companies were liquidated. An 
administrator was subsequently appointed. At the relevant meetings of the creditors of 
both companies it was decided to pool the assets and liabilities. All the creditors of the 
respective companies attended the respective meetings except for the Inland Revenue 
Service.  
 
Due to the death of the sole director and controller of the two companies the liquidator 
found it difficult to wind up the companies. Furthermore, there was a clear commingling 
of the affairs of the two companies which was difficult to untangle due to the death of 
their controlling shareholder. The liquidator therefore applied for the pooling order in 
terms of the Corporations Law which provided that a court could grant an order granting 
the liquidator a(ny) power if such power is “just and beneficial”.176 
 
The court had a number of problems with granting an order which would provide the 
liquidator with the power to consolidate the assets and liabilities of the two companies. 
The first problem was the position of the respective concurrent creditors, namely whether 
the pari passu principle of payment would be disturbed, and if so, whether the 
disadvantaged creditors agreed to this. Since the Receiver of Revenue did not attend the 
meetings, an order could not be granted. In effect the Receiver of Revenue had to indicate 
that he had no objection to the proposed power of the liquidator to consolidate.177 
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The second problem which the court envisaged is that it would be difficult to have 
creditors’ meetings since it would be difficult to establish which creditor is a creditor of 
which company. The effect would be that if there were to be a creditors’ meeting it would 
be difficult to determine whether the requisite majority had voted in favour of a 
resolution or whether a person voted on a matter and he was not authorised to do so since 
he was not a creditor. In terms of the Corporations Law, however, the court held that it 
could grant an order in respect of the manner of the bankruptcy process.178 Despite the 
problems which the court foresaw, it granted the order to the applicant on condition that 
the Receiver of Revenue had to consent to such order. 
 
In Re Charter Travel Co Ltd179 the same court and judge as in the Dean-Wilcocks case180 
had another opportunity to consider an application for the consolidation of the assets of 
two companies. CTC Package Holidays Pty Ltd was the subsidiary of Charter Travel Co 
Ltd. Both these companies in turn were subsidiaries of Black Sea Shipping Co Ltd. The 
two subsidiaries of Black Sea Shipping were being wound up and an order to consolidate 
their respective assets was sought by the respective liquidators. 
 
The court confirmed that an order for the consolidation of two companies in liquidation 
would only be granted in exceptional cases where it is to the advantage of the creditors. 
On the facts it was clear that the respective creditors of each company were not easily 
discernable and even if they were, this would be a time consuming process. 
Consolidation would also be practical and beneficial for the creditors since expensive 
litigation would be avoided.181 Consolidation was therefore ordered. 
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The Federal Court of Australia also had an opportunity to consider the consolidation of 
the assets and liabilities of companies within a group of companies in Mentha and Others 
v G E Capital Ltd and Another.182 The case involved a number of companies in the DIM 
Group of companies. If all the companies in the group were to be wound up it would have 
resulted in the unsecured creditors receiving between 0 cents and 45.7 cents in the dollar 
depending on which company in the group was the debtor. 
 
The court considered part 5.3A of the Corporations Law which provided that an insolvent 
company could be administered in such a manner that would secure a better dividend for 
its creditors than would result from an immediate liquidation. The liquidators of the 
companies in the group were of the opinion that the most advantageous option for the 
creditors of the companies was to enter into an arrangement in terms of which all the 
assets and liabilities of the group members would be transferred to the holding company. 
The court approved the arrangement based on the advantage to all the unsecured creditors 
and the fact that the secured creditors would not lose their securities. The court, rightly, 
left open the question whether a consolidation order could be granted in cases of 
insolvent companies in liquidation, since the case at hand did not involve an application 
to consolidate the assets of the companies in liquidation but an order for an arrangement 
of the affairs of the companies.183 
 
Due to the lack of suitable remedies for creditors of an insolvent subsidiary company in 
Australian law, especially remedies against the holding company, various committees 
investigated possible law reform regarding the liability of the holding company for the 
debts of the subsidiary company. Two of these committees were the committee that 
produced the Harmer Report and the Australian Companies & Securities Advisory 
Committee. Some of the considerations and possible reforms measures of these two 
committees will be investigated below. 
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7.5.2 Calls for reform: the Harmer Report  
As illustrated above and from the available resources it would appear that the Australian 
law of insolvency only recognised the pooling of assets in very limited circumstances. In 
depth investigations were undertaken to determine whether the New Zealand or United 
States models of contribution orders and pooling orders should be adopted in Australia.184  
 
There were recommendations made by the Harmer Report that courts should have the 
power to grant orders which would authorise contribution orders, namely orders that one 
company in a group must make a contribution to the creditors of an insolvent member of 
that company group. It was suggested that the court should take into account various 
factors to determine whether it was satisfied that such order was justified. These factors 
were: 
“[T]he extent to which the related company took part in the management of the [insolvent] 
company; 
The conduct of the related company towards the creditors of the company and; 
The extent to which the circumstances that gave rise to the winding-up of the company are 
attributable to the actions of the related company.”185 
 
The Law Commission of Australia, however, was reported as being opposed to the 
proposal and its opposition was based on the following factors: 
“Separate entity principle. It is a fundamental principle of company law that separate companies 
have separate legal entities. However, as a matter of policy, the Commission sees no reasonable 
objection to recommending the imposition of liability where a parent company 
permits its subsidiary to incur debts when insolvent. 
Project financing. Financing for large resource and other projects needs to be done on a limited 
recourse basis, but that, under the Commission’s proposal, it would not be possible for a parent 
company to satisfy itself that it would not be liable for the debts of the project. However, the fact 
that creditors have entered into contracts on a limited recourse basis would be one of the ‘other 
relevant matters’ to which the court is required to have regard.  
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Uncertainty. Uncertainty in commercial dealings that would be created by the wide discretion 
given to the court would be undesirable. Lenders would be unable to ascertain the true liabilities of 
parent companies and could be expected to assume that at least some unguaranteed  liabilities of 
subsidiaries should be taken into account. However, persons lending to the parent of a group of 
companies have regard not only to its balance sheet but to the consolidated balance sheet of the 
group and generally take cross-collateralised security. The Commission does not accept therefore 
that the suggested uncertainty would follow from its proposal. Moreover liability for a 
subsidiary’s debts otherwise than under a guarantee would only arise in the context of the 
Commission’s recommendations where that subsidiary was or became insolvent. 
Accounts. Auditors and company directors would have enormous difficulty in producing accounts 
which represent a true and fair view of a parent company. However, the Commission does not 
accept that accounting difficulties are sufficiently serious to deter it from recommending the 
imposition of liability on a parent company which has permitted its subsidiary to trade while 
insolvent.”186 
 
In respect of pooling orders the Harmer Report recommended that the same factors for 
contribution orders should be adopted in respect of pooling orders.187 According to the 
Harmer Report a pooling order would be administratively convenient where there had 
been a commingling of the affairs of the companies within the same group.188 The 
proposal in respect of pooling orders, furthermore, included firstly the power of the 
appropriate court to appoint one liquidator to conduct the winding-up of the various 
companies in the group of companies which would ensure in theory a more efficient 
winding-up process. Secondly, the report recommended that the position of secured 
creditors should not be prejudiced by a pooling order. Thirdly the court should have the 
power to order a conditional pooling of assets where an equal distribution of assets would 
cause an injustice. 
 
Subsequently in 2000, the Companies and Securities Advisory Committee on Corporate 
Groups189 was of the view that there should be a balance between the interests of the 
respective creditors of the various companies within a group and those of the 
shareholders.  
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“A clearer balance of interests, and reduction of uncertainty, in pooling might be achieved by 
expressly providing that: 
pooling orders should not affect the rights of external secured creditors to enforce their securities, 
except those that depend on retaining the separate identity of the group companies in liquidation. 
The court should retain a discretion to protect those latter creditors, where appropriate. Also, a 
secured creditor with an insufficient security should be able to claim as an unsecured creditor for 
the remaining debt from the remaining pooled assets of the group. 
The court should have a discretionary power to provide for different creditors of companies in 
liquidation to receive different levels of return in appropriate circumstances. This power might be 
used, for instance, to exclude from the pooling arrangements, and uphold according to their terms, 
various supply or limited recourse project financing arrangements entered into with clearly 
identified particular group companies on arm's length commercial terms.”190 
  
Pooling orders were subsequently implemented in Australia as will be referred to below. 
 
7.5.3 Australian Companies & Securities Advisory Committee 
7.5.3.1 A possible “opt-in” provision to be considered 
An option which was considered in 2000 by the Australian Companies & Securities 
Advisory Committee191 in respect of corporate groups was a statutory opt-in provision in 
respect of company groups with a corresponding stick and carrot approach. This regime 
would be entirely voluntary and permit a holding company and its subsidiary companies 
to decide to be treated as one entity or company. The incentive would be in the form of 
tax advantages where the holding company can write off the assessed losses of the 
subsidiary company or companies.  
 
Advantages in terms of labour law could also be offered by a similar proposal in a South 
African context. For example, should the business of one subsidiary be transferred to a 
fellow subsidiary or to the holding company, there would be no transfer of an 
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undertaking for purposes of section 197 of the Labour Relations Act.192 A retrenchment 
exercise pursuant to a transfer of an undertaking is automatically unfair in terms of the 
Labour Relations Act.193 If the companies within a group, however, form one entity, there 
would be no transfer and a retrenchment exercise would not be automatically unfair, 
since the employees would remain with the same employer. The stick part of this 
approach for the holding company would be a provision similar in nature to the statutory 
liability of directors of personal liability companies.194  
 
A statutory provision to give effect to this approach, on an opt-in basis, could read as 
follows: 
“A holding company may provide in its Memorandum of Incorporation that it shall be jointly and 
severally liable, together with a named subsidiary company, for such debts and liabilities of the 
subsidiary company as are or were contracted during the period that the subsidiary was a subsidiary 
company of that holding company.”
This approach only focuses on contractual debts and not delictual liability, criminal 
liability or any statutory obligations.195 The reason for this restriction is that these debts 
would be, to an extent, under the control of the holding company, unlike debts in the case 
of delictual creditors. It is therefore a deterrent to opt into a system of a single entity, but 
on the other hand the extent of the liability is largely under the control of the holding 
company which is then aware of the possible future risks. The proverbial carrot of tax 
relief may then just be sufficient to justify incurring the risk of joint and several liability 
with the subsidiary company for the debts of the subsidiary company. However, it has 
been shown that this option is not popular in Germany and it is doubtful whether it would 
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be viable in South Africa, since the possible advantages appear to be outweighed by the 
potential risks of liability.196  
 
7.5.3.2 Breach of fiduciary duties 
Another possibility which the Australian Companies & Securities Advisory Committee 
considered, which is not restricted to cases of insolvency, is the setting aside of 
agreements between the subsidiary company and the holding company or other 
companies within the group, on the basis that those agreements constitute a breach of the 
fiduciary duties of the directors of the subsidiary company.197 A breach of a fiduciary 
duty by a director provides a company with a number of remedies, depending on the 
agreement which gave rise to the breach of the fiduciary duty. The company may claim 
damages, by a claim which is neither contractual nor delictual, but sui generis.198  
 
As part of his fiduciary duty, a director has a duty of good faith.199 This duty, generally 
speaking, entails that a director has to act, at all times, in good faith and in the interest of 
the company of which he is a director.200 If the subsidiary company comes under pressure 
from the holding company to transfer assets to the holding company or to provide soft 
loans, which would be detrimental to the financial position of the subsidiary company, 
and the directors of the subsidiary company acquiesce, this could constitute a breach of 
their fiduciary duties by the directors of the subsidiary company. Their fiduciary duties 
are owed to the subsidiary and not to the holding company since both are separate legal 
entities.201 In Walker v Wimborne202 the High Court of Australia said the following 
regarding the duties of the directors of a company: 
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“The creditor of a company, whether it be a member of a "group" of companies in the accepted 
sense of that term or not, must look to that company for payment.”203 
 
The report of the Australian Companies & Securities Advisory Committee on corporate 
groups204 refers to the case of Parker v NRMA205 where it was held that: 
“The directors of each company [in a corporate group] owed separate duties to each [company]. It 
was not open to the directors to ignore these separate duties or to conceive of themselves as owing 
a higher, larger or broader duty to the group.”206 
 
From the above cases it is clear that the fiduciary duties are owed to the company of 
which the relevant person is a director.207 In cases where the holding company, however, 
advances credit to its subsidiary the position is slightly easier, since the subsidiary is an 
asset of the holding company. By improving the financial stability of the subsidiary or 
concluding any transaction which benefits the subsidiary company, the holding company 
should, in theory, derive a benefit from this transaction and therefore the directors of the 
holding company would conceivably act in the interests of the holding company. If 
members of the board of the holding company are also directors of the subsidiary 
company, they also appear to have acted in the interest of the subsidiary company. 
 
The more problematic cases are those where a subsidiary is forced by the holding 
company into upward or horizontal transactions, namely agreements with the holding 
company or agreements with co-subsidiary companies. Where the interests of the 
subsidiary company are not served, the directors of the subsidiary would be breaching 
their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the subsidiary. Since the holding 
company or the co-subsidiary companies, on a balance of probabilities, should know that 
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the directors of the subsidiary company are breaching their fiduciary duty, the particular 
transactions could be set aside due to this breach, notwithstanding the fact that the 
transaction did not lead to the insolvency of the subsidiary company.208 
 
Although there is a theoretical possibility of setting aside transactions of an insolvent 
subsidiary due to impeachable preferences in terms of the Insolvency Act209 or due to 
breaches of fiduciary duty by the directors of the company, the practical application is 
problematic. As with dispositions between spouses,210 depending on the state of the 
companies’ accounting records, it may be extremely difficult to distinguish the assets of 
the holding company and those of the subsidiary company.211 Creditors of an insolvent 
subsidiary will have to prove the impeachable dispositions without necessarily having 
recourse to all the facts in respect of the assets of the respective companies within the 
group. The agreements between companies within a group could also be numerous and 
complex which would complicate the evidentiary burden on a creditor. 
 
In Qintex Australia Finance Ltd v Schroders Australia Ltd212 the court made the 
following observation in respect of transactions involving company groups, especially the 
difficulties facing creditors of a company within the group structure: 
“As I see it, there is today a tension between the realities of commercial life and the applicable law 
in circumstances such as those in this case. In the everyday rush and bustle of commercial life in 
the last decade it was seldom that participants to transactions involving conglomerates with a large 
number of subsidiaries paused to consider which of the subsidiaries should become the contracting 
party.  
 
It may be desirable for parliament to consider whether this distinction between the law and 
commercial practice should be maintained. This is especially the case today when the many 
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collapses of conglomerates occasion many disputes. Regularly, liquidators of subsidiaries, or of 
the holding company, come to court to argue as to which of their charges bears the liability.”213 
 
The Australian courts have recognised the commercial difficulties in unravelling intra-
group transactions. A creditor could lack proper information when dealing with a 
company within a group. First of all it may be possible that he is not aware that a 
company forms part of a group. Secondly in cases of insolvency the liquidator will often 
have to incur substantial legal expenses to have certain intra-group transactions set aside, 
either based on breach of fiduciary duty by the directors of the subsidiary company or on 
the basis that those transactions constitute impeachable dispositions. As shown before 
this is not really a solution. Prior to a liquidator approaching a court for an order to set 
aside an intra-group disposition he will have to conduct a thorough investigation of the 
merits of the claim which prejudices creditors of the insolvent company, since they have 
to wait until the end of the investigation, and thereafter the litigation, before they are able 
to recover (part of) their claims. Even if the liquidator is successful it will be highly 
unlikely that a creditor will receive a substantial portion of his original claim. 
 
A further problem for creditors is that the voiding of a transaction, where a director of a 
subsidiary company breached his duties to the company by entering into ill-conceived 
transactions with the holding company, will bring about nothing more than possible 
restitution and a return of the performance by the subsidiary. It was pointed out that the 
new South African Companies Act provides that a director should not knowingly cause 
harm to the company or to its subsidiary company.214 Where this occurs the harm which 
may be suffered by the subsidiary will only be recoverable under this statutory remedy 
from the director who acted contrary to his duties and not from the holding company.215 
This remedy is therefore of limited application. 
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It appears that the Harmer Report and the investigations of the Australian Companies & 
Securities Advisory Committee influenced the Australian legislature to some extent when 
it drafted the Corporations Act of 2001, especially since the legislature recognised 
pooling orders as well as the liability of the holding company for the debts of its insolvent 
subsidiary in certain circumstances. 
 
7.5.4 The Corporations Act of 2001 
The Australian legislature provides for the pooling of assets and liabilities of the 
companies within a group of companies.216 Furthermore the legislature inserted a 
provision which would make the holding company liable for the debts of the subsidiary 
company in certain circumstances.217 The provisions of the Corporations Act, however, 
only apply to debts incurred when the subsidiary is already insolvent218 and do not cover 
the relationship between subsidiaries inter se or a subsidiary being liable for the debts of 
the holding company.219 The provisions of the Corporations Act in respect of liability 
within a group therefore only apply in a very narrow set of circumstances. 
 
The Corporations Act makes provision for circumstances under which a holding company 
could be held liable for insolvent trading by its subsidiary.220 Section 588V of the 
Corporations Act provides that: 
 “(1)  A corporation contravenes this section if:  
(a)  the corporation is the holding company of a company at the time when the company 
incurs a debt; and  
(b)  the company is insolvent at that time, or becomes insolvent by incurring that debt, or 
by incurring at that time debts including that debt; and  
(c)  at that time, there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the company is 
insolvent, or would so become insolvent, as the case may be; and                       
 (d)  one or both of the following subparagraphs applies:  
(i)  the corporation, or one or more of its directors, is or are aware at that time 
that there are such grounds for so suspecting;  
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(ii)  having regard to the nature and extent of the corporation's control over the 
company's affairs and to any other relevant circumstances, it is reasonable to 
expect that:  
(A)  a holding company in the corporation's circumstances would be so aware; 
or 
(B)  one or more of such a holding company's directors would be so aware; and  
(e)  that time is at or after the commencement of this Act.  
               (2)  A corporation that contravenes this section is not guilty of an offence. “ 
From the wording of the relevant provisions221 of the Corporations Act, it would appear 
that liability would be incurred by the holding company if the subsidiary is insolvent at 
the time of incurring the debt or the debt causes the insolvency and there are suspicions 
that the subsidiary is insolvent.222 “Insolvent” means not being able to pay debts as and 
when they become due and payable.223 From the wording of the provision it appears that 
an objective test must be used to determine whether the company is insolvent.224 Whether 
this objective test means the reasonable holding company/director or the reasonable 
person in general is not entirely clear.225 A liquidator has a period of six years, from the 
commencement of the winding-up of the subsidiary company, to recover any debt which 
would be recoverable under the provisions of the Corporations Act.226 
Section 588W provides that: 
              “(1)  Where:  
(a)  a corporation has contravened section 588V in relation to the incurring of a debt by a 
company; and 
(b)  the person to whom the debt is owed has suffered loss or damage in relation to the debt 
because of the company's insolvency; and  
(c)  the debt was wholly or partly unsecured when the loss or damage was suffered; and  
                      (d)  the company is being wound up;  
the company's liquidator may recover from the corporation, as a debt due to the company, an 
amount equal to the amount of the loss or damage.  
(2)  Proceedings under this section may only be begun within 6 years after the beginning of the 
winding up.” 
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The Corporations Act provides defences to the holding company should there be any 
action by the liquidator against them.227 The holding company (and each of its directors) 
could aver that they had reasonable grounds to expect, and in fact did expect, that the 
company was solvent at the time that the debt was incurred and that the company would 
remain solvent even if it incurred the debt and any other debts which it incurred at that 
time.228  
It is also a defence if the holding company and its directors (if any) can prove that at the 
time that the debt was incurred, they reasonably expected that a competent and reliable 
person would provide adequate information about the solvency of the company and that 
the person was fulfilling that responsibility. They therefore expected that the company 
was solvent based on the information of that competent and reliable person and that the 
company would remain solvent even if it incurred the debt and any other debts at that 
time.229  
A further defence for a director would be to show that he was not part of the management 
of the holding company when the subsidiary incurred the debt due to illness or another 
good reason.230 The last available defence is for the holding company to show that it took 
all reasonable steps to prevent the subsidiary company from incurring the debt.231 
The Corporations Act makes specific provision for directors of wholly-owned subsidiary 
companies.232 The Corporations Act provides that: 
“A director of a corporation that is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a body corporate is taken to act 
in good faith in the best interests of the subsidiary if:  
(a)  the constitution of the subsidiary expressly authorises the director to act in the best 
interests of the holding company; and  
(b)  the director acts in good faith in the best interests of the holding company; and  
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(c)  the subsidiary is not insolvent at the time the director acts and does not become 
insolvent because of the director's act.”233  
The provisions of the ACC in respect of the liability of the holding company for the debts 
of the subsidiary company are only applicable in a very narrow set of circumstances. The 
provisions seem very similar to the argument that a holding company could incur liability 
under section 424 of the 1973 Companies Act of South Africa. The Australian legislature 
makes it fairly simple for a creditor to hold the holding company liable but 
simultaneously restricts the applicability of the liability provisions. The discussion of the 
provisions of the Corporations Act has been brief due to the fact that the legislation is 
relatively new and significant cases could not be found. The suitability of the provisions 
of the Corporations Act will be discussed in some detail at the end of this chapter. 
 
7.6 Dutch Law 
This section will examine a few Dutch cases which, prima facie, appear to impose 
delictual liability on the holding company of an insolvent Dutch subsidiary under certain 
circumstances. In the Osby234 case Osby Sweden incorporated a wholly-owned 
subsidiary, Osby Netherlands. The business of the Dutch subsidiary was not successful 
and soon after its incorporation it was already experiencing financial difficulties. The 
holding company provided credit to the subsidiary which in return transferred all of its 
assets, movable and immovable and including future assets, to the holding company as 
security. The other creditors of the subsidiary were not aware of the precarious financial 
position of the subsidiary, nor did they know about the transfer of all the assets as 
security to the holding company. Debts were always duly paid by the subsidiary which to 
the outside world created the impression of a financially stable and expanding company. 
In the end though the subsidiary company went into liquidation, prior to which most of its 
moveable assets were removed and taken to a fellow subsidiary in Germany.  
 
One of the concurrent creditors of Osby Netherlands brought an action to recover its 
losses from the holding company. In the court evidence was presented that the financial 
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position of Osby steadily deteriorated over the five years of its existence. The financial 
position deteriorated to such an extent that the major creditor bank, Algemene Bank 
Nederland, terminated its relationship with Osby in 1967. The Bank of America became 
the banker of the company but demanded that the holding company stood surety. The 
financial position became worse, however. From the facts it was also clear that the 
holding company was directly involved in the management of the subsidiary company 
and determined the policies of the company.  There was also an extensive mixing of 
assets of the holding company and the subsidiary company.  
 
The court held that the holding company did not take the necessary care in the 
management of the subsidiary and that it held a terminally ill company artificially alive to 
the detriment of creditors when circumstances demanded that other actions should have 
been taken. Also the holding company ensured that through the transfer of assets and 
preferent claims which it obtained, it stood in a much more advantageous position than 
other creditors. The court then stated that if a holding company owns all the shares in a 
subsidiary company and provides credit to the subsidiary and thereafter transfers all the 
assets of the subsidiary, present and future, completely or nearly completely to the 
holding company as security which results in new creditors of the subsidiary practically 
no longer having any recourse against the subsidiary, there can be an unlawful act 
towards these creditors in circumstances where the holding company neglected to 
consider the interests of the new creditors. This will especially be the case if the holding 
company has such insight in and control over the policies of the subsidiary that it, in the 
light of the extent of its claim against the subsidiary, the transfer of the assets of the 
subsidiary as security and the nature of the business, knows or should have foreseen that 
new creditors would be prejudiced. The holding company therefore has to take care that 
creditors are protected.235 
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In the Nimox / Auditrade case,236 Nimox was the holding company of the wholly owned 
Auditrade. In 1983 Auditrade declared a dividend from its reserves which drastically 
reduced its liquidity. Instead of paying the dividend in cash, the dividend was converted 
into a loan to Nimox which ceded its rights against Auditrade to Heller. During 1984 
Auditrade applied for a postponement or rescheduling of its debt repayments but soon 
found itself in liquidation. 
 
The court held that the resolution which passed the dividend and converted it into a loan 
was unlawful since it elevated the holding company’s position from being a shareholder 
to that of a creditor. The holding company, even when voting as (the only) shareholder of 
Auditrade should have known that the payment of the dividend would severely prejudice 
the position of the other creditors. The loss to the remaining creditors of Auditrade should 
therefore have been foreseen by the holding company. 
 
In the Albada Jelgersma237 case, Albada took up all the shares in Wijnalda Kuntz BV at 
some time during 1980. Inza was a creditor of Albada. Inza supplied milk products to 
Albada over a period of five months between September 1980 and February 1981 but 
received no payment. Albada issued a letter to suppliers, except Inza, in September 1980 
in which it notified suppliers of Wijnalda that it has taken Wijnalda over and that the 
liabilities of Wijnalda would be taken care of. The claim of Inza, however, was not 
satisfied and it claimed the outstanding amounts from Albada. 
 
The Hoge Raad held Albada liable for the losses of Inza because of the wrongful actions 
of Albada. The wrongfulness of Albada’s actions was partly due to the fact that Albada 
extensively broadcast its takeover of Wijnalda but even more due to Albada’s extensive 
involvement in the management and policies of Wijnalda. Albada therefore had to take 
measures to ensure that the creditors of Wijnalda would not be prejudiced. These 
measures could have included not buying any new supplies from suppliers or the 
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payment by Albada of the debts of Wijnalda. Having regard to the Osby case, it is 
submitted that Albada, as the holding company, would also have been sufficiently 
informed about the state of the subsidiary’s liquidity.238 
 
In the Coral239 case the facts were as follows. Forsythe was the wholly-owned subsidiary 
of Stalt. At some stage Coral and Forsythe entered into a charter party in terms of which 
Forsythe would transport oil from the United States of America to the United Kingdom. 
Forsythe failed to comply with its duties. Coral and Forsythe entered into a subsequent 
agreement in terms of which Forsythe would pay the charter fee, demurrage and 
cancellation fees. Forsythe paid the charter fee but failed to perform in respect of the 
cancellation fee or demurrage. The dispute in respect of the payment of the demurrage 
and cancellation fee was referred to arbitration where an award was made against 
Forsythe. Forsythe still failed to make payment in terms of the arbitration award. 
Forsythe, prior to the agreement with Coral for the payment of the demurrage, 
cancellation fees and charter fees, decided to terminate all its activities and sold all the 
shares it held in Forsythe International Cyprus Ltd, namely 100%,  to Stalt. This 
effectively meant that Coral had no effective recourse against Forsythe. The sale of the 
shares by Forsythe to Stalt effectively frustrated the claim of Coral against Forsythe. 
 
Coral alleged that Stalt acted wrongfully in a number of ways. The wrongful actions were 
in respect of actions of Forsyth which were at the behest of Stalt. The sale of the Forsythe 
International Cyprus Ltd shares severely prejudiced the possibilities of attaching property 
of Forsythe to comply with the later arbitration award. If the sale of these shares was in 
good faith it should have been at their true value and not at the value the shares were sold 
for. Coral further alleged that the proceeds of the assets of Forsythe, when it terminated 
its activities, should have been maintained to satisfy any award which could, or would, 
have been obtained by Coral in the arbitration proceedings against Forsythe. The 
proceeds of the Cyprus shares in particular were misappropriated. 
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From the facts of the case it was clear that Stalt was directly and actively involved in the 
management and affairs of Forsythe. The court held that the holding company and the 
subsidiary would have had access to the same information in respect of the financial 
position of Forsythe after the sale of the Forsythe Cyprus shares. The two companies 
should have been aware and should therefore have foreseen that the claim of Coral would 
or could remain unsatisfied if the other creditors were being paid.  The wrongfulness was 
therefore situated in this fact: the holding company and subsidiary company possessed 
the same knowledge and facts and from this could be deemed to have been one entity.240 
 
The last Dutch case to be discussed is Hurks / Hurks Bouwbedrijf Amsterdam BV 
(HBA).241 HBA was the wholly-owned subsidiary company of Bouwgroep Hurks BV. 
Mr Hurks was the only shareholder of Bouwgroep and initially also the sole director.  
Bouwgroep was responsible for the financial aspects of the business of HBA. HBA was 
also bound for the debts of co-subsidiaries and the holding company in terms of an 
agreement with a bank. HBA found itself in a precarious financial position but still 
encumbered some of its assets in favour of a bank and transferred funds to Bouwgroep. 
The creditors of HBA alleged that Hurks and Bouwgroep acted wrongfully from the date 
on which HBA found itself in a precarious financial position. It was submitted by the 
creditors that the holding company and Hurks should have taken positive steps vis-à-vis 
the creditors of HBA, by HBA not incurring new debts and warning the creditors of HBA 
of the precarious financial position of HBA. 
 
The Hoge Raad focused on the internal structure of the two companies and that HBA was 
relatively free to conduct its own business. The Hoge Raad recognised that the holding 
company did not have the legal power, in terms of the articles of association of the 
subsidiary company, to give binding instructions in respect of the management or 
conduct of the business of HBA. The court then, startlingly, stated that the lack of legal 
power did not mean that the holding company, as sole shareholder of HBA, did not have 
the de facto power to give instructions to the subsidiary company which it had to follow 
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and implement. A legal duty therefore rested on the holding company to warn the 
creditors of the subsidiary of the precarious financial position of the subsidiary company. 
This decision rests purely on the factual power which the holding company had. 
 
It would appear that, in all the above mentioned Dutch cases, the interference of the 
holding company in the affairs of the subsidiary weighed heavily on the minds of the 
judges of the Hoge Raad in holding the respective holding companies liable. The 
exception was the Bouwgroep/HBA case where a positive duty to act was implied even 
where the holding company did not interfere in the management of the subsidiary 
company. The other cases discussed above dealt with the ostensible creditworthiness of a 
subsidiary which caused a creditor to enter into agreements with the subsidiary or the 
withdrawal of capital by means of dividends which could be prejudicial to the long or 
medium-term stability of the subsidiary.  
 
Olaerts argues that the distinction between lawful and wrongful withdrawal of funds by 
the holding company is a very thin and tenuous one.242 Due to the nature of the 
relationship between the holding company and the subsidiary the holding company is 
ultimately an investor in the subsidiary company and entitled to have dividends paid out 
if, and when, there is compliance with the necessary rules and regulations.  
 
The other cases mainly dealt with circumstances where the holding company was actively 
involved in the management of the subsidiary or also a creditor. In this situation the 
courts either held that the holding company should probably have subordinated its claims 
against the subsidiary to those of the other creditors, or that there was a duty to warn the 
creditors of the subsidiary of its financial position. 
 
When one evaluates the Dutch cases it is doubtful whether they can be applied directly in 
South Africa. The main reason for this is that it is not entirely clear what the basis of the 
liability is. Prima facie the Dutch term “onrechtmatige daad” could imply that one is 
dealing with a delictual claim. However, when one delves beneath the surface it does not 
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appear that these cases were decided on a delictual basis but more on a hybrid of what, in 
terms of our law, would be the piercing of the corporate veil doctrine and the law of 
delict. That does, however, not imply that the South African legal system could then 
summarily dismiss the possibility of a delictual claim against the holding company in 
justifiable circumstances where the actions of the holding company were wrongful vis-à-
vis a creditor of the subsidiary company, particularly in a situation where the subsidiary is 
in a precarious financial position. As discussed above, however, the problematic 
evidentiary aspects would be the question of wrongfulness and the need to establish a 
duty of care on the holding company vis-à-vis the creditors of its subsidiary company.243  
 
7.7 Letters of comfort 
The effect of a letter of comfort by a holding company which induces a party to enter into 
an agreement with the former’s subsidiary could be especially relevant, not only in the 
context of a contractual claim but also in the context of the law of delict. Prima facie one 
would assume that a letter of comfort creates an impression of creditworthiness of the 
subsidiary and that the holding company gives comfort to a potential creditor of a 
subsidiary that the subsidiary will be able to perform. The English courts and the courts 
of certain other common-law jurisdictions have, however, adopted a different approach to 
letters of comfort. Typically a letter of comfort is issued by a holding company in which 
it confirms that it is “its policy that its subsidiaries are at all times able to meet their 
liabilities […] but is usually designed to provide no more than moral re-assurance.”244 
According to Goode a letter of comfort will typically be issued where the holding 
company refuses to provide a guarantee or stand surety for the liabilities of the subsidiary 
company.245 
 
In Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Malaysia Mining Corporation Berhad246 Malaysia Mining 
incorporated a wholly owned subsidiary, MMC Metals Ltd, with a start up capital of £1,5 
million, which was insufficient to trade on the London Metal Exchange. MMC Metals 
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sought to obtain funds from Kleinwort Benson, a merchant bank. Kleinwort Benson 
needed some form of assurance from Malaysia Mining, the holding company of MMC 
Metals, that MMC Metals would repay the loan amount. Malaysia Mining issued a letter 
of comfort as part of an acceptance of a credit/multi-currency cash loan facility which 
Kleinwort Benson granted to MMC Metals to a maximum of £5 million. The letter of 
comfort included the statement that it was the policy of Malaysia Mining to ensure that 
the business of MMC Metals was at all times in a position to meet its obligations to 
Kleinwort Benson in terms of the cash loan facility. The cash loan facility was later 
increased to a maximum of £10 million in reliance upon a second letter of comfort from 
Malaysia Mining which was couched in substantially identical terms to the first letter of 
comfort. MMC Metals defaulted on its obligations, was liquidated and Malaysia Mining 
refused to perform the outstanding obligations of MMC Metals towards Kleinwort 
Benson. Kleinwort Benson subsequently sought to obtain judgment for damages against 
Malaysia Mining and based its claim on the statement in the letter of comfort referred to 
above. The court a quo247 granted judgment in favour of Kleinwort Benson.  
 
The thrust of the appeal of Malaysia Mining was that it did not enter into any contractual 
obligations to Kleinwort Benson. The court of first instance considered a number of 
authorities248 and accepted the following principles: 
“(i) An agreement, even though it is supported by consideration, is not binding as a contract if 
it was made without any intention of creating legal relations. 
(ii) In the case of an ordinary commercial transaction it is normally not necessary to prove 
that the parties in fact intended to create legal relations: the onus of proving that there 
was no such intention ‘is on the party who asserts that no legal effect was intended, and 
the onus is a heavy one:’ per Megaw J in Edwards v Skyways Ltd [1964] 1 W.L.R 349, 
355. 
(iii) To decide whether legal effect was intended, the courts normally apply an objective test; 
for example, where the sale of a house is not ‘subject to contract,’ either party is likely to 
be bound even though he subjectively believed that he would not be bound until the usual 
exchange of contracts had taken place. 
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(iii) The court will, in deciding that question, attach weight (a) to the importance of the 
agreement of the parties, and (b) to the fact that one of them has acted in reliance upon it. 
(iv) In the search for agreed terms of a commercial transaction, businessmen may adopt 
language of deliberate equivocation in the hope that all will go well. It may, therefore, be 
artificial to try to ascertain the common intention of the parties as to the legal effect of 
such a claim if in fact their common intention was that the claim should have such effect 
as a judge or arbitrator should decide: see Staughton J in Chemco Leasing S.p.A v 
Rediffusion Plc, on 19 July 1985, cited by Hirst J [1988] 1 W.L.R 799, 806G. 
Nevertheless, the court’s task is to ascertain what common intentions should be ascribed 
to the parties from the terms of the documents and the surrounding circumstances.”249 
 
The court of first instance followed the principles as set out above and came to the 
conclusion that Malaysia Mining could not prove that the parties did not intend that the 
relevant paragraph in the letter of comfort would have effect as a contractual term. The 
judge in the court of first instance held that it was clear that there was an undertaking on 
the side of Malaysia Mining that it was its policy to ensure that MMC Metals was in a 
position to meet its liabilities towards Kleinwort Benson in terms of the cash loan facility. 
 
The Court of Appeal held that Malaysian Mining made a statement as to what their policy 
was, and did not in the relevant paragraph of the two letters of comfort expressly promise 
that the policy, in respect of ensuring that its subsidiary would comply with its 
obligations, would be continued in future. The Court of Appeal held that the words in 
question were a statement in respect of the present fact and not a promise of future 
conduct. Furthermore the Court of Appeal held that the concept of a letter of comfort was 
known to the parties in their negotiations, especially after Malaysia Mining refused to 
assume joint and several liability and also refused to give a guarantee for the obligations 
of MMC Metals. The intention was therefore clearly that Malaysia Mining would give 
moral comfort for the obligations of its subsidiary and not undertake any legal liability 
for those obligations towards Kleinwort Benson. Since the preceding paragraph expressly 
mentioned that Malaysia Mining would not reduce its financial interest in Metals without 
the consent of Kleinwort Benson, the Court of Appeal held that this constituted a legally 
binding undertaking by the holding company. The holding company admitted, in any 
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event, that the preceding paragraph to the paragraph in question was meant to be a legally 
binding undertaking. The Court of Appeal held that the paragraphs preceding the 
offending paragraph would have been superfluous if the intention of the parties was to 
create a legally binding undertaking in the offending paragraph. 
 
The factual circumstances under which the letters of comfort were given were also very 
relevant. The holding company refused to be bound jointly and severally as co-principal 
debtor and declined to issue a guarantee that the subsidiary would comply with its 
obligations. The intention was merely to confirm that the policy of the holding company 
was to ensure that the obligations would be met but nothing prevented from changing that 
policy if circumstances changed in the future. 
 
In Bouygues SA & Another v Shanghai Links Executive Community Ltd250 the Hong Kong 
court confirmed the principles as set out by the Court of Appeal in the Kleinwort Benson 
case. It held that the test was whether the written statements by a party amounted to 
simple statements of fact or whether they were contractual promises of future conduct. 
The court further held that: 
“The letter of comfort was a tool of commerce developed to provide an alternative to a guarantee 
or surety. The writer was normally a parent company unwilling to give security for its subsidiary's 
liabilities. Thus, letters of comfort were issued when the parent company did not want to incur 
legal liability, it wished to protect its own credit rating or it wanted to avoid showing a contingent 
liability on its balance sheet.”251 
 
The court held further that: 
“The question was whether the letters contained simply statements of fact regarding the parent 
company's current policy or whether they amounted to contractual promises as to the parent 
company's future conduct. If the former, the letter is a letter of comfort with no legal effect. If the 
latter, the promise it contains is enforceable (provided that the other elements of enforceability are 
satisfied, such as consideration). If the letter contains express words of promise, no difficulty 
arises […] since the issue is ultimately one of construction, the absence of express words of 
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promise means that it is necessary to consider carefully the context in which the letters were 
written.”252 
 
So-called letters of awareness can, in principle, be described with regards to their legal 
effect in similar terms to a letter of comfort. This boils down to a notice from the issuer 
that it is aware of the fact that a lender of money has made an offer to make a loan facility 
available to a prospective borrower.253 In Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation 
Ltd v Jurong Engineering Ltd254 the Singapore High Court had to decide on the legally 
binding status of a letter of awareness. The plaintiff instituted an action for damages in 
the amount of approximately $9 million against the defendants. Huge Corporation Pte 
(Ltd) was an associate company of the first defendant for a period of time, then became a 
subsidiary company of the first defendant for a period of two years and then became an 
associate company again. When Huge was wound up it owed money to the plaintiff in 
terms of the credit facilities which the plaintiff had granted to it.  
 
The facts in casu were fairly similar to the letters of comfort cases discussed above. The 
plaintiff wanted to lend money to Huge. The first defendant refused to give a guarantee as 
security for any loans to Huge but instead was willing to give a letter of awareness. The 
plaintiff drafted the letter. In one of the paragraphs of the draft letter the word 
“undertake” was replaced with the word “ensure” by the first defendant, to which the 
plaintiff did not object. Two further letters of awareness were issued by the first 
defendant in substantially similar terms as the first one. In the next two, however, the 
word “undertake” was not replaced by the word “ensure”. Huge started encountering 
financial difficulties and was eventually wound up. The plaintiff based their claim against 
the first defendant on the breach of the third letter of awareness. 
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The court in casu dismissed the plaintiff’s claim, since no legal obligations were 
undertaken by the first defendant.255 The court held that it must look at the substance of 
the agreement and not just at the terminology used by the parties.256 The court must, 
furthermore, look at the surrounding circumstances and the text of the letter of awareness 
to determine the intentions of the respective parties to the agreement.257 
 
The question that needs to be addressed is whether the courts are correct in respect of 
their approach to letters of comfort and letters of awareness. These letters, as the two 
cases discussed above show, are substantially standard-form documents which seem to 
serve no purpose, whatsoever.258 Ultimately they will always lead to disagreement; the 
recipient of the letters or the lender, inevitably, will always allege that it was its intention 
that the letter of comfort or awareness was meant to be a legally binding document when 
the borrower defaults on its obligations. The grantor of the letters, usually the holding 
company of the borrower, will always deny that it was its intention to incur any legal 
obligations vis-à-vis the lender. Since the wording is in general very similar, if not the 
same, in most letters of comfort the question arises why the lender would proceed with 
the loans if it is, or should be, aware of the fact that the letters serve no practical function. 
Are they merely naïve in believing that the holding company or grantor of the letter of 
comfort/awareness will either as a matter of good faith, or to rescue its investment in the 
subsidiary borrower, perform the obligations which the subsidiary is not capable of, or do 
the lenders genuinely believe that there may exist some form of legal recourse against the 
holding company? 
 
Given the fact that these letters are mainly issued by holding companies in respect of 
loans of their subsidiaries from banks, one would expect a level of sophistication on the 
side of both borrower and lender with the concomitant access to legal advice. Also, the 
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lender bank would, or should in most cases, be in a stronger bargaining position than the 
lender. If this is so, why would banks be satisfied with a legally non-binding letter of 
comfort when they have the bargaining power to insist on security from the holding 
company? Could it conceivably not be possible that the banks or any recipient of a letter 
of comfort or awareness believes that this is some form of security? Even if this is so, the 
courts have held that they will look objectively at whether there was an intention to create 
legally binding agreements or not; i.e. the officious bystander test. But if this is the case, 
and if most, or all, letters of comfort are similarly worded, a letter of comfort will 
virtually never be interpreted as having been intended to create legally enforceable 
obligations between the parties to the letter of comfort. When banks deal with large 
multi-national companies it could be argued that the borrower has more negotiating 
power, due to its size, to take its business somewhere else, which forces banks to extend 
loans without obtaining any proper security and having to settle for a letter of comfort. 
 
If these letters of comfort or awareness do not constitute legally enforceable obligations 
between the lender and the holding company, could they in any manner be used in a 
delictual action for pure economic loss which the lender has suffered? The elements of a 
delict will have to be proved for the claim to be successful. There clearly was an act in 
the form of an issue of a letter of awareness or comfort, there was causation in that the 
lender will allege that the letter caused him to enter into a legally binding agreement with 
the subsidiary company but which transpired to be a worthless piece of paper which 
caused him loss since he is unable to recover his losses contractually and there are clearly 
damages. It is submitted that the two difficult elements will be fault and wrongfulness.259 
Fault was arguably present on the side of the holding company through negligently 
creating the impression that it would stand in for the obligations of the subsidiary 
company to the lender of the funds in terms of a loan agreement. The problematic aspect, 
as with pure economic loss,260 is the question of wrongfulness. To answer this, again it 
must be asked whether the holding company owed a duty of care to the lender of money 
to its subsidiary.  
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Since there is no legally binding contract between the parties to the letters of comfort in 
respect of the payment of the loan by the holding company, a duty of care could more 
easily be implied, especially where the holding company is intimately involved in the 
management and policies of the subsidiary company.261 The holding company is privy to 
the financial position of the subsidiary and should be aware at a very early stage that the 
subsidiary company is in financial difficulties. The Dutch cases, which were referred to 
earlier,262 could provide useful guidance here. An ongoing duty to disclose the financial 
position of the subsidiary company could be placed on the holding company, not only 
due to the fact that it has financial information in respect of the subsidiary which is not 
readily available, but also because some form of close, but non-contractual, relationship 
exists between the lender and the holding company. This is not just a tenuous link which 
exists between the parties but a strong one which probably had been nurtured over time 
by means of protracted negotiations. The usual reluctance of the courts to imply a duty of 
care due to the possible proliferation of actions against the holding company would also 
not be of relevance here since the relationship is strictly between the lender and the 
holding company and is not concerned with liability to an indeterminable number of 
faceless potential claimants.  
 
When one considers the South African cases which dealt with pure economic loss and 
then specifically the Holtzhausen263 case, the previously quoted passage264 would appear 
to be apt in the context of letters of comfort and letters of awareness. Since there is no 
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contract between the holding company and the bank or recipient of the letter of awareness 
or letter of comfort, the problematic aspect of a delictual claim based on contract which 
the South African courts have been battling with should not then enter the discussion.265 
If the status of a letter of comfort and letter of awareness imposes merely moral 
obligations it still cannot be denied that some form of unique relationship comes into 
existence between the holding company and the recipient or holder of the letter of 
comfort or awareness. It is questionable whether this relationship is purely moral in its 
nature. It is submitted that the relationship between the holding company and the 
recipient or holder of the letter of awareness or comfort is at best a quasi contractual one 
or at least a sui generis one. It is further submitted, irrespective of the name of the 
relationship between the respective parties, that due to this relationship, which has come 
into existence between the holding company and the recipient of the relevant letter of 
comfort or awareness, a duty of care has arisen towards the recipient of that letter.   
 
What would the content of this duty be, or put differently, what would constitute 
wrongful behaviour which would lead to the duty of care being breached? Should the 
wrongful act be the failure of the holding company to pay the debts of the subsidiary 
which then causes the holder of the letter of comfort or awareness loss, or should it be 
restricted to a situation where there was a duty on the holding company to inform the 
recipient of the letter of comfort or awareness of the precarious position of the subsidiary 
to enable that party to mitigate its losses by, for example, halting the provision of credit 
to the subsidiary? It is submitted that, at the very least, there rests a positive duty on the 
holding company, under these circumstances, to inform the holder of the letter of comfort 
or awareness of the financial position of the subsidiary. From the moment that the 
holding company realises that there is a risk that the subsidiary company may not be 
capable of performing its obligations and unless and until this danger is removed the 
holding company moves from being negligent to being possibly reckless. 
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In Philotex (Pty) Ltd v Snyman266 the court held that if the directors are of the opinion 
that there is a risk that a company may not repay its debts and it incurs new debts, they 
could be found to have acted negligently. The position would be no different here where 
the holding company is aware that the subsidiary company is in financial trouble and that 
there is a (real) risk that it will not be capable of repaying any existing debt, let alone new 
debt. The silence of the holding company, namely not informing the holder of the letter 
of the impending financial difficulties of the subsidiary could be considered to be 
negligent.  
 
The courts267 have held that the moral obligation that the holding company undertakes is 
in respect of its current policy in respect of the solvency of the subsidiary and that it 
ensures that the subsidiary will perform its obligations. But what is this “current policy”? 
Is it the policy for one financial year, or for two, or just until the subsidiary becomes a 
business liability? If the policy is only for one year, should there then not be a duty on the 
holding company to inform the holder of the letter of comfort or awareness that the 
policy of the company vis-à-vis its subsidiary has changed? Surely the holder of the letter 
of comfort will be under the (mistaken) belief that until it is notified to the contrary, the 
policy of the holding company is still as set out in the letter of comfort. Any debts 
therefore incurred after a change of policy or after the moment the holding company 
realises the risk of non-payment of debts, should be considered to be incurred through its 
negligence. 
 
It should then be asked whether it would be against public policy to impose or imply a 
duty of care on the holding company towards the holder of the letter of comfort or 
awareness. There can be no convincing public policy argument against delictual liability. 
First of all there is not an indeterminate class of potential plaintiffs who may attempt to 
hold the holding company liable. The only plaintiff it had a duty of care towards was the 
holder of the letter of comfort or awareness. Furthermore, the duty of care is based on, or 
founded by, the existing relationship between the parties where the holder of the letter of 
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comfort relies strongly on the good faith of the holding company in the absence of 
securities for the debts of the subsidiary. The holding company is, or should reasonably 
be, aware of this reliance. The duty of care does therefore not arise casually but because 
of the prior or existing relationship between the holding company and the holder of the 
letter of comfort or awareness. The content of the duty is also not onerous on the holding 
company. It merely has to inform the holder of the letter of comfort or awareness that its 
policy towards the subsidiary has changed or that the subsidiary company is finding itself 
in financial difficulties. The holder of the letter of comfort or awareness can then take 
steps to either prevent, or at least mitigate, its losses. This position would tie in perfectly 
with the Dutch principles discussed earlier.268  
 
It was shown earlier that holding companies in Dutch law could be held liable for the 
debts of the subsidiary based on the wrongful actions of the holding companies. It was 
shown, however, that the liability does not appear to be strictly delictual but more of a 
disguised piercing of the corporate veil. However, some useful pointers have come out of 
the discussed cases.269 The most important one is where the holding company is actively 
involved in the management and policies of the subsidiary company without necessarily 
having the same directors of its own board on the board of the subsidiary company. In 
these cases the holding company is aware, or at the very least should be aware, of the 
damages which a creditor bank will incur should the subsidiary company incur any 
further debts where the financial position of the subsidiary is precarious. A reasonable 
person would under these circumstances foresee that a creditor may suffer loss and would 
refrain from incurring further liabilities. Under these circumstances there should be no 
policy considerations to impede a successful action by a creditor bank against a holding 
company which has issued a letter of comfort or awareness and has not subsequently 
warned the bank that it has changed its policy towards the subsidiary company or that the 
subsidiary company is hovering precariously on the precipice of bankruptcy. A strong 
argument could be made out that the directors of the subsidiary company, the holding 
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company itself and the directors of the holding company should under these specific facts 
be held jointly and severally liable for the loss of the creditor bank. 
 
7.8 Alternative basis for liability of the holding company  
In chapters one and six reference was made to abuses which Muscat identified within 
groups of companies and which according to him justified changes to the law to address 
these problems or abuses.270 His recommendations will be discussed below and evaluated 
for their potential application in South Africa. 
 
7.8.1 The subservient company  
The subservient subsidiary company could equally well be called the submissive 
company. This is used to describe the situation where the subsidiary company has no 
independent will of its own but merely exists to serve its holding company or other 
companies within the group. According to Muscat the external creditors of a subservient 
company can be harmed in a number of ways. These include business opportunities 
which the holding company forces the subsidiary to waive in favour of another group 
member, internal asset transfers to the detriment of the subsidiary,271 the forced 
declaration of dividends by the subservient company to divert the profits to the holding 
company instead of re-investing them in the subsidiary company, the holding company 
forcing the subsidiary to extend loans to other group members and the commingling of 
assets.272 The effect on creditors is threefold. Firstly, the net asset value and profitability 
of the subsidiary is diminished which weakens the subsidiary financially. The diversion 
of corporate opportunities reduces the likelihood of the subsidiary expanding its business 
and becoming self-sufficient, which exposes it to potential insolvency in the medium to 
long term. Secondly, the treatment by the holding company of the subsidiary in these 
circumstances constitutes an abuse of the privilege of incorporation273 by the holding 
company and makes a mockery of the supposed separate juristic personality of the two 
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entities. Thirdly, for the holding company to deprive the subsidiary of the means to 
survive and then abandon it when it becomes insolvent is “repugnant to one’s sense of 
justice and fair play”.274 A further problem of the concept of the subservient company is 
that the waiver of business opportunities and declarations of dividends are not per se 
unjustified and abusive. The problem with the law as it stands is that it looks at specific 
behaviour by the holding company instead of at the global picture of how the holding 
company treats the subsidiary. 
 
Muscat is of the opinion that the available remedies in English law are not sufficient to 
alleviate the problem, since these all focus on individual circumstances of abuse instead 
of on the holistic picture.275 He proposes that the holding company should be held liable 
“for the debts of its insolvent subservient subsidiaries to such an extent as may be 
determined by the court”.276 Subservience is then defined in vague terms as “intrusive 
domination”, “act[ing] to its own detriment and in the interests of the holding company or 
some other unit within the corporate group” at the behest of the holding company.277 The 
subservience, however, also has to be continuous to attract liability for the holding 
company, a court should look at the global picture of how the holding company treats the 
subsidiary and not focus on individual transactions, and the holding company should only 
be held liable in cases of insolvency. The liability which is imposed should be by way of 
a contributory order and should vest in the liquidator and should not be an independent 
cause of action for the creditors of the subsidiary company. The remedy should be 
available to voluntary and involuntary creditors and should supplement existing 
remedies.278 
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7.8.2 The undercapitalised subsidiary company 
The next form of abuse by the holding company which Muscat argues should be punished 
by the imposition of liability is where the subsidiary company is undercapitalised.279 
However, he accepts firstly that to define capital in this context is a difficult task and then 
secondly there is the need to define what would constitute inadequate capital. The easy 
scenario is where the investment by the holding company is hopelessly insufficient to let 
the subsidiary enjoy an independent self-sustainable existence and condemns it to 
eventually fail.280 Muscat argues that limited liability should have a price, namely that a 
company should initially be adequately capitalised, i.e. at incorporation, for the right to 
enjoy limited liability.281 He himself raises a number of questions in respect of adequate 
financing of a subsidiary company. The questions are: firstly what would constitute 
adequate capitalisation; secondly whether the financing should only be investment capital 
or may debt also constitute financing and if so whether there should be a specified debt-
equity ratio; thirdly should there be a difference between initial inadequate financing and 
inadequate financing which arises later in the life of the subsidiary company; fourthly 
whether there should be a causal connection between the inadequate initial financing and 
the insolvency and finally the extent of the liability, namely should the holding company 
be held liable for all the debts of the insolvent subsidiary or only for the difference 
between the inadequate capital and what it should have provided to the subsidiary.282 A 
further problem is that of the holding company providing loans to the subsidiary: the 
status of these loans on insolvency of the subsidiary must be addressed as well. Not only 
ordinary loans are problematic but also secured loans, where the subsidiary company 
owns no assets but leases all its equipment from the holding company and lastly where 
the holding company “milks” the subsidiary of all its profits.283 
 
Muscat again argues that the current English law is inadequate to address the problem284 
and proposes that the holding company should be forced to provide sufficient funding for 
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the business needs of the subsidiary company at its incorporation. This funding can be a 
blend of equity and debt, a reasonable portion of the funding should be treated as risk 
capital. This risk capital of the holding company, to the extent that it does not consist of 
equity, should be a subordinated claim at the insolvency of the subsidiary company, and 
the holding company should be held liable for the debts of its insolvent subsidiary if it 
inadequately financed the subsidiary.285 
 
Muscat accepts that the most challenging aspect of his proposal is the determination of 
what adequate financing will be and how should the holding company determine which 
portion of the funding should be risk financing.286 He argues that it is relative easy to 
determine the level of start-up capital which is needed since an incorporator would 
usually look at factors like the start-up capital required, the possible cash flow, the level 
of funding to ensure the generation of income and the debts which the company may 
face.287 
 
The difference between risk capital and loans can be determined by various factors which 
overlap with the proposals by the Cork Committee.288 These factors are the expectation of 
payment by the holding company, the debt-equity ratio, what the loans are used for, the 
name for the transaction between the two companies, the terms of the arrangement and 
the length of repayment, the proportion of equity advances made compared to loans made 
by the holding company, the history of the subsidiary in respect of the loans it has 
obtained and the income it has generated, the question whether parties dealing at arm’s 
length would have enetered into the loan agreement on the terms and the motives of the 
parties. The court should then weigh these factors in the light of the facts at hand.289 
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The remedy would only be available to deceived creditors290 and involuntary creditors 
since most creditors could have investigated the capital structure of the subsidiary. 
Muscat also raises the question whether the adequate capitalisation obligation should be 
continuous or not and accepts that there is no easy answer. Certainly sufficient initial 
capital should be provided to allow a chance of survival but if business adversity strikes, 
it cannot necessarily be expected of the holding company to increase its exposure. On the 
other hand, if the holding company forces the subsidiary into an expansion drive it should 
ensure that the subsidiary is continuously sufficiently capitalised.291 The extent of the 
obligation therefore depends upon the particular circumstances. 
 
There must furthermore be a causal connection between the undercapitalisation and the 
insolvency of the subsidiary company and its subsequent inability to pay its debts, 
otherwise it would lead to unfairness.292 The extent of the liability should be in the 
discretion of the court.293 
 
7.8.3 The integrated economic situation 
Muscat accepts that mere economic integration of the companies within the group is not 
sufficient to attract liability for the holding company. It should be remembered that 
companies within a group can be vertically or horizontally integrated. Muscat argues that 
the economic integration should be abusive before liability can be imposed on the 
holding company.294 He defines abusive economic integration as being “the unitary 
enterprise, for no functional reasons whatsoever, [...] artificially fragmented into several 
legal units with the sole aim of insulating the enterprise from potential claims”.295 
Although Muscat accepts that Adams v Cape Industries plc296 rejected the single 
economic approach of Lord Denning in the DHN Food Distributors Ltd v Tower 
Hamlets297 decision he refers to the fact that the court of appeal in the Adams v Cape plc 
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case recognised that the corporate veil will be ignored where a façade exists which 
conceals the true state of affairs. Muscat asks whether an abusive economic integration 
would be such a façade.298 He refers in this regard to the law of the United States and 
argues ultimately for legislative intervention without, however, providing a detailed 
proposal.299 He proposes that the holding company should be liable towards tort victims 
since they are not aware of the deception that the group is an integrated entity and the 
group liability should be to their advantage.300 Voluntary creditors can, however, only 
complain if they were deceived.301 
 
7.8.4 The group persona situation 
The last ground which Muscat argues should be addressed is where the group holds itself 
out as one entity. Often creditors and the public are confused as to the entity with which 
they are dealing in a group, on the assumption they know that the entity is part of a 
group.302 Muscat accepts that the mere fact that a group holds itself publicly out as one 
entity should not be sufficient for liability. Where, however, there is misrepresentation to 
the public or creditors, i.e. the individual companies within the group are portrayed as a 
single enterprise and creditors are misled, there should be liability for the holding 
company.303 Liability should here be in the form of substantive consolidation and to 
avoid unfairness substantive consolidation should be adapted where some creditors 
specifically relied on the credit of specific subsidiaries.304 He argues that delictual 
creditors should be able to rely on this ground even though they never relied on the group 
persona and although the existence of an abusive group persona is merely coincidental. 
Delictual creditors should benefit by receiving compensation but also “[as] a means of 
penalising the abuse and deterring such unconscionable conduct.”305 
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7.9 Evaluation 
It has been shown in this dissertation that the principle of limited liability is suspect when 
it involves a group of companies. It was shown in chapter two that the principle of 
limited liability was most likely adopted by the legislature to stimulate investment by 
natural persons without them having to fear liability should the business venture in which 
they invested, fail. It was also shown that a group of companies quite often forms a single 
economic unit but that despite this fact the judiciary does not, as a rule, accept this as a 
basis to impose liability on a holding company for the obligations of its subsidiary. In 
chapter five it was shown that the legislature in South Africa also treats a group of 
companies as one entity in some respects but not in other respects. 
 
The insolvency of a group member is one of the situations where the legislature has not 
adopted any specific provisions which creditors could use to hold the holding company 
liable for the debts of its insolvent subsidiary. Reference was made to the provisions of 
the 1973 Companies Act which may have provided relief to a creditor of an insolvent 
subsidiary, but with the advent of the new Companies Act this potential remedy appears 
to have been lost.306 With the exception of the principle of piercing the corporate veil 
there seems to be no remedy for the creditor of a subsidiary company other than using the 
principles of agency, which were not discussed in this dissertation since there has not 
been any successful reliance on these principles in South Africa. It was also shown in the 
Adams v Cape plc307 case that agency is very difficult to prove. In the light of the 
conservatism of the South African judiciary towards the piercing of the corporate veil this 
remedy also seems unlikely to succeed. There has been no case law in South Africa 
where the corporate veil has been pierced between a holding company and a subsidiary to 
hold the holding company liable for the debts of the insolvent subsidiary company. No 
case could even be found where this was attempted. Does this therefore mean that the law 
as it currently stands is insufficient to cover abuses which could take place upon the 
insolvency of the subsidiary company? 
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Despite the dubious historical foundations for applying the principle of limited liability to 
company groups, it is a given that the principle was adopted to cater particularly for the 
situation where the company, in which an investor has invested, fails and goes into 
insolvency. In such a case the investor would as a general rule not be liable for the debts 
of the insolvent company. The principle of limited liability is therefore there on the one 
hand to stimulate risk taking. However, as the court mentioned in the Philotex (Pty) Ltd v 
Snyman; Braitex (Pty) Ltd v Snyman308 the purpose of business is to take risks but that 
risk-taking must not be excessive.309  
 
Limited liability is a privilege and not an automatic right. It may therefore not be abused 
and if it is abused, the law provides some remedies in the form of the piercing the 
corporate veil, although this remedy is rarely granted by a court because of the strict 
requirements imposed in the interests of greater certainty in South Africa and England, 
especially.  
 
In the context of the insolvency of a subsidiary company and the possible liability of its 
holding company the issue surrounding liability of the holding company becomes more 
complex, especially due to the interests of the creditors of the holding company as well as 
the minority shareholders, if any.310 The position of minority shareholders will not be 
further considered for, as has already been shown, the interests of shareholders yield to 
the interests of creditors in cases of liquidation.311 Furthermore the minority shareholders 
of a holding company possibly had the opportunity to influence the conduct of the 
holding company vis-à-vis the subsidiary, and by extension the creditors of the subsidiary 
company. The creditors of the holding company are, however, exposed in those cases 
where they contracted with the holding company on the basis that the holding company is 
a separate entity and not due to its group membership. Where the holding company acts 
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recklessly, fraudulently or otherwise prejudicially towards the creditors of the subsidiary 
company, the creditors of the subsidiary company may want to hold the holding company 
liable for the debts of the insolvent subsidiary. This may however lead to a potential 
conflict of interests between the two sets of creditors. If the holding company is liable for 
the debts of the insolvent subsidiary, or has to make a contribution or there is a pooling of 
assets this will reduce the assets, which are exclusively available for the creditors of the 
holding company.312 Should any imposition of liability on the holding company 
specifically have to take into account the interests of the innocent creditors of the holding 
company or should the court be given a broad discretion based on fairness? The court in 
Chemical Bank New York Trust Company v Kheel said in this regard: 
“[E]quity is not helpless to reach a rough approximation of justice to some rather than deny any to 
all.”313 
 
It is clear from the cases mentioned in this chapter that the position of the creditors of the 
holding company is taken into consideration before an order is made in respect of liability 
for the debts of the insolvent subsidiary company. The only manner in which to 
determine which creditors deserve more protection is by means of policy considerations. 
But where does the balance between these policy considerations lie? Equally strong 
arguments could be made out in respect of the protection of each set of creditors, 
especially where all of them were innocent participants in the activities of the subsidiary 
and holding companies. Is there therefore a way to protect each set of creditors and 
simultaneously to satisfy their competing claims? 
 
On the assumption that changes to the law have to be made to impose liability on a 
holding company, the question arises as to what this proposal for change should contain. 
It is submitted that the most viable options are the provisions of the New Zealand 
Companies Act dealing with liability in groups, namely pooling orders and contribution 
orders,314 the substantive consolidation orders which the courts in the United States may 
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order,315 the provisions of the Australian Corporations Act dealing with holding company 
liability316 and an adapted version of section 424 of the 1973 Companies Act, in the light 
of the underlying principles of German law, which recognise the single economic unit 
constituted by a group of companies.  
 
The problems with the New Zealand and United States provisions have already been 
discussed although the courts in the Dalhoff and King Holdings and Owens Corning 
cases managed to restrict the application of liability for the holding company to prevent 
prejudice, especially for the creditors of the holding company. The possibilities of these 
two systems are therefore plausible options to consider, since they have not led to 
unrestricted liability for the holding company and its creditors have in general been well 
protected.  
 
The provisions of the Australian Corporations Act and an adapted section 424 provision 
prima facie seem less intrusive and therefore more protective of the interests of the 
creditors of the holding company. On further examination, however, it is clear that the 
potential for prejudice to the creditors of the holding company is just as real under these 
options as it is under the New Zealand and United States options. Holding the holding 
company liable for the debts of its insolvent subsidiary inevitably reduces the asset base 
of the holding company which creates the possibility that there may not be sufficient 
assets to satisfy the claims of the creditors of the holding company. 
 
There is one provision in South African law where the creditors of a non-insolvent debtor 
are prejudiced and potential preference is given to the creditors of the actual insolvent 
debtors. This provision is found in the Insolvency Act.317 The Insolvency Act provides 
that where two parties are married out of community of property and the estate of one 
spouse is sequestrated, the assets of the other party vest in the trustee of the insolvent 
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spouse, unless the solvent spouse can show that the assets are in fact the assets of that 
solvent spouse.318  
 
The purpose of this provision in the Insolvency Act in respect of the assets of the solvent 
spouse is to prevent collusion between spouses.319 In terms of the common law the trustee 
had no power to attach the property of the solvent spouse and he had to prove that there 
was a collusive disposition between the spouses for the purpose of defrauding the 
creditors of the insolvent spouse, where he suspected that the insolvent spouse transferred 
assets to the solvent spouse.320 The trustee of the estate of the insolvent spouse has to 
release certain property of the solvent spouse. This includes property which belonged to 
that spouse before marriage,321 property acquired under an ante-nuptial contract,322 
property which the solvent spouse acquired with valid title against the creditors of the 
insolvent spouse during the marriage323 and property which was obtained with the 
proceeds of the previously mentioned property.324 The solvent spouse bears the onus to 
prove that the property falls within the previously mentioned categories and should be 
released to him.325 
 
The most interesting effect of the provision in respect of the property of the solvent 
spouse is the one which determines the effect of that spouse’s failure to prove that certain 
assets are her property.326 Section 21(5) of the Insolvency Act provides that: 
“Subject to any order [releasing property] made under subsection (4) any property of the solvent 
spouse realized by the trustee shall bear a proportionate share of the costs of the sequestration as if 
it were property of the insolvent estate but the separate creditors for value of the solvent spouse 
having claims which could have been proved against the estate of that spouse if it had been the 
estate under sequestration, shall be entitled to prove their claims against the estate of the insolvent 
spouse in the same manner and, except as in this Act is otherwise provided, shall have the same 
rights and remedies and be subject to the same obligations as if they were creditors of the 
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insolvent estate; and the creditors who have so proved claims shall be entitled to share in the 
proceeds of the property so realized according to their legal priorities inter se and in priority to the 
separate creditors of the insolvent estate, but shall not be entitled to share in the separate assets of 
the insolvent estate.” 
 
This provision prima facie appears to be nonsensical. It in essence provides that if the 
solvent spouse cannot prove that assets belong to her, the trustee of the insolvent spouse 
may realise these assets. The proceeds of the assets are however for the satisfaction of the 
claims of the creditors of the solvent spouse. If the solvent spouse could not prove that 
the assets belong to her, why should her creditors then be paid from these assets?327 The 
provision still exists despite this contradiction. What it does however provide is a 
recognition that dispositions between related parties are realities and that they are very 
difficult to prove, which is detrimental to the creditors of an insolvent person. The 
shifting of the onus of proof to the solvent spouse to prove that the assets belong to her is 
an attempt to safeguard the interests of the creditors of the insolvent party, which relieves 
them from the burden of proving that there was a collusive disposition. 
 
There are therefore provisions in South African law, although inelegantly and 
contradictorily drafted, which attempt to reconcile the interests of the competing creditors 
of spouses. The question is whether this could be a workable solution in the context of a 
group of companies. As mentioned before the aim of section 21 of the Insolvency Act is 
to prevent collusive dealings between spouses and the difficulty facing creditors of the 
insolvent spouse to prove such collusive dealings. It is submitted that the same 
difficulties would not necessarily be present in the context of a company group. In the 
first place the subsidiary may be obviously undercapitalised and own very few assets 
which it can dispose of. Secondly profits would have been declared and paid to the 
shareholders. A paper trail of asset movement would make collusion more difficult to 
conceal in a group situation than between spouses. A rebuttable presumption or a 
provision shifting the onus of proof could however be helpful.328 
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Milo is of the opinion that any liability will have to be imposed by means of legislation 
on the holding company, since the piercing of the corporate veil doctrine, agency 
argument and partnership argument are too vague or uncertain.329 Milo suggests that any 
legislation should consider an appropriate adaptation of the German-law provisions 
although he does not suggest how this should be done.330 Milo does suggest that there 
should be a presumption that the holding company ignored or did not respect the separate 
identity of the subsidiary. This presumption rests on the basis that the principle of limited 
liability is not necessarily desirable and can therefore be ignored as a point of departure. 
If the holding company succeeds in discharging this presumption, the Salomon principle 
will apply.331 The justification for the presumption which Milo advocates corresponds to 
the arguments above,332 namely that limited liability is a historical accident in respect of 
company groups and that the economic justification of the principle is not necessarily 
convincing in respect of company groups.333 
 
It is submitted that Milo is correct to suggest that the provisions in the German law are 
theoretically sound and could serve as a guide to legislative reform regarding liability of 
holding companies in South Africa. However, it has been shown above that the practical 
implementation of the provisions of the German Aktiengesetz has caused difficulty. It has 
been shown that the problems regarding de facto groups are the difficulties to distinguish 
directives from the holding company to the subsidiary from the directives of the directors 
of the subsidiary itself, the business judgment rule available as a defence to the holding 
company and the calculation of the damages which flowed from the harmful directives of 
the holding company.334 The treatment of qualified factual groups, after the Tri-hotel 
decision,335 would appear to lean towards delictual liability which is close to the Dutch 
model of liability.336 
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To conclude this evaluation it appears that the best option for legislative reform is a 
proposal based on the New Zealand, and therefore the Australian law regarding pooling 
orders, and United States law but also including a provision similar to section 424 of the 
1973 Act. The provisions for reform must then however bear in mind the practical 
problems as well as the policy considerations in respect of the creditors of the holding 
company and ensure that liability does not result in an inequitable result where some 
creditors are disadvantaged. 
 
7.10 Proposal 
 It is submitted that an appropriate statutory provision could read as follows: 
“(1)(a) When it appears in a winding-up or otherwise that any business of a company was  carried 
on recklessly or with intent to defraud creditors of the company or creditors of any other person or 
for any fraudulent purpose, the Court may, on the application of the the liquidator any creditor or 
shareholder of the company, declare that a company which is or was a related  company of the 
company and which  knows or knew  that the company was carrying on its business in the manner 
aforesaid, shall be responsible, without any limitation of liability, for all or any of the debts or 
other liabilities of the company as the Court may direct. 

(b) To the extent that the Court so orders, upon the application of the liquidator, a creditor or a 
shareholder of the company being wound-up, and subject to such terms and conditions as the 
Court may impose, a company that is, or has been, related to the company being wound-up must 
pay to the liquidator the whole or part of any or all of the claims made in the winding-up subject to 
subsection (3); 
(c) Where two or more related companies are in winding-up proceedings, the winding-up in 
respect of each company must proceed together, subject to subsection (4) as if they were one 
company, to the extent that the Court so orders, upon the application of the liquidator, creditor or 
shareholder of any such company, and subject to such terms and conditions as the Court may 
impose. 
(2) The Court may make such other order or give such directions to facilitate giving effect to an 
order under subsection (1)(b) and (1)(c) as it thinks fit. 
(3) In deciding whether to make an order under subsection (1)(b), the Court must have regard to 
the following matters: 
(a) The extent to which the related company took part in the management of the company in 
liquidation; 
(b) The conduct of the related company towards the creditors of the company in liquidation; 
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(c) The extent to which the circumstances that gave rise to the liquidation of the company are 
attributable to the actions of the related company; 
(d) The interests of the creditors of the related party; 
(d) Such other matters as the Court thinks fit. 
(4) In deciding whether to make an order under subsection (1)(c), the Court must have regard to 
the following matters: 
(a) The extent to which any of the companies took part in the management of any of the other 
companies; 
(b) The conduct of any of the companies towards the creditors of any of the other companies; 
(c) The extent to which the circumstances that gave rise to the liquidation of any of the companies 
are attributable to the actions of any of the other companies; 
(d) The extent to which the businesses of the companies have been combined; 
(e) Such other matters as the Court thinks fit.” 
 
The proposal in subsection (1)(a) contains elements of section 424(1) of the 1973 Act, the 
Australian Corporations Act, the substantive consolidation powers of the United States’ 
courts as well as the spirit of the German Aktiengesetz. The spirit of the German 
legislation is reflected in the acknowledgement that a group of companies forms one 
entity in many cases, that abuse can take place and that the law should recognise this fact. 
The contribution and pooling provisions under subsection 1(b)-4 are based on the 
corresponding provisions of the New Zealand Act.337  
 
The proposal in aggregate provides for three forms of liability, namely full liability where 
there is reckless or fraudulent conduct and which liability is not restricted to winding-up 
proceedings but can also be instituted at any time, full or partial contributions where the 
conduct of the holding or other related company was not necessarily reckless or 
fraudulent but could still have been abusive or a disguised single entity and therefore a 
façade, and thirdly pooling orders where the companies in a group are in winding-up and 
certain abusive practices may have been present or the group was a façade for a single 
entity. 
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It is submitted that the provisions are not unduly onerous on holding companies or groups 
since there is no blanket liability. Furthermore the proposal is predictable since investors 
will be aware what is expected when they create groups and what the required conduct of 
the holding company must be, as well as the factors which would be most relevant to a 
court. In essence the principle of limited liability has been maintained despite the doubt 
which has been expressed about its historical applicability to groups as well as the less 
than convincing economic arguments in favour of limited liability, which have been 
shown to be more applicable to natural persons as investors and therefore shareholders.338  
 
There is also no rebuttable presumption as in the case of delictual liability. The reason for 
this is that, despite the historical accident of limited liability in respect of groups, 
recognition is given to the purpose of limited liability as being to prevent liability for 
investors, since one of the aims of the principle is to stimulate risk. Protection is, 
however, given to creditors by means of the provisions, which should punish excessive 
risk taking. The most extreme intrusion on limited liability is the possibility that the 
holding company may be held liable even if the subsidiary is not in liquidation. This 
corresponds with the section 424(1) of the 1973 Act and is therefore not entirely new. 
The evidentiary burden on a litigant will still be difficult. He will have to prove 
recklessness or fraud and then that the holding company knew about the conduct. The 
“party to” requirement has been removed to avoid the evidentiary burden which it could 
create.339 Knowledge of the holding company could be ascertained on the facts without 
having a presumption and the existing directing minds doctrine could be helpful.340 
Putting “independent” directors on the board of the subsidiary company who are not on 
the board of the holding company will not assist the holding company to avoid liability if 
it is shown that the independent directors are in fact not independent at all. The holding 
company will therefore have to show that the operations were at arms’ length to avoid 
liability. 
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 See paras 2.2.2, 2.3, 2.5 and 2.6 above. 
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 See para 7.2.2 above. 
340
 See para 7.2.2 and the cases cited there above. 
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The contribution and pooling provisions under subsection 1(b)-4 are aimed at achieving 
an equitable result for creditors, since the aim of winding-up is to bring about a fair 
distribution for creditors, in circumstances where one or more companies in the group 
conducted themselves in such a manner to the creditors which may have caused them to 
believe that they are dealing with one entity. Ultimately the court has a discretion 
whether to grant any of the orders and to issue supplementary directives where pooling 
orders are granted. The court will have to look at the interests of all creditors of all the 
entities within the group and also has the power to consider any other relevant factors, for 
example the interests of shareholders in the related entities. Where the court therefore is 
of the opinion that there may not have been recklessness or fraud but the conduct was 
unconscionable, gravely improper or wrongful, it has the power, on application, to 
employ the “lesser” remedies of pooling or contribution orders. 
 
In respect of the question of the claims which group members may have against an 
insolvent member the court has the power in terms of the voidable preference provisions 
of the Insolvency Act341 to deny claims in cases of collusion which would more than 
likely usually be present where payments were made close to liquidation. In respect of 
more bona fide claims the danger exists that the holding company undercapitalised the 
subsidiary company and funded it, virtually, by means of loans only. In this case 
subsection 2 should provide a wide enough power to convert such a loan into investment 
capital by considering the arguments of Muscat342 and the Cork Committee or 
subordinating such loans to below the concurrent creditors. 
 
7.11 Conclusion 
It has been shown that the doctrine of limited liability was not necessarily conceived for 
the group of companies situation and was probably more of a historical accident in that 
context. Also, once economic arguments are introduced, the doctrine seems to lack 
                                                           
341
 Ss 26, 29, 30 and 31 of Act 24 of 1936 and see para 7.2.1 above. 
342
 See para 7.8.2 and para 1964, 442 of the Cork Committee Report where the committee provides the following 
guidelines to determine whether funding by a holding company to its subsidiary constitutes a loan or as capital. 
Factors to be considered would be the original debt-equity ratio; the adequacy of the paid-up share capital; the 
absence of reasonable expectation of payment; the terms on which the advance was made and the length of time for 
which it has been outstanding; whether outsiders would make such advances; and the motives of the parties. 
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justification in respect of groups. This is even more so in cases of delictual liability as 
was shown above.343 Despite this and the fact that many groups form single economic 
units, the law still, as a rule, does not treat a group of companies as one entity.  
 
The South African law in various statutes, including the 1973 and the new Companies 
Acts, provides for groups in different ways without much consistency.344 Despite 
exceptions to limited liability, including the piercing of the corporate veil principle, the 
law still does not currently make adequate provision for abuse within groups due to the 
vagueness and uncertainty of the piercing of the corporate veil doctrine. Legislative 
reform is therefore necessary. The German Aktiengesetz is a legislative attempt which has 
partially succeeded although it has its problems and does not address all groups. It, 
however, recognises the realities of external relationships in the context of company 
groups. Other jurisdictions have begun addressing the external realities of company 
groups, most notably Australia and New Zealand in cases of insolvency law. In cases of 
delictual liability the law in South Africa, England and Australia still do not deal with 
abuse as flexibly as in the United States of America. The judiciary in the United States 
has also done significant work in addressing the external realities of groups although it 
still appears to be in a haphazard manner. There are therefore strong arguments for the 
South African legislature to implement reforms on the lines of the proposals suggested 
above. 
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